STATE IN THE INTEREST OF R.J. (FJ-19-0166-18 AND FJ-19-0072-19, SUSSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2020 )

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4541-18T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY
IN THE INTEREST OF R.J.,
a Juvenile.
____________________________
Submitted May 28, 2020 – Decided June 19, 2020
Before Judges Koblitz and Mawla.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Sussex County,
Docket Nos. FJ-19-0166-18 and FJ-19-0072-19.
Patti & Patti, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Jeffrey
Michael Patti, of counsel and on the briefs).
Francis A. Koch, Sussex County Prosecutor, attorney
for respondent (Shaina Brenner, Assistant Prosecutor,
of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
R.J. appeals from a March 4, 2019 adjudication of delinquency for acts
which, if committed by an adult, would constitute possession of a firearm for an
illegal purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4; aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(4);
terroristic threats, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a); criminal mischief, N.J.S.A. 2C:17-
3(a)(1); and harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c) arising from an incident with his
girlfriend K.R. He also appeals from a May 7, 2019 order denying his motion
for a new trial. We affirm.
This matter was tried for four days during which the State presented seven
witnesses, and R.J. presented the testimony of his mother and brother. R.J. did
not testify, but his voluntary statement to police was admitted into evidence.
The underlying incident occurred in March 2018, when R.J. sent K.R. a
picture via Snapchat depicting her mother's sweatshirt with the words "fuck you"
spray-painted across it. This prompted K.R. to drive her grandmother's vehicle
to R.J.'s home in an attempt to retrieve the sweatshirt. As K.R. waited in R.J.'s
driveway, he emerged and began to yell at her. He retrieved a shovel and a chain
from the garage and began striking K.R.'s car with them before resorting to
hitting and kicking the car. He retrieved a BB gun, fired it at the windshield
several times, and held the gun to K.R.'s temple, bruising her cheekbone in the
process. R.J. also wrenched the driver's side window, rendering it inoperable.
R.J.'s brother, who was playing a loud video game inside the residence,
did not witness the assault but heard muffled shouts coming from the driveway,
saw K.R.'s car, and saw R.J. pacing in front of it. The brother alerted his mother
who observed a snow shovel under the vehicle. According to R.J.'s mother, K.R.
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advised her that she was there to retrieve her sweatshirt. R.J.'s mother testified
she asked R.J. to go back inside the residence and K.R. to leave multiple times,
but K.R. just stared ahead, emotionless, until eventually leaving after receiving
the sweatshirt.
K.R.'s vehicle suffered damage to its hood, driver's side door, and roof.
Her grandmother and an auto repair technician testified to the extent of the
damage and repairs, which approximated $3000. The grandmother also
observed the bruise on K.R.'s cheek.
K.R. testified she and R.J. continued to communicate following the
incident. During one of their communications, K.R. asked R.J. whether he
would have pulled the trigger on the BB gun when it was against her head and
he responded, "it doesn't matter. I should have." A few days later, K.R. was
admitted to a psychiatric facility for harming herself.
Following K.R.'s release, her mother contacted Sparta Township Police,
who began an investigation. Detectives interviewed R.J. and he voluntarily gave
a statement admitting to kicking K.R.'s car and putting a shovel under it. The
Sussex County Prosecutor's Office executed a search warrant of R.J.'s residence
and recovered the BB gun, which was tested and found to be operational. The
chain and shovel were obtained from R.J.'s attorney prior to the trial.
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The trial judge made extensive findings, which we summarize here. The
judge found K.R.'s testimony credible because she admitted she could not recall
certain details relating to the incident, which she could have fabricated to her
advantage. By example, the judge noted K.R. could not remember the color of
the shovel R.J. used during the assault, yet the actual shovel was present in court
during her testimony and visible to her. She also could not remember the length
of the chain R.J. used to damage the car. However, the judge found K.R.
credible because it was reasonable for her not to recollect, considering the rapid
succession of events during the rampage and the trauma she experienced,
including having a gun put to her head.
The judge found the traumatic nature of the event was also corroborated
by R.J.'s mother, who testified to K.R.'s non-responsiveness during the incident,
which the judge found unsurprising. The judge also found K.R.'s testimony
consistent with R.J.'s statement to police in which he admitted he was mad and
kicked her car, as well as messages K.R. and R.J. exchanged after the incident
in which he admitted threatening her with the gun.
The judge concluded the testimony of R.J.'s brother and mother did not
detract from K.R.'s credibility because they arrived after the rampage. He found
the State's witnesses credible.
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The trial judge concluded the State proved all of the statutory elements of
the offenses charged. The State proved the weapons offense because a detective
testified the BB gun was tested and operable, and K.R.'s testimony and the text
messages exchanged between her and R.J. after the incident established that he
fired the weapon at her vehicle and held it against her head. The judge also
found the State proved the aggravated assault charge because R.J. knowingly
pointed the gun at K.R.'s head, shot at the vehicle, held the gun to her head and
admitted he should have pulled the trigger, which "manifested extreme
indifference to the value of human life." The judge also found R.J. committed
terroristic threats and made the following findings:
Using the firearm to shoot at the vehicle and then
hold [it] against [K.R.]'s head expresses far more than
fleeting anger or an effort to alarm. His intent to
convey menace and fear is confirmed again by his
words the following day when he responds to her text
message that he should have pulled the trigger.
....
[R.J.] admits numerous times in his statement to
[police] that he was pissed, mad, angry, irritated, that
he made threatening movements and that he undertook
actions against [K.R.] out of spite. While he denied . . .
using the weapon, as referenced above, his attempt to
blunt his damning Snapchat and [comment] about
wishing to pull the trigger undercut[] his assertion that
he did not use the weapon. [K.R.] was credible in her
description about how he used the weapon to first shoot
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at her vehicle and then hold it against her temple while
he continued to yell at her.
