STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. URIE RIDGEWAY (15-12-1315, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3682-18T2
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
URIE RIDGEWAY,
Defendant-Appellant.
_____________________________
Submitted February 5, 2020 – Decided March 11, 2020
Before Judges Gooden Brown and Mawla.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Burlington County, Indictment No. 15-12-
1315.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Frank M. Gennaro, Designated Counsel, on
the brief).
Scott A. Coffina, Burlington County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Alexis R. Agre, Assistant
Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Urie Ridgeway appeals from the September 13, 2018 Law
Division order denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an
evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
We glean these facts from the record. Along with his uncle, co-defendant
Willie Hymon, defendant was charged in a ten-count indictment with first-
degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1) (count one); first-degree kidnapping,
N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(b)(1) (count two); second-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A.
2C:12-1(b)(1) (count three); second-degree burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2(a)(1)
(count four); third-degree terroristic threats, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(b) (count five);
third-degree theft, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3(a) (count six); third-degree criminal
restraint, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-2(a) (count seven); third-degree aggravated assault,
N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(2) (count eight); third-degree possession of a weapon for
an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d) (count nine); and fourth-degree
unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d) (count ten). The charges
stemmed from a home invasion robbery, during which the sixty-four-year-old
victim was bound, terrorized, tortured, and threatened with a deadly weapon.
On July 27, 2016, defendant entered a negotiated guilty plea to count one,
as amended to reflect that the robbery was committed "[w]hile armed with a
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deadly weapon, to wit: [a] blunt object." 1 See N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(b). The
prosecutor explained that "the amendment [was] appropriate under the [c]ourt
[r]ules" because it was "consistent with what was presented to the grand jury
and . . . consistent with the discovery . . . provided to defense counsel, so there
[was] no surprise." See State v. Dorn, 233 N.J. 81, 96 (2018) ("[T]he analysis
as to whether an indictment was sufficient and whether an amendment under
Rule 3:7-4 was appropriate hinges upon whether the defendant was provided
with adequate notice of the charges and whether an amendment would prejudice
defendant in the formulation of a defense."). When questioned by the trial court,
defense counsel responded he had no objection to the amendment as part of the
plea agreement, which also included the prosecutor's agreement to move the
dismissal of the remaining counts, and to recommend a twelve-year sentence,
subject to an eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility pursuant to the No
Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.
During the plea allocution, defendant admitted that he and co-defendant
Hymon robbed the victim on February 8, 2014, in Medford Township, by
committing a theft while armed with a deadly weapon. Specifically, while co-
1
The original charge alleged that the robbery was committed while "inflict[ing]
bodily injury or us[ing] force upon another." See N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1).
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defendant Hymon was armed with a blunt object, they entered the victim's home,
and stole items from the house. Among the items stolen, defendant admitted
stealing the victim's cell phone. After ensuring that the plea conformed with the
requirements of Rule 3:9-2, and that the factual basis sufficed to establish
accomplice liability, see N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6, the judge accepted defendant's guilty
plea.
At the sentencing hearing on October 6, 2016, defense counsel argued
there were "mitigating factors that the [c]ourt should consider." Defense counsel
pointed to defendant's agreement to pay "restitution . . . to the extent t hat
[defendant] has the ability to pay," see N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(6), and to
defendant's lifetime struggle with "drug addiction . . . since . . . age [twenty -
two]." Defense counsel elaborated that defendant's use of "cocaine and alcohol
. . . has contributed to his departures from living a law-abiding life" and
prevented him from "being the productive citizen" he hoped to be. Defense
counsel added that, in fact, defendant "was under the influence of cocaine" when
the crime occurred but "because of the nature of the offense . . . he was not
eligible for drug court." See N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(4). Additionally, in
mitigation, defense counsel asserted that defendant believed the house he was
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entering with his co-defendant "was actually an abandoned house," but that
turned out not to be the case. See N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(2).
The judge sentenced defendant in accordance with the plea agreement.
