STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. QUAHEEM JOHNSON (08-08-1494, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2686-18T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
QUAHEEM JOHNSON, a/k/a
DANTE JOHNSON, DEREK
SMITH, DONTAE JOHNSON,
and SCOOBY,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________
Submitted April 20, 2020 – Decided July 10, 2020
Before Judges Rothstadt and Moynihan.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Hudson County, Indictment No. 08-08-1494.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Mark Zavotsky, Designated Counsel, on the
brief).
Esther Suarez, Hudson County Prosecutor, attorney for
respondent (Erin M. Campbell, Assistant Prosecutor,
on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Following his indictment on one count of first-degree murder –
purposely/knowingly, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and (2) (count one); one count of
first-degree felony murder – commission of crime, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3)
(count two); two counts of first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 (counts three
and six); three counts of second-degree unlawful possession of weapon –
handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (counts four, seven and eleven); three counts of
second-degree possession of weapon for unlawful purpose – firearms, N.J.S.A.
2C:39-4(a) (counts five, eight and twelve); one count of fourth-degree
aggravated assault with firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(4) (count nine); and one
count of third-degree resisting arrest – purposely, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a) (count
ten), a jury found defendant Quaheem Johnson guilty of first-degree aggravated
manslaughter on count one, as a lesser included offense of first-degree murder;
second-degree robbery on count three, as a lesser included offense of first-
degree robbery; and on counts four, six, eight and ten.1 The trial judge granted
defendant's motion to bar a retrial on counts two, five, nine and twelve on which
1
We refer to the counts as they were originally numbered in the indictment, and
as utilized in the judgment of conviction.
A-2686-18T1
2
the jury was deadlocked.2 We affirmed his conviction on direct appeal. State
v. Johnson, No. A-1368-14 (App. Div. July 18, 2017). The Supreme Court
denied defendant's petition for certification. State v. Johnson, 232 N.J. 100
(2018).
Defendant appeals from the order denying his subsequent petition for
post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing, arguing:
POINT I
DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR [PCR] SHOULD
NOT BE BARRED BECAUSE THE CLAIM THAT
COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO
FILE AN INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL ON DENIAL
OF HIS MOTION TO RECUSE THE JUDGE
INVOLVED INACTION WHICH WAS NOT PART
OF THE RECORD FOR APPELLATE REVIEW.
POINT II
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL ENTITLING
HIM TO [PCR], OR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING,
ON THE ISSUES OF FAILURE TO EMPLOY AN
EXPERT TO TESTIFY ON IDENTIFICATION,
FAILURE TO CONSULT A BALLISTICS EXPERT,
FAILURE TO FILE A MOTION FOR A CHANGE OF
VENUE, AND FAILURE TO FILE AN
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL ON DENIAL OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO RECUSE THE JUDGE.
2
We granted leave to appeal and affirmed the trial judge's ruling. State v.
Johnson, 436 N.J. Super. 406, 426 (App. Div. 2014).
A-2686-18T1
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(A) APPLICABLE LAW.
(B) COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR
FAILING TO EMPLOY THE EXPERT IN
IDENTIFICATION USED IN DEFENDANT'S
FIRST TRIAL.
(C) COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR
FAILING TO INVESTIGATE AND CONSULT A
BALLISTICS EXPERT.
(D) COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR
FAILING [TO] FILE A MOTION FOR A
CHANGE OF VENUE.
(E) COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING
TO FILE AN APPEAL ON THE DENIAL OF HER
MOTION TO RECUSE THE TRIAL JUDGE
FROM PRESIDING OVER DEFENDANT'S
CASE.
POINT III
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF APPELLATE COUNSEL
ENTITLING HIM TO [PCR] OR A NEW APPEAL
FOR FAILURE OF COUNSEL TO ARGUE THE
INCLUSION OF THE LESSER-INCLUDED
OFFENSE OF MANSLAUGHTER TO THE JURY,
AND FAILURE TO CHALLENGE THE STATE'S
WITNESSES' TESTIMONY REGARDING
DEFENDANT'S TEARDROP TATTOO.
