STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. YUSEF STEELE (09-05-0884, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2020 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-0352-18T2
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    YUSEF STEELE, a/k/a
    YUSIF STEELE,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Submitted December 14, 2020 – Decided December 31, 2020
    Before Judges Sabatino and Gooden Brown.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 09-05-
    0884.
    Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
    appellant (Kisha M. Hebbon, Designated Counsel, on
    the brief).
    Yolanda Ciccone, Middlesex County Prosecutor,
    attorney for respondent (David M. Liston, Assistant
    Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Defendant Yusef Steele appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for
    post-conviction relief ("PCR") arising out of Middlesex County Indictment No.
    09-05-0884. We consider this appeal back-to-back with A-0353-18, which
    concerns the trial court's denial of a PCR petition stemming from an unrelated
    indictment. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
    The facts were described in our previous opinion on direct appeal from
    defendant's conviction in this case. State v. Steele, No. A-4044-11 (App. Div.
    Mar. 24, 2015) (slip opinion).      Succinctly stated, New Brunswick police
    observed defendant on April 10, 2009 in an area known for drug trafficking.
    They saw defendant and another man huddled close, and defendant appeared to
    be counting something. The men separated when they saw the officers. As
    defendant walked away, one of the officers saw him drop a bundle of heroin on
    the ground. The police apprehended him and found on his person seven bags of
    marijuana plus $254 in cash. The bags of heroin were retrieved from the ground
    close by.
    According to the police, the seized marijuana and heroin were placed in
    an evidence bag and secured at the police station. Samples of the drugs were
    tested at the State Police laboratory and confirmed by the chemist to be heroin
    and marijuana. The police questioned defendant about the seized drugs. He
    A-0352-18T2
    2
    admitted the marijuana was for personal use but refused to concede that the
    heroin was his.
    The indictment charged defendant in five counts with multiple drug
    offenses concerning the heroin and marijuana: count one, third-degree
    possession of heroin, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1); count two, third-degree
    possession with intent to distribute heroin, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and N.J.S.A.
    2C:35-5(b)(3); count three, fourth-degree possession with intent to distribute
    marijuana, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(12); and counts four
    and five, third-degree possession with intent to distribute heroin and marijuana
    within 1,000 feet of school property, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a).
    Defendant's pretrial motion to suppress the seized drugs and to dismiss
    the indictment failed.
    The case was tried twice. The first trial in May 2011 resulted in a mistrial
    because an empaneled juror had passed by while defendant was being arrested.
    At the second trial in November 2011, the jury found defendant guilty of all five
    counts.
    The trial court sentenced defendant on count four to a mandatory extended
    term of seven years with a three-year parole disqualifier, to be served
    consecutively to the sentence imposed on Indictment No. 08-10-1809. The other
    counts either merged or resulted in concurrent terms.
    A-0352-18T2
    3
    On direct appeal in 2013, this court upheld defendant's convictions on
    certain counts but vacated the convictions on two counts of the marijuana
    offenses because the court had failed to charge lesser-included offenses. We
    reserved defendant's pro se claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for a
    future PCR petition. The Supreme Court denied certification. State v. Steele,
    
    223 N.J. 163
     (2015).
    On remand, the trial court dismissed those two counts and resentenced
    defendant to a three-year prison term with a three-year parole disqualifier on the
    surviving counts.
    Thereafter, on May 24, 2018, the trial court 1 denied defendant's PCR
    petition without an evidentiary hearing. That same day, the court likewise
    denied defendant's petition for PCR arising from an unrelated indictment, which
    is the subject of the appeal in A-0353-18.
    In the present appeal, defendant argues the following:
    POINT I
    THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
    DEFENDANT'S     PETITION    FOR    POST-
    CONVICTION RELIEF WITHOUT AFFORDING
    HIM   AN    EVIDENTIARY    HEARING   TO
    DETERMINE THE MERITS OF HIS CONTENTION
    THAT HE WAS DENIED THE RIGHT TO THE
    EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL.
