COUNTY OF HUDSON VS. STATE OF NEW JERSEY OFFICE OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER (C-000199-18, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2020 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-3088-18T1
    COUNTY OF HUDSON,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY
    OFFICE OF THE STATE
    COMPTROLLER,
    Defendant-Respondent.
    _________________________
    Argued September 29, 2020 – Decided December 30, 2020
    Before Judges Gooden Brown and DeAlmeida.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Chancery Division, Hudson County, C-000199-18.
    Cindy Nan Vogelman argued the cause for appellant
    (Chasan Lamparello Mallon & Cappuzzo, PC,
    attorneys; Cindy Nan Vogelman, of counsel and on the
    briefs; Qing H. Guo, on the briefs).
    Amy Chung, Deputy Attorney General, argued the
    cause for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney
    General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant
    Attorney General, of counsel; Beth Leigh Mitchell,
    Assistant Attorney General, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Plaintiff County of Hudson appeals from the March 15, 2019 order of the
    Chancery Division transferring this matter to this court pursuant to our exclusive
    jurisdiction to review plaintiff's challenge to a final agency decision of
    defendant State Comptroller. We dismiss the appeal for want of justiciability.
    I.
    This matter concerns the statutory authority of the State Comptroller with
    respect to the procurement of contracts by local public entities. Review of the
    relevant statutory provisions is necessary to put the facts in context.
    The State Comptroller, an executive branch officer, is authorized to
    "monitor the process of soliciting proposals for, and the process of awarding,
    contracts made by . . . units of local government . . . that involve a significant
    . . . expenditure of funds . . . ." N.J.S.A. 52:15C-7(b). To facilitate this authority
    [a] contracting unit shall inform the State Comptroller
    in writing . . . of the commencement of any procurement
    process involving . . . an expenditure of $10,000,000 or
    more at the earliest time practicable . . . but no later
    than the time the contracting unit commences
    preparation of any . . . bid specification or request for
    proposal . . . .
    [N.J.S.A. 52:15C-10(b)(1).]
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    2
    Such notification triggers a thirty-day pause in the procurement process:
    [u]nless waived by the State Comptroller upon request
    from the contracting unit, at least 30 days shall elapse
    from the time the contracting unit informs the State
    Comptroller . . . and the time the contracting unit may
    issue any public advertising, notice of availability of a
    request for proposals or any other public or private
    solicitation of a contract for a procurement . . . in order
    that the State Comptroller may complete a review that
    may be undertaken pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 52:15C-
    10(b)(4)].
    [N.J.S.A. 52:15C-10(b)(2).]
    Once the contracting unit gives the State Comptroller information and
    documents concerning the proposed procurement, "the State Comptroller may
    review such submission and provide a written determination to the contracting
    unit regarding whether the procurement process complies with applicable public
    contracting laws, rules, and regulations." N.J.S.A. 52:15C-10(b)(4).
    If the State Comptroller determines that the
    procurement process does not comply with applicable
    public contracting laws, rules, and regulations, the
    State Comptroller shall direct the contracting unit not
    to proceed with the procurement. In such an instance,
    the State Comptroller shall state the reasons for such
    determination and may include in its determination
    guidance to the contracting unit regarding an
    appropriate procurement process.
    [Ibid.]
    A-3088-18T1
    3
    "A contracting unit may proceed with a planned procurement . . . after
    expiration of the 30-day period or the granting of a wavier" by the State
    Comptroller "unless it receives a written determination not to proceed from the
    State Comptroller within 15 business days of the date the contracting unit
    provided written notice to the State Comptroller . . . ." Ibid.
    Hudson County is a local government unit whose contract procurement
    practices are subject to the State Comptroller's review. N.J.S.A. 52:15C-10(a).
    On May 1, 2018, the county sent contract specifications to ten preselected
    vendors soliciting proposals for the medical health care management, mental
    health care management, and related fiscal management at the Hudson County
    Correctional Center (HCCC). The specifications indicate the county sought not
    only the professional services of physicians and other medical personnel, but
    also related fiscal and administrative services to provide all functions of a health
    care facility within the HCCC. The county did not publicly advertise that it was
    issuing the contract specifications or provide a means by which potential
    bidders, other than the ten preselected vendors, could obtain a copy of the
    specifications.
    On May 14, 2018, the county wrote to the State Comptroller informing
    him for the first time that it had solicited contract proposals from ten preselected
    A-3088-18T1
    4
    vendors and that it would not engage in competitive bidding for the services it
    sought at the HCCC. According to the county, neither competitive contracting
    nor public bidding were necessary because the services sought in the contr act
    were professional in nature pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:11-2(6). The county stated
    that it expected the contract value to exceed $10 million and that it intended to
    select a vendor and subsequently negotiate a contract with that vendor. The
    county was expecting responses from the preselected vendors by June 11, 2018.
    The county wrote to the State Comptroller again on May 24, 2018, stating
    that an emergent need existed to replace the then-existing contract for health
    care services at the HCCC. The County requested that the State Comptroller
    waive his review of the contract specifications pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:15C-
    10(b). Alternatively, the county offered to postpone the June 11, 2018 contract
    proposal due date.
