HUDSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES O/B/O KATHERINE CALCANO VS. ANGELO E. MATEO (FD-09-1173-19, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2020 )

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3590-18T2
HUDSON COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY
SERVICES o/b/o KATHERINE
CALCANO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ANGELO E. MATEO,
Defendant-Appellant.
_____________________________
Argued February 12, 2020 – Decided March 11, 2020
Before Judges Koblitz, Gooden Brown and Mawla.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County,
Docket No. FD-09-1173-19.
Angelo E. Mateo, appellant, argued the cause pro se.
Catherine Healy argued the cause for respondent.
PER CURIAM
Defendant Angelo Mateo appeals from the March 25, 2019 Family Part
orders, establishing child support for N.M. and L.M., claiming New Jersey
courts lack personal jurisdiction over him. We disagree and affirm.
When N.M. was born at Hackensack Hospital in April, 2007, defendant
executed a certificate of parentage (COP) dated April 30, 2007. In the COP,
defendant certified that he was the natural father of N.M., and that he resided
with Katherine Calcano, the child's mother, in North Bergen, where the parties
would presumably reside with the child once discharged from the hospital.
Calcano gave birth to L.M. one year and nine months later, in January, 2009.
No COP was executed for L.M.
On behalf of Calcano, on February 25, 2019, the Hudson County
Department of Family Services (HCDFS) filed a complaint against defendant to
establish paternity of L.M. and child support for both children, pursuant to Rule
5:6-1, providing that "a summary action for support may be brought by either
the party entitled thereto, or an assistance agency . . . provided no other family
action is pending in which the issue of support has been or could be raised." In
accordance with Rule 5:4-1(b), a summons was issued to defendant at an address
in Wilmington, Delaware, notifying him to appear before a Hudson County child
support hearing officer (CSHO) on March 25, 2019, to answer the complaint.
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On the morning of March 25, defendant appeared before the CSHO for
the limited purpose of contesting personal jurisdiction and service. As a result,
the case was referred to a Family Part judge, see R. 5:25-3(b)(7), who
determined that, based on the contents of the COP, as well as the fact that both
Calcano and the children were residents of Hudson County and recipients of
Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF) benefits through HCDFS, "the
[c]ourt [had] jurisdiction over th[e] matter." Specifically, the judge determined
that defendant was properly served by both regular and certified mail, evidenced
by the fact that he appeared on the scheduled date, and, based on the totality of
the circumstances, was subject to the jurisdiction of the court.
When the judge asked defendant whether he wanted to undergo a paternity
test to challenge paternity of L.M., defendant responded "[n]o." 1 Relying on the
COP and defendant's response, the judge determined that paternity was
established as to both children. The judge then proceeded to ask defendant a
series of questions in order to establish child support. When defendant refused
to answer the questions, the judge imputed income at minimum wage, awarded
"no credits" or "deductions," and referred the matter back to the CSHO to
1
Defendant refused to be sworn but was administered an affirmation at the
beginning of the proceedings.
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calculate child support in accordance with the Child Support Guidelines. See
Child Support Guidelines, Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules,
Appendix IX to R. 5:6A, www.gannlaw.com (2019).
On the afternoon of March 25, although defendant appealed the CSHO's
ensuing recommendation as permitted under Rule 5:25-3(d)(2), he failed to
appear before the judge for a de novo hearing. Accordingly, the judge affirmed
the CSHO's decision, imputing minimum wage to defendant and establishing
child support for both children in the amount of "$100 per week plus $5 towards
arrears dating back to the date of filing." This appeal followed.
On appeal, defendant renews his jurisdictional challenge. Although we
exercise de novo review of the trial court's legal decision on personal
jurisdiction, YA Glob. Invs., L.P. v. Cliff, 419 N.J. Super. 1, 8 (App. Div. 2011),
we will not disturb the trial court's finding of jurisdictional facts so long as they
are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. Jacobs v. Walt
Disney World, Co., 309 N.J. Super. 443, 452 (App. Div. 1998). These principles
of personal jurisdiction apply to litigation in which a plaintiff seeks to impose
affirmative duties on a defendant, including child support. See Katz v. Katz,
310 N.J. Super. 25, 31 (App. Div. 1998).
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Pertinent to this appeal, N.J.S.A. 2A:4-30.129(a) provides the bases for
personal jurisdiction over a non-resident as follows:
In a proceeding to establish or enforce a support order
or to determine parentage of a child, a tribunal of this
State may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident individual . . . if:
(1) the individual is personally served
with a summons or notice within this State;
(2) the individual submits to the
jurisdiction of this State by consent in a
record, by entering a general appearance,
or by filing a responsive document having
the effect of waiving any contest to
personal jurisdiction;
(3) the individual resided with the child in
this State;
(4) the individual resided in this State and
provided prenatal expenses or support for
the child;
(5) the child resides in this State as a result
of the acts or directives of the individual;
(6) the individual engaged in sexual
intercourse in this State and the child may
have been conceived by that act of
intercourse;
(7) there is any other basis consistent with
the constitutions of this State and the
United States for the exercise of personal
jurisdiction.