(A) APPLICABLE LAW.
(B) APPELLATE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE
FOR FAILING TO APPEAL THE [JUDGE'S]
INCLUSION OF MANSLAUGHTER AS A
A-2686-18T1
4
LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE TO THE
CHARGE OF MURDER.
(C) APPELLATE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE
FOR FAILING TO APPEAL THE STATE'S
REDIRECT EXAMINATION OF . . .
DEFENDANT REGARDING HIS TEARDROP
TATTOO.
Absent an evidentiary hearing, we review both the factual inferences
drawn by the PCR judge from the record and the judge's legal conclusions de
novo. State v. Blake, 444 N.J. Super. 285, 294 (App. Div. 2016). To establish
a PCR claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must satisfy the
two-pronged test formulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984), and adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58
(1987), first by "showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was
not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment," Fritz,
105 N.J. at 52 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687); then by proving he suffered
prejudice due to counsel's deficient performance, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687,
691-92. Defendant must show by a "reasonable probability" that the deficient
performance affected the outcome. Fritz, 105 N.J. at 58. Under those standards,
we determine defendant failed to establish that either his trial or appellate
counsel was ineffective. Hence, we affirm.
A-2686-18T1
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I.
Defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because she failed
to file an interlocutory appeal of the denial of his motion to recuse the initial
trial judge.3 Defendant further contends that "[e]ven if this court was to find
th[is] issue . . . could have been brought in a prior proceeding," it "could not
have been properly adjudicated on direct appeal" because this claim "lies outside
the record[.]"
We agree with the PCR judge's determination that this claim was
procedurally barred under Rule 3:22-4(a) which bars a defendant from
employing PCR to assert a claim that could have been raised at trial or on direct
appeal. See State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 546 (2013) ("A petitioner is generally
barred from presenting a claim on PCR that could have been raised at trial or on
direct appeal[.]"). The Rule provides:
Any ground for relief not raised in the proceedings
resulting in the conviction . . . or in any appeal taken in
any such proceedings is barred from assertion in a
proceeding under this rule unless the court on motion
or at the hearing finds: (1) that the ground for relief not
previously asserted could not reasonably have been
raised in any prior proceeding; or (2) that enforcement
3
After a delay in the trial caused by Superstorm Sandy, see Johnson, 436 N.J.
Super. at 411, trial resumed; another judge presided over the jury deliberations
and took the verdict because the initial judge was unavailable.
A-2686-18T1
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of the bar to preclude claims, including one for
ineffective assistance of counsel, would result in
fundamental injustice; or (3) that denial of relief would
be contrary to . . . the Constitution of the United States
or the State of New Jersey.
[R. 3:22-4(a).]
Although, as defendant contends, the reason trial counsel did not file an
interlocutory appeal is not apparent from the record, the conduct of the trial
judge that precipitated defendant's motion was. In his merits brief, defendant
avers:
Defense counsel expressed what she perceived as a
negative attitude toward her efforts in developing a case
for her client. Furthermore, she conveyed to the trial
judge that she felt pressured to proceed. She pointed
out to the trial [judge] a few examples of bias[,]
including the lack of opportunity to file a motion for
judgment of acquittal, and the [judge's] failure to hold
a jury charge conference. Defendant submits that under
the circumstances, counsel's failure to file an
interlocutory appeal was ineffective assistance.
Defendant later concedes in his brief, "the record demonstrated unnecessary
hostility toward the defense by the trial judge." In that the record set forth the
A-2686-18T1
7
grounds for defendant's recusal argument, it could have been raised on direct
appeal. As it was not, it is barred.4
Substantively, defendant's argument lacks merit. The trial judge's
"negative attitude" was never evident to the jury. The record shows all of the
alleged "hostility" took place outside of the jury's presence. Thus, defendant did
not establish the second Strickland-Fritz prong because no prejudice befell
defendant. Even defendant admits in his merits brief, "[i]t is unclear what effect
the repeated comments by the assistant prosecutor and the [judge] had on the
jury's perception of the defense's credibility." 5
Moreover, we agree with the PCR judge "that the trial judge's occasional
frustration with defense counsel [did] not amount to hostility toward
[defendant], or bias in favor of the prosecution, sufficient to justify recusal."