The trial judge found the State proved criminal mischief, crediting the
testimony of K.R., her grandmother, and the auto repair technician, which
established the nature of the damage to the vehicle and the cost to repair it. The
judge found the vehicle was K.R.'s property because it was under her "regular
dominion and control." He concluded the damage occurred from R.J. kicking
the vehicle and striking it with the shovel and credited K.R.'s testimony that R.J.
used a chain during the incident because
[t]he chain appears to be something [R.J.]
regularly utilizes in connection with his martial arts
fighting skills. The description by his attorney during
the proceeding of somebody who wouldn't even weigh
100 pounds soaking wet is not the observations that this
[c]ourt made of this young man sitting before the
[c]ourt for many days. He appears to be athletic,
muscular, and in good shape.
[K.R.] testified about [R.J.]'s knowledge of
martial arts and [R.J.] did not dispute his martial arts
knowledge during his videotaped statement when it was
mentioned by [a detective]. [R.J.] was upset that [K.R.]
had come to his house that evening demanding the
return of the sweatshirt after he had texted her a picture
with the words "fuck you" written on it, and he admitted
that he had put those words there. They exchanged
words in the driveway. His emotions escalated to a
point at which he damaged the vehicle by kicking it,
striking it with the shovel, and striking it with the chain.
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The trial judge concluded the State proved harassment because R.J.
admitted he threatened to burn the sweatshirt, defaced it by spraying an expletive
on it, and sent K.R. a picture of the sweatshirt out of spite. The judge concluded
"[t]hese actions represent a course of conduct undertaken with the purpose to
worry and trouble [K.R.] . . . [R.J.'s] actions in making the repeatedly unwanted
communications about the sweatshirt represented an intolerable interference
with the expectation of privacy of [K.R.]"
R.J. raises the following points on appeal:
POINT I - APPELLANT R.J.'S APPEAL IS
APPROPRIATE AS A TIMELY MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL WAS MADE TO THE TRIAL COURT
PURSUANT TO R. 2:10-1.
POINT II – K.R. GAVE MULTIPLE DIFFERENT
STATEMENTS AND WAS UNABLE TO RECALL
SIMPLE, BUT ESSENTIAL, KEY FACTS AT TRIAL
BUT THE COURT IGNORED ALL
INCONSISTENCIES AND LACK OF RECALL AND
GAVE HEAVY WEIGHT TO HER HIGHLY
INCONSISTENT AND UNRELIABLE TESTIMONY.
POINT III - THE COURT DID NOT PROPERLY
WEIGHT K.R.'S PSYCHIATRIC RECORDS AND
INSTEAD MADE UNSUPPORTED INFERENCES
TO MAKE K.R. APPEAR MORE CREDIBLE.
POINT IV – TRIAL TESTIMONY OF R.J.'S
BROTHER [] AND HIS MOTHER [] WAS NOT
AFFORDED THE WEIGHT IT DESERVED
WITHOUT ANY REAL EXPLANATION.
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POINT V - THE TRIAL COURT MADE WILD AND
UNSUBSTANTIATED LOGICAL LEAPS TO
JUSTIFY ITS FINDING OF DELINQUENCY AND
BASED UPON THE TESTIMONY OF K.R., THERE
IS NO WAY R.J. COULD HAVE CAUSED THE
DAMAGE DEPICTED IN THE PICTURES
ADMITTED AS EVIDENCE.
Our standard of review in juvenile delinquency bench trials "is narrow and
is limited to evaluation of whether the trial judge's findings are supported by
substantial, credible evidence in the record as a whole." State in Interest of
J.P.F., 368 N.J. Super. 24, 31 (App. Div. 2004) (citing State v. Locurto, 157 N.J.
463, 471 (1999)). We do not engage in an independent assessment of the
evidence as if "[we] were the court of first instance." State v. Johnson, 42 N.J.
146, 161 (1964). Rather, we give special deference to the trial judge's findings,
particularly those that are substantially influenced by the judge's opportunity to
observe the witnesses directly. Id. at 162.
The gravamen of the arguments raised on appeal challenge the trial judge's
credibility findings. Having considered these arguments in light of the record
and the deference we must afford to a trial court's credibility determinations; we
affirm substantially for the reasons expressed in the judge's thorough and well -
reasoned oral opinion.
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We add that R.J.'s assertions that the judge did not accord enough weight
to K.R.'s psychiatric records are unpersuasive. The judge considered K.R.'s
records from her stay in a psychiatric facility following the incident. However,
those records corroborated the judge's findings relating to the traumatic nature
of the incident. Indeed, the judge stated: "While [K.R.] was hospitalized, she
explained to the hospital staff that the root cause of a lot of her problems [was]
the incredibl[y] dysfunctional relationship with R.J. . . ."
R.J. argues the trial judge's conclusions regarding K.R.'s credibility could
not be drawn without expert testimony on the effect of trauma on memory and
recall. He also argues that because K.R. was hospitalized and her records
indicated drug use, her testimony was untruthful. However, R.J.'s counsel stated
K.R.'s mental health was not an issue, did not challenge her competency to
testify, and stated the admission of her psychiatric records into evidence was
"purely for impeachment." Expert testimony was not required to consider the
materiality of K.R.'s medical records.
Finally, in juvenile delinquency matters, the State bears the burden of
proving all elements of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt.
N.J.S.A. 2C:1-13(a). The trial judge's conclusions that the State proved the
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statutory elements of each offense are supported by the adequate, substantial and
credible evidence in the record.
Affirmed.
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