KEVIN MALANGA VS. TOWNSHIP OF WEST ORANGE (L-1137-18, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2020 )


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    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
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    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-4036-18T3
    KEVIN MALANGA,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    TOWNSHIP OF WEST ORANGE,
    TOWNSHIP OF WEST ORANGE
    PLANNING BOARD, and
    TOWNSHIP OF WEST ORANGE
    TOWNSHIP COUNCIL,
    Defendants-Respondents,
    and
    WEST ORANGE OFFICE
    EXECUTIVE PARK, LLC,
    Defendant/Intervenor-
    Respondent.
    ________________________________
    Argued March 10, 2020 – Decided September 11, 2020
    Before Judges Fisher, Accurso and Gilson.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Law Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-1137-18.
    James M. Turteltaub argued the cause for appellant
    (Carlin & Ward, PC, attorneys; James M. Turteltaub,
    of counsel and on the briefs).
    Richard D. Trenk and Kenneth D. McPherson III
    argued the cause for respondents Township of West
    Orange, Township of West Orange Township Council
    and Township of West Orange Planning Board
    (McManimon, Scotland & Baumann, LLC, and
    Kenneth D. McPherson III, attorneys; Richard D.
    Trenk and Patrick J. Dwyer, on the joint brief).
    Robert S. Goldsmith argued the cause for intervenor-
    respondent West Orange Office Executive Park, LLC
    (Greenbaum, Rowe, Smith & Davis, LLP, attorneys,
    join in the brief of respondents Township of West
    Orange, Township of West Orange Township Council
    and Township of West Orange Planning Board).
    PER CURIAM
    Resident taxpayer plaintiff Kevin Malanga appeals from the dismissal of
    his complaint in lieu of prerogative writs challenging the Township of West
    Orange's designation of the Essex Green Shopping Center and the Executive
    Drive Office Park as a non-condemnation area in need of redevelopment
    pursuant to the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1
    to -73. Because the record lacks substantial evidence to support the finding,
    we reverse.
    In September 2017, the West Orange Township Council adopted a
    resolution directing the Township's Planning Board to investigate and
    A-4036-18T3
    2
    determine whether the properties located on Executive Drive and Rooney
    Circle, five lots in Block 155, 40.02, 40.03, 41.02, 42.01 and 42.02, and all of
    Block 155.21, met the criteria of an area in need of redevelopment in N.J.S.A.
    40A:12A-5. The following month, Paul Grygiel, the Board's consultant
    planner, submitted a report of his study of the area to the Planning Board.
    In preparing his report, Mr. Grygiel surveyed the uses and conditions of
    the properties in the study area and nearby areas, including their ownership
    and occupancy. He also reviewed municipal records, including the municipal
    tax map and Township tax records; the existing zoning ordinance and map; the
    2004 West Orange reexamination report and the 2010 Master Plan update. He
    researched office and retail markets in New Jersey and met with the owners
    and property manager of the shopping center and with the architect and
    property owner of the office park.
    The area targeted for redevelopment consists of about seventy acres in
    the center of West Orange in the area of Prospect Avenue and Interstate 280,
    which Mr. Grygiel described as "developed with an office park and shopping
    center, both of which are characterized by outdated buildings and relatively
    high vacancy rates." According to Mr. Grygiel, the Essex Green shopping
    center, situated on more than thirty-five acres, was built in 1957, with its last
    A-4036-18T3
    3
    major renovation undertaken in 1991, although he noted more recent
    improvements throughout the site, including a restaurant pad for TGI Fridays.
    Mr. Grygiel reported the occupancy rate at seventy-seven percent, with major
    tenants including Shop Rite, Sears Outlet, Total Wine, AMC Theaters and
    Panera Bread. Macy's had recently vacated, with its outlet store brand, Macy 's
    Backstage, occupying some of its former space.
    The shopping center was purchased by Clarion Partners, an investment
    firm with over $40 billion under management, for $97 million the year before.
