BRANDON BECKFORD VS. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS) ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4959-17T3
BRANDON BECKFORD,
Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent.
____________________________
Submitted December 2, 2019 – Decided February 3, 2020
Before Judges Moynihan and Mitterhoff.
On appeal from the New Jersey Department of
Corrections.
Brandon Beckford, appellant pro se.
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel; Suzanne Marie Davies, Deputy
Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Appellant Brandon Beckford appeals pro se from a final agency decision
of the New Jersey Department of Corrections (DOC) that found him guilty of a
prohibited act and sanctioned him. Having reviewed the record in light of the
governing legal principles, we affirm.
I.
We discern the following facts from the record. On March 8, 2018,
Special Investigations Division (SID) Investigator J. Newton conducted a
review of the recorded inmate telephone system. Investigator Newton located
a call made by appellant on March 6, 2018 at approximately 8:30 p.m. to
Ayeisha Forbes. During the call, appellant instructed Forbes to initiate a three-
way call with his cousin Crystal. During the call, appellant stated, "alright
look, I want to ask you something. I don't want to say it I'm going to spell it."
Appellant then spelled out Suboxone,1 a controlled dangerous substance
(CDS). Appellant requested that Crystal acquire "as many [of the drug] as she
. . . can get her hands on." Appellant assured Crystal that Forbes could pick up
the drug from her. Appellant asked that Crystal relay the purchase price to
Forbes, who would then communicate the price to him. Investigator Newton
1
Appellant spelled the word "Suboxen," which the DOC determined meant
Suboxone. Therefore, we refer to it as Suboxone.
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also located a second call between appellant and Forbes that occurred on
March 7, 2018, during which Forbes asked how much of the drug he wanted,
and appellant reiterated that he "wants all of [it]."
As a result of these calls, appellant was charged with violating
prohibited act "*.803/*.203[,] [a]ttempting to possess or introduce any
prohibited substances such as drugs, intoxicants or related paraphernalia not
prescribed for the inmate by the medical or dental staff, in violation of
N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a)." Appellant pleaded not guilty to this charge and was
granted a counsel substitute to represent him in his ensuing hearing.
On March 9, 2018, a hearing was held, at which appellant asserted he
made no attempt to purchase Suboxone or introduce it into the prison. C.
Ralph, a disciplinary hearing officer, found appellant guilty of *.803/*.203 and
entered an adjudication of disciplinary charge:
[Appellant] waived his [twenty-four hour] notice and
plead not guilty stating he was trying to get pills for
his girlfriend[.] SID Inv. Newton reported [appellant]
was attempting to introduce CDS into the institution.
[Ralph] listened to phone calls . . . where [appellant]
specifically asked his cousin [C]rystal to get
[S]uboxone (as many as she could) and [Forbes] . . .
would pick them up. [Forbes] is on [appellant's] visit
list. Crystal is not[.] [Appellant] stated the drugs
were not meant for the institution.
....
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[Ralph] relies on [appellant] admitt[ing] to asking his
cousin to get [S]uboxone[.] [Appellant] did not
[s]pecifically state how to introduce them, [but] he did
admit to attempting to possess CDS. [Forbes] is a
visitor who could attempt to bring them into
NJDOC[.]
After the hearing, appellant received sanctions, including 120 days' loss of
commutation time, 120 days' administrative segregation, and 365 days of urine
monitoring. Appellant appealed the officer's determination, claiming that he
did not seek "to introduce drugs into the institution" and was merely
"instructing [Forbes] to get the [Suboxone] for herself." Appellant argued that
the phone conversations did not indicate he had asked Forbes to bring anything
to the prison and that she does not visit him. That same day, Erin Nardelli, a
DOC associate administrator, entered a disposition of disciplinary appeal,
upholding the hearing officer's decision. This appeal ensued. 2
On appeal, appellant argues that the DOC's determination denied him
due process because the agency restricted him from hearing the recordings that
purportedly supported its findings. In addition, largely for the same reason,
2
On August 6, 2018, we entered orders granting motions by appellant to
proceed as an indigent and to file his notice of appeal as within time and
denying his motion for a stay pending appeal. On March 14, 2019, we entered
an order granting appellant's motion to file a brief as within time.
