IN THE MATTER OF JOSEPH CONNORS, CAMDEN COUNTY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (NEW JERSEY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION) ( 2021 )


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  •                              NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-2779-18
    IN THE MATTER OF JOSEPH
    CONNORS, CAMDEN COUNTY,
    DEPARTMENT OF
    CORRECTIONS.
    _____________________________
    Argued March 8, 2021 – Decided July 7, 2021
    Before Judges Gooden Brown and DeAlmeida.
    On appeal from the New Jersey Civil Service
    Commission, Docket No. 2016-912.
    Jacqueline M. Vigilante argued the cause for appellant
    Joseph Connors (The Vigilante Law Firm, PC,
    attorneys; Jacqueline M. Vigilante and Kelly A. Hicks,
    on the briefs).
    Howard L. Goldberg, First Assistant County Counsel,
    argued the cause for respondent Camden County
    Department of Corrections (Christopher A. Orlando,
    County Counsel, attorney; Howard L. Goldberg, on the
    brief).
    Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
    respondent New Jersey Civil Service Commission
    (Craig S. Keiser, Deputy Attorney General, on the
    statement in lieu of brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Appellant Joseph Connors appeals from the January 18, 2019 final agency
    decision of the Civil Service Commission (Commission) upholding his thirty-
    day suspension from his position as a corrections lieutenant with the Camden
    County Department of Corrections (CCDOC). We affirm.
    I.
    The following facts are derived from the record. On November 9, 2014,
    Connors was a lieutenant and acting shift commander at the Camden County
    Correctional Facility. He was responsible for the operations of the facility.
    Eight corrections officers were assigned to search cells with Sergeant James
    Pierce as their supervisor. After the search, several inmates reported that their
    personal photographs had been defaced, some with the handwritten word "Carr."
    This appears to be a reference to Corrections Officer Alfred Carr, who was not
    one of the officers who participated in the search of the cells.
    Corrections Officer King received some of the inmate complaints. He
    referred the complaints to Pierce, who interviewed the inmates and spoke with
    the officers who had participated in the search. Pierce informed Connors of the
    allegations. Pierce admitted that he failed to keep a log of which officers
    A-2779-18
    2
    searched which cells, contrary to established procedures. He also failed to ask
    the officers which cells they searched.
    Together Connors and Pierce spoke again to the inmates and collected the
    defaced photographs. Connors then interviewed the officers involved in the
    search as a group. He informed them of the seriousness of the complaints and
    asked them to come forward with information about who defaced the photos.
    Connors and Pierce subsequently spoke to each of the officers individually.
    Corrections Officer Jacob reported that he witnessed King write on the
    photographs. Connors then spoke with King, who denied any involvement in
    the incident.
    Connors instructed Pierce to prepare an incident report, directing him to
    make the report vague. After reviewing Pierce's report, Connors instructed him
    to submit it, along with the collected photographs, to the Internal Affairs (IA)
    mailbox.
    Connors was unaware whether IA received the incident report or
    conducted an investigation. Although he claimed that he asked Sergeant Jones,
    an IA investigator, about the report in the days following the incident, Jones
    testified that he did not remember having had that conversation with Connors.
    No investigation was undertaken by IA.
    A-2779-18
    3
    Carr learned of the incident on December 1, 2014, nearly a month after it
    took place. Fearing for his safety, he immediately submitted a report to IA about
    the incident. Jones testified that he did not receive Pierce's report until he
    received Carr's report. He obtained the original photographs from the warden.
    Jones interviewed the inmates, who reported that they had had no previous
    problems with Carr and doubted he was involved in defacing their property. On
    December 11, 2014, Jones interviewed Pierce and King. King denied any
    involvement in the incident.     He stated that shortly after the incident he
    approached Connors to discuss a conversation he had with Corrections Officer
    Bulzak, who he suspected was involved in defacing the photographs. According
    to King, Connors refused to discuss Bulzak, telling him the matter was out of
    his hands.1
    On December 19, 2014, Jones interviewed Jacob. He stated that although
    he saw King write on the photographs, he never gave that information to
    Connors.
    On December 30, 2014, Jones interviewed Connors. Prior to the start of
    the interview, Connors signed a witness acknowledgment form that provided
    1
    Bulzak denied involvement in the incident and was not charged.
    A-2779-18
    4
    notice that he was a witness in an IA investigation concerning a complaint by
    Carr. At the time of the interview, Connors was not a target of the investigation.
