STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. EARNST WILLIAMS (13-03-0574, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2256-15T3
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
EARNST WILLIAMS, a/k/a
ERNEST WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
_____________________________
Argued May 2, 2018 — Decided May 21, 2018
Before Judges Fuentes, Koblitz and Suter.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Essex County, Indictment No.
13-03-0574.
Brian P. Keenan, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, argued the cause for appellant
(Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney;
Mark H. Friedman, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Lucille M. Rosano, Special Deputy Attorney
General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued
the cause for respondent (Robert D. Laurino,
Acting Essex County Prosecutor, attorney;
Lucille M. Rosano, of counsel and on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Earnst Williams appeals from his December 14, 2015
conviction for felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(3), for which he
was sentenced to fifty years in prison with an 85% parole
disqualifier and a five-year parole supervision term pursuant to
the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. The State and
defendant agreed that the victim was shot and killed after meeting
defendant in an apartment building to buy oxycodone pills. The
State's theory was that defendant shot the victim during the course
of a robbery. Defendant testified that he was intending to sell
the victim the drugs, but the victim tried to shoot defendant and
defendant wrested the victim's gun away and shot the victim in
self-defense. We reverse because the trial judge did not allow
defendant to introduce relevant exculpatory evidence of the
victim's prior drug purchases.
Defendant was indicted for first-degree murder, N.J.S.A.
2C:11-3a(1) (count one); first-degree felony murder, N.J.S.A.
2C:11-3a(3) (count two); first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1
(count three); second-degree conspiracy to rob, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2
and 2C:15-1b (count four); second-degree unlawful possession of a
handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b (count five); second-degree possession
of a handgun for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a (count
six); and third-degree conspiracy to violate the narcotics laws,
N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5, and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10 (count
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seven). Count four was dismissed prior to trial. Defendant was
convicted of aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a), as a
lesser included offense of murder in count one and convicted of
all other counts. The judge merged all other convictions into
count two, felony murder.
At trial, Craig1 testified that on July 22, 2015, Barry, a
22-year old Connecticut resident, contacted his friend John to ask
if he knew anyone selling oxycodone pills. John put Barry in
touch with his next-door neighbor, defendant. Barry, who planned
to drive from Connecticut with his friend Craig to buy the pills,
asked defendant if they could meet halfway, but defendant refused
and set up a meeting in Montclair. Barry then asked to meet in a
"public place, like a grocery store," but defendant again declined,
setting up a meeting on a street in Montclair.
When Barry and Craig arrived at the address, defendant entered
the car. The two buyers asked to see the drugs. Defendant
answered that the drugs were at his girlfriend's apartment. He
also insisted that Barry bring all the money. Barry took $900 and
walked into the building with defendant. Craig heard two gunshots
coming from inside the house.
Craig called Barry's cell phone number, and when he received
no answer, he "drove away frantically . . . hysterical, afraid for
1
We use pseudonyms for the names of the victim and witnesses.
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[his] life." Three witnesses testified that they saw defendant
and another man fitting Barry's description go inside the building
and then heard gunshots.
On the same date, Rob, who drove a taxi for Montclair Yellow
Cab, "pick[ed] up a guy," who he identified as defendant, sometime
between 6:30 and 7:30 p.m., and took him to Newark. Defendant's
cousin Rose initially testified that she could not remember what
happened. After being confronted with her police statement, she
remembered that defendant came to her home in Newark by taxi at
about 7:30 p.m. and asked to use her telephone. Defendant then
met with "about three or four" men outside. She heard what she
"guess[ed] was [defendant's] voice" saying "I robbed him."
Defendant's friend John,2 his daughter, defendant's brother,
and a friend drove to Newark and saw defendant sitting on his
cousin's stoop "with his head down." Defendant stated that "shit
went wrong." Defendant admitted to John that he was trying to rob
Barry and that defendant brought the gun to the scene, but he also
claimed that it was Barry "who reached to the gun," after they
began "tusseling" and "fighting." He told John that "he shot down
on [Barry's] leg. And then he shot him again." He said he took
"some" money from Barry, tossed the gun away, and left the scene.
2
John pled guilty to count seven, third-degree conspiracy to
distribute drugs, agreeing to testify against defendant in
exchange for a probationary sentence.