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appellant claims that the decision was not grounded in credible or substantial
evidence.
Appellant first contends that "the evidence relied on by the [DOC] does
not support [its] findings." We disagree.
Our review of the DOC's final agency decision is deferential, and we
must uphold it unless the decision "is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or
it is not supported by substantial credible evidence." In re Taylor, 158 N.J.
644, 657 (1999) (quoting Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80
(1980)). The relevant standard of review is "'whether the findings made could
reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the
record' considering 'the proofs as a whole.'" Id. at 656 (quoting Close v.
Kordulak Bros., 44 N.J. 589, 599 (1965)).
N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.15(a) provides that "[a] finding of guilt at a
disciplinary hearing shall be based upon substantial evidence that the inmate
has committed a prohibited act." Substantial evidence is "such evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." In re Pub.
Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 35 N.J. 358, 376 (1961) (quoting In re Hackensack
Water Co., 41 N.J. Super. 408, 418 (App. Div. 1956)). In that regard,
appellant's initial phone call with Forbes and Crystal, as well as his subsequent
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phone call with Forbes, support the hearing officer's determination that
appellant attempted to possess or introduce a prohibited substance such as
drugs not prescribed to him and was therefore in violation of *.803/*.203.
Indeed, appellant does not dispute that he asked Crystal to obtain the
Suboxone and deliver the drugs to Forbes, who was on his visitor's list.
Assuming arguendo that appellant did not explicitly state that Forbes should
bring the drugs to the prison, it was reasonable for the hearing officer to
conclude that was the purpose of the transaction. Thus, we conclude that the
DOC's determination that appellant was guilty of attempting to introduce
Suboxone, thereby violating N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a), is supported by ample,
credible evidence in the record. See In re Taylor, 158 N.J. at 656; In re Pub.
Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 35 N.J. at 376; N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.15(a).
Equally without merit is appellant's argument that he was denied due
process because the agency denied his request to hear the actual recordings of
his telephone conversations with Crystal and Forbes. Inmates subject to
disciplinary proceedings do not receive the full spectrum of rights accorded to
criminal defendants, but they must be accorded a minimum level of due
process. Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 521-22 (1975). The Court in Avant
clarified that these rights include
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(a) written notice of the claimed violations[;] (b)
disclosure . . . of evidence[;] (c) opportunity to be
heard in person and to present witnesses and
documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and
cross[-]examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing
officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing
confrontation); (e) a "neutral and detached" hearing
body . . . members of which need not be judicial
officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the
factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons
(for acting).
[Id. at 523 (alterations in original) (quoting Morrissey
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972)).]
See also McDonald v. Pinchak, 139 N.J. 188, 202 (1995) (stating that the
Avant requirements "strike the proper balance between the security concerns
of the prison, the need for swift and fair discipline, and the due process rights
of the inmates"). An inmate's rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses
and present evidence are predicated upon that inmate making a request to do
so. Id. at 197 (quoting N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.14(a)).
Contrary to appellant's argument, the DOC afforded him all due process
rights to which he was legally entitled. See Avant, 67 N.J. at 523. Appellant
was notified of his charge on March 9, 2018, and a hearing proceeded
expeditiously that same day after he waived his right to twenty-four hours'
notice. Appellant was represented by a counsel substitute, and hearing officer
Ralph was an impartial tribunal. Appellant had the opportunity to call
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witnesses on his behalf and confront and cross-examine them, which he
declined to do. Because the DOC scrupulously adhered to the procedures
mandated by Avant, appellant's due process claims have no merit.
To the extent we have not specifically addressed any remaining
arguments raised by the parties, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to
warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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