ALLEN JONES VS. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS) ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4989-18T1
ALLEN JONES,
Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent.
_____________________________
Submitted May 11, 2020 – Decided June 12, 2020
Before Judges Rothstadt and Moynihan.
On appeal from the New Jersey Department of
Corrections.
Allen Jones, appellant pro se.
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Chanell Branch, Deputy Attorney General,
on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Appellant Allen Jones, an inmate at Northern State Prison, appeals from
respondent the New Jersey Department of Corrections (DOC) final agency
decision finding he committed prohibited act *.004, fighting with another
person. See N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a)(2)(i). The DOC imposed sanctions of one
hundred days administrative segregation, one hundred days loss of commutation
time and one hundred days loss of recreation privileges. On appeal, Jones
contends that the DOC's decision was contrary to "the sufficient credible
evidence present in the record," and its factual conclusions were "so wide off
the mark as to be manifestly mistaken giving rise to a sense of wrongness, in
violation of due process, statute, and regulation." We affirm.
The charge against Jones arose from an incident that occurred on May 13,
2019, when he and another inmate engaged in an argument. According to Jones,
the argument started when the other inmate accused Jones of "talking about
him." That other inmate was joined by another inmate who placed his hands-on
Jones, which led to Jones and the other inmate engaging in a spitting match. The
other inmate then initiated the first strike against Jones and a physical altercation
ensued. That led to other inmates getting involved and according to Jones he
was "forced to defend himself."
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As the fight escalated, other prisoners tried to prevent the two from
fighting without success. Corrections officers on the scene ordered the inmates
to cease fighting and when they ignored those directions, a "Code 33" was
initiated that caused other officers to immediately appear at the scene and assist
in breaking up of the fight and restraining the participants.
Based on these events, prison officials charged Jones and the other two
inmates with committing the prohibited act. After the charge was drawn against
Jones, he was served with it on the same day. After several postponements of
the scheduled hearing, the matter was finally heard on May 29, 2019, before an
institutional hearing officer.
At the hearing, Jones was provided with the benefit of counsel substitute.
Jones pled not guilty to the charge and explained in his defense that he "was
playing chess, two guys came on me for no reason. I had no choice but to fight
back." In addition, counsel substitute argued that the other inmates came at
Jones and he had no choice but to react.
Although offered the opportunity to call witnesses, Jones did not ask for
any to appear. Significantly, at the hearing, Jones viewed with counsel
substitute and the hearing officer a video from the prison's surveillance cameras
that captured the entire incident.
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At the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing officer determined that Jones
was guilty of the charge. According to the hearing officer, Jones's assertion of
self-defense was belied by the video footage. The hearing officer thereafter
imposed sanctions.
Jones sought an administrative appeal from the hearing officer's
determination. In his appeal, Jones asserted that the video footage depicted that
he was defending himself and he alleged that additional footage was withheld
that would have confirmed what happened. According to Jones, the hearing
officer knew that he was not the initial aggressor. On June 7, 2019, the DOC
upheld the hearing officer's findings and sanctions. This appeal followed.
Our review of an agency's determinations is limited. See In re Stallworth,
208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011). We will not reverse an administrative agency decision
unless it is "arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or [] not supported by
substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole." Stallworth, 208 N.J. at
194 (alteration in original). When determining whether an agency action is
arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, we consider: (1) whether the agency
followed the law; (2) whether substantial evidence supports the findings; and
(3) whether the agency "clearly erred" in applying the "legislative policies to the
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facts." In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482-83 (2007) (quoting Mazza v. Bd. of Trs.,
143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995)).
Although we afford deference to an administrative agency's
determination, our review is not perfunctory and "our function is not to merely
rubberstamp an agency decision." Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J.
Super. 186, 191 (App. Div. 2010). We must "engage in a 'careful and principled
consideration of the agency record and findings.'" Williams v. Dep't of Corr.,
330 N.J. Super 197, 204 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting Mayflower Sec. Co. v.
Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973)). However, in our consideration, where
video tape evidence is involved, we will defer to the agency's determination, as
the fact finder, and not substitute our judgment for the agency's, unless its
"factual findings are so clearly mistaken—so wide of the mark—that the
interests of justice demand intervention." State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 381
(2017); see also State v. McNeil-Thomas, 238 N.J. 256, 272 (2019).
We carefully reviewed the record and conclude Jones's arguments are
without sufficient merit to warrant further discussion in a written opinion as
there is "substantial" credible evidence, N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.15(a), supporting the
DOC's determination he committed the charged offense. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D).
We note only that the hearing officer considered all the evidence presented and
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determined that Jones's version of the events was not credible. We therefore
find no basis to reject the DOC's acceptance of the hearing officer's factual
finding that Jones engaged in impermissible fighting.
We reject Jones's contention that the DOC did not consider the evidence
that, he claims, established he acted in self-defense. N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.13(f)
requires an inmate who "raise[s] self-defense to a prohibited act involving the
use of force among inmates" to present evidence establishing six specific
conditions. The regulation provides, in part, the following:
[An] inmate claiming self-defense shall be responsible
for presenting supporting evidence that shall include
each of the following conditions:
1. The inmate was not the initial aggressor;
2. The inmate did not provoke the attacker;
3. The use of force was not by mutual agreement;
4. The use of force was used to defend against personal
harm, not to defend property or honor;
5. The inmate had no reasonable opportunity or
alternative to avoid the use of force, such as, by retreat
or alerting correctional facility staff; and
6. Whether the force used by the inmate to respond to
the attacker was reasonably necessary for self-defense
and did not exceed the amount of force used against the
inmate.
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[N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.13(f) (emphasis added).]
Even when an inmate presents evidence of self-defense, his contention is
subject to further scrutiny. The hearing officer must then consider whether "any
other condition or evidence that would cause the force that was used by the
inmate to be deemed unreasonable, such as, but not limited to, any use of force
that would interfere with or otherwise undermine the safe, secure or orderly
operation of the correctional facility." N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.13(g).
Here, the evidence Jones presented in support of his self-defense claim
was deemed not credible, determined by the hearing officer to be belied by the
video footage, and was insufficient under the regulation. Under the
circumstances here, where Jones only argued that the video showed he did not
initiate the fight, his contention alone does not satisfy his obligation under the
regulation.
Affirmed.
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