LLOYD MUHAMMAD VS. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD (NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD) ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3589-18T2
LLOYD MUHAMMAD, a/k/a
LLOYD M. JACKSON, and
LLOYD GEORGE JACKSON,
Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY STATE
PAROLE BOARD,
Respondent.
___________________________
Submitted May 26, 2020 – Decided August 4, 2020
Before Judges Rothstadt and Mitterhoff.
On appeal from the New Jersey State Parole Board.
Lloyd Muhammad, appellant pro se.
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Jane C. Schuster, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel; Christopher Josephson, Deputy
Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Lloyd Muhammad 1 appeals from the New Jersey State Parole Board's
(Board) March 27, 2019 final agency decision denying his request for an early
discharge from parole supervision. On appeal, he argues that the Board
wrongfully denied his request because he has made a "satisfactory ad justment"
while on parole, as contemplated by N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.66 and N.J.A.C. 10A:71-
6.9, based upon his employment history, his children's success, and his never
having failed a drug test. We affirm as we conclude that, despite Muhammad's
achievements while on parole, the Board's decision was not arbitrary, capricious,
or unreasonable as it was supported by sufficient credible evidence of
Muhammad having committed numerous violations of the conditions of his
parole.
On March 10, 1976, Muhammad was convicted after a jury trial of murder
and armed robbery, and was sentenced to life in prison. Three months later, he
pled guilty to two counts of armed robbery, two counts of atrocious assault, and
one count of giving false information to the police. On Jul y 30, 1976,
Muhammad was sentenced to an aggregate term of seven to ten years in prison,
to run concurrent with his previous life sentence.
1
Muhammad is also known as Lloyd Muhammad Jackson and Lloyd G.
Jackson.
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The Board placed Muhammad on parole in May 1995 until September 6,
2000, when it revoked his parole and established a fifteen-month future
eligibility term because he failed to report as instructed, failed to get approval
for a change of residence or employment, and failed to obtain approval before
leaving the State. In addition, on March 19, 2001, Muhammad pled guilty to
absconding from parole and uttering a forged instrument. A court sentenced
him to an aggregate five-year custodial term, concurrent to his parole-violation
term.
The Board again released Muhammad on parole in 2003. Among his
general conditions of parole, Muhammad was "required to obey all laws and
ordinances," notify his parole officer "immediately after being served with or
receiving a complaint or summons," and notify his parole officer before leaving
New Jersey.
On July 19, 2018, Muhammad requested to be discharged from parole. He
stated he had been classified as "advanced" since 2015, "stayed gainfully
employed throughout [his] time in the community," never failed a drug test,
raised two children that were gainfully employed, and "continually worked with
nonprofit agencies which focus[ed] attention on dysfunctional youth."
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On July 30, 2018, a representative of the Division of Parole (Division)
who was a District Parole Supervisor, wrote to Muhammad informing him that
he would not be recommending Muhammad for a discharge for several reasons
that included Muhammad's "history under parole supervision in total, police
contacts/police reports in recent years that came to [the Division's] attention,
and the specific impressions of [his] assigned parole officer in reference to [his]
adjustment and cooperation with parole supervision."
Muhammad appealed that determination and a designee of the Division's
director affirmed the earlier denial. According to the letter sent to Muhammad,
the Division conducted a "review of [Muhammad's] [c]ase [that] disclosed
numerous incidents of noncompliance with [his] conditions of supervision that
were not addressed in earlier reviews." Specifically, it stated that since his "last
release to parole supervision in November 2003, [Muhammad] received no less
than [twenty-eight] traffic tickets, which resulted in [fifteen] convictions for
moving violations and eight convictions for parking violations." The letter also
noted that Muhammad's receiving a speeding ticket in New York, when he had
not received permission to leave New Jersey, also constituted a violation of
Muhammad's parole conditions. Further, Muhammad never advised his parole
officer of any of his traffic tickets or his convictions. The letter concluded by
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stating that "[Muhammad's] actions indicate that good reason exists to require
continued supervision."
Muhammad appealed the Division's denial of his request to a Board panel.
A month later, the Board panel affirmed the Director's decision. In its written
decision, the Board panel again cited to Muhammad's numerous traffic
violations and his leaving the State without permission, which "v iolat[ed]
conditions of his parole supervision." The Board panel concluded by
recommending "that the request for a discharge from parole as specified in
N.J.A.C. 10A:71-6.9 'Discharge from Parole' be denied as good cause has not
been shown that supervision is no longer required."
