STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. HEATHER LEWIS (10-12-1301, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2020 )


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  •                                       RECORD IMPOUNDED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-1260-18T4
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    HEATHER LEWIS,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ___________________________
    Submitted December 16, 2019 – Decided January 29, 2020
    Before Judges Sabatino and Sumners.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Burlington County, Indictment No. 10-12-
    1301.
    Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
    appellant (Steven M. Gilson, Designated Counsel, on
    the brief).
    Scott A. Coffina, Burlington County Prosecutor,
    attorney for respondent (Alexis R. Agre, Assistant
    Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Defendant Heather Lewis appeals from a Law Division order denying her
    petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. Having
    reviewed the record considering the applicable legal standards, we affirm
    substantially for the reasons set forth by Judge Terrence R. Cook in his well-
    reasoned written decision.
    I.
    The procedural history and trial evidence are detailed in our unpublished
    decision affirming defendant's conviction on direct appeal, State v. Melia, Nos.
    A-1403-12, A-1912-12, (App. Div. Aug. 3, 2015), and in Judge Cook's written
    decision. A brief summary of the relevant facts and proceedings will suffice
    here.
    Over numerous occasions between 2002 and 2008, Robert S. Melia, Jr.
    and defendant (collectively defendants), who were romantically involved,
    sexually assaulted three minor females, nieces of a man with whom defendant
    had a previous relationship. Additionally, in 2007, defendant sexually assaulted
    a fourteen-year-old boy, who was related to one of the female victims.
    Execution of search warrants at Melia's house uncovered videos on his computer
    depicting some of the sexual abuse committed by defendants.
    A-1260-18T4
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    Following a ten-day trial, a jury found defendants guilty of numerous
    counts of sexual-assault and related offenses.       Specifically, defendant was
    convicted of four counts of first-degree aggravated sexual assault while aided
    and abetted, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(5); two counts of first-degree aggravated
    sexual assault on a victim who was physically helpless, N.J.S.A. 2C:14 -2(a)(7);
    four counts of second-degree sexual assault using physical force, N.J.S.A.
    2C:14-2(c)(1); three counts of second-degree sexual assault on a victim at least
    thirteen but less than sixteen year old, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(4); three counts of
    third-degree endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a); third-
    degree invasion of privacy by filming intimate parts, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-9(b); two
    counts of third-degree aggravated criminal sexual conduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(a);
    and five counts of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(b).
    After merger and concurrent sentences, defendant was sentenced to an aggregate
    twenty-year prison term subject to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7,
    and a consecutive five-year sentence for invasion of privacy. 1 Defendant's
    petition for certification was denied. State v. Lewis, 
    223 N.J. 558
    (2015).
    Over a year later, defendant filed for PCR alleging her trial counsel was
    ineffective because he failed to: (1) file a severance motion; (2) file a brief in
    1
    Co-defendant Melia received the same sentence.
    A-1260-18T4
    3
    support of Melia's suppression motion and did not adequately argue at the
    motion's hearing; (3) adequately conduct pre-trial investigation and consult with
    her prior to trial; and (4) file a motion for a new trial because the weight of the
    evidence did not support the verdict. Judge Cook, who was not the trial judge,
    denied relief without an evidentiary hearing.
    II.
    In this appeal, defendant presents the following arguments:
    THIS MATTER MUST BE REMANDED FOR AN
    EVIDENTIARY      HEARING       BECAUSE
    DEFENDANT ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE
    CASE OF TRIAL COUNSEL'S INEFFECTIVENESS
    FOR FAILING TO MOVE FOR A SEVERANCE
    FROM HER CO-DEFENDANT AND FAILING TO
    CONDUCT AN ADEQUATE INVESTIGATION AND
    TO CONSULT WITH HER.
    A. Trial Counsel Failed To Move For A
    Severance From The Co-defendant.
    B. Trial Counsel Failed To Conduct An
    Adequate Investigation And To Consult
    With Defendant.