    Based on his site visit and discussions with the property manager, Mr. Grygiel
    concluded the size and layout of many of the retail units "are long and
    awkwardly laid out," and are "outdated by today's retail standards." The
    property manager reported "the mechanical and HVAC systems in many of the
    vacant units are old and are in need of replacement." The property is serviced
    by a central loading dock with a network of underground tunnels with each
    retail unit having a basement to receive deliveries and store goods. There are
    no elevators from the basements to the retail floor, resulting in many tenants
    taking deliveries via the doors on the retail floor, creating potential conflicts
    with cars and pedestrians.
    A-4036-18T3
    4
    Mr. Grygiel determined the central building was aged "and is close to
    being or could be considered actually functionally obsolete," and "the retail
    units in need of significant renovation." He concluded the retail units, "[i]n
    their unused state, . . . are detrimental to the public welfare, especially when
    considering municipal land use policies which are meant to encourage the
    updating and upkeep of existing commercial development in the Township."
    He opined the shopping center met the criteria for an area in need of
    redevelopment under N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5(b) "due to its partially vacant
    condition and unfavorable prospects for re-tenanting," and under N.J.S.A.
    40A:12A-5(d) based on "the odd configuration of the central shopping center
    building, overall dated aesthetic, impractical loading system, and unsuitable
    retail units" and "outdated layouts and designs."
    The Executive Drive Office Park, a complex of four buildings across
    thirty-two acres was also under new ownership, having been purchased by
    intervenor West Orange Executive Park, LLC for approximately $14 million
    earlier in the year. Although all four buildings have frontage along the I-280
    right of way, there is no access from the highway. Instead, access is provided
    by a private road, Executive Drive, essentially a spur of Rooney Circle, which
    winds through the office park providing access to all four buildings.
    A-4036-18T3
    5
    The office park was developed over more than a dozen years, with
    buildings going up in 1971, 1977, 1978 and 1984. Each building is serviced
    by a surface parking lot. Major tenants at the time of Mr. Grygiel's study
    included Lincoln Tech, GEICO and the Department of Homeland Security.
    The new owner's architect told Mr. Grygiel that the buildings are considered
    "Class C" office space. In his report, Mr. Grygiel wrote that "[a]s there is an
    oversupply of dated, suburban office buildings in New Jersey, there is no real
    market for Class C office space at this time, or in the foreseeable future." The
    new owner reported a vacancy rate of fifty-eight percent, which Mr. Grygiel
    reported was nearly double the vacancy rates of suburban office space in New
    Jersey.
    Mr. Grygiel noted the buildings were "poorly placed" on the site, tucked
    in as they were behind the shopping center, with little visibility from Rooney
    Circle on the approach through the shopping center or from I-280 as
    landscaping screens the buildings from the highway. Mr. Grygiel noted that
    "[m]odern office users are seeking open, daylighted spaces with multiple
    amenities" on site, and the only amenity on this site was a small, dated
    cafeteria. He found the buildings had dated facades and interiors that were in
    A-4036-18T3
    6
    only fair condition, and that updating "the outdated mechanical, electrical and
    plumbing systems would take a significant amount of investment."
    Mr. Grygiel concluded the office park properties qualified as an area in
    need of redevelopment under criteria (b) of the Redevelopment Act "due to the
    partially vacant condition and unfavorable prospects of re-tenanting" based on
    the office park's "inferior location," its odd, outdated layout, dearth of natural
    light and lack of on-sight amenities. He also found the "obsolescent location"
    and layout of the office park provided "little or no options" for upgrades,
    qualifying the office park for a redevelopment designation under criteria (d) of
    the Redevelopment Act.
    The Planning Board held two nights of public hearings on the proposed
    designation in accordance with N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-6. Mr. Grygiel was the only
    witness. After he summarized his findings, Board members and members of
    the public put questions to him. There were a number of objectors, with many
    directing questions and comments to the wisdom of the Town offering
    redevelopment incentives to the well-capitalized new owners of these
    properties, instead of leaving to them the costs of upgrading their investments.
    Both the Board chair and Mr. Grygiel repeatedly attempted to explain that the
    only issue before the Planning Board was whether the preliminary
    A-4036-18T3
    7
    investigation undertaken by Mr. Grygiel allowed the Board to conclude that
    the properties met the statutory criteria for an area in need of redevelopment
    under section 5 of the Redevelopment Act.