Muhammad appealed the Board panel's decision to the full Board, which
also denied his request for the reasons stated in its March 27, 2019, "Notice of
Final Agency Decision." According to the Board, under N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.66,
a parolee "may be discharged from parole supervision prior to the expiration of
the sentence imposed, provided that the parolee demonstrates that he has made
a satisfactory adjustment while on parole, that continued supervision is not
required, and that the parolee has made full payment of any fine or restituti on."
The Board denied Muhammad's request for discharge after it also noted
Muhammad's twenty-eight traffic violations and his failure to obtain approval
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from his parole officer before leaving the state of New Jersey. The Board stated
that Muhammad was required, under his general conditions for parole, to obey
all laws and ordinances and inform his parole officer before leaving the State so
that he could first obtain approval for doing so. As Muhammad violated both of
those conditions, the Board denied his request. The Board concluded that good
cause existed to continue Muhammad's parole supervision. This appeal
followed.
The gist of Muhammad's arguments on appeal is that traffic violations and
leaving the State on a temporary basis are not violations of the conditions of
parole. Moreover, had he been given the hearing before the Board to which he
was entitled, he would have demonstrated that he had achieved a "satisfactory
adjustment" that warranted his discharge from parole, and relieving him of the
punitive nature of parole supervision. We disagree.
"Our role in reviewing an administrative agency's decision is limited."
Malacow v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 457 N.J. Super. 87, 93 (App. Div. 2018) (citing
Circus Liquors, Inc. v. Governing Body of Middletown Twp., 199 N.J. 1, 9
(2009)). "Judicial review of the Parole Board's decisions is guided by the
arbitrary and capricious standard that constrains other administrative action."
Acoli v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 224 N.J. 213, 222-23 (2016). Accordingly, the
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Board's decisions should be reversed "only if they are arbitrary and capricious."
Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd. (Trantino V), 166 N.J. 113, 201 (2001)
(Baime, J., dissenting). We must uphold the Board's factual findings if they
"could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence in the
whole record." Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd. (Trantino IV), 154 N.J. 19, 24
(1998) (quoting N.J. State Parole Bd. v. Cestari, 224 N.J. Super. 534, 547 (App.
Div. 1988)).
"'Parole Board decisions are highly individualized discretionary
appraisals' and should only be reversed if found to be arbitrary or capricious."
Hare v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 368 N.J. Super. 175, 179-80 (App. Div. 2004)
(citation omitted) (quoting Trantino V, 166 N.J. at 173). According to our
Supreme Court, a reviewing court must determine:
(1) whether the agency's action violates express or
implied legislative policy, i.e., did the agency follow
the law; (2) whether the record contains substantial
evidence to support the findings on which the agency
based its action; and (3) whether in applying the
legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred
in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have
been made on a showing of the relevant factors.
[Trantino V, 166 N.J. at 172 (quoting Trantino IV, 154
N.J. at 24).]
In our review of the Board's action for arbitrariness, we
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must determine whether [the Board's] factual finding
could reasonably have been reached on sufficient
credible evidence in the whole record. Under this
standard, the agency's decision will be set aside "if
there exists in the reviewing mind a definite conviction
that the determination below went so far wide of the
mark that a mistake must have been made." "This sense
of 'wrongness' arises in several ways, among which are
the lack of inherently credible supporting evidence, the
obvious overlooking or underevaluation of crucial
evidence or a clearly unjust result."
[Cestari, 224 N.J. Super. at 547 (citation omitted)
(quoting 613 Corp. v. State, Div. of State Lottery, 210
N.J. Super. 485, 495 (App. Div. 1986)).]
In our determination of whether the Board's action was arbitrary,
unreasonable, or capricious, we are also guided by certain principles. "New
Jersey prisoners have a protected liberty interest, rooted in the language of our
parole statute, in parole release, and a resulting constitutional right to due
process of law." Thompson v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 210 N.J. Super. 107, 120
(App. Div. 1986). Moreover, inmates possess a liberty interest that entitles them
to due process protection of their right to a fair decision. N.J. State Parole Bd.
v. Byrne, 93 N.J. 192, 210-11 (1983). "[T]he joint interests of society and the
prisoner in basic fairness require some measure of protection from gross
miscarriages of justice and totally arbitrary action." Id. at 211. "Only a few,
basic procedures are required to deal with the risks of erroneous or arbitrary
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determinations in this context." Ibid. Parolees are entitled to notice of the
pendency of a disposition, a statement of the reasons for any unfavorable
decision, and an opportunity for a response. Ibid.
