STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. SHANIKAH S. DANIELS (11-11-0749, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0649-18T2
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
SHANIKAH S. DANIELS,
a/k/a SHANIKA DANIELS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Submitted June 2, 2020 – Decided June 16, 2020
Before Judges Fisher and Rose.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Somerset County, Indictment No. 11-11-
0749.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Elizabeth H. Smith, Designated Counsel, on
the brief).
Michael H. Robertson, Somerset County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Amanda Paige Frankel,
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Shanikah Daniels appeals an order denying her petition for
post-conviction relief (PCR) following an evidentiary hearing. Because
defendant failed to demonstrate her trial counsel's "deficient performance
prejudiced the defense," Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), 1
we affirm.
For her part in crimes against a seventeen-year-old girl, defendant was
charged in a separate indictment from her two accomplices with first-degree
robbery, second-degree kidnapping, third-degree aggravated assault, and several
second- and fourth-degree weapons offenses. Prior to trial, the State extended
an open plea offer to defendant, which meant the State did not make a sentencing
recommendation but reserved the right to argue for a sentence in the second-
degree range. Defendant rejected that offer and a jury convicted her of nearly
all charges, except robbery and one weapons offense; she was sentenced to an
aggregate seven-year prison term, subject to the eighty-five percent parole
disqualifier under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.
1
In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court established a two-part test,
requiring a defendant seeking PCR on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds
to demonstrate: (1) the particular manner in which counsel's performance was
deficient; and (2) that the deficiency prejudiced defendant's right to a fair trial .
Ibid. Our Supreme Court adopted the Strickland test in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J.
42, 58 (1987).
A-0649-18T2
2
One month later, the trial judge resentenced defendant solely to impose
the registration requirements under Megan's Law. See N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(b)(2)
(requiring registration as a sex offender for certain non-sexual offenses,
including kidnapping of a minor). We affirmed defendant's conviction and
sentence in our prior unpublished opinion. State v. Daniels, No. A-5451-12
(App. Div. Dec. 9, 2014).
After the Supreme Court denied certification, defendant filed a petition
for PCR, contending her trial counsel was ineffective by failing to advise that
her kidnapping charge triggered Megan's Law consequences. The State
conceded defendant established counsel's deficiency and was thereby entitled
to an evidentiary hearing. But the State further argued defendant could not
establish prejudice under the second Strickland prong because defendant's
ineffectiveness claim was "premised solely on the speculative success of a
theoretical plea negotiation in a multi-defendant case."
Defendant testified at the hearing and presented the testimony of her trial
counsel. Defendant asserted that had she known she would have had to register
under Megan's Law, she would have attempted "to work out a plea" that avoided
that requirement. Trial counsel acknowledged he was unaware Megan's Law
registration applied to defendant's kidnapping charge until after she was
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sentenced, and said he would have attempted to negotiate a deal that avoided
that consequence. 2
Notably, both witnesses conceded they did not know whether the State
would have agreed to eliminate the requirement. On cross-examination, trial
counsel recalled the State was "principally focused" on defendant's cohort, "the
Irvington police officer." Trial counsel acknowledged that the State would not
have "cut one loose and let the other [go] to trial alone," specifically stating:
"It's my understanding there was no plea by one without the other."
Because defendant was unable to demonstrate the State would have
offered her a plea agreement eliminating her exposure to Megan's Law
registration requirements, the PCR judge, who was not the trial judge, denied
defendant's petition. In a written decision that accompanied his order, the judge
concluded defendant failed to establish prejudice under the second Strickland
prong. This appeal followed.
On appeal, defendant renews her argument in a single point for our
consideration:
THE [PCR] COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR
FAILING TO ADVISE [DEFENDANT] THAT A
CONVICTION OF KIDNAPPING WOULD SUBJECT
2
Neither the trial judge nor the State was aware of the consequences until after
defendant's initial sentence.
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4
HER TO THE REGISTRATION PROVISIONS OF
MEGAN'S LAW.
We have carefully considered defendant's contentions in view of the applicable
law, and conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant extended discussion in
this written opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(2), beyond the following comments.
Our review following an evidentiary hearing for PCR "is necessarily
deferential to a PCR court's factual findings based on its review of live witness
testimony." State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 540 (2013). Where an evidentiary
hearing has been held, we should not disturb "the PCR court's findings that are
supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. Pierre, 223
N.J. 560, 576 (2015) (citation omitted). We review any legal conclusions of the
court de novo. Nash, 212 N.J. at 540-41.
The testimony adduced at the hearing fell far short of establishing the
second Strickland prong. The record is devoid of any evidence that the State
would have offered a plea agreement eliminating Megan's Law consequences.
Rather, the record reveals the State was unwilling to negotiate a plea agreement
with defendant because her accomplice exercised his right to trial. The State's
open plea offer therefore required defendant to plead guilty to all counts, only
limiting her sentencing exposure on the first-degree robbery to the second-
degree range. Defendant simply presented no evidence to demonstrate the State
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would have extended a plea offer, eliminating the mandatory registration
requirement under the kidnapping charge. The record amply supports the P CR
judge's findings. 3 See Pierre, 223 N.J. at 576.
Affirmed.
3
We part company with the judge's reasoning in one respect. We discern no
distinction between a trial attorney's obligation to advise a client about Megan's
Law consequences in the context of "completing the plea form and/or during
the plea colloquy" and when informing the client's "decision to go to trial." See
State v. L.G.-M., N.J. Super. , (App. Div. 2020) (slip op. at 11)
("impos[ing] an obligation upon defense attorneys to advise their clients of the
potential immigration consequences of any criminal disposition whether that
disposition will result from a guilty plea, trial, or diversionary program"), certif.
denied, N.J. (2020).
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