    Connors admitted that on the day of the incident, he interviewed the
    officers involved in the search, but did not write a report documenting the fact
    that the interviews took place or detailing the information he gathered. In
    addition, Connors told Jones he felt he could not act on Jacob's accusation
    against King. He explained that:
    I took it into consideration and then I made a point
    again to speak to Officer King in my office . . . . And
    he went on a long rant about . . . his future intentions
    with the department at the time . . . . And at the time
    Officer King had no discipline that I knew of . . . . So
    . . . I had one guy, Jacob, who is up for promotion who
    had a lengthy . . . disciplinary history saying he's seen
    someone do something. And then I have an officer with
    a stern (sic) clean record . . . telling me he had nothing
    to do with it . . . . So I had two different weighing
    options . . . .
    When asked why he did not prepare an initial incident report, Connors
    stated
    I didn't generate any reports because I didn't have any
    credible evidence. And I did not want to mislabel any
    officer, uh, for being, eh, juvenile or make their – their
    work atmosphere and the people they work with harder.
    Once you accuse someone until they have their day in
    court they're assumed guilty in – in a lot of people's
    eyes in the court of public opinion. And if you have to
    work with someone you think that is doing something
    A-2779-18
    5
    improper and we put the reports out there and everyone
    gets copies then no one's [going to want to] work with
    that individual.
    Connors also admitted that Pierce's report was
    vague intentionally because I didn't want to . . .
    automatically be branded with this title of, uh, rat or –
    a juvenile or – or a danger. [A]t the time all I had was
    hearsay. So the report was intentionally vague with the
    assumption that when I reported to work on my
    assigned day I would be interviewed first being[] that I
    was the Shift Commander of the jail for that incident.
    After his interview, and almost two months after the incident, Connors
    filed a report that stated that "more than one officer had been lying" and that
    "more than one person had committed the act."
    Based on the information gathered at the interviews, Jones determined that
    Connors had violated his duties by failing to conduct an appropriate
    investigation and to document the investigation he did undertake.          Jones
    determined that Connors should have: (1) had Jacobs write a report detailing
    what he claimed to have seen; (2) detailed his investigation in a written report;
    and (3) recommended disciplinary action be taken against King based on the
    information he received. As a result of the findings he set forth in a written
    report, Jones filed a complaint recommending Connors be disciplined.
    A-2779-18
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    On February 5, 2015, CCDOC filed a preliminary notice of disciplinary
    action against Connors seeking a thirty-day suspension based on the following
    charges: conduct unbecoming a public employee, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(6);
    neglect of duty, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(7); and other sufficient cause, N.J.A.C.
    4A:2-2.3(a)(12), specifically, violations of CCDOC's rules of conduct and
    general orders. After a departmental hearing, all charges were sustained, and
    CCDOC served Connors with a final notice of disciplinary action suspending
    him for thirty days.
    Connors appealed his suspension to the Commission, which transmitted
    the matter to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL).        After a hearing,
    Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Elia A. Pelios issued an initial decision
    sustaining the charges. ALJ Pelios found, based on a preponderance of the
    evidence, that on the day of the incident Pierce made Connors aware of the
    inmates' complaints that their property had been defaced during the cell
    searches. In addition, the ALJ found that Jacob told Connors that he witnessed
    King defacing inmate property. The ALJ found that Connors failed to: (1)
    document the incident and Jacob's allegation; (2) complete the investigation;
    and (3) recommend disciplinary charges against King.
    A-2779-18
    7
    The ALJ found that CCDOC had established each of the charges alleged.
    The ALJ found that Connors's conduct was unbecoming a public employee
    because he failed to initiate an appropriate investigation after receiving a report
    of serious misconduct by a subordinate. That failure, the ALJ concluded, could
    have an effect on the chain of command in the corrections facility, as employees
    may be chilled in coming forward with allegations of wrongdoing if they believe
    their reports of misconduct by coworkers will not be taken seriously.
    In addition, the ALJ found that Connors neglected his duties because he
    violated established CCDOC rules requiring a supervisor to conduct proper,
    thorough, and complete investigations when circumstances so indicate, to
    submit reports detailing those investigations, and to ensure that reports written
    by subordinates do not provide false, improper, or incomplete information. This
    finding included the ALJ's determination that Connors violated General Order
    169, concerning the mandatory reporting of unusual incidents in the facility.
    Finally, the ALJ found that CCDOC had established other sufficient cause
    to discipline Connors, based on his violation of several facility rules specified
    in the disciplinary charges concerning supervision, neglect of duty,
    investigations, reports, and unbecoming conduct. The ALJ found that CCDOC
    A-2779-18
    8
    had failed to establish Connors violated a CCDOC standing order concerning IA
    procedures.