Indeed, the record belies any acrimony between trial counsel and the judge. In
a wide-ranging colloquy outside the jury's presence, this exchange exemplifies
their relationship and explains why defendant's argument is meritless:
THE COURT: It may be your first trial, okay, but you
have appeared in front of me countless times. You have
4
Defendant does not argue appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise
this issue.
5
The prosecutor's comments are not in issue on appeal. Even so, any argument
about them should have been raised on direct appeal. See R. 3:22-4(a).
A-2686-18T1
8
provided written summations of law which are, on a
scale of [one] to [ten], a [twelve]. You know what
you're doing, okay?
[TRIAL COUNSEL]: I do, Judge.
THE COURT: The mere fact that this is your first
physical presence --
[TRIAL COUNSEL]: And you've been very fair.
THE COURT: -- in this courtroom --
[TRIAL COUNSEL]: Yeah. I want to say that, too.
Let me be very clear for Your Honor's sake. Day one
of this trial I turned to my client and I told him, you see
what I said, because I refused to allow him to appeal
Your Honor's recusal order on that motion. And I did
that because I knew that Your Honor would give us fair
rulings, and I think that you have given me a lot of
latitude, probably because this is my first trial.
When trial counsel told the judge, "I did get you mad, probably for good reason
and for very logical reasons," the judge replied, "I don't get mad. I don't get
mad." Moreover, the remarks complained of did not express bias against
defendant. There is no evidence the judge's displeasure, at times, with counsel's
actions impacted on any of the judge's rulings. See State v. Leverette, 64 N.J.
569, 571 (1974).
Contrary to defendant's argument, the trial judge did not foreclose
defendant from making a motion for a judgment of acquittal. He merely required
A-2686-18T1
9
the motion be made at a different time because the judge did not want to keep
the jury, who had been waiting in what the judge described as "that
claustrophobic room back there . . . for half an hour," waiting after defense
counsel was tardy in reporting to court. The judge invited the motion to be made
at a later time that did not require additional wait-time by the jury, a decision
well within the judge's discretion under N.J.R.E. 611(a). During the wide-
ranging colloquy to which we just referred, the assistant prosecutor asked trial
counsel if she ever made the motion. Although some of the record is
unintelligible, it is evident the judge invited the motion to be made while the
jury was deliberating.
Defendant's contention that the judge failed to hold a charge conference
is mistaken. As the PCR judge noted, both counsel and the trial judge had an
extensive discussion about the jury charge, particularly the identification
instruction, prior to summations, satisfying the mandate of Rule 1:8-7(b).
And, again, even if recusal was warranted by the trial judge's actions, we
discern no prejudice suffered by defendant. Counsel did not make the motion
after all the evidence was presented, R. 3:18-1, or after the return of the verdict,
R. 3:18-2, to the second trial judge. Nor was or is there any objection to the
judge's instruction. Defendant did not meet the second Strickland-Fritz prong.
A-2686-18T1
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II.
Defendant contends trial counsel was ineffective for failing to reemploy
an eyewitness identification expert who testified at defendant's first trial.6 The
expert opined the identification by the only witness to identify defendant was:
the product of cross-racial identification and the suggestive show-up at which
defendant was identified; and influenced by the witness's focus on the gun used
by the robber and the brevity—less than one minute—of the robbery. Defendant
argues this "testimony was crucial because it brought into serious question the
witness's identification, given that there was no other corroborating testimony
available," noting the other victim of the robbery identified another man despite
the inclusion of defendant's photograph in the array she viewed.