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Footage from two businesses' security video cameras in the
area showed Craig's vehicle turning onto the street, and one showed
defendant walking, carrying a T-shirt. Barry's cell phone
contained several text messages with defendant regarding the terms
of the sale and where the transaction would take place. Barry
texted defendant "I'm not giving you the money up front, letting
you go back into the house. I'll park on the street and you can
just bring them to the car. I'll count them and give you the
cash." He also texted defendant, "I don't need to come into the
house. . . . You got to understand, I'm not gonna go in the house
where I've never been without seeing all the pills first. . . .
You got to work with me. Let me know I'm safe."
Defendant spent the night after the killing at his cousin
Rose's home. She had a conversation with defendant the next day
in which he stated he "did something in Montclair . . . [H]e robbed
a [Caucasian] man in Montclair and they got into a little scuffle
and that he shot him" twice, once in the leg and once in the head.
She stated that "he was supposed to meet up with a guy to make a
[drug] transaction," but that he had no drugs to sell and, instead,
intended to "rob him." Rose then stated that during this account,
defendant took out $400 and counted it.
Defendant testified at trial that, in preparation for the
drug sale, he had stashed oxycodone pills in a shoe that he left
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in the second floor hallway. He walked up to the second floor
landing, put the pills in his pocket, and as he was "walking down,
[Barry] pull[ed] a gun out. So I dove on [Barry]. . . . I bit
[him] . . . . I'm [in] fear for my life . . . . I know he got shot
. . . . I know he got hit again . . . . I never had total control."
He took the gun from Barry, ran from the building, but denied
taking any money from him. He further denied that he had ever
planned to rob Barry.
Defendant said he walked towards his mother's home, removed
his T-shirt, wrapped the gun in it, threw it away into a garbage
can, and later sold the drugs he was carrying for $500 to another
buyer. He took a shower, went to Newark, met John, and told him
what happened. The next day, his father came to pick him up, and
he turned himself in at the Essex County Prosecutor's Office. He
admitted that he did not have a girlfriend at the address where
he arranged to sell the drugs, but chose that building because it
was quiet, the front door was always open, and he was "familiar
with the format." He did not want to conduct the sale in the
local business areas because a "police station [is] right there,"
nor did he want to sell drugs in his own home.
Barry died as a result of a gunshot wound to the head. He
was also shot in the abdomen, and the bullets found in both wounds
were fired from the same .38 caliber pistol. He was found with
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$500 in his pocket. DNA testing confirmed that defendant bit
Barry's right forearm. Barry had oxycodone in his blood.
On appeal, defendant argues:
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED PREJUDICIALLY
BY REFUSING TO ALLOW THE DEFENSE TO CROSS-
EXAMINE [CRAIG] ABOUT HIS STATEMENTS TO THE
POLICE REGARDING HIS AND [BARRY]'S PRIOR DRUG
TRANSACTIONS WITH [JOHN] AT PALISADES
[CENTER], WHICH WERE RELEVANT TO AND
SUPPORTIVE OF DEFENDANT'S SELF-DEFENSE CLAIM.
POINT II: DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE IS MANIFESTLY
EXCESSIVE AND UNDULY PUNITIVE.
Defendant argues that Craig's statements concerning Barry's
prior drug purchases in a public place enhanced the evidence of
Barry's "security concerns" when purchasing drugs. Defendant
points to Craig's admission to police that the two young men had
"very smoothly" purchased drugs about three times from John at
Palisades Center where, as here, Craig dropped off Barry and waited
for him in the car until Barry called. Craig further told the
police that leading up to this trip, Barry tried to convince
defendant to meet him at Palisades Center, but when defendant
claimed he "didn't have a ride," Barry suggested a meeting in a
public place. The text messages on Barry's phone substantiated
this evidence.
The State responds that Barry's concern for conducting drug
transactions in public places does not mean that he carried a gun
to this transaction inside a private home. We agree that the
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excluded evidence does not prove Barry brought the gun; the
question is whether this evidence supports defendant's affirmative
defense. Defendant testified that he had no intention of robbing
Barry, and that he planned to sell oxycodone pills. Barry's state
of enhanced vigilance, stemming from the drug transaction out of
public view, was somewhat supportive of the defense that Barry
brought a gun to the sale. The jury found defendant guilty of
aggravated manslaughter and not murder. Thus the jury did not
find that the State proved the murder charge against defendant,
to wit, that defendant did not "knowingly" or "purposely" caused
Barry’s death. See N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1) or (2).
The trial judge misapplied the heavy burden against admission
of the State's evidence under State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328, 338
(1992) and N.J.R.E. 404, ruling that defense counsel could not
cross-examine Craig about a December 2011 transaction because
defendant had failed to present sufficient evidence to show the
meeting occurred or that it was similar to the July 22, 2012
incident. The strict Cofield standard, however, is appropriate
only when the State seeks to introduce evidence of other crimes
against defendant.
The "relaxed" standard for the admission of defense evidence
of prior criminal activity is set forth in State v. Weaver, 219
N.J. 131, 150 (2014). The admissibility of other-crimes evidence
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used defensively is governed by Rule 401, and the standard is
"simple relevance to guilt or innocence." Weaver, 219 N.J. at
150. Evidence is relevant if it has "a tendency in reason to
prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of
the action." N.J.R.E. 401; State v. Williams, 190 N.J. 114, 122-
23 (2007). "It is well established that a defendant may use
similar other-crimes evidence defensively if in reason it tends,
alone or with other evidence, to negate his guilt of the crime
charged against him." State v. Garfole, 76 N.J. 445, 453 (1978);
State v. Cook, 179 N.J. 533, 566-67 (2004).
If relevance is established, the court must undertake a Rule
403 analysis. Weaver, 219 N.J. at 151. "[T]he question . . . is
not relevance as such, but the degree of relevance balanced against
the counter considerations expressed in [N.J.R.E. 403] of undue
consumption of time, confusion of the issues and the misleading
of the jury." Id. at 157 (quoting Garfole, 76 N.J. at 451). The
State argues that the evidence would be confusing and misleading
and that Craig's "testimony would have also prejudiced the State's
case by 'muddying' the victim's character with unsubstantiated
allegations of violent behavior." The jury heard evidence that
Barry had oxycodone in his system, and that he wanted to conduct
this drug transaction in a public place. The additional evidence
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of a prior drug transaction occurring in a mall would not have
been unduly time-consuming, confusing or misleading.
"Although a trial court retains broad discretion in
determining the admissibility of evidence, that discretion is
abused when relevant evidence offered by the defense and necessary
for a fair trial is kept from the jury." State v. Stubblefield,
450 N.J. Super. 337, 348 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting State v. Cope,
224 N.J. 530, 554-55 (2016)). The trial judge's ruling precluding
defense evidence was a clear error of judgment resulting in a
manifest denial of justice. See State v. Morton, 155 N.J. 383,
454 (1998) (expressing the standard of review of an evidentiary
ruling).
We have considered whether the improper preclusion of
evidence sought to be admitted by the defense should be considered
harmless error. R. 2:10-2. In a murder case where the defendant
testifies and provides an alternate version of the facts, the
preclusion of evidence supporting the defense version is not likely
to be harmless. "If there is a 'reasonable doubt as to whether
the error denied a fair trial and a fair decision on the merits,'
State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 338 (1971), a new trial is required.
Because defendant objected at trial, the harmful error standard
applies. R. 2:10-2." State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J. 493, 509 (2008).
We therefore reverse.
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Because we reverse defendant's convictions, we need not
address his sentence. We do note, however, that the judge erred
in considering defendant's prior record of arrests as a juvenile
and adult as an important consideration. Our Supreme Court has
instructed us in a Pre-trial Intervention context that the
prosecutor may not consider an individual's history of arrests as
an indication of unlawful behavior. State v. K.S., 220 N.J. 190,
199 (2015). In the sentencing context, certainly defendant's
juvenile and adult arrests that did not result in convictions
should not have been considered as indicia of unlawful behavior.
Defendant had been convicted of six drug-related disorderly
persons offenses, but had no juvenile adjudications of delinquency
or indictable criminal convictions.
After reviewing in detail defendant's arrest record,
beginning in 2007 when he was a juvenile, the judge commented on
the severity and frequency of the charges. She said: "There is
an ample record of [defendant's] criminal activity prior to the
events in this matter. He has a criminal history which includes
numerous arrests and was, by his own admission, a drug dealer by
trade." When considering arrests for the purposes of sentencing,
even prior to K.S., they might be considered as an unsuccessful
deterrent to criminal activity, or for some other relevant purpose,
but "[t]he important limitation of course is that the sentencing
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judge shall not infer guilt as to any underlying charge with
respect to which the defendant does not admit his guilt." State
v. Green, 62 N.J. 547, 571 (1973).
Reversed and remanded for a new trial. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
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