STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. MATTHEW G. MOORE (16-11-0521, SALEM COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3152-18T3
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MATTHEW G. MOORE,
a/k/a MATT,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
Argued telephonically May 7, 2020 –
Decided July 23, 2020
Before Judges Alvarez and DeAlmeida.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Salem County, Indictment No. 16-11-0521.
Leonard S. Baker argued the cause for appellant
(Greenblatt Pierce Funt & Flores, LLC, attorneys;
Leonard S. Baker, of counsel and on the brief).
Lila Bagwell Leonard, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal,
Attorney General, attorney; Lila Bagwell Leonard, of
counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant appeals from an April 22, 2019 judgment of conviction for
second-degree vehicular homicide, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5(a), and driving while
intoxicated, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, for the death of his nephew, a passenger in a truck
he crashed while driving drunk. We affirm.
I.
The following facts are derived from the record. On November 29, 2015,
defendant and his nephew spent approximately eight hours drinking at the
Alloway Village Bar. According to a witness who joined the two men more than
four hours after they arrived, defendant and his nephew consumed five or six
beers and one shot of alcohol between 9:00 p.m. and midnight, when defendant
told his nephew he was ready to leave. It is undisputed the two left the bar
parking lot in defendant's truck. The central disputed issue at trial was whether
defendant or his nephew was driving.
Shortly after midnight, State Troopers were called to the scene of a motor
vehicle accident on a rural road near the bar. They found defendant's truck
"completely destroyed." Defendant's nephew was "[h]anging out of the truck
on the passenger side" with one leg "pinned inside and under the dash" of the
passenger side of the truck. He died of blunt force trauma to his torso before
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first responders arrived on scene. Defendant was on the ground beside his
deceased nephew being treated by medical personnel. He was transported to a
hospital in Delaware for treatment.
An expert in accident reconstruction testified that a computer chip from
defendant's truck indicated it was travelling at seventy-nine miles per hour when
it left the road, striking a tree five seconds later. He opined that the truck's speed
at the time of impact was between seventy-six and eighty-two miles per hour.
The brakes had not been applied before the crash. The posted speed limit for
the roadway was forty miles per hour.
State Troopers investigating the crash interviewed defendant in his
hospital bed. They read him Miranda1 warnings before he began answering
questions. He admitted that he had been at the bar with his nephew prior to the
crash but could not recall how much alcohol he had consumed or how long they
had been there. Although defendant said he could not recall the accident, he
stated that he had not been thrown from the truck and had crawled from the
vehicle to assist his nephew.
A Delaware justice of the peace issued a warrant to draw defendant's
blood. Test results indicated a blood alcohol content (BAC) at the time of the
1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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blood draw of 0.147. The legal limit for driving in New Jersey is 0.08. In an
extrapolation report, an expert determined that at the time of the crash
defendant's BAC was between 0.17 and 0.23.
The day after the crash, defendant called his nephew's mother from the
hospital and told her "he was sorry and that it was all his fault." He said he did
not know how the crash happened and that "the last thing he remembered was
[his nephew] telling him, [']we're leaving and we're taking your truck and you're
driving.[']"
A few days later, a friend visited defendant at the hospital. He told her
that he did not "really remember everything, but he said he was driving." He
told her "when he woke up he looked over to find [his nephew]. [He] wasn't
there so he went to get out of the truck and he fell out of the truck and had to
crawl around and he found [his nephew.]" Although the friend told police
defendant made these admissions at his nephew's funeral, she testified she was
mistaken when she spoke to police.
The victim's mother saw defendant at her son's wake. She testified that
defendant said to several people at the wake that he "was sorry, it was his fault
and that he was a piece of shit." She visited defendant approximately a week
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4
later, and he again told her "that he was sorry and it was all his fault." After he
was indicted, defendant began telling the victim's mother he was not driving.
Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress the statements he made from
his hospital bed. He argued he was too impaired from his injuries and alcohol
consumption to have voluntarily and knowingly waived his Miranda rights.
After an evidentiary hearing, which included review of an audio recording of
the interrogation, Judge Benjamin C. Telsey denied defendant's motion. In an
oral opinion, Judge Telsey found "the State has met its burden of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt that the statement was voluntarily and knowingly given after
voluntarily and knowingly waiving his Miranda rights."2
Defendant also moved pretrial pursuant to N.J.R.E. 104 to admit hearsay
statements from a deceased witness, Bradley Loveland. Loveland was a bouncer
at the Alloway Village Bar on the night of the crash. He died about five months
before the hearing on defendant's motion. His wife, Helen Nelson, testified that
someone had called Loveland around 1:30 a.m. on the morning of the accident
to tell him there had been a crash "and that actually that [defendant] had passed
2
On the same day, Judge Telsey denied defendant's motion to suppress the
results of the blood draw, rejecting his argument the Delaware justice of the
peace lacked authority to issue the warrant.