Of course, the factors analyzed by the expert are some of the same factors
our Supreme Court deemed essential to a jury's consideration of eyewitness
testimony. State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 302 (2011). Henderson, however,
was decided between the end of defendant's first trial and the beginning of the
second trial.
The trial judge adhered to Henderson, and gave a thorough and complete
charge regarding eyewitness identification, addressing all factors defendant
6
Defendant's first trial ended in a mistrial.
A-2686-18T1
11
claims to which the expert could have testified, including: cross-racial
identification, weapon focus, duration of the event, and the suggestive nature of
the show-up. Expert testimony was not required, therefore, to bring these issues
to the jury. As our Supreme Court recognized, although expert testimony will,
in some cases, aid a jury,
[w]e anticipate . . . that with enhanced jury instructions,
there will be less need for expert testimony. Jury
charges offer a number of advantages: they are focused
and concise, authoritative (in that juries hear them from
the trial judge, not a witness called by one side), and
cost-free; they avoid possible confusion to jurors
created by dueling experts; and they eliminate the risk
of an expert invading the jury's role or opining on an
eyewitness' credibility.
[Id. at 298.]
We further note, trial counsel effectively cross-examined the eyewitness
regarding the aspects of the identification to which the expert had testified. She
told the jurors in summation that "as a matter of law you need to consider how
identification procedures were conducted. And that's why in painstaking detail
I belabored the State's witnesses" about the eyewitness's identification.
Additionally, she referenced the "very lengthy instruction from [the trial judge]
about those identification procedures," in delineating the reasons why the
eyewitness's identification was flawed:
A-2686-18T1
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Think about the jury instruction in relation, okay, to
what the judge is going to instruct you about. He's
going to give you a lot of other things to consider about
eyewitness identification still. He's going to tell you
that it must be scrutinized carefully. Please do it. He's
going to tell you human memory is not foolproof.
Please . . . recognize that. Recognize all of the things
that the judge is going to ask you to recognize. He's
going to ask you to think about the witnesses'
opportunity to view the perpetrator and the degree of
attention, stress, weapon focus, competence and
accuracy. I asked [a detective] whether anyone asked
[the victim who identified defendant] how sure he was,
okay, because we heard about how sure [the victim who
did not identify defendant] was, okay, because [another
detective] did her job and said how sure are you.
Hundred percent, [the victim who did not identify
defendant] said. There's nothing to show how sure [the
victim who identified defendant] was.
A trial counsel's "decision concerning which witnesses to call to the stand
is 'an art,' and a [judge's] review of such a decision should be 'highly
deferential.'" State v. Arthur, 184 N.J. 307, 321 (2005) (quoting Strickland, 466
U.S. at 689, 693). The Court, synopsizing the familiar standards, cautioned that
we
"must avoid viewing the performance under the
'distorting effects of hindsight.'" State v. Norman, 151
N.J. 5, 37 (1997). Because of the inherent difficulties
in evaluating a defense counsel's tactical decisions from
his or her perspective during trial, "a court must indulge
a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance;
that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption
A-2686-18T1
13
that, under the circumstances, the challenged action
'might be considered sound trial strategy.'" Strickland,
466 U.S. at 689.
In determining whether defense counsel's alleged
deficient performance prejudiced the defense, "[i]t is
not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had
some conceivable effect on the outcome of the
proceedings." Id. at 693. Rather, defendant bears the
burden of showing that "there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different.
A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 694.
[Id. at 319 (alteration in original).]
According the presumption that counsel's conduct fell within the range of
reasonable professional assistance, ibid., and adhering to the tenet that "an
otherwise valid conviction will not be overturned merely because the defendant
is dissatisfied with his or her counsel's exercise of judgment during the trial,"
State v. Castagna, 187 N.J. 293, 314 (2006), we determine defendant has not
demonstrated trial counsel's failure to call the expert provided a different
outcome. Counsel well-highlighted the factors the expert would have covered,
and the jury charge fully explained how the jury was to consider the evidence .