"Parole is a period of supervised release 'by which a prisoner is allowed to
serve the final portion of his sentence outside the gates of the institution on
certain terms and conditions, in order to prepare for his eventual return to
society.'" State v. Black, 153 N.J. 438, 447 (1998) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
State v. Oquendo, 262 N.J. Super. 317, 324 (App. Div.), rev'd on other grounds,
133 N.J. 416 (1993)). A discharge from parole therefore amounts to an earlier
termination of the sentence imposed upon the parolee.
The Board is authorized to discharge parolees from parole. Its decision as
to whether it should discharge a parolee is guided by specific statutes and
regulations. According to N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.66:
[T]he appropriate board panel may give any parolee a
complete discharge from parole prior to the expiration
of the full maximum term for which he was sentenced
or as authorized by the disposition, provided that such
parolee has made a satisfactory adjustment while on
parole, provided that continued supervision is not
required, and provided the parolee has made full
payment of any fine or restitution.
The Board's governing regulations set forth the factors to be considered in
response to a request for a discharge from parole. They state the following:
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(a) The appropriate Board panel may grant any parolee
a complete discharge from parole prior to the
expiration of the maximum term for which he or she
was sentenced, provided that:
1. Such parolee has made a satisfactory adjustment
while on parole; and
2. Continued supervision is not required;
3. The parolee has made full payment of any
assessment, fine, penalty, lab fee or restitution or the
parolee has in good faith established a satisfactory
payment schedule; or
4. In the opinion of the Board panel continued
supervision is not warranted or appropriate based upon
a review of the facts and circumstances considered
pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10A:71-7.10, 7.11, 7.12, 7.16 and
7.17, 7.17A or 7.17B. [2]
[N.J.A.C. 10A:71-6.9(a)(1) to (4).]
The same regulation also provides that "[a] decision to discharge an adult
parolee serving a sentence for murder shall be rendered by the Board. The Board
may require an adult parolee to appear for an interview before the Board prior
to a decision being rendered." N.J.A.C. 10A:71-6.9(h).
With those guiding principles in mind, we turn to Muhammad's primary
argument about his having demonstrated a "satisfactory adjustment" sufficient
2
These regulations relate primarily to parole revocation and are not at issue in
this matter.
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to warrant his discharge from parole. While we applaud Muhammad on his
success in raising his family, maintaining employment, helping others, and
never using drugs, we cannot conclude that the Board's denial of discharge was
unsupported, and therefore arbitrary, in light of the numerous violations of the
conditions of parole to which the Board cited in its final decision. Contrary to
Muhammad's belief, the accumulation of traffic offense convictions and leaving
the State without permission, even temporarily, constitute violations of parole.
See N.J.A.C. 10A:71-6.4 (stating an offender granted parole "shall comply" with
various general conditions of parole, including requirements to "[o]bey all laws
and ordinances" and "[o]btain permission prior to leaving the state of the
approved residence for any purpose"). His failure to recognize that reality after
his initial parole revocation lends further support to the Board's decision here.
We are equally satisfied that, contrary to Muhammad's contention on
appeal that he was denied due process, the Board afforded him the due process
to which he was entitled. The premise to Muhammad's argument in this regard
is also simply mistaken—he was not entitled to the hearing he now demands.
See N.J.A.C. 10A:71-6.9(h). There was no requirement for the Board to have a
hearing for Muhammad. Nevertheless, Muhammad was given numerous
opportunities to appeal the continued denial of his early discharge request, and
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indeed, he submitted several briefs at each juncture with supporting
documentation that were considered by the Division and the Board. And, the
Board provided him with the factual basis for its reasons for denying his request,
which Muhammad does not refute, but only incorrectly argues did not constitute
a history of parole violations. Nothing more was required.
To the extent we have not specifically addressed any of Muhammad's
remaining contentions, we conclude they are without sufficient merit to warrant
discussion in a written decision. See R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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