    On May 31, 2018, a representative of the State Comptroller replied in
    writing, noting the county's failure to comply with the notice provisions of
    N.J.S.A. 52:15C-10(b)(1), and acknowledging the urgent nature of the
    procurement due to recent inmate and detainee deaths. The letter stated that in
    light of those considerations, the State Comptroller would not review the
    procurement process and would instead conduct a post-award contract review.
    A-3088-18T1
    5
    Although the State Comptroller did not stop the procurement process from
    proceeding, the letter noted that the county's characterization of the contract as
    being one for professional services may be in conflict with N.J.S.A. 40A:11-15,
    which requires contracts for professional services not exceed twelve months.
    In a July 30, 2018 letter, the county advised the State Comptroller that on
    July 12, 2018, the Hudson County Board of Chosen Freeholders 1 approved a
    resolution awarding a one-year contract to Correct Care Solutions (CCS) for a
    term of July 16, 2018 through July 17, 2019, at a cost of $7,675,073.60, with
    extensions for two additional one-year periods at prices established through the
    procurement.2 The county included with its correspondence documentation for
    the State Comptroller's post-award review. The county requested the State
    Comptroller issue an advisory opinion as to: (1) whether the county's contract
    with CCS was one for professional services; and (2) whether the duration of the
    contract was permissible. The county stated that "in the event a consensus could
    not be reached on these issues," it would file a declaratory judgment action.
    1
    Effective January 1, 2021, the State's Boards of Chosen Freeholders have been
    renamed Boards of County Commissioners. L. 2020, c. 67.
    2
    Although the CCS contract was intended to begin on July 16, 2018, a transition
    period in which the prior vendor was paid for the provision of health care
    services at the HCCC delayed the starting date of the CCS contract to October
    1, 2018. The initial one-year term ended September 30, 2019.
    A-3088-18T1
    6
    On October 15, 2018, the State Comptroller issued a letter neither
    approving nor disapproving the county's contract with CCS.           The letter,
    however, explained in detail how the procurement process did not comply with
    the Local Public Contracts Law (LPCL), N.J.S.A. 40A:11-1 to -39. The letter
    also provided guidance for similar future procurements and the State
    Comptroller offered to work cooperatively with the county to structure future
    procurements in a manner consistent with the LPCL, as contemplated by
    N.J.S.A. 52:15C-10(b).
    Specifically, the State Comptroller stated that designating the contract as
    one for professional services yet bidding it with an extension of more than one
    year was inconsistent with N.J.S.A. 40A:11-15.          In addition, the State
    Comptroller explained that given the nature of the CCS contract the county
    should have either: (1) publicly bid and awarded to the lowest responsible bidder
    under N.J.S.A. 40A:11-4, for a term of up to three years under N.J.S.A. 40A:11-
    15(29); or (2) issued a request for proposals under N.J.S.A. 40A:11-4.1, -4.1(h),
    and -4.2, and awarded a contract for up to five years through the competitive
    bidding process.
    On December 26, 2018, the county filed a complaint in the Chancery
    Division seeking a declaratory judgment under the Declaratory Judgment Act
    A-3088-18T1
    7
    (DJA), N.J.S.A. 2A:16-50 to -62 and Rule 4:42-3, that the CCS contract is a
    professional services contract that may extend for a term of up to three years.
    The State Comptroller moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing the county
    lacked standing because it had no actual injury, there was no adversity between
    the county and the State Comptroller, and because the county, in effect, s ought
    a writ of mandamus directing the State Comptroller to retroactively approve the
    county's procurement of the CCS contract. The State Comptroller also argued
    that to the extent that there was anything justiciable in the matter, plaintiff
    sought judicial review of the State Comptroller's October 15, 2018 letter as a
    final agency decision, agency action, or agency inaction and should have filed
    its claims in this court under its exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 2:2-
    3(a)(2).3
    On March 15, 2019, the trial court issued an oral opinion, declining to
    issue a declaratory judgment and concluding that "[t]he crux of the matter
    presented here is whether the cause of action pled in the plaintiff's complaint
    requires this [c]ourt to review the action of a State administrative agency." The
    trial court concluded that because plaintiff challenged a "final decision" of the
    3
    The State Comptroller also argued that if the trial court did not transfer the
    matter to this court, venue was proper in the Mercer Vicinage, where the State
    Comptroller's office is located.
    A-3088-18T1
    8
    State Comptroller as to whether the county could "contract with a healthcare
    provider under the professional services exception," this court had exclusive
    jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims. The trial court held that the county could not
    circumvent this court's exclusive jurisdiction by instituting an action under the
    DJA. Thus, the court found, transfer of plaintiff's claims to this court was
    necessary. A March 15, 2019 order memorializes the court's decision.
    This appeal followed. The county raises the following arguments.
    POINT I
    THE COUNTY MAY AWARD A PROFESSIONAL
    SERVICES CONTRACT FOR THE PROVISION OF
    MEDICAL, MENTAL HEALTH AND ANCILLARY
    SERVICES WITHOUT A PUBLIC BID IN
    ACCORDANCE WITH N.J.S.A. 40A:11-5.