Moreover, in our prior decision, we reviewed the plethora of evidence against
defendant:
A-2686-18T1
14
According to the State's proofs, on April 8, 2008,
defendant shot and killed Ramon Francisco Morales
while in the course of taking his necklace. Shortly
thereafter, and several blocks away, defendant held
another victim, [who later identified defendant], at
gunpoint and took his chain as well. Police responded
to the scene and, after ten to fifteen minutes, spotted
defendant in the general vicinity of the commission of
the crimes. They commanded defendant to stop, but he
fled. While being pursued, he pointed a handgun in the
direction of one of the officers. As a result, the officer
discharged his weapon twice, but missed defendant.
The officer eventually apprehended defendant, and
both victims' necklaces were found on his person. The
police also recovered a gun in a nearby yard, and
ballistics tests later confirmed that it was the murder
weapon.
[Johnson, 436 N.J. Super. at 410-11.]
Thus, defendant failed to show that the expert, if called, would have changed
the verdict. Trial counsel's decision not to call the expert was not ineffective.
III.
We also see no merit in defendant's argument that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to investigate and consult a ballistics expert to counter the
State's firearms and toolmark identification expert's testimony that the bullets
recovered from the murder victim's body matched the gun the State claimed
defendant discarded.
A-2686-18T1
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When, as in this case, a defendant claims that his or her trial attorney
"inadequately investigated his case, he must assert the facts that an investigation
would have revealed, supported by affidavits or certifications based upon the
personal knowledge of the affiant or the person making the certification." State
v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999). "[B]ald assertions"
of deficient performance are insufficient to support a PCR application. Ibid.;
see also State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 356-57 (2013) (reaffirming these
principles in evaluating which of a defendant's various PCR claims warranted
an evidentiary hearing). In other words, a defendant must identify what the
investigation would have revealed and demonstrate the way the evidence
probably would have changed the result. Fritz, 105 N.J. at 64-65.
Defendant has not proffered a report, affidavit or certification from any
expert that would have countered the State's evidence. He has failed to establish
the second prong of that test with regard to his arguments; that is, he has not
demonstrated a "reasonable probability" that counsel's purported deficient
performance affected the outcome. See id. at 58.
Additionally, under the same lens we described in analyzing defendant's
argument regarding the identification expert, we discern nothing that established
the outcome of the trial would have been different if an opposing expert was
A-2686-18T1
16
called, or that overcomes the presumption that counsel's performance was
adequate. As the PCR judge observed, "[t]rial counsel engaged in a lengthy voir
dire, during which she asked [the expert] many questions concerning both his
methodology and his qualifications to testify," and objected to his testimony.
The trial judge observed trial counsel "went at length" in her voir dire of the
expert—some twenty minutes. Any challenge to the trial judge's admission of
the expert's testimony is barred here under Rule 3:22-4(a).
IV.
We reject defendant's argument that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to move for a change of venue for the same reasons the PCR judge set
forth in her written decision. The PCR judge's careful analysis of the impact of
pretrial publicity and one juror's refusal to return for service justified her
findings that the presumption of prejudice was not warranted, and there was no
actual prejudice. See State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 32-33 (1987). There is
no evidence any of the jurors were influenced by the media or by any other
outside influences. Defendant has failed to identify any juror who should have
been excused because of an inability to be fair or impartial, or establish that the
jury voir dire did not result in an impartial jury.
A-2686-18T1
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We also observe the jurors were instructed not to read any articles related
to the trial and not to otherwise discuss the trial. The trial judge warned the
jurors:
Your deliberation should be based on the
evidence in the case without any outside influence or
opinion of relatives or friends. Additionally, I must
instruct you not to read any newspaper articles
pertaining to this case. More likely than not there's
going to be newspaper cover of this case. Okay? It's
probably going to happen. But you're instructed to
completely avoid reading or listening to any newspaper
or media accounts, or listening to anyone else discuss
them or talk about them.
The jury is presumed to have followed that instruction. See State v. Loftin, 146
N.J. 295, 390 (1996) ("That the jury will follow the instructions given is
presumed.").