    Notwithstanding the general objections voiced by many members of the
    public, there were some relevant questions put to the planner. In response to
    several questions about occupancy of the shopping center and the office park,
    Mr. Grygiel stated the owners provided him the information about the vacancy
    rates, and that he did not review the leases himself. After several members of
    the public and at least one member of the Board expressed the desire to have
    the owners appear before the Planning Board to address the vacancy rates at
    their properties, the planner said he would speak to the owners about having a
    representative who could testify about such matters appear at the next hearing.
    At the second hearing, Mr. Grygiel reported he contacted the
    representatives of the owners that had appeared before the Town Council when
    it voted to approve the resolution authorizing his firm to undertake the
    preliminary investigation of whether the area qualified for redevelopment, who
    declined to appear before the Planning Board. He also testified that viewing
    the empty storefronts at the shopping center allowed him to confirm the 23.5
    percent vacancy rate reported by management of the shopping center was
    A-4036-18T3
    8
    likely accurate. Although he could not similarly verify the vacancy rate at the
    office park, he was able to say based on the number of cars he saw in the
    parking lots and by viewing the building directories and walking some
    common areas that the complex was not nearly fully occupied. Mr. Grygiel
    testified in response to questions from the public that he could not say how
    long the vacancies at either the shopping center of the office park had
    persisted. He testified in response to questions about "discontinuance of use"
    that none of the buildings in the study area was "100 percent vacant."
    Mr. Grygiel also responded to questions from members of the Board and
    the public at both hearings about the condition of the properties in relation to
    the statutory criteria, and specifically the requirement in section 5(d) of the
    Redevelopment Law that conditions be "detrimental to the safety, health,
    morals, or welfare of the community." Plaintiff asked Mr. Grygiel to "point
    out" where in the report he had concluded that the conditions of the property
    were "detrimental to the safety, health, morals, or welfare of the community."
    Mr. Grygiel responded:
    Well, it talks — the report talks generally about the
    Township's planning objectives and it's a — for this
    particular section of the town, that the intention is for
    being an economic driver to have — to be occupied
    essentially. And that if the current conditions persist
    and vacancy continues, that it will no longer be
    A-4036-18T3
    9
    serving that purpose. That's detrimental to the general
    welfare of the Township.
    Plaintiff followed up, asking, "At the moment, is it detrimental to the
    safety, health, morals or welfare of the community, not ten years in the future,
    right now?" Mr. Grygiel responded: "Currently, I don't believe so." Plaintiff
    asked Mr. Grygiel again about this at the next hearing. After getting the
    planner to again agree the conditions he found, such as "obsolete layout" must
    be detrimental to the safety, health, morals or welfare of the community in
    order to qualify for redevelopment under section 5(d), plaintiff asserted the
    planner had nowhere explained "how that's the case." Mr. Grygiel responded:
    What I've talked about are the broader trends in office
    and retail and how these properties, if they go down
    the current road, are going to be, again, more obsolete
    and this is an important part of the Township that it
    should be — the Township should be proactive about
    the planning.
    [Emphasis added.]
    Following the hearing, the Planning Board voted six to one in favor of
    recommending the designation. It subsequently adopted a one-page resolution
    stating only that the Board had received Mr. Grygiel's report, that the report
    concluded that the shopping center and office park "qualified for
    redevelopment designation under either criteria 'b' or 'd'" of section 5 of the
    A-4036-18T3
    10
    Redevelopment Law, and that "the Board hereby agrees with the conclusion of
    the Redevelopment Study" conducted by Mr. Grygiel that the properties
    "qualify as an 'area in need of redevelopment' in accordance with N.J.S.A.
    40A:12A."1 The Township Council subsequently voted to accept the Planning
    Board's recommendation, likewise not detailing the basis for the finding
    beyond stating that the Planning Board, "after completing its investigation and
    public hearing . . . concluded that there was sufficient credible evidence to
    support findings that satisfy the criteria" in section 5 of the Redevelopment
    Law.
