APRIL SIRLEAF VS. BOARD OF REVIEW (BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR) ( 2020 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-2640-18T3
    APRIL SIRLEAF,
    Appellant,
    v.
    BOARD OF REVIEW,
    DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
    and FIRST FINANCIAL
    FEDERAL CREDIT UNION,
    Respondents.
    _________________________
    Argued telephonically June 15, 2020 –
    Decided June 30, 2020
    Before Judges Fisher and Fasciale.
    On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of
    Labor, Docket No. 166,050.
    Sarah Shaver Hymowitz argued the cause for appellant
    (Legal Services of New Jersey, attorneys; Sarah Shaver
    Hymowitz and Melville D. Miller, on the briefs).
    Rimma Razhba, Deputy Attorney General, argued the
    cause for respondent Board of Review (Gurbir S.
    Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Donna Sue Arons,
    Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Rimma
    Razhba, on the brief).
    Respondent First Financial Federal Credit Union has
    not filed a brief.
    PER CURIAM
    April Sirleaf left her job of three and one-half years as an assistant branch
    manager at First Financial Federal Credit Union to care for her child with
    medical issues. She appeals from the Board of Review's final agency decision,
    which disqualified her from receiving unemployment benefits under N.J.S.A.
    43:21-5(a) because she left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to
    her work. We affirm.
    Our "capacity to review administrative agency decisions is limited."
    Brady v. Bd. of Review, 
    152 N.J. 197
    , 210 (1997). We will not disturb an
    agency's ruling unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
    Ibid. We defer to
    a Board's factual findings if they are supported by sufficient credible
    evidence.
    Ibid. The employee must
    establish her right to collect unemployment
    benefits.
    Id. at 218.
    Under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), an employee who "left work voluntarily
    without good cause attributable to such work" is disqualified for unemployment
    compensation benefits.      The threshold question is whether an applicant
    A-2640-18T3
    2
    voluntarily left work. Lord v. Bd. of Review, 
    425 N.J. Super. 187
    , 190-91 (App.
    Div. 2012). If so, the applicant bears the burden to prove she did so with good
    cause attributable to the work. 
    Brady, 152 N.J. at 218
    . An employee has left
    work "voluntarily" within the statute's meaning when "the decision whether to
    go or to stay lay at the time with the worker alone." Campbell Soup Co. v. Bd.
    of Review, 
    13 N.J. 431
    , 435 (1953); see also Utley v. Bd. of Review, 
    194 N.J. 534
    , 544 (2008).
    On appeal, Sirleaf argues:
    [POINT I]
    MS. SIRLEAF IS ENTITLED TO BENEFITS
    BECAUSE SHE WAS TERMINATED FROM THE
    JOB THROUGH NO FAULT OF HER OWN[.]
    [POINT II]
    MS. SIRLEAF IS ENTITLED TO BENEFITS UNDER
    THE "OFFER OF NEW WORK" STATUTE AND
    REGULATION[.]
    [POINT III]
    THE [BOARD'S] FACTUAL FINDINGS WERE
    INACCURATE, INSUFFICIENT, AND LED TO AN
    UNJUST DISQUALIFICATION FROM BENEFITS.
    A-2640-18T3
    3
    We considered Sirleaf's contentions and conclude they are without sufficient
    merit to warrant an extended discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
    We add the following brief remarks.
    Sirleaf testified that her child was diagnosed with a medical condition
    while she was on leave as to her newborn. She notified her employer and
    explained that she exhausted her family medical leave. Sirleaf's employer said
    it would hold her position open for a specific duration, which she did not
    consider as an option. She acknowledged that her employer gave her two other
    options⸻return full time, or if that was not an option, then accept a part-time
    position.   Sirleaf declined all options.    Moreover, Sirleaf had no further
    communication with her employer, who did not terminate her.
    Guided by our standard of review, we conclude that the Board's factual
    findings are supported by credible evidence, and its decision comports with the
    law and is not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
    Affirmed.
    A-2640-18T3
    4