STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. MICHAEL C. CEDOLA, JR. (17-07-0269, WARREN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1253-18T3
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MICHAEL C. CEDOLA, JR., a/k/a
MIKE CEDOLA, MICHAEL
COREY CEDOLA, JR., and
MICHAEL CEDOLA,
Defendant-Appellant.
______________________________
Argued February 11, 2020 – Decided March 17, 2020
Before Judges Hoffman and Firko.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Warren County, Indictment No. 17-07-0269.
Christopher George Olsen argued the cause for
appellant (Schwartz, Hanna & Olsen, P.C., attorneys;
Christopher George Olsen, on the briefs).
Dit Mosco, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting
Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent
(James L. Pfeiffer, Acting Warren County Prosecutor,
attorney; Dit Mosco, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Michael C. Cedola appeals from a January 17, 2018 order
denying his motion to suppress his confession, citing Miranda1 violations. He
seeks to have his confession overturned and his August 20, 2018 judgment of
conviction (JOC) vacated, with a remand for further proceedings without the
State having the benefit of his confession. We disagree and affirm.
I.
We discern the following facts from the motion record. In mid-December
2016, a confidential informant advised the Washington Township Police that he
had information about a male known to him as "Mikey" (defendant) selling
heroin in the area and was willing to assist the task force. The day after receiving
the tip, detectives equipped the informant with an audio listening device and
currency for a drug purchase. The detectives followed the informant and
observed him contact one of defendant's suspected partners, Charles Pickett,
who led the informant to defendant's residence. The record indicates that
defendant was living at his mother's home. The informant purchased heroin
from defendant and turned it over to detectives, who observed the entire
transaction.
1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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On the evening of December 20, 2016, a previously approved search
warrant was executed at defendant's residence in Washington. Based upon the
previously approved search warrant, the officers forced their entry into the home
and found thirty-four wax folds of suspected heroin and a stolen semi-automatic
handgun. Defendant was arrested. Patrolman Stephen Pappalardo transported
defendant to police headquarters for processing. 2
Detective Walter Koch assisted in the search of defendant's residence.
After discovering the stolen handgun, Koch returned to headquarters to
interview defendant about the handgun and "not anything else that was occurring
that evening." Defendant agreed to give Koch a statement about the handgun.
Questioning began around 1:48 a.m. Koch informed defendant of his rights one-
by-one and explained that defendant's decision to waive his rights was not final.
Koch explained, "as we start talking if you change your mind; you can withdraw,
you can say hey wait a second Detective Koch, changed my mind." Defendant
quipped that he had "never been told that one before . . . ." Koch claimed he
was a "straight shooter" and "want[ed] to make sure [defendant] under[stood]
2
Defendant, in his testimony and brief, asserts he was taken into custody
between 7:00 p.m. and 8:30 p.m. The police reports provided in the record note
the incident time as 6:47 p.m. on the evening of December 13, 2016, when the
recorded purchase took place, but 11:18 p.m. on the night of December 20, 2016,
when the police executed the search warrant.
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. . . ." After asking defendant if he would initial the Miranda waiver form and
affix his signature, defendant responded, "Yeah absolutely."
During the interview, defendant explained that the handgun belonged to
his friend's brother, who wanted defendant to hold it while he went on a trip to
Alaska. Defendant maintained the handgun was legal, he did not buy or trade
for it, and it was in the same spot his friend's brother left it in. Defendant's
statements to Koch about the weapon provided the basis for the charges that he
had possession of the weapon without a license, that was stolen, and after
previously being convicted of a crime.
Following the interview, probable cause was established. On December
21, 2016, a complaint issued, and charged defendant with possession of a firearm
during commission of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) distribution
related crime, a second-degree offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1(a); certain persons
not to have a firearm, a second-degree offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1); unlawful
possession of a firearm, a second-degree offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1);
distribution of heroin, a third-degree offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(3);
possession with the intent to distribute heroin, a third-degree offense, N.J.S.A.
2C:35-5(b)(3); receiving stolen property, a third-degree offense, N.J.S.A.
2C:20-7(a); possession of heroin, a third-degree offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-
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10(a)(1); and possession of heroin, a third-degree offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-
10(a)(1).
At a pre-indictment conference held on February 2, 2017, defendant pled
not guilty and the case was transferred to Warren County. On July 24, 2017, a
Warren County Grand Jury charged defendant with all of the above-stated
charges.
Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress his statement to Koch, arguing
that he invoked his Miranda rights to other officers before he spoke to Koch and
confessed in a videotaped statement to the charged crimes. Defendant further
contended that several factors impaired his ability to knowingly and intelligently
provide the videotaped statement. A Rule 104(c) hearing was conducted.