V.
Turning to defendant's two claims of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel, we use the same Strickland-Fritz two-prong test that applies to
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims. State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 518
(2004).
Defendant first argues appellate counsel should have argued the trial judge
erred by including manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder because
A-2686-18T1
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"the evidence presented by the State could only have been used to establish he
acted purposefully."
"[A] trial [judge] has an independent obligation to instruct on lesser-
included charges when the facts adduced at trial clearly indicate that a jury could
convict on the lesser while acquitting on the greater offense." State v. Jenkins,
178 N.J. 347, 361 (2004). "If neither party requests a charge on a lesser-
included offense, the [judge] must sua sponte provide an instruction 'when the
facts adduced at trial clearly indicate that a jury could convict on the lesser while
acquitting on the greater offense.'" State v. Maloney, 216 N.J. 91, 107 (2013)
(quoting State v. Thomas, 187 N.J. 119, 132 (2006)).
No one witnessed the actual shooting. A witness who saw the aftermath
testified the victim was apparently alive after he was shot; the witness saw him
rolling on the ground as the shooter walked away. The State alleged the shooting
occurred during a robbery. Considering that no single shot killed the victim,
which would be more indicative of a purposeful or knowing murder, the trial
judge made an observation that could have very well have been made by the
jury: "Who knows why the gun went off, who knows why -- it could have been
a number of reasons, okay and . . . the case law is pretty clear that I have to give
lesser includeds and I'm giving them lesser includeds."
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The trial judge simply followed the mandate of our Supreme Court:
"[W]here the facts on record would justify a conviction of a certain charge, the
people of this State are entitled to have that charge rendered to the jury[.]" State
v. Garron, 177 N.J. 147, 180 (2003) (quoting State v. Powell, 84 N.J. 305, 319
(1980)). Tellingly, the jury found defendant guilty of the lesser-included
offense of aggravated manslaughter.
That verdict obviated any prejudicial impact the inclusion of the
manslaughter instruction may have had. As we recognized in our prior opinion,
the initial trial judge instructed "the jury that they were to consider reckless
manslaughter only if they were not convinced that defendant committed
aggravated manslaughter." Johnson, 436 N.J. Super. at 413. Although the
second trial judge told the jury it could consider the separate counts in the
indictment "in any order" it wished, id. at 414, 419-20, the judge
did not respond specifically to the jury question relative
to the order in which greater and lesser included
offenses must be considered, although the first trial
judge did so in [the judge's] instructions to the jury and
in [the] verdict form. The second trial judge gave a
response as it relates to separate counts in the
indictment.
[Id. at 419 (alterations in original).]
A-2686-18T1
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The jury, therefore, never considered the manslaughter charge that sequentially
followed the aggravated manslaughter charge as a lesser-included offense in the
same count. Defendant was not prejudiced by the inclusion of the manslaughter
offense.
Defendant's final argument avers appellate counsel was ineffective for
failing to challenge that portion of the redirect examination of the arresting
officer, when the assistant prosecutor asked him "to step off the stand, approach
. . . defendant, and identify if there were any teardrop tattoos on the side of his
face." Defendant claims the redirect examination exceeded the scope of cross-
examination, and "the issue of tattoos, especially teardrop tattoos, was highly
prejudicial and was offered for the express purpose to demonstrate to the jury
defendant was a bad person, and not for reasons of identification," because "[i]t
is well-known that teardrop tattoos may signify gang membership and is an
indication of prior bad acts including murder."
The first question the assistant prosecutor asked on redirect examination
was if the officer noticed "anything about [defendant's] face, whether there were
any tattoos or anything of that nature," when the officer apprehended him. The
officer replied he did not know. Following trial counsel's sidebar objection that
the question was outside the scope of his cross-examination because he "never
A-2686-18T1
21
asked [the officer] about that," 7 the assistant prosecutor asked the officer to
"come off the stand" to look at defendant, asking, "[d]o you see . . . what
appear[s] to be teardrop markings on either side of [defendant's] face?" The
officer replied affirmatively. When asked if he "saw that on his face" on the
date of defendant's arrest, he said he could not recall.