    Applying the well-recognized two-prong test to establish ineffectiveness
    of counsel, Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687 (1984) and State v.
    Fritz, 
    105 N.J. 42
    , 58 (1987), Judge Cook properly found defendant failed to
    establish a prima facie PCR claim that: (1) trial counsel's performance was
    A-1260-18T4
    4
    deficient and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. We also
    agree with the judge's conclusion that consequently, defendant was not entitled
    to an evidentiary hearing. State v. Preciose, 
    129 N.J. 451
    , 462 (1992). Our
    reasoning follows.
    A. Motion to Sever Trial
    Defendant contends the judge erred in his analysis that counsel was not
    ineffective for seeking a separate trial from Melia. She asserts trial severance
    was necessary because her defense was antagonistic to Melia's defense because
    the "overwhelming bulk of [the State's] testimony" related to him; thereby
    causing her undue prejudice. We disagree, as Judge Cook made the right call
    that severance would not have been proper.
    Judge Cook found separate trials for defendants was not appropriate under
    State v. Sanchez, 
    143 N.J. 273
    , 282 (1996) (holding a joint trial is preferred
    where the State's evidence against the defendants is common) and State v.
    Coleman, 
    46 N.J. 16
    , 24 (1965) (holding the potential prejudice to the
    defendant's due process rights must be balanced against judicial economy of a
    joint trial). The judge explained that given defendants' common defense strategy
    – the victims, instigated by one of the victims and her stepfather, fabricated their
    allegations – severance for separate trials would have undermined their strategy.
    A-1260-18T4
    5
    Because the victims' testimony and the video evidence applied against both
    defendants, the judge noted, "[t]wo separate trials would have been a waste of
    judicial resources, an inconvenience to witnesses and the victims, could have
    resulted in inconsistent verdicts and would have prevented a reliable assignment
    of culpability." Therefore, trial counsel was not deficient, and defendant did not
    satisfy the first Strickland prong. We also agree with the judge's determination
    that the second prong of Strickland was not satisfied because defendant failed
    to offer any "facts in support of her contention that she was prejudiced by the"
    joint trial.
    We further add that since a motion to sever would have been unsuccessful,
    trial counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to raise a losing argument. State
    v. Echols, 
    199 N.J. 344
    , 360-61 (2009).
    B. Inadequate Investigation/Not Consult with Defendant
    Defendant asserts Judge Cook "did not address [her] general claim of
    inadequate investigation and lack of consultation regarding discovery." She
    contends trial counsel failed to conduct an adequate investigation to formulate
    a defense strategy and failed to review discovery with her, thus preventing her
    from being able to participate in her defense. We again disagree.
    A-1260-18T4
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    In recognizing the deference afforded to trial counsel's decisions
    concerning the witnesses to present and the "art" involving such choice, State v.
    Arthur, 
    184 N.J. 307
    , 321 (2005), Judge Cook found defendant's argument was
    hollow. The judge reasoned defendant made a bald assertion of failure to
    investigate because she
    provides no names, affidavits or anything else to
    support her allegation that there were witnesses who
    could have testified on her behalf. There is also nothing
    to suggest that any unnamed witnesses would have been
    available or amenable to testifying on [her] behalf.
    The judge further noted the victims' testimony and video evidence "was too
    overwhelming for any potential witness to change the outcome" of the guilty
    verdict. We discern no fault in this analysis. See State v. Cummings, 321 N.J.
    Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999) (explaining there must be more than bald
    allegations of counsel's substandard investigation; the defendant's PCR petition
    lacked supporting affidavits setting forth personal knowledge of what a more
    thorough investigation would have revealed).
    Because defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of counsel
    ineffectiveness, it was appropriate to deny her an evidentiary hearing. 
    Preciose, 129 N.J. at 462
    . To the extent we have not discussed them expressly, all other
    A-1260-18T4
    7
    arguments raised by defendants lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion. R.
    2:11-3(e)(2).
    Affirmed.
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