Notwithstanding defense counsel's arguments, the judge found "no mitigating
factors" and aggravating factors three, six, and nine. See N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3)
("[t]he risk that the defendant will commit another offense"); N.J.S.A. 2C:44 -
1(a)(6) ("[t]he extent of the defendant's prior criminal record and the seriousness
of the offenses of which he has been convicted"); N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9) ("[t]he
need for deterring the defendant and others from violating the law"). In
"conclud[ing] that the aggravating factors clearly and substantially outweigh[ed]
the mitigating factors," the judge explained that while he "sympathize[d] with"
and had "compassion towards" "somebody [like defendant] who has a drug
addiction," his "compassion . . . and . . . sympathy end[ed] when the drug-
addicted person's conduct turn[ed] to violence, as it did here."
On June 5, 2017, we heard defendant's challenge to his sentence on the
sentence only argument calendar. See R. 2:9-11. We affirmed the sentence but
remanded the matter "to the trial court for an amended judgment of conviction
to reflect one . . . [additional] day of jail credit." On September 28, 2017, the
Supreme Court denied defendant's petition for certification. State v. Ridgeway,
A-3682-18T2
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230 N.J. 610 (2017). Shortly thereafter, on October 27, 2017, defendant filed
the PCR petition that is the subject of this appeal, asserting ineffective assistance
of counsel (IAC).
In his supporting pro se brief, defendant alleged that his plea counsel
pressured him into pleading guilty, "failed to communicate with [him]
throughout the plea process," failed to provide him with "the complete
discovery," "failed to investigate" the case, failed to file any "motions to
suppress . . . evidence" or dismiss charges, and gave "minimal argument at
sentencing." He asserted he pled guilty because "he feared the consequences of
going to trial" with his attorney representing him. Defendant also alleged that
his appellate counsel was ineffective by failing to raise several arguments on
appeal that "may" have resulted in "a lesser sentence." In his counseled brief,
defendant alleged his attorney was ineffective by failing to file a motion to
withdraw his guilty plea based on an inadequate factual basis.
During oral argument, defendant relied on the arguments contained in both
briefs. However, rather than seeking "a new trial" or "a new sentencing
hearing," defendant specified that "the relief [he was] seeking" was limited to
"a reduction in the custodial sentence." Defendant argued that had plea "counsel
fulfilled all his duties without any errors," the court would have sentenced him
A-3682-18T2
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to "a ten-year sentence," subject to NERA. The State responded that there was
no basis to reduce defendant's sentence because "it was a negotiated plea," and
the sentence was reasonable given the serious charges defendant faced "that
carried a very significant amount of exposure." The State also pointed out that
his co-defendant was convicted following a jury trial, during which "the victim
testified at length," and the co-defendant subsequently received a thirty-year
NERA sentence.
Following oral argument, the PCR court denied defendant's petition. In a
written decision, the judge reviewed the factual background and procedural
history of the case, applied the applicable legal principles, and concluded
defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of IAC. The judge found
defendant failed to show that either counsel's performance fell below the
objective standard of reasonableness set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105
N.J. 42, 49-53 (1987), or that the outcome would have been different as required
under the second prong of the Strickland/Fritz test. Additionally, in rejecting
defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing, the judge concluded defendant
failed to present any issues that could not be resolved by reference to the existing
record.
A-3682-18T2
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Specifically, the judge determined defendant's attorney "acted in an
objectively reasonable manner when he negotiated [defendant's] plea" because
defendant was facing "four charges of first[-] or second-degree crimes" and
defendant's "potential custodial exposure was vastly greater than his current
twelve-year term of incarceration." The judge pointed out that during the plea
colloquy, defendant acknowledged that he was entering the plea voluntarily, that
no one had pressured him into pleading guilty, that he understood the charge he
was pleading guilty to, that he understood the consequences of his plea, that he
had discussed the matter with his attorney, and that he was satisfied with his
attorney's services and advice.