    Plaintiff timely filed this action in lieu of prerogative writs and the trial
    court granted the motion to intervene by the owner of the office park. After
    hearing argument, the court issued a written decision dismissing the complaint.
    The court found the Redevelopment Law "specifically allows for
    redevelopment of an area due to obsolescence, faulty arrangement or design,
    lack of ventilation and light, obsolete layout, or a combination" of them, and
    that Mr. Grygiel found evidence of those factors for both properties. The court
    1
    See 62-64 Main St., L.L.C. v. Mayor & Council of City of Hackensack, 
    221 N.J. 129
    , 157 (2015) (noting a resolution that fails to "clearly articulate the
    factual findings that support the statutory criteria for designating an area as in
    need of redevelopment. . . . disserves the municipality and the parties").
    A-4036-18T3
    11
    noted that the objectors did not introduce any evidence at the hearing, leaving
    Mr. Grygiel's opinion as the only evidence in the record. The court found the
    Planning Board and Council "[a]fter proper legislative procedures, . . .
    accepted [the planner's] recommendations that the facts set forth above are
    detrimental to the safety, health, morals, or welfare to the community."
    Finding the designation "supported by substantial evidence in the
    record," the court found itself "bound to affirm that determination." Having
    concluded the Town satisfied the criteria under section 5(d) of the statute that
    the shopping center and office park were in need of redevelopment, the court
    concluded in did not need to address whether the criteria under 5(b) were also
    satisfied.
    We review a trial court's decision sustaining or setting aside a
    municipality's decision that an area is in need of redevelopment using the same
    standard that governs the trial court. Levin v. Twp. Comm. of Bridgewater, 
    57 N.J. 506
    , 537 (1971). We are to approach review of a municipality's blight
    determination "with an acute awareness of the salutary social and economic
    policy which prompted the various slum clearance and redevelopment
    statutes." 
    Ibid.
    A-4036-18T3
    12
    Although "remind[ing] planning boards and governing bodies that they
    have an obligation to rigorously comply with the statutory criteria for
    determining whether an area is in need of redevelopment," 62-64 Main St., 221
    N.J. at 156, our Supreme Court regularly reminds us that "after the municipal
    authorities have rendered a decision that an area is in need of redevelopment,
    that decision is 'invested with a presumption of validity.'" Id. at 157 (quoting
    Levin, 
    57 N.J. at 537
    ). In order to effectuate "the salutary social and economic
    policy" that animates the Redevelopment Law, the Court has instructed that we
    are "to interpret the powers granted to the local planning board liberally and to
    accept its exercise of the powers so long as a necessarily indulgent judicial eye
    finds a reasonable basis, i.e., substantial evidence, to support the action taken."
    Levin, 
    57 N.J. at 537
    .
    At the time this case was decided in the trial court, the relevant portions
    of section 5 of the Redevelopment Law read as follows:
    A delineated area may be determined to be in need of
    redevelopment if, after investigation, notice and
    hearing as provided in section 6 of P.L.1992, c. 79
    (C.40A:12A-6), the governing body of the
    municipality by resolution concludes that within the
    delineated area any of the following conditions is
    found:
    b. The discontinuance of the use of buildings
    previously used for commercial, manufacturing, or
    A-4036-18T3
    13
    industrial purposes; the abandonment of such
    buildings; or the same being allowed to fall into so
    great a state of disrepair as to be untenantable.
    d. Areas with buildings or improvements which, by
    reason of dilapidation, obsolescence, overcrowding,
    faulty arrangement or design, lack of ventilation, light
    and sanitary facilities, excessive land coverage,
    deleterious land use or obsolete layout, or any
    combination of these or other factors, are detrimental
    to the safety, health, morals, or welfare of the
    community.
    [N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5(b) and (d).]
    Having synopsized the key testimony underlying the Planning Board's
    finding that the shopping center and office park comprised an area in need of
    redevelopment, we think it plain that even viewing the finding with the most
    indulgent of judicial eyes that it cannot stand. The problem is that Mr.