    ALJ Pelios upheld the thirty-day suspension. The ALJ found Connors's
    disciplinary history to be "not particularly noteworthy," although he declined to
    find it "unremarkable." Connors had five prior written reprimands, three for
    neglect of duty and one for conduct unbecoming a public employee, and one
    one-day fine, but no major disciplinary action had been taken against him.
    Several other incidents were addressed through counseling. No discipline had
    been imposed on Connors since 2008.2 The ALJ determined that in light of the
    paramilitary environment of the correctional facility and Connors's role in the
    supervisory structure on the day in question, a thirty-day suspension was
    appropriate and not barred by considerations of progressive discipline.
    Connors filed exceptions to the ALJ's decision with the Commission. On
    January 18, 2019, the Commission, "having made an independent evaluation of
    the record," issued a final administrative determination adopting the ALJ's
    findings of fact and initial decision affirming Connors's suspension.
    This appeal followed. Connors argues that the Commission erred because
    it adopted the ALJ's opinion, which: (1) did not include credibility findings on
    2
    The ALJ erroneously referred to 2009 in his opinion.
    A-2779-18
    9
    disputed facts; (2) did not address Connors's argument that CCDOC did not
    comply with the forty-five-day rule, see N.J.S.A. 30:8-18.2; (3) violated
    Connors' due process rights by relying on his internal affairs interview, which
    was conducted without notice to him that he was a target of the investigation;
    and (4) suspended Connors without first imposing progressive discipline.
    II.
    Our role in reviewing the decision of an administrative agency is limited.
    Circus Liquors, Inc. v. Middletown Twp., 
    199 N.J. 1
    , 9 (2009). We will not
    disturb the determination of the Commission absent a showing "that it was
    arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or that it lacked fair support in the
    evidence, or that it violated legislative policies expressed or implicit in the civil
    service act." Campbell v. Dep't of Civil Serv., 
    39 N.J. 556
    , 562 (1963).
    Decisions of administrative agencies carry with them a presumption of
    reasonableness. In re Carroll, 
    339 N.J. Super. 429
    , 437 (App. Div. 2001).
    Moreover, "[a]ppellate courts must defer to an agency's expertise and superior
    knowledge of a particular field." Greenwood v. State Police Training Ctr., 
    127 N.J. 500
    , 513 (1992). However, we are "in no way bound by the agency's
    interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue."
    Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 
    64 N.J. 85
    , 93 (1973).
    A-2779-18
    10
    "There is no constitutional or statutory right to a government job." State-
    Operated Sch. Dist. v. Gaines, 
    309 N.J. Super. 327
    , 334 (App. Div. 1998). Civil
    Service employees' rights and duties are governed by the Civil Service Act,
    which provides that a public employee may be subject to major discipline for
    various employment-related offenses. N.J.S.A. 11A:2-6; N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3. In
    an appeal from a disciplinary action or ruling by an appointing authority, the
    appointing authority bears the burden of proof to show, by a preponderance of
    the evidence, that the action taken was appropriate.          N.J.S.A. 11A:2-21;
    N.J.A.C. 4A:2-1.4(a); In re Polk, 
    90 N.J. 550
    , 560 (1982).
    Having carefully reviewed Connors's arguments in light of the record and
    applicable legal principles, we conclude the Commission's final agency decision
    is sufficiently supported by the record and is not arbitrary, capricious, or
    unreasonable. We add the following comments.
    While it is true that the ALJ did not expressly state that he found the
    testimony of any witness to be credible, it is clear from his findings of fact that
    he found that Connors was aware of the incident on the day in question, that
    Jacob told him King had defaced inmate property, that Connors failed to
    complete a report detailing that information, and that Connors did not complete
    A-2779-18
    11
    an investigation of the incident or memorialize any of the interviews he
    conducted, or recommend disciplinary action against King.
    Connors argues that the ALJ did not make a specific finding with respect
    to whether Pierce submitted a timely report to IA. The ALJ's opinion suggests
    that he found Pierce's testimony on this point credible. The ALJ notes that IA
    was in possession of the original photographs and could not have obtained them
    other than as an attachment to Pierce's report. However, even if the question of
    Pierce's submission of a report to IA was not resolved, Connors admitted that he
    instructed Pierce to make the report intentionally vague, thereby omitting
    critical information of which Connors was aware. This fact alone is sufficient
    support for the disciplinary charges.
    We are not persuaded by Connors's arguments regarding his right to
    representation when interviewed by Jones. See NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc.,
    
    420 U.S. 251
     (1975); In re Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 
    144 N.J. 511
    , 526-
    528 (1996).   An employee is "entitled to the Weingarten right during the
    investigation only if he reasonably believed that disciplinary action might
    result." 