Further, the judge determined that during the plea hearing, plea "counsel
elicited a factual basis that satisfied each element of [N.J.S.A.] 2C:15-1(a)"
under "an accomplice liability theory" because "[t]he elicited factual basis"
demonstrated that defendant and co-defendant Hymon "both entered the victim's
home without consent," and "Hymon threatened the victim's life" with "a blunt
object" while "[defendant] stole [the victim's] phone." Additionally, the judge
explained that "[e]ven if [he] . . . accept[ed] defendant's argument that [his
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attorney's] failure to file a Slater[2] motion [met] the first Strickland prong,"
defendant provided no showing that "he would have been successful in a
[m]otion to [w]ithdraw [his] [g]uilty [p]lea" "to satisfy the second [Strickland]
prong," because defendant "fail[ed] to raise a colorable claim of innocence," as
required under Slater.3
On appeal, defendant raises the following point for our consideration:
POINT ONE – DEFENDANT'S PLEA COUNSEL
PROVIDED HIM WITH INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE BY PERMITTING HIM TO ENTER A
GUILTY PLEA WITHOUT A PROPER FACTUAL
BASIS, FAILING TO MOVE TO WITHDRAW THE
PLEA, FAILING TO ADEQUATELY
COMMUNICATE WITH DEFENDANT AND
INVESTIGATE THE CASE AND FAILING TO
MAKE AN EFFECTIVE ARGUMENT IN
MITIGATION OF SENTENCE.
A. THE PREVAILING LEGAL
PRINCIPLES REGARDING CLAIMS
FOR INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL, EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS
2
See State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145, 157-58 (2009) (establishing four factors trial
courts must "consider and balance . . . in evaluating motions to withdraw a guilty
plea," namely, "(1) whether the defendant has asserted a colorable claim of
innocence; (2) the nature and strength of defendant's reasons for withdrawal; (3)
the existence of a plea bargain; and (4) whether withdrawal would result in
unfair prejudice to the State or unfair advantage to the accused.").
3
Defendant correctly points out that, contrary to the judge's analysis, "when the
issue is solely whether an adequate factual basis supports a guilty plea, a Slater
analysis is unnecessary." State v. Tate, 220 N.J. 393, 404 (2015).
A-3682-18T2
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AND PETITIONS FOR POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF.
B. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS
INEFFECTIVE FOR PERMITTING
DEFENDANT TO PLEAD GUILTY TO A
FIRST[-]DEGREE CRIME WITHOUT A
FACTUAL BASIS, AND FOR FAILING
TO MOVE TO WITHDRAW THE
GUILTY PLEA.
C. FAILURE TO COMMUNICATE,
INVESTIGATE AND CALL
WITNESSES.
D. COUNSEL'S PERFORMANCE AT
SENTENCING.
Defendant asserts the judge erred by denying "[his] [p]etition without
affording him an evidentiary hearing." Merely raising a claim for PCR does not
entitle a defendant to relief or an evidentiary hearing. See Cummings, 321 N.J.
Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999). Rather, trial courts should grant evidentiary
hearings only if the defendant has presented a prima facie claim of IAC, material
issues of disputed fact lie outside the record, and resolution of those issues
necessitates a hearing. R. 3:22-10(b); State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 355 (2013).
A PCR court deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing "should view the
facts in the light most favorable to a defendant." State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451,
463 (1992). However, "[a] court shall not grant an evidentiary hearing" if "the
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defendant's allegations are too vague, conclusory or speculative." R. 3:22-
10(e)(2). Indeed, the defendant "must do more than make bald assertions that
he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. He must allege facts sufficient
to demonstrate counsel's alleged substandard performance." Cummings, 321
N.J. Super. at 170.
In turn, we review under the abuse of discretion standard the PCR court's
determination to proceed without an evidentiary hearing. State v. Marshall, 148
N.J. 89, 157 (1997). We also typically review a PCR petition with "deference
to the trial court's factual findings . . . 'when supported by adequate, substantial
and credible evidence.'" State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 415 (2004) (alteration in
original) (quoting Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of W. Windsor, 173 N.J. 502, 549
(2002)). However, where, as here, "no evidentiary hearing has been held, we
'may exercise de novo review over the factual inferences drawn from the
documentary record by the [PCR judge].'" State v. Reevey, 417 N.J. Super. 134,
146-47 (App. Div. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Harris, 181 N.J. at
421). We also review de novo the legal conclusions of the PCR judge. Harris,
181 N.J. at 415-16 (citing Toll Bros., 173 N.J. at 549).
To establish a prima facie claim of IAC, defendant must satisfy the two -
prong Strickland test: he must show that (l) "counsel's performance was
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deficient" and he "made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
'counsel' guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment" to the United States
Constitution; and (2) "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 694; see also Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52. A reasonable
probability is defined as "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
Under the first Strickland prong, "counsel is strongly presumed to have
rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise
of reasonable professional judgment." Id. at 690. Adequate assistance of
counsel must be measured by a standard of "'reasonable competence.'" State v.