At the hearing, defendant testified that before giving his statement, he did
not sleep "over [forty], [forty-eight] hours probably" because of "drug use [and]
alcohol" resulting in "almost like a dreamlike state." He claimed to have gone
even longer without an "actual meal," claiming he ate "maybe three days before
that." Defendant testified that he was at headquarters from the time of his arrest,
"between [7:00] and 8:30 that night," hours before the interview took place,
which began at 1:48 a.m. He described being "handcuffed to a metal bar . . .
[for] at least five hours" and feeling "very uncomfortable."
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Defendant also testified that prior to being interrogated by Koch, he
asserted his right to remain silent "multiple times." Defendant continued:
I wasn't in understanding all of what I was doing as
much as after I slept, you know, ate and kind of re-
gathered a little bit. . . . I was so exhausted I can't even
. . . understand myself on this tape. I'm mumbling, I'm
ranting, just going on and I feel like I was talking about
irrelevant stuff. I was, like delusional. . . . I can't say I
understood what I was doing.
The court also considered the testimony of Koch, who worked for the
Washington Township police department and had over twenty years of police
experience. Koch testified that defendant agreed to give a recorded statement
regarding the handgun found in his bedroom, and Koch recalled reading
defendant his Miranda rights. Even though the department lost defendant's
signed Miranda form, Koch testified that defendant "initialed by numbers [one]
through [five] and he signed in the signature block of that form [,]" which was
captured on the video footage. Further, Koch testified that he provided
defendant water before the interview, and he did not ask for anything else. Koch
asked defendant if he was under the influence of drugs or alcohol or anything ,
which would affect his ability to understand his rights, and defendant answered
in the negative.
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The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress defendant's
statements to Koch and the physical evidence seized from his residence.
Additionally, the trial court found defendant was adequately informed of his
right to remain silent under Miranda and that defendant "made a knowing and
intelligent waiver of each and every one of his rights that were properly read to
him prior to making the statement, and neither invoked nor attempted to invoke
any of the rights thereafter." Curiously, the court noted that defendant thought
he was helping out with a burglary—a different case—than the case he was
arrested for when he gave his statement. In addition, the court found defendant
was not credible and labeled his testimony as "convenient," questioning how
defendant could claim he was in a "dream state" but have a specific recollection
of asking for an attorney.
Conversely, the court found Koch's testimony to be credible and
consistent with the videotaped statement. The court determined that Koch gave
defendant a "very detailed warning" that was "slow" and "direct." Moreover,
the court found Koch's testimony about his interaction with defendant to be
honest, and that he had no reason to believe defendant requested an attorney
before meeting with him. Accordingly, the court found defendant's statement to
be admissible.
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Defendant was subsequently deemed ineligible for Drug Court on March
1, 2018, and a trial date was set for April 16, 2018. However, on April 17, 2018,
defendant's appointed counsel and newly retained counsel filed a joint
certification seeking substitution of record. The trial court adjourned the trial
to allow defendant's new counsel to prepare, and trial was rescheduled for May
29, 2018. Instead, on May 18, 2018, defendant pled guilty to counts two, three,
four, six, and eight, preserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to
suppress. The State agreed to recommend dismissal of the other counts.
On August 15, 2018, the trial court sentenced defendant to six years in
state prison on count two, which pursuant to the Graves Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-
6(c), included a mandatory term of forty-two months of parole ineligibility. On
both counts three and four, defendant was sentenced to five years flat in state
prison. On count six, he was sentenced to six years in state prison with two
years of parole ineligibility. On count eight, defendant was sentenced to six
years in state prison, and he is statutorily required to serve five years of that
sentence, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1). The sentences on all counts were
to run concurrently.
Defendant raises the following points on appeal:
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POINT I
STANDARD OF PROOF ON APPEAL (not raised
below).
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND
THAT THE STATE HAD MET ITS BURDEN IN
PROVING THE DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS
MIRANDA RIGHTS WHEN THE DEFENDANT
TESTIFIED THAT HE ASSERTED HIS RIGHT TO
REMAIN SILENT AND THE STATE FAILED TO
PROVIDE ANY EVIDENCE TO CONTRADICT THE
DEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY.
II.
In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we must defer
to the court's factual findings provided they are supported by sufficient credible
evidence in the record. State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 32-33 (2016) (citing State
v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243-44 (2007)). Our deference to the trial court's factual
findings is especially appropriate when those findings "are substantially
influenced by [an] opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the
'feel' of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy." State v. Gamble, 218
N.J. 412, 424-25 (2014) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42
N.J. 146, 161 (1964)). However, we owe no deference to the trial court's ruling
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on an issue of law, which we review de novo. State v. