JAINARINE LALBACHAN VS. BOARD OF REVIEW (DEPARTMENT OF LABOR) ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4800-18T3
JAINARINE LALBACHAN,
Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF REVIEW,
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
and APIDEL TECHNOLOGIES,
LLC,
Respondents.
___________________________
Submitted December 1, 2020 – Decided January 14, 2021
Before Judges Fisher and Gilson.
On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of
Labor, Docket No. 169,511.
Jainarine Lalbachan, appellant pro se.
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent Board of Review, Department of Labor
(Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of
counsel; Achchana C. Ranasinghe, Deputy Attorney
General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Claimant Jainarine Lalbachan appeals from a final agency decision by the
Board of Review (Board), which determined that he was ineligible for
unemployment benefits because he left work voluntarily without good cause
attributable to such work. N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). We affirm.
Claimant worked as a compliance auditor and fiscal analyst for Apidel
Technologies, LLC (Apidel) from May 30, 2017 until October 16, 2018. After
he left employment, he applied for unemployment benefits. In December 2018,
the Deputy of the Division of Unemployment and Disability Insurance
interviewed claimant. Claimant explained that his rent had increased and he
could no longer afford to pay rent. He also told the Deputy that his parents had
asked him to move back to Florida. Moreover, claimant had previously told his
work supervisor that he was looking for another residence.
Accordingly, the Deputy found that claimant was disqualified from
receiving unemployment benefits because he left work voluntarily without good
cause attributable to such work. Claimant administratively appealed.
The Appellate Tribunal conducted three proceedings, during which
claimant testified. Before the ALJ, claimant asserted that he had left work
because of two incidents that made him feel "mentally abused." The alleged
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incidents involved comments made by employees of the State of New Jersey
Department of Community Affairs, one of the clients of claimant's employer.
Claimant also testified that after reporting the incidents, his employer informed
him he would be reassigned to a new client. Moreover, he testified that if his
rent had not been raised, he would have continued working at Apidel.
The Appellate Tribunal determined that claimant had left work because
he could not afford his rent and planned to move to Florida. The Tribunal found
claimant's inconsistent testimony about his reasons for leaving work to be "self -
serving in an attempt to receive unemployment benefits." In that regard, the
Tribunal found that claimant's employer was willing to move him to work with
a different client, but claimant left employment before that reassignment could
be effectuated. Finally, the Tribunal determined that claimant had to repay
$1,599 in benefits he received but was not entitled to keep. N.J.S.A 43:21-16(d).
The Board affirmed the Appellate Tribunal on the basis that the claimant
relocated out of "the area." The Board also noted certain minor errors in the
Tribunal's written opinion, but otherwise adopted that decision.
Claimant now appeals the Board's decision to us, contending that the
Board did not consider his claims of "discrimination and abuse," he had
established good cause for leaving work, and he should have been afforded
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another hearing and more time to obtain evidence from his employer. Given our
limited scope of review, we discern no basis to reverse the decision of the Board.
An agency's decision should not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown
to be arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J.
197, 210 (1997) (citing In re Warren, 117 N.J. 295, 296 (1989)). We "can
intervene only in those rare circumstances in which an agency action is clearly
inconsistent with its statutory mission or with other State policy." Ibid. (quoting
George Harms Constr. Co., Inc. v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 137 N.J. 8, 27 (1994)).
Furthermore, "'[i]n reviewing the factual findings made in an unemployment
compensation proceeding, the test is not whether an appellate court would come
to the same conclusion if the original determination was its to make, but rather
whether the factfinder could reasonably so conclude upon the proofs.'" Ibid.(alteration in original) (quoting Charatan v. Bd. of Review, 200 N.J. Super. 74,
79 (App. Div. 1985)). In sum, our scope of review is confined to determining
"whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on
which the agency based its action;" and whether the agency, "in applying the
legislative policies to the facts . . . clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that
could not reasonably have been made[.]" Id. at 211 (quoting George Harms
Constr., 137 N.J. at 27).
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The relevant statute provides that an individual shall be disqualified from
receiving benefits if "the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause
attributable to such work[.]" N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). "While the statute does not
define 'good cause,' . . . courts have construed the statute to mean 'cause
sufficient to justify an employee's voluntarily leaving the ranks of the employed
and joining the ranks of the unemployed.'" Domenico v. Bd. of Review, 192
N.J. Super. 284, 287 (App. Div. 1983) (citations omitted) (quoting Condo v. Bd.
of Review, 158 N.J. Super. 172, 174 (App. Div. 1978)).
The test for determining whether an employee's decision to leave work
constitutes "good cause" is one of "ordinary common sense and prudence[.]"
Brady, 152 N.J. at 214 (quoting Zielenski v. Bd. of Review, 85 N.J. Super. 46,
52 (App. Div. 1964)). The employee's decision to quit "must be compelled by
real, substantial and reasonable circumstances not imaginary, trifling and
whimsical ones." Ibid. (quoting Domenico, 192 N.J. Super. at 288). "A claimant
has the 'responsibility to do whatever is necessary and reasonable in order to
remain employed.'" Ibid. (citations omitted) (quoting Heulitt v. Bd. of Review,
300 N.J. Super. 407, 414 (App. Div. 1997)).
Applying these well-established standards, we discern no basis to disturb
the decision of the Board. Based on the testimony at the hearing, the Tribunal
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found that claimant had voluntarily quit and he had not been forced to leave. In
particular, the Tribunal noted claimant's inconsistent testimony concerning why
he left his employment. The Tribunal then found that claimant was not credible,
and the evidence established that claimant left work because he could not afford
the increase in his rent and he wanted to relocate to Florida. The Tribunal
rejected claimant's later claims that he was forced to leave work because of
abuse by a client. In that regard, the Tribunal noted that claimant admitted his
employer told him that he would be reassigned to work with a new client and
that he would not have left work except for the increase in his rent. The Board
accepted those findings and based its decision on the finding that claimant
resigned to relocate to Florida. Those findings are amply supported by the
substantial credible evidence in the record and there is nothing arbitrary,
capricious, or unreasonable about the Board's determination.
Affirmed.
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