    Grygiel, while cataloging the dated design, layout and mechanical systems of
    these properties under section 5(d), could not opine that any of those factors,
    singly or in combination, were "detrimental to the safety, health, morals, or
    welfare of the community" at the present time.
    The report Mr. Grygiel authored states as to both the shopping center
    and the office park only that each "qualifie[d] under criteria 'd' due to their
    obsolete layout and faulty arrangement and design." The report does not
    explain how the flaws described affected the community's safety, health,
    A-4036-18T3
    14
    morals or welfare. When asked point blank at the first night of hearings
    whether those conditions were detrimental to safety, health, morals or welfare,
    right now, "not ten years in the future," Mr. Grygiel replied: "Currently, I
    don't believe so." That was an admission that neither the municipal bodies nor
    the trial court was free to ignore.
    The most Mr. Grygiel could offer was that his "report talks generally
    about the Township’s planning objectives . . . for this particular section of the
    town," specifically the 2004 Reexamination Report's encouragement of
    development that "generates employment opportunities and beneficial
    commercial/retail activity." He asserted that for the properties to serve as
    intended in the Master Plan as "an economic driver" they need "to be occupied
    essentially. And that if the current conditions persist and vacancy continues,
    that it will no longer be serving that purpose." Mr. Grygiel concluded
    "[T]hat’s detrimental to the general welfare of the Township."
    We, of course, accept that a commercial area could be found in need of
    redevelopment based not only on "economic deterioration in tax revenue
    terms" but also based on "the adverse physical conditions of property that
    individually or in combination impeded its reasonable productivity and
    resulted in its negative impact upon the general welfare and economic well -
    A-4036-18T3
    15
    being of the community." Forbes v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Orange Vill., 
    312 N.J. Super. 519
    , 525 (App. Div. 1998). We said so in Forbes and repeated it in
    Concerned Citizens of Princeton, Inc. v. Mayor & Council of Princeton, 
    370 N.J. Super. 429
    , 458-59 (App. Div. 2004).
    The Redevelopment Law under section 5(d), however, requires a finding
    that the conditions specified "are detrimental to the safety, health, morals, or
    welfare of the community," not that they will become so at some unspecified
    point in the future. See ERETC, L.L.C. v. City of Perth Amboy, 
    381 N.J. Super. 268
    , 279 (App. Div. 2005) (holding dilapidation insufficient to
    designate an area in need of redevelopment without detriment to the safety,
    health, morals or welfare). A desire to engage in "proactive planning" does
    not permit a municipality to designate an area in need of redevelopment in
    anticipation that conditions will cause it to become a detriment to the
    community in the future. See 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster
    Redevelopment Agency, 
    237 F. Supp. 2d 1123
     (C.D. Cal. 2001), dismissed, 
    60 Fed. Appx. 123
     (9th Cir. 2003) (notion of avoiding future blight was entirely
    speculative and wholly without support under California's Community
    Redevelopment Law (CRL), and thus city's efforts to condemn retailer's
    property due to concern regarding future blight would violate public use
    A-4036-18T3
    16
    clause); cf. Gallenthin Realty Dev., Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 
    191 N.J. 344
    , 365 (2007) (noting definition of "blight" could not be so broad as to make
    "most property in the State . . . eligible for redevelopment").
    "[P]lanning boards and governing bodies . . . have an obligation to
    rigorously comply with the statutory criteria for determining whether an area is
    in need of redevelopment." 62-64 Main Street, 221 N.J. at 156. Because Mr.
    Grygiel was unable to offer the opinion that the obsolete layout and faulty
    arrangement and design of the shopping center and the office park was
    currently detrimental to the general welfare of the community, the record
    lacked substantial evidence to support the Planning Board's finding, adopted
    by the Township Council, that the properties were in need of redevelopment
    under section 5(d).
    Although the trial court did not reach the Planning Board's determination
    that the finding could also be supported under section 5(b), we are satisfied
    that section, as it existed at the time of the decision, is of no avail to the
    Township. Before its recent amendment, section 5(b) provided that a
    delineated area could be found to be in need of redevelopment if,
    b. The discontinuance of the use of buildings
    previously used for commercial, manufacturing, or
    industrial purposes; the abandonment of such
    A-4036-18T3
    17
    buildings; or the same being allowed to fall into so
    great a state of disrepair as to be untenantable.