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away." Nelson had been at the bar the night of the crash and asked Loveland
what happened after she left.
She testified that Loveland told her "[defendant] and I think his nephew
. . . I don't know his name" had left the bar about an hour after she had. Nelson
asked Loveland "if [defendant] was driving or if the nephew was driving," and
he said "he did not actually see them leave the parking lot but he did see [the
victim] put [defendant] in the passenger side of the vehicle and that [defendant]
was very intoxicated."
Seven months after defendant was charged, Loveland gave a statement to
a defense investigator that was similar to that recounted in his wife's testimony.
The investigator did not record Loveland's statement. He did, however, create
a report, which included Loveland's statement and indicated Loveland admitted
he consumed four beers on the night in question.
Defendant argued Loveland's out-of-court statements were admissible
pursuant to N.J.R.E. 804(b)(6). In a comprehensive oral opinion, Judge Linda
L. Lawhun denied defendant's motion. She concluded defendant had not
established any of the indicia of reliability that would warrant admission of
Loveland's hearsay statements. As the court explained, when referring to
Loveland's statement to the investigator,
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I really have no measure from the testimony I have
received to determine whether the statement was made
in good faith or not. I know nothing of Mr. Loveland.
He's deceased. I don't know the circumstances under
which he gave that statement other than that an
investigator went to speak to him so I would have to say
at best I can really make no finding as to whether he
made the statement in good faith.
I don't know what his relationship was with either
[defendant] or [the victim]. There's an indication he
knew them both by name from seeing them in the bar.
I don't know if that's a good thing or a bad thing for
either one of them. . . . On the face of it, without
knowing the declarant, it appears [his statement was]
made upon his personal knowledge. . . . The statement
was made 10 months after the accident, made to a
defense investigator. . . . [T]he question is we don't
know what exactly Mr. Loveland said or why he said it
and the State makes a very good point. He has no way
of ever being able to find out why Mr. Loveland gave
the statement that he gave to [the investigator]. . . .
[W]hat causes the Court the greatest concern is the fact
that he didn't come forward at any time before he was
approached by the investigator to authorities to correct
what he perceived to be an error. . . . [H]e had some
knowledge that [defendant] had been charged with this
offense and [the victim] was deceased.
The court concluded,
[t]here are no particularized facts from which I can
guarantee its trustworthiness and for that reason neither
the testimony of [the investigator] or Ms. Nelson will
be admissible as to what Mr. Loveland had to say.
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At trial, defense counsel argued the State did not prove defendant was
driving the truck at the time of the crash. Counsel argued that when the truck
struck the tree, defendant was thrown from the passenger seat to outside the
truck and his nephew was thrown from the driver's seat to the passenger seat.
An accident reconstruction expert testified it would not have been possible "for
the driver to be thrown at a 90[-]degree angle on impact into the passenger seat,"
nor would it have been possible for the passenger to have been thrown 90
degrees out of the vehicle. According to the expert, "it's only going to happen
one way. You can't change the laws of physics." He explained that because
defendant and his nephew were not wearing seatbelts, when the truck hit the
tree, they would have continued in "the pre-impact speed that the vehicle was
traveling" until they hit the inside of the truck. He opined, "the vehicle [stopped]
by [they did] not." He also testified that "the entirety of the crushing of the
vehicle was within two-tenths of a second." Thus, the only way for the victim's
foot and lower leg to have been pinned under the passenger-side dashboard was
for him to have been in the passenger seat at the moment of the crash.
After a three-day trial, a jury found defendant not guilty of first-degree
aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1), and guilty of second-degree
vehicular homicide, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5 and driving while intoxicated, N.J.S.A.
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39:4-50. Judge Lawhun sentenced defendant to a three-year term of
incarceration, with a three-year period of parole ineligibility.
This appeal followed. Defendant raises the following arguments for our
consideration.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW
APPELLANT TO OFFER INTO EVIDENCE AN
EXCULPATORY STATEMENT FROM A
DECEASED WITNESS VIOLATED APPELLANT'S
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS AND HIS RIGHT TO
PRESENT A DEFENSE.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE
RESULTS OF HIS BLOOD ALCOHOL TEST
WHERE HIS BLOOD WAS DRAWN PURSUANT TO
AN INVALID SEARCH WARRANT ISSUED BY A
DELAWARE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE WHO
LACKED TERRITORIAL JURISDIC[TI]ON TO
ISSUE THE WARRANT. 3
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS HIS
STATEMENT WHERE THE STATE FAILED TO
ESTABLISH THE STATEMENT WAS MADE
VOLUNTARILY, KNOWINGLY AND
3
At oral argument, defendant withdrew this argument.
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INTELLIGENTLY UNDER THE TOTALITY OF THE
CIRCUMSTANCES.