    POINT II
    THE COUNTY MAY AWARD A PROFESSIONAL
    SERVICES CONTRACT FOR THE PROVISION OF
    MEDICAL, MENTAL HEALTH AND ANCILLARY
    SERVICES FOR UP TO THREE YEARS IN
    ACCORDANCE WITH N.J.S.A. 40A:11-15(29).
    POINT III
    THE [STATE COMPTROLLER'S] OCTOBER 15,
    2018 LETTER WAS NOT A FINAL AGENCY
    DECISION.
    A-3088-18T1
    9
    II.
    Our authority is limited to the adjudication of "actual cases and
    controversies. Actions that are essentially requests for advisory opinions will
    be dismissed." Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2.1 on R.
    4:6-2 (Gann 2020); Indep. Realty Co. v. Twp. of N. Bergen, 
    376 N.J. Super. 295
    , 301 (App. Div. 2005). "The prohibition on advisory opinions prevents
    courts 'through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling
    themselves in abstract disagreements.'" In re N.J. Fireman's Ass'n, 
    230 N.J. 258
    ,
    275 (2017) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 
    387 U.S. 136
    , 148 (1967)).
    "A justiciable controversy exists when 'one party definitively asserts legal
    rights and such rights are positively denied by the other party.'" O'Shea v. N.J.
    Schools Constr. Corp., 
    388 N.J. Super. 312
    , 317 (App. Div. 2006) (quoting
    Registrar & Transfer Co. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 
    157 N.J. Super. 532
    , 539 (Ch.
    Div. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 
    166 N.J. Super. 75
    , 76 (App. Div. 1979)).
    "It is a controversy 'in which a claim of right is asserted against one who has an
    interest in contesting it.'" 
    Ibid.
     (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 777 (5th ed.
    1979)). The controversy must be real, not hypothetical or abstract. 
    Ibid.
    These considerations apply whether we consider plaintiff's claims to be a
    challenge to a final agency decision of the State Comptroller, as did the trial
    A-3088-18T1
    10
    court, or as claim for relief under the DJA. See In re N.J. Fireman's Ass'n, 230
    N.J. at 275 (holding that under the DJA, courts are "forbidden from declaring
    the rights or status of parties upon a state of facts which are future, contingent
    and uncertain.") (internal quotations and alterations omitted). "It follows, then,
    that a declaratory judgment claim is ripe for adjudication only when there is an
    actual controversy, meaning that the facts present 'concrete contested issues
    conclusively affecting' the parties' adverse interests."     Ibid. (quoting N.J.
    Turnpike Auth. v. Parsons, 
    3 N.J. 235
    , 241 (1949) (citation omitted)).
    The county cannot allege any harm arising from the State Comptroller's
    October 15, 2018 letter. The State Comptroller did not prevent the county from
    awarding the contract to CCS, or twice renewing the agreement for one-year
    terms. The State Comptroller's opinion that the procurement process for the
    CCS contract violated the LCPL has had no effect on the validity of the
    agreement. No party has sought to vitiate the contract. The county is in no
    different position than it would have been had the State Comptroller either found
    that the procurement process complied with the law or had not acted at all.
    Nor does the county have a concrete claim against the State Comptroller
    that can be resolved by our review of the October 15, 2018 letter. The county
    argues that a judicial decision with respect to whether the procurement process
    A-3088-18T1
    11
    complied with the LCPL would provide the legal clarity necessary for its
    anticipated procurement of a new contract after the CCS agreement expires in
    September 2021.4 We find this argument unpersuasive for two reasons. First, a
    decision concerning the validity of the procurement process for the CCS contract
    will not obviate the county's obligation to comply with the notice provisions of
    N.J.S.A. 52:15C-10(b) when it contemplates procuring a new agreement. Nor
    will a decision with respect to the procurement process for the CCS contract
    necessarily apply to the procurement process for a new contract, which will have
    its own specifications. It is the details of the specification for the new contract
    that will be reviewed by the State Comptroller to determine compliance with the
    LCPL, not the provisions of the CCS contract.
    Second, and more importantly, the Legislature has established a statutory
    procedure for the county to obtain the State Comptroller's review, approval, and
    guidance on procuring its contracts of significant cost. Uncertainty with respect
    to the CCS contract, if such uncertainty exists, is the result of the county's failure
    to fulfill its statutory obligation to provide timely notice of its intended
    procurement to the State Comptroller. There is no doubt that the county is now
    aware that it is required to provide the State Comptroller notice "at the earliest
    4
    The contract was twice extended for one-year terms.
    A-3088-18T1
    12
    time practicable," N.J.S.A. 52:15C-10(b)(1), of its intention to procure a new
    contract after expiration of the CCS agreement. We must respect the legislative
    preference to have the county's procurement process for a new agreement
    reviewed in the first instance by the State Comptroller. The statute contemplates
    a cooperative effort between the local government entity and the State
    Comptroller to ensure compliance with the LCPL. In the event that those efforts
    do not result in the State Comptroller's approval of the county's intended
    procurement process for a new contract, the county may at that time seek judicial
    relief.
    Dismissed.
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    13