    [N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-5(b).]
    Mr. Grygiel admitted that neither the shopping center nor office park had
    been abandoned or permitted to fall into such disrepair as to be untenantable.
    He contended, however, that the tenant vacancies in the shopping center and
    office park could constitute "[t]he discontinuance of the use of buildings
    previously used for commercial . . . purposes." We disagree, because the
    planner admitted that all of the buildings in both the shopping center and the
    office park continued to be used, none was vacant. See Gallenthin, 
    191 N.J. at 365
     (noting a "statute's plain language is the most reliable indicium" of the
    Legislature's intent).
    Our reading of the plain meaning of "discontinuance of use" is
    buttressed by the Legislature's recent amendment of section 5(b) to add the
    underlined language.
    b. The discontinuance of the use of a building or
    buildings previously used for commercial, retail,
    shopping malls or plazas, office parks, manufacturing,
    or industrial purposes; the abandonment of such
    building or buildings; significant vacancies of such
    building or buildings for at least two consecutive
    years; or the same being allowed to fall into so great a
    state of disrepair as to be untenantable.
    A-4036-18T3
    18
    [L. 2019, c. 229, § 1, eff. Aug. 9, 2019; N.J.S.A.
    40A:12A-5(b).]
    If discontinuance of use could encompass a building still in use although
    suffering significant vacancies, there would appear no need for the
    amendment. See Kasper v. Bd. of Trs. of the Teachers' Pension & Annuity
    Fund, 
    164 N.J. 564
    , 577 (2000) (noting the presumption that a change
    evidences "a departure from the old law," is strongest when the Legislature
    does not overhaul the entire statute but enacts only "an isolated independent
    amendment"). A committee statement to the bill provided it would
    allow municipalities to use the powers authorized
    under Article VIII, Section III, paragraph 1 of the
    State Constitution to redevelop these "stranded
    assets."[2] By specifying that a vacant shopping mall
    or office park is an area in need of redevelopment, a
    municipality can offer potential private sector partners
    redevelopment tools such as tax exemptions and
    abatements to encourage them to repurpose these
    stranded assets.
    [Assembly Commerce and Econ. Dev. Comm.
    Statement with Comm. Amendments to A. 1700
    (L. 2019, c. 229) (Sept. 13, 2018).]
    2
    Sponsor’s Statement to A. 1700 (L. 2019, c. 229) ("[L]arge corporate office
    parks and large shopping malls have become obsolete, vacant, and difficult to
    market, today they are characterized in development circles as "stranded
    assets.").
    A-4036-18T3
    19
    Thus, it appears that the Legislature, by expanding the criteria of section
    5(b), has addressed precisely the issues identified by Mr. Grygiel in his report
    to the Planning Board about the oversupply of "dated, suburban office
    buildings" and the inability of the shopping center to effectively compete,
    despite its key location in the Township, because it "does not comport with
    modern retail standards." Defendants have not asked that we decide this
    appeal under the current statute by resorting to the time of decision rule. See
    R. Neumann & Co. v. City of Hoboken, 
    437 N.J. Super. 384
    , 395 (App. Div.
    2014) (applying 2013 amendments to the Redevelopment Law effective after
    the designation of an area in need of rehabilitation to the issues on appeal); see
    also Cox & Koenig, New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration §19-3.5
    (2020) (noting the time of application rule, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10.5 applies only
    to municipal ordinances). Even were we to do so, however, the result would
    be unchanged.
    Although it appears likely that the study area might well qualify for
    designation as an area in need of redevelopment under the 2019 amendment to
    the Redevelopment Law, the absence of any information in the record about
    how long the vacancies in either the shopping center or the office park had
    persisted would prevent us from applying the current version of section 5(b) to
    A-4036-18T3
    20
    affirm the trial court's decision upholding the designation. Accordingly, we
    invalidate the designation of the area as one in need of redevelopment and
    reverse the April 5, 2019 order that upheld it.
    Reversed.
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    21