    Id. at 529
    . "The reasonable belief standard is guided by 'objective
    standards under all the circumstances of the case.'" 
    Ibid.
     (quoting Weingarten,
    
    420 U.S. at 257
    ). An employee must be advised of the right to representation
    A-2779-18
    12
    prior to the start of questioning when they are the subject of the investigation
    and the right to representation attaches only once the employee "requests
    representation and reasonably believes the interview may result in disciplinary
    action." Id. at 526.
    The record supports the conclusion that when Connors was interviewed,
    Jones thought Connors was a witness, not a target, of the investigation. The
    charges against Connors are based on his failure to memorialize Jacob's
    accusation against King and detail the interviews he conducted, his instruction
    to Pierce to write an intentionally vague report for submission to IA, and his
    failure to recommend discipline against King. That information was obtained
    during Jones's interview with Connors, not prior to the interview, and was not,
    as suggested by Connors, readily apparent from the vague report Pierce filed
    with IA.
    We also see no basis to reverse the Commission's final agency decision
    based on the forty-five-day rule. N.J.S.A. 30:8-18.2 provides in relevant part:
    [a] person shall not be removed from employment or a
    position as a county correctional police officer, or
    suspended, fined or reduced in rank for a violation of
    the internal rules and regulations established for the
    conduct of employees of the county corrections
    department, unless a complaint charging a violation of
    those rules and regulations is filed no later than the 45th
    day after the date on which the person filing the
    A-2779-18
    13
    complaint obtained sufficient information to file the
    matter upon which the complaint is based. A failure to
    comply with this section shall require a dismissal of the
    complaint.
    Under an analogous statute governing discipline of State Police Officers, courts
    have evaluated the "sufficient information" provision that starts the forty-five-
    day clock. See N.J.S.A. 53:1-33. Under that statute, "it is not the happening of
    the event giving rise to discipline that starts the clock for purposes of evaluating
    timeliness, but the receipt of 'sufficient information' by the one who is
    authorized to file the charge that is significant." Roberts v. Div. of State Police,
    
    191 N.J. 516
    , 524 (2007). Receipt of an investigative report to the supervisor
    permitted to file charges, will satisfy the sufficient information requirement.
    
    Ibid.
    The record supports the conclusion that the forty-five-day clock began on
    January 7, 2015, when Jones submitted his report and recommendation for
    discipline to the warden. The warden, not Jones, is the supervisor authorized to
    submit charges against Connors. The formal charges were brought against
    Connors on February 6, 2015, thirty days after sufficient information to do so
    was received by the warden.
    We disagree with Connors's argument that the forty-five-day clock began
    when Pierce filed his report on November 9, 2014, or when Carr filed his
    A-2779-18
    14
    complaint on December 1, 2014. Those documents did not provide sufficient
    information to bring charges against Connors. While it was apparent on those
    dates that Connors had not filed a report about the incident, the full context of
    his actions, including the fact that he had interviewed many witnesses, including
    one who accused King, and had directed Pierce to file a vague report with IA
    omitting that information, were not known to those authorized to file charges.
    We also reject Connors's argument that the Commission erred by not
    imposing progressive discipline. Generally, the severity of a public employee's
    discipline should increase incrementally.     In re Herrmann, 
    192 N.J. 19
    , 33
    (2007). However, progressive discipline can be waived if "the misconduct is
    severe, when it is unbecoming to the employee's position or renders the
    employee unsuitable for continuation in the position, or when [its] application
    . . . would be contrary to the public interest." Ibid.; see also In re Stallworth,
    
    208 N.J. 182
    , 196-197 (2011); Div. of State Police v. Jiras, 
    305 N.J. Super. 476
    ,
    478-82 (App. Div. 1997) (finding bypass of progressive discipline appropriate
    after State Trooper assaulted a prisoner, rendering the Trooper unable to
    function as a law enforcement officer).
    As the ALJ aptly noted, Connors's disciplinary history was not sterling.
    He had on several occasions previously been found to have neglected his duties
    A-2779-18
    15
    and to have engaged in conduct unbecoming of a public employee. In addition,
    the current charges involve actions that undermine the command structure at the
    correctional facility, discourage officers from reporting misconduct by other
    officers, and potentially left Carr in a dangerous position, as his name had been
    scrawled on the personal photographs of inmates, but complete information
    about the incident had not been memorialized.
    To the extent we have not addressed Connors's other arguments, we
    conclude they are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written
    opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
    Affirmed.
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