TARA J. KUMOR VS. BOARD OF REVIEW (BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR ( 2020 )


Menu:
  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-2126-18T2
    TARA J. KUMOR,
    Appellant,
    v.
    BOARD OF REVIEW,
    DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
    and FOURANS, LLC,
    Respondents.
    Argued telephonically May 19, 2020 –
    Decided June 18, 2020
    Before Judges Accurso and Gilson.
    On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of
    Labor, Docket No. 157,035.
    Tara J. Kumor, argued the cause pro se.
    Rimma Razhba argued the cause for respondent Board
    of Review (Donna Sue Arons, Assistant Attorney
    General, of counsel; Rimma Razhba, Deputy Attorney
    General, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Tara J. Kumor appeals from the final decision of the Board of Review
    disqualifying her from receipt of unemployment compensation pursuant to
    N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). The Board determined that Kumor left her job without
    good cause attributable to the work. We affirm.
    Kumor was employed by a staffing agency, Fourans, LLC, and assigned
    to the Department of Community Affairs where she worked as a paralegal in
    the Sandy Recovery Division in an open-ended assignment that began in April
    2017. Kumor testified at the hearing before the Appeal Tribunal that she
    resigned after being asked to sign a legal document on behalf of the agency
    that made her very uncomfortable. When she refused, the person asking her to
    sign the document told Kumor she was uncooperative and would have
    someone else sign in her stead.
    Kumor thereafter sent an email to her supervisor at Community Affairs
    explaining that she would "not be renewing [her] contract" and would be
    "filing for unemployment as a quit with good cause or contract ended." She
    wrote that she believed her colleagues in the Sandy Recovery Division
    "value[d] [her] work — but the State of New Jersey does not and that is a
    breach of the social contract." Her supervisor at the State replied in an email
    two hours later stating she and her colleagues "appreciate[d] [Kumor's] hard
    A-2126-18T2
    2
    work and would be happy if you change your mind and decide to stay."
    Kumor wrote the same day to Fourans, stating she "would like to be available
    for assignments but not with the State of New Jersey. The State is bankrupt."
    Kumor also testified she contacted the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation
    for assistance, which it provided in some fashion, and that she'd quit the Sandy
    Recovery Division "in haste," but that she had not "quit Fourans." Kumor
    admitted seeking unemployment benefits four days after her resignation from
    the State.
    A representative of Fourans testified at the hearing that Fourans knew
    Kumor had "tendered her resignation to [its] client," the State of New Jersey,
    but was not made aware that the State had allowed Kumor the opportunity to
    rescind her resignation, or that she was seeking assistance from the Division of
    Vocational Rehabilitation. The representative claimed that Kumor quit her
    full-time assignment before contacting Fourans and applied for unemployment
    benefits only days later, thus clearly indicating her unwillingness to continue
    employment.
    After hearing the testimony and considering the documents submitted in
    evidence, the Appeal Tribunal determined that Kumor left work voluntarily
    without good cause attributable to the work. The Tribunal reasoned that
    A-2126-18T2
    3
    Kumor was "in an ongoing long-term assignment . . . which would not have
    ceased if not for her voluntary resignation," underscored by the language in her
    resignation letter indicating that she would be "'filing for unemployment as a
    quit with good cause or contract ended.'" The Tribunal rejected Kumor's
    contention that she left with good cause attributable to the work because being
    termed "uncooperative" or "[f]eeling undervalued, or that the client was
    'bankrupt' does not constitute good cause to justify voluntarily leaving."
    Acknowledging Kumor's concern about being asked to sign a legal document
    on behalf of the agency, the Tribunal noted her resignation letter did not
    mention the incident, but found that had her resignation "been due to being
    asked to perform an act that was inappropriate or illegal," her failure to grieve
    the matter with her employer, Fourans, "prior to resigning constitutes a failure
    to do what was necessary and reasonable in order to remain employed." The
    Board of Review found Kumor had been afforded a full and impartial hearing
    and "agree[d] with the decision reached" on "the basis of the record below."
    Kumor appeals, arguing the Board's decision was arbitrary because she
    was "available for work" as assigned by Fourans, just not with the State of
    New Jersey. She also contends her refusal to execute the document she was
    asked to sign was reasonable in accordance with professional codes.
    A-2126-18T2
    4
    Our review of administrative agency decisions is limited. In re
    Stallworth, 
    208 N.J. 182
    , 194 (2011). The agency's determination carries a
    presumption of correctness, and the claimant bears a substantial burden of
    persuasion. Gloucester Cty. Welfare Bd. v. N.J. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 
    93 N.J. 384
    , 390-91, 397 (1983).
    "If the Board's factual findings are supported by 'sufficient credible
    evidence, [we] are obligated to accept them.'" Brady v. Bd. of Review, 
    152 N.J. 197
    , 210 (1997) (quoting Self v. Bd. of Review, 
    91 N.J. 453
    , 459 (1982)).
    "Unless . . . the agency's action was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, the
    agency's ruling should not be disturbed." 
    Ibid.
    Under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), a person is ineligible for unemployment
    benefits if he or she leaves work voluntarily without good cause attributable to
    the work. "[G]ood cause" is "a reason related directly to the individual's
    employment, which was so compelling as to give the individual no choice but
    to leave the employment." N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(b). "Mere dissatisfaction with
    working conditions which are not shown to be abnormal or do not affect
    health, does not constitute good cause for leaving work voluntarily."
    Domenico v. Bd. of Review, 
    192 N.J. Super. 284
    , 288 (App. Div. 1983)
    (quoting Medwick v. Bd. of Review, 
    69 N.J. Super. 338
    , 345 (App. Div.
    A-2126-18T2
    5
    1961)). "The decision to leave employment must be compelled by real,
    substantial and reasonable circumstances not imaginary, trifling and whimsical
    ones." 
    Ibid.
    Reviewing the record in light of those standards convinces us that we
    have no cause to disturb the Board's determination that Kumor is disqualified
    from receiving unemployment benefits. The Appeal Tribunal heard the
    testimony of the witnesses and determined that Kumor voluntarily left an on-
    going assignment, saying she would be applying for unemployment benefits
    "as a quit with good cause" and then applied for such benefits only days later.
    The Tribunal's conclusion, affirmed by the Board, was that Kumor quit
    voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work and did not take all
    reasonable steps to remain employed by contacting her employer, Fourans,
    before leaving her assignment at Community Affairs. As there was ample
    proof in the record to support that conclusion, we are obligated to accept it.
    Brady, 
    152 N.J. at 210
    . Although we have no doubt that Kumor testified
    candidly that she left her employment with what she determined to be good
    cause, we are equally convinced that she does not qualify for unemployment
    benefits under the statute.
    Affirmed.
    A-2126-18T2
    6