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Even if one or more of the long-arm jurisdictional provisions of N.J.S.A.
2A:4-30.129(a) is satisfied, the court must still consider whether "the exercise
of that jurisdiction violates the Due Process Clause." C.L. v. W.S., 406 N.J.
Super. 484, 491 (App. Div. 2009). "[T]o satisfy the Due Process Clause,
'defendant's contacts with the forum State must be such that maintenance of the
suit "does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."'"
Ibid. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292
(1980) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945))). The
requisite
"minimum contacts" with the forum State required to
exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident will be found
if a defendant "purposely avails [himself] of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State" and his contacts with the State are of a nature
that "he should reasonably anticipate being haled into
court there."
[Ibid. (quoting Woodson, 444 U.S. at 297). See also
Sharp v. Sharp, 336 N.J. Super. 492, 501 (App. Div.
2001).]
In deciding whether a non-resident's minimum contacts are sufficient, the
court must distinguish between "specific" jurisdiction, where the "cause of
action directly relates to the [non-resident's] contacts with the [forum] [s]tate,"
and "general" jurisdiction, where the "cause of action is unrelated to those
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contacts." Id. at 492. "If a . . . cause of action is predicated on specific
jurisdiction, 'an isolated act may be sufficient to subject the [non-resident] to the
jurisdiction of the forum.'" Ibid. (quoting Charles Gendler & Co. v. Telecom
Equip. Corp., 102 N.J. 460, 471 (1986)).
This case involves an exercise of "specific" jurisdiction because the child
support claim directly relates to defendant's activities in New Jersey between
2006 and 2009, when the children were conceived. Because N.J.S.A. 2A:4-
30.129(a) provides that engaging in sexual intercourse in New Jersey,
conceiving children in New Jersey, and residing with the children conceived in
New Jersey constitute sufficient contacts to support jurisdiction of New Jersey
courts in a claim for child support, all of which occurred here, defendant is
clearly subject to New Jersey's jurisdiction. Moreover, Calcano and the children
have continued to be domiciled in New Jersey as evidenced by their receipt of
TANF benefits through HCDFS. These significant and "substantial contacts
with New Jersey establish that defendant 'purposefully avail[ed] [himself] of the
privilege of [engaging in sexual] activities within [New Jersey]' and that 'he
should reasonably [have] anticipate[d] being haled into court [in New Jersey]'
to respond to a claim" for child support when those activities resulted in the
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conception of his children. C.L., 406 N.J. Super. at 492 (alterations in original)
(quoting Woodson, 444 U.S. at 297).
"The protection against inconvenient litigation [outside a defendant's state
of residence] is typically described in terms of 'reasonableness' or 'fairness.'"
Woodson, 444 U.S. at 292.
Implicit in this emphasis on reasonableness is the
understanding that the burden on the defendant, while
always a primary concern, will in an appropriate case
be considered in light of other relevant factors,
including the forum State's interest in adjudicating the
dispute [and] the plaintiff's interest in obtaining
convenient and effective relief . . . .
[Ibid. (citations omitted).]
The substantiality of the parties' contacts with New Jersey clearly establishes
the reasonableness and fairness of New Jersey's exercise of jurisdiction to
determine defendant's obligation to pay child support for his two children.
Defendant's argument contesting service of the summons and complaint
lacks sufficient merit to warrant extended discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). As
the judge found, service was effectuated in accordance with Rule 4:67-2,
governing service of summary actions, and defendant's appearance on the
scheduled court date, albeit to challenge jurisdiction, demonstrates that he
received notice. See R. 5:4-1(b) and 4:4-3(a); see also Jameson v. Great Atlantic
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and Pacific Tea Co., 363 N.J. Super. 419, 425 (App. Div. 2003) ("It is
elementary that service must be accomplished in accordance with the pertinent
rules in such a way as to afford 'notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and
afford them an opportunity to present their objections.'" (quoting Davis v. DND/
Fidoreo, Inc., 317 N.J. Super. 92, 97 (App. Div. 1998))).
To the extent we have not specifically addressed any of defendant's
remaining arguments, including his contention that he is "not an individual,
obligor, or person," and that "[t]he State of New Jersey," under its "parens
patriae responsibility," is "in fact . . . the true obligor" and thus legally obligated
"to support . . . its . . . children," we deem them without sufficient merit to
warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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