During colloquy with the judge on the next trial date, trial counsel agreed
she had brought up the tattoos, and asked "the jury [during the trial] to look at
[defendant] . . . [w]ith respect to what the probative value of his having tattoos
almost everywhere on his person is in this case, an identification case, to say the
very least, since moment one." Trial counsel said "the probative value of asking
a jury to look at the fact that he has tattoos almost all over his body is certainly
- - it's relevant[.]" Trial counsel agreed with the judge's observation that counsel
"kept bring[ing] tattoos up."
In summation, trial counsel emphasized that no witness "identified a man
who had tattoos." She rhetorically asked, "[y]ou think if I opened on that and
7
Contrary to defendant's contention in his merits brief that the trial judge
"sustained the objection and allowed [the officer] to approach . . . defendant,"
the record does not reflect any further sidebar colloquy after counsel stated his
objection.
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there was evidence that my client didn't have tattoos on the night in question the
State would introduce that?"
Trial counsel's concern was the prejudicial impact of highlighting the
teardrop tattoos. The judge prepared a limiting instruction, which trial counsel
accepted.
While we look askance at the prosecution's focused question on
defendant's teardrop tattoos, the trial judge limited the jury's use of that
testimony to the issue of identification and forbade the jury from drawing any
inference from the tattoos other than that limited purpose:
Furthermore, there has been testimony regarding
defendant['s] . . . tattoos on his face. An officer was
asked to step down . . . and look at [defendant's] face.
This question became admissible because [trial
counsel] inquired of the witnesses whether any
descriptions of the perpetrator's face included the
tattoos.
The mere fact that a person or this defendant for
that matter has tattoos . . . or body art for that matter
should not cause you to drawn any inference
whatsoever about that person.
First of all, there's no evidence before you as to
whether -- as to the date when [defendant] had the
tattoo done. Secondly, tattoos or body art, whatever
you want to call it are very commonplace, particularly
in today's younger generation, not necessarily mine, but
the younger generation.
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My generation, perhaps some of you my age and
older may have associated tattoos in the past with
sailor[s] like I said before or bad guys in movies. This
is 2012 and that's a completely and utterly ridiculous
association today.
Societies today and younger generation, body art
just are very, very commonplace, so particularly again
in -- youth and therefore absolutely no inference should
be drawn, discussed or deliberated by you relative to
[defendant's] body art, okay, other than in the context
of identification.
Not only is the jury presumed to have followed that instruction, trial
counsel in summation stated, "[t]he judge is going to give you an instruction, an
instruction that he already gave you after [the arresting officer] was traipsed
down from the witness stand. Listen to that instruction. That's all I'm going to
say." She nonetheless continued,
[t]he judge is going to ask you not to infer anything
nefarious based upon any tattoos, whether or not [the
assistant prosecutor] traipsed [the arresting officer]
over to talk about teardrop tattoos in particular. The
judge is going to . . . give you an instruction regarding
the tattoos. Listen to it.
Any prejudice engendered by the brief, improvident question by the
assistant prosecutor was ameliorated by the instruction. As the PCR judge
observed, "regardless of which party opened the door to the evidence of [the
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facial] tattoos, such evidence was considered only for the purposes of
identification."
Appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise those issues,
neither of which had merit.
VI.
We conclude defendant has failed to establish a prima facie case
warranting an evidentiary hearing. "[I]n order to establish a prima facie claim,
a petitioner must do more than make bald assertions that he was denied the
effective assistance of counsel." State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170
(App. Div. 1999). "To establish such a prima facie case, the defendant must
demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that his or her claim will ultimately succeed
on the merits." State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158 (1997). Defendant failed to
meet that threshold. See State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462-63 (1992); R. 3:22-
10(b). As such, an evidentiary hearing was properly denied.
To the extent not addressed here, defendant's remaining arguments lack
sufficient merit to warrant discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
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