Jack, 144 N.J. 240, 248 (1996) (quoting Fritz, 105 N.J. at 53). However,
"'[r]easonable competence' does not require the best of attorneys . . . ." State v.
Davis, 116 N.J. 341, 351 (1989).
Under the second Strickland prong, defendant must prove prejudice.
Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52. In order to establish the Strickland prejudice prong to set
aside a guilty plea based on IAC, a defendant must show "'there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not have pled
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'" State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J.
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434, 457 (1994) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). Moreover,
"'a [defendant] must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain'"
and "insist on going to trial" would have been "'rational under the
circumstances.'" State v. Maldon, 422 N.J. Super. 475, 486 (App. Div. 2011)
(quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010)). That determination
should be "based on evidence, not speculation." Ibid. Because there is a strong
presumption that counsel "rendered adequate assistance and made all significant
decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment," Strickland, 466
U.S. at 690, a defendant "bears the burden of proving" both prongs of an IAC
claim "by a preponderance of the evidence." State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 350
(2012).
Applying these standards, we are satisfied defendant failed to make a
prima facie showing of IAC under the Strickland/Fritz test, and we discern no
abuse of discretion in the judge's denial of defendant's PCR petition without an
evidentiary hearing. Defendant argues "plea counsel was ineffective for
permitting the improper amendment of the robbery charge, [4] for permitting him
4
We note that this specific claim was never presented to the PCR judge, and,
therefore, is not properly before us. See State v. Galicia, 210 N.J. 364, 383
(2012) ("Generally, an appellate court will not consider issues, even
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to enter a plea to a first[-]degree crime without an adequate factual basis, and
for failing thereafter to move to withdraw the plea." Additionally, defendant
claims his attorney "was ineffective for failing to adequately communicate with
him, and to properly investigate the case, including interviewing and producing
trial witnesses."5 Finally, defendant asserts his plea counsel "was ineffective for
failing to make an effective argument in mitigation of sentencing." 6
constitutional ones, which were not raised below." (citing Deerfield Estates, Inc.
v. E. Brunswick, 60 N.J. 115, 120 (1972))).
5
Contrary to defendant's claim, the record includes letters he received from his
attorney advising him of the status of the case, the results of plea negotiations,
and the outcome of the investigation and interview of a potential witness.
Defendant provides no information about investigative leads his attorney failed
to pursue or specific witnesses his attorney failed to interview. Instead,
defendant seeks an evidentiary hearing to explore these issues. However,
"[d]efendant must demonstrate a prima facie case for relief before an evidentiary
hearing is required, and the court is not obligated to conduct an evidentiary
hearing to allow defendant to establish a prima facie case not contained within
the allegations in his PCR petition." State v. Bringhurst, 401 N.J. Super. 421,
436-37 (App. Div. 2008).
6
Relying on defendant's challenge to his sentence as excessive on direct appeal,
the PCR judge mistakenly applied Rule 3:22-5, barring claims previously
adjudicated on the merits in a direct appeal. Nonetheless, defendant's claim is
belied by the record. Unlike State v. Hess, 207 N.J. 123, 154 (2011), where
"[t]he sentencing court heard the prosecution's impassioned account, and from
the defense a deafening silence," here, defense counsel vigorously argued both
statutory and non-statutory mitigating factors on defendant's behalf. "The test
is not whether defense counsel could have done better, but whether he met the
constitutional threshold for effectiveness." State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 543
(2013).
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Even if defense counsel's performance was deficient, defendant has failed
to establish the prejudice prong of the Strickland/Fritz test to set aside his guilty
plea because defendant never demonstrated that "but for counsel's errors," he
"would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial[,]"
DiFrisco, 137 N.J. at 457 (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 59), and "'a decision to reject
the plea bargain'" and "insist on going to trial" would have been "'rational under
the circumstances.'" Maldon, 422 N.J. Super. at 486 (quoting Padilla, 559 U.S.
at 372). Indeed, during oral argument on his PCR petition, defendant
specifically limited the relief he sought to a reduced sentence, rather than
seeking to vacate his guilty plea and proceed to trial. Thus, defendant failed to
satisfy his burden of proving both prongs of his IAC claim.
Affirmed.
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