MARION JACOBS VS. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS) ( 2020 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-3264-18T2
    MARION JACOBS,
    Appellant,
    v.
    NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT
    OF CORRECTIONS,
    Respondent.
    ___________________________
    Submitted March 30, 2020 – Decided April 22, 2020
    Before Judges Ostrer and Vernoia.
    On appeal from the New Jersey Department of
    Corrections.
    Marion Jacobs, appellant pro se.
    Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
    respondent (Jane C. Schuster, Assistant Attorney
    General, of counsel; Beonica McClanahan, Deputy
    Attorney General, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Appellant Marion Jacobs is incarcerated in New Jersey State Prison, and
    he appeals from a New Jersey Department of Corrections (DOC) final agency
    decision finding he committed prohibited act *.002, assaulting another person,
    N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a)(1)(ii); and imposing the following sanctions: 181 days
    administrative segregation, 180 days loss of commutation time, and 30 days loss
    of phone privileges. We affirm.
    On February 2, 2019, another inmate at the prison was assigned to clean
    Jacobs's cell. Dissatisfied with the manner in which the inmate was cleaning his
    cell, Jacobs punched and bit the inmate. A corrections officer inquired about
    the blood he observed on the inmate's shirt, and the inmate reported Jacobs
    assaulted him. The inmate had a cut above his left eye, a bite mark on his chest,
    and scratches on his arms and back.
    Officers searched Jacobs's cell and spoke with Jacobs. They observed
    blood on Jacobs's shirt, but he did not exhibit or complain of any injuries. Jacobs
    did not report to the officers or medical staff that the inmate struck him.
    The same day, Jacobs was charged with prohibited act *.004, fighting with
    another person, N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a)(2)(ii). Jacobs pleaded not guilty and was
    assigned a counsel substitute. A corrections officer obtained a video recording
    A-3264-18T2
    2
    of the area outside Jacobs's cell at the time of the incident, and Jacobs reviewed
    the recording prior to his hearing on the charge.
    The hearing officer considered the video recording, Jacobs's testimony,
    the inmate's written statement, and the officers' and medical staff's reports.
    Jacobs testified he acted in self-defense. He claimed the inmate "popped [him]
    in the face" and "put [him] in a bear hug," and, in response, he punched and bit
    the inmate.
    The hearing officer found the inmate's version of the incident credible and
    Jacobs's testimony inconsistent with the video recording and other evidence.
    The hearing officer determined there was no credible evidence showing Jacobs
    and the inmate fought and found Jacobs's guilty of an amended charge of
    committing prohibited act *.002, assaulting another person. The hearing officer
    recommended     sanctions   including    administrative    segregation,   loss    of
    commutation time, and loss of phone privileges.           Jacobs administratively
    appealed.
    A DOC Associate Administrator determined the hearing officer's findings
    were "based on substantial evidence and the sanction was proportionate in view
    of [Jacobs's] prior disciplinary history," and upheld the hearing officer's
    decision. This appeal followed.
    A-3264-18T2
    3
    Jacobs presents the following arguments for our consideration:
    POINT I
    THE    DECISION    OF    THE    PRISON
    ADMINISTRATOR WAS NOT ADEQUATELY
    SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL CREDIBLE
    EVIDENCE IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD.
    THE DECISION WAS AT ODDS WITH THE
    AUTHOR OF THE CHARGE AND THE
    APPELLANT'S SELF-DEFENSE ARGUMENT IN
    VIOLATION OF THE APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO
    DUE PROCESS.
    POINT II
    THE HEARING OFFICER FAILED TO CONDUCT
    THE DISCIPLINARY HEARING IN ACCORDANCE
    WITH TITLE 10A, AND THEREBY VIOLATED
    [APPELLANT'S] RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
    POINT III
    THE   APPELLANT   SUBMITS   THAT THE
    DISCIPLINARY HEARING OFFICER AND THE
    ADMINISTRATOR FAILED TO ADEQUATELY
    REVIEW OR CONSIDER THE RECORD IN
    DISMISSING   APPELLANT'S   PLEA  FOR
    LENIENCY.
    POINT IV
    THE HEARING WAS HELD IN VIOLATION OF
    NUMEROUS CODES OF TITLE 10A WHICH
    GOVERNS THE DISCIPLINARY PROCESS.
    A-3264-18T2
    4
    Our review of agency determinations is limited. See In re Stallworth, 
    208 N.J. 182
    , 194 (2011); Brady v. Bd. of Review, 
    152 N.J. 197
    , 210 (1997);
    Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 
    414 N.J. Super. 186
    , 190 (App. Div. 2010). We
    will not reverse an administrative agency's decision unless it is "arbitrary,
    capricious, or unreasonable, or [] not supported by substantial credible evidence
    in the record as a whole." 
    Stallworth, 208 N.J. at 194
    (citation omitted); accord
    Jenkins v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 
    412 N.J. Super. 243
    , 259 (App. Div. 2010). In
    determining whether an agency action is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable,
    we consider: (1) whether the agency followed the law; (2) whether substantial
    evidence supports the findings; and (3) whether the agency "clearly erred" in
    applying the "legislative policies to the facts." In re Carter, 
    191 N.J. 474
    , 482-
    83 (2007) (quoting Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 
    143 N.J. 22
    , 25 (1995)).
    Although    we    afford   deference   to   an   administrative    agency's
    determination, our review is not perfunctory and "our function is not to merely
    rubberstamp an agency's decision." 
    Figueroa, 414 N.J. Super. at 191
    . We must
    "engage in a 'careful and principled consideration of the agency record and
    findings.'" Williams v. Dep't of Corr., 
    330 N.J. Super. 197
    , 204 (App. Div.
    2000) (quoting Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 
    64 N.J. 85
    , 93 (1973)).
    A-3264-18T2
    5
    We carefully reviewed the record and find Jacobs's arguments are without
    sufficient merit to warrant further discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-
    3(e)(1)(D) and (E).       We note only there is substantial credible evidence
    supporting the DOC's determination Jacobs assaulted the inmate and did not act
    in self-defense. The hearing officer considered all the evidence presented and
    determined the inmate's version of the events was credible and Jacobs's version
    was not. We owe particular deference to the agency's credibility determinations,
    where its hearing officer had the opportunity to observe the inmate's testimony.
    See State v. Locurto, 
    157 N.J. 463
    , 470-74 (1999). We therefore find no basis
    to reject the hearing officer's factual finding Jacobs assaulted the inmate.
    We also reject Jacobs's assertion the DOC did not consider the evidence
    he claims established he acted in self-defense under N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.13(f).
    The regulation requires an inmate who "raise[s] self-defense to a prohibited act
    involving the use of force among inmates" present evidence establishing six
    specified conditions.1 Jacobs's argument fails because, as noted, the evidence
    1
    In pertinent part, N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.13(f) provides:
    [An] inmate claiming self-defense shall be responsible for
    presenting supporting evidence that shall include each of the
    following conditions:
    A-3264-18T2
    6
    and testimony he presented in support of his self-defense claim was deemed not
    credible.
    Affirmed.
    1. The inmate was not the initial aggressor;
    2. The inmate did not provoke the attacker;
    3. The use of force was not by mutual agreement;
    4. The use of force was used to defend against personal harm, not
    to defend property or honor;
    5. The inmate had no reasonable opportunity or alternative to avoid
    the use of force, such as, by retreat or alerting correctional facility
    staff; and
    6. Whether the force used by the inmate to respond to the attacker
    was reasonably necessary for self-defense and did not exceed the
    amount of force used against the inmate.
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    7