STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. MARC S. GOODSON (02-07-0309, SALEM COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2020 )


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  •                                      RECORD IMPOUNDED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-0757-18T1
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    MARC S. GOODSON, a/k/a
    TALIB A. GOODSON,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Submitted February 12, 2020 – Decided March 2, 2020
    Before Judges Fuentes and Mayer.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Salem County, Indictment No. 02-07-0309.
    Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
    appellant (Howard E. Drucks, Designated Counsel, on
    the brief).
    John T. Lenahan, Salem County Prosecutor, attorney
    for respondent (David M. Galemba, Assistant
    Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Defendant Marc S. Goodson appeals from an August 29, 2018 order
    denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary
    hearing. We affirm.
    Defendant was indicted on two counts of first-degree aggravated sexual
    assault for an act of sexual penetration against a victim at least thirteen years
    old but less than sixteen years old, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c), and two counts of
    second-degree endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a). He
    pleaded guilty to one count of second-degree sexual assault as a lesser included
    offense of first-degree aggravated sexual assault, third-degree witness
    tampering, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b)(3), and the petty disorderly persons offense of
    harassment downgraded from terroristic threats. On June 22, 2004, defendant
    was sentenced to an aggregate eight-year prison term, concurrent to the sentence
    he was already serving at the time, as well as Megan's Law and parole
    supervision for life. The State dismissed the remaining indictments.
    Defendant appealed the sentence imposed by the court through the
    summary process available under Rule 2:9-11. In an order dated August 30,
    2007, this court remanded the matter for the sentencing judge to ensure
    defendant was informed of the potential of civil commitment under the Sexually
    Violent Predator Act, N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24 to -27.38. State v. Goodson, No. A-
    A-0757-18T1
    2
    3542-04 (App. Div. Aug. 30, 2007). In accordance with our remand, defendant
    was resentenced on January 28, 2008.
    Defendant filed a pro se PCR petition on November 14, 2017. In his
    supporting certification, defendant contended there was newly discovered
    evidence that should have been investigated and presented by his trial attorney.
    Defendant argued his attorney's failure to investigate and obtain evidence
    constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. He also claimed the failure to file
    his petition within the five-year time period pursuant to Rule 3:22-12 was "due
    to newly discovered evidence obtained while paroled" and constituted excusable
    neglect.
    The PCR judge determined defendant's petition was procedurally time-
    barred. Despite the time-bar, the judge addressed the substantive arguments
    raised in defendant's application, and concluded the petition lacked merit and
    therefore no evidentiary hearing was warranted.
    On appeal, defendant argues the following:
    POINT ONE
    THE PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING
    DEFENDANT'S      PETITION      FOR   POST-
    CONVICTION      RELIEF     DESPITE    THE
    INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AS
    ESTABLISHED BY THE U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI
    AND BY THE N.J. CONST. ART. I, ¶ 10.
    A-0757-18T1
    3
    (a)   Defendant's Claims.
    (b)   Legal Standards Governing Application for Post-
    Conviction Relief.
    (c)   Argument Before the PCR Court.
    (d)   The PCR Court's Rulings.
    (e)   The PCR Court Erred in Ruling that Defendant's
    Petition for Post-Conviction Relief was Time-
    Barred.
    (f)   The PCR Court Erred in Rejecting Defendant's
    Claim that Defendant was Denied Effective
    Assistance of Counsel When Trial Counsel 1)
    Failed to Review the DNA Report with
    Defendant; 2) Failed to Apprise Defendant of the
    Evidential Significance of the DNA Report; 3)
    Indicated that he had Lost the DNA Report but
    Would not Solicit Another Copy; 4) Indicated
    that he Would not Cross-Examine [the minor
    victim] on the Basis of the DNA Test; 5) and
    Stated the DNA Test Would not be Admitted as
    Evidence.
    (g)   The PCR Court Erred in Rejecting Defendant's
    Claim that Defendant was Denied Effective
    Assistance of Counsel Because of Trial Counsel's
    Failure to Conduct Effective Pre-Trial
    Investigation.
    (h)   The PCR Court Erred in Rejecting Defendant's
    Claim that Trial Counsel's Failures Regarding
    Pre-Trial   Discovery,     Investigation, and
    Disclosures to his Client Rendered Defendant's
    Plea Involuntary.
    A-0757-18T1
    4
    (i)   The PCR Court Erred in not Finding That the
    Errors of his Trial Counsel Cumulatively
    Constituted Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
    POINT TWO
    THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT
    DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR AN EVIDENTIARY
    HEARING REGARDING DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS
    OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL
    COUNSEL.
    We need not address defendant's substantive arguments on appeal because
    we agree with the PCR judge that defendant's petition was time-barred in
    accordance with Rule 3:22-12(a)(1). The PCR petition was filed in November
    2017. Defendant's judgment of conviction was entered on June 22, 2004. Even
    using the date of defendant's subsequent resentencing, January 30, 2008,1
    defendant's petition was filed well-beyond the five-year period.
    The five-year time bar may be relaxed only under the specified
    circumstances set forth in Rule 3:22-12(a)(1)(A).        A late filing may be
    considered if the petition itself shows excusable neglect for the late filing and
    that a fundamental injustice will result if defendant's claims are not considered
    on the merits. See State v. Brewster, 
    429 N.J. Super. 387
    , 400 (App. Div. 2013).
    1
    The date of the judgment of conviction controls even in the event of
    subsequent sentencing proceedings. See State v. Cann, 
    342 N.J. Super. 93
    , 102
    (App. Div. 2001).
    A-0757-18T1
    5
    Here, we agree with the PCR judge that none of the exceptions applied to relax
    the five-year time-bar.
    Defendant failed to establish excusable neglect justifying his delay in
    filing the PCR petition. Nor did he demonstrate enforcement of the time-bar
    will result in a fundamental injustice. The information upon which defendant
    relies in support of his PCR application, namely fifty-five witnesses who would
    testify defendant was not present at the apartment on the date of the incident ,
    was known at the time of trial. Further, the lack of DNA evidence establishing
    defendant as the father of the child was legally irrelevant to the charged offense
    of sexual assault of a child between ages thirteen and sixteen. Defendant is
    required to submit "sufficient competent evidence" to satisfy the standards for
    relaxing the rule's time restriction, State v. Brown, 
    455 N.J. Super. 460
    , 470
    (App. Div. 2018), and he failed to do so.
    Having reviewed the record, we affirm for the reasons stated in Judge John
    C. Eastlack, Jr.'s thorough August 30, 2018 written decision.
    Affirmed.
    A-0757-18T1
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-0757-18T1

Filed Date: 3/2/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 3/2/2020