    1
    The PCR judge had not presided over the trials.
    A-0352-18T2
    4
    A. THE PREVAILING LEGAL PRINCIPLES
    REGARDING    CLAIMS OF  INEFFECTIVE
    ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, EVIDENTIARY
    HEARINGS AND PETITIONS FOR POST
    CONVICTION RELIEF.
    B. TRIAL COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE
    LEGAL REPRESENTATION BY VIRTUE OF HIS
    FAILURE TO CONSULT WITH DEFENDANT
    PRIOR TO STIPULATING TO THE CHAIN OF
    CUSTODY AND LAB REPORT REGARDING THE
    DRUGS IN QUESTION.
    C. DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO A REMAND TO
    THE TRIAL COURT TO AFFORD HIM AN
    EVIDENTIARY HEARING TO DETERMINE THE
    MERITS OF HIS CONTENTION THAT HE WAS
    DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL
    COUNSEL.
    Having considered these arguments, we affirm, substantially for the sound
    reasons articulated in the PCR judge's oral decision.
    The applicable law is well established and requires little elaboration. To
    establish a deprivation of the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance
    of counsel, a convicted defendant must satisfy the two-part test enunciated in
    Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
     (1984), by demonstrating that: (1)
    counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance actually
    prejudiced the accused's defense. 
    Id. at 687
    ; see also State v. Fritz, 
    105 N.J. 42
    ,
    58 (1987) (adopting the Strickland two-part test in New Jersey).            When
    A-0352-18T2
    5
    reviewing such claims, courts apply a strong presumption that defense counsel
    "rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise
    of reasonable professional judgment."           Strickland, 
    466 U.S. at 690
    .
    "[C]omplaints 'merely of matters of trial strategy' will not serve to ground a
    constitutional claim of inadequacy . . . ." Fritz, 
    105 N.J. at 54
     (citations omitted);
    see also State v. Perry, 
    124 N.J. 128
    , 153 (1991).
    Defendant's PCR petition hinges on an argument that his attorney at the
    second trial was deficient because that attorney agreed with the prosecutor to
    stipulate to the chain of custody of the drugs and the associated lab report. We
    disagree.
    The record shows that the State presented the arresting officers and a State
    forensic scientist at the first trial to establish the chain of custody and they were
    cross-examined. The stipulation, which defendant contends his attorney made
    over his strenuous opposition, relieved the State of calling these and other chain
    of custody witnesses at the second trial.
    Defendant testified in his own defense at the second trial and asserted that
    the heroin he was shown at the police station when the officers interrogated him
    was different from the heroin the prosecutors presented at trial.          However,
    defendant admitted to the marijuana possession and did not testify that the
    A-0352-18T2
    6
    marijuana presented at court was not the same marijuana taken from his person
    or shown to him after his arrest.
    Defendant fails to show there was clear prejudice arising from his
    counsel's stipulation about the chain of custody. Defendant has proffered no
    proof of evidence-tampering or a break in the chain of the drugs' custody, other
    than his testimony that the drugs presented in court looked different from the
    drugs he was shown at the police station. That does not undermine the State's
    contention that the drugs admitted in evidence were the drugs he possessed at
    the scene. There is also not a shred of proof that the laboratory analysis of the
    drugs was scientifically flawed.
    The stipulation avoided the specter of the State parading before the jury
    chain-of-custody witnesses who could have bolstered the overall impressiveness
    of the State's investigation. The stipulation is within the zone of strategic
    choices that a criminal trial attorney has great latitude to make. Perry, 
    124 N.J. at 153
    .
    There was no need for an evidentiary hearing on the PCR petition, as
    defendant failed to present a prima facie case for redress under the Strickland
    standards. State v. Preciose, 
    129 N.J. 451
    , 462-63 (1992) (requiring a prima
    facie demonstration to warrant such a hearing).
    Affirmed.
    A-0352-18T2
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-0352-18T2

Filed Date: 12/31/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/31/2020