POINT IV
THE STATE'S EXPERT WITNESS, DETECTIVE
PAUL APPLEGATE, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN
ALLOWED TO OPINE THAT JOSHUA MOORE
WAS THE PASSENGER IN THE VEHICLE. 4
II.
"In reviewing a trial court's evidential ruling, an appellate court is limited
to examining the decision for abuse of discretion." Hisenaj v. Kuehner, 194 N.J.
6, 12 (2008). N.J.R.E. 804(b)(6) allows admission into evidence "[i]n a civil
proceeding, [of] a statement made by a person unavailable as a witness because
of death if the statement was made in good faith upon declarant's person al
knowledge in circumstances indicating that it is trustworthy." This rule was
extended to criminal proceedings so long as there is a "particularized guarantee[]
of [the statement's] trustworthiness." State v. Bunyan, 154 N.J. 261, 267 (1998)
(quoting Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 816 (1990) (alteration in original)).
Our review of the record reveals no mistaken exercise of discretion by
Judge Lawhun when she denied defendant's motion to admit Loveland's hearsay
statements. There is ample support in the record for the trial court's conclusion
4
At oral argument, defendant withdrew this argument.
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that Loveland's statements do not have sufficient indicia of trustworthiness to
warrant admission. Unlike the out-of-court declarant in Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 299-302 (1973), on which defendant relies, Loveland
made statements that were not self-incriminatory or otherwise against his
interest. In addition, unlike the declarant in Chambers, who was available for
cross-examination, Loveland, who died before the start of defendant's trial,
could not be cross-examined. This factor is particularly relevant because of the
notation in the investigator's report that Loveland had consumed a significant
amount of alcohol on the night in question. Loveland's alcohol consumption
raises questions about the reliability of his perceptions and memory, as well as
the accuracy of his estimate of his alcohol intake, given that he admitted to
drinking while at work. Finally, as noted by the Court in Bunyan, an out-of-
court statement to a defense investigator made long after the events in question
is less trustworthy than a statement given to investigating police. 154 N.J. at
271. There is no evidence in the record Loveland recounted his statements to
police investigators, although the trial court found he was likely aware defendant
had been charged with his nephew's death.
We note, as well, that Loveland admitted he did not see defendant and his
nephew leave the tavern's parking lot. Nor did he state that he saw either of
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them drive the truck. Finally, the record contains significant evidence, including
unrebutted expert testimony, establishing that defendant's nephew was in the
passenger seat at the time of the crash.
III.
"An appellate court reviewing a motion to suppress evidence in a criminal
case must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision,
provided that those findings are 'supported by sufficient credible evidence in the
record.'" State v. Boone, 232 N.J. 417, 425-26 (2017) (quoting State v. Scriven,
226 N.J. 20, 40 (2016)). Findings of fact are overturned "only if they are so
clearly mistaken 'that the interests of justice demand intervention and
correction.'" State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007) (quoting State v. Johnson,
42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964)). However, we owe no deference to conclusions of law
made by the trial court, which are reviewed de novo. Boone, 232 N.J. at 426.
A valid waiver of Miranda rights "does not require that an individual be
informed of all information useful in making his decision." State v. A.M., 237
N.J. 384, 398 (2019). "Instead, a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver is
determined by the totality of the circumstances surrounding the custodial
interrogation based on the fact-based assessments of the trial court." Ibid.; see
also State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304, 313 (2000). When making this analysis,
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courts consider the defendant's age, education, and intelligence, whether he or
she was advised of his constitutional rights, the length of the detention, whether
the interrogation was repeated and prolonged, and whether physical punishment
or mental exhaustion were involved. State v. Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383, 402
(2009).
We see no ground for reversing the trial court's decision with respect to
the statements defendant made from his hospital bed. Judge Telsey listened to
the audiotape of defendant's interrogation twice, the second time with the aid of
a written transcript. He determined that defendant was sober, alert, aware of his
circumstances, and able to waive his right to remain silent. In evaluating
whether defendant was too intoxicated to knowingly and voluntarily waive his
rights, Judge Telsey concluded "that's not the case here at all." He continued,
"[i]n fact, the transcript indicates that he was responsive with regard to these
answers. He was quick with regards to his response, he had no extended delays
before he provided responses."
In addition, the judge found the instance where defendant "apologized for
cursing to the officer to be indicative of someone that understood what was
going on." He noted, "someone [who] is so impaired is not going to be
concerned about cursing in front of an officer to the point where he actually
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apologizes for acting disrespectful." The court also noted defendant corrected
an investigator's factual error when he stated that he had not been thrown from
the truck, which the court found indicative of defendant's awareness of his
circumstances.5
To the extent we have not addressed defendant's other arguments, it is
because we conclude them to be without sufficient merit to warrant discussion
in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
5
Because we agree with the trial court's conclusion that defendant knowingly
and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, we need not address the question of
whether he was in custody while in his hospital bed.
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