STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. DECTRIC J. RAWLS (10-04-0705, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4091-18T2
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DECTRIC J. RAWLS, a/k/a
JERMAINE JEFFERSON,
LO LO, DETRIC RAWLS,
DETRIC J. RAWLS, and
DETRICK J. ROSS,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
Submitted May 28, 2020 – Decided June 29, 2020
Before Judges Haas and Enright.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Monmouth County, Indictment No. 10-04-
0705.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Andrew Robert Burroughs, Designated
Counsel, on the briefs).
Christopher J. Gramiccioni, Monmouth County
Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Lisa Sarnoff
Gochman, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the
brief).
Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief.
PER CURIAM
Defendant Dectric Rawls appeals from the February 26, 2019 denial of his
petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. We
affirm, substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge James J. McGann's
comprehensive oral opinion of February 15, 2019.
In 2010, defendant and twenty-one codefendants were indicted for various
drug-related offenses based on their participation in a large-scale heroin
trafficking ring. Defendant was charged with second-degree conspiracy to
distribute a controlled dangerous substance (heroin), N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5b(2) (count one); second-degree possession of heroin with
intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5b(2) (count two); second-degree
distribution of heroin, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5b(2) (count three); third-degree
possession of heroin, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a(l) and N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6 (count five);
first-degree leader of a narcotics trafficking network, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3 (count
six); third-degree possession of heroin, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a(l) (count forty-six);
second-degree possession of heroin with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-
A-4091-18T2
2
5b(2) (count forty-seven); and second-degree possession of a firearm in the
course of committing a drug offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.la (count forty-eight).
In 2011, defendant moved to dismiss the indictment and his application
was denied. He then moved to suppress evidence seized by police pursuant to
several Communication Data Warrants (CDWs) and wiretap authorizations.
That suppression motion, too, was denied. On April 3, 2012, the plea cutoff
date, defendant rejected a conditional plea offer of a twenty-five year custodial
term with a twelve and one-half year parole ineligibility period. A few weeks
later, when the trial was scheduled, defendant appeared before the trial court and
entered an unconditional, open-ended guilty plea to the eight charges pending
against him, including the first-degree charge. By doing so, defendant did not
waive his right to file an appeal from the trial court's denial of his pretrial
motions.
In August 2012, defendant was sentenced to life in prison, subject to a
twenty-five-year parole ineligibility period, for the first-degree leader of a
narcotics trafficking network charge (count six). Additionally, the judge
imposed a consecutive eight-year term with a four-year parole ineligibility
period on the second-degree possession of a firearm charge (count forty-eight).
A-4091-18T2
3
The sentencing judge dismissed the remaining charges per the State's motion
and imposed appropriate fines and penalties.
Defendant, along with two of his codefendants, filed a direct appeal.
Defendant challenged the denials of his motion to dismiss and the suppression
motion. He also argued the conditional plea process was defective, his motion
to withdraw from his open-ended guilty plea should have been granted, he was
denied the right to effective assistance of counsel, and his sentence was
excessive. Moreover, defendant joined in the arguments of his codefendants to
the extent they were "not inconsistent with [his] arguments." In 2016, we
affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. State v. Rawls, A-1984-12 (App.
Div. Feb. 5, 2016).
In December 2016, defendant filed a timely PCR petition, arguing his trial
counsel was ineffective and that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. On
February 15, 2019, Judge McGann heard arguments regarding defendant's PCR
petition. After extensively addressing each of defendant's arguments, the judge
denied his PCR petition without an evidentiary hearing. The judge executed an
order on February 26, 2019 confirming his decision.
A-4091-18T2
4
On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments for our
consideration:
POINT I
AS [DEFENDANT] HAS ESTABLISHED A PRIMA
FACIE CASE OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
TRIAL COUNSEL, THE PCR COURT ERRED
WHEN IT DENIED HIS PETITION FOR [PCR]
WITHOUT HOLDING AN EVIDENTIARY
HEARING.
(1) Trial counsel failed to accurately advise his client
about the collateral consequences of entering an open-
ended plea.
(2) Trial counsel failed to adequately investigate and
prepare the case.
(3) [Defendant] waived his right to file a minimization
motion due to trial counsel's erroneous legal advice.
(4) Trial counsel failed to properly review discovery to
locate phone records which would have supported the
suppression motion and the motion to dismiss the
indictment.
(5) Counsel's cumulative errors denied his client
effective legal representation
POINT II
AS THERE WERE GENUINE ISSUES OF
MATERIAL FACTS IN DISPUTE, AN
EVIDENTIARY HEARING WAS REQUIRED.
A-4091-18T2
5
Defendant's pro se brief adds the following arguments:
POINT I
[DEFENDANT] HAS ESTABLISHED A PRIMA
FACIE CASE OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
TRIAL COUNSEL, THE PCR COURT ERRED
WHEN IT DENIED HIS [PCR] WITHOUT HOLDING
AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING. (ADDENDUM)
(a) Trial counsel failed to accurately advise his client
about the collateral consequences of entering an open-
ended plea, not advising [defendant] that preserving his
pre-trial motion to dismiss the indictment in exchange
for a guilty plea was not dispositive in gaining finality
of his case altogether.
(b) Trial counsel failed to inform [defendant] that the
motion to dismiss the indictment was not
"dispositive[,]" which counsel failed to inform
[defendant] that the motion would not dispose [of] the
case.
(c) The [trial court] erred in not determining that
defendant established a prima facie case to award [him]
an evidentiary hearing on the ineffective assistance
rendered when trial counsel misadvised defendant of
the collateral consequence prior to accepting the plea.
The mere raising of a claim for PCR does not entitle the defendant t o an
evidentiary hearing. State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div.
1999). Rather, trial courts should grant evidentiary hearings and make a
determination on the merits only if the defendant has presented a prima facie
claim of ineffective assistance, material issues of disputed facts lie outside the
A-4091-18T2
6
record, and resolution of the issues necessitates a hearing. R. 3:22-10(b); State
v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 355 (2013). We review a judge's decision to deny a PCR
petition without an evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion. State v. Preciose,
129 N.J. 451, 462 (1992).
To establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the
defendant
must satisfy two prongs. First, he must demonstrate
that counsel made errors "so serious that counsel was
not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment." An attorney's
representation is deficient when it "[falls] below an
objective standard of reasonableness."
Second, a defendant "must show that the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense." A
defendant will be prejudiced when counsel's errors are
sufficiently serious to deny him a "fair trial." The
prejudice standard is met if there is "a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different."
A "reasonable probability" simply means a "probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome" of
the proceeding.
[State v. O'Neil, 219 N.J. 598, 611 (2014) (alteration in
original) (citations omitted) (quoting Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984)).]
"[I]n order to establish a prima facie claim, [the defendant] must do more
than make bald assertions that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel.
A-4091-18T2
7
He must allege facts sufficient to demonstrate counsel's alleged substandard
performance." Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. at 170. The defendant must
establish, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that he is entitled to the
required relief. State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 541 (2013).
We have considered defendant's contentions in light of the record and
applicable legal principles and conclude they are without sufficient merit to
warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We discern no abuse
of discretion in the denial of defendant's PCR petition without an evidentiary
hearing, and agree with Judge McGann's assessment that defendant failed to
present a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel warranting an
evidentiary hearing.
Affirmed.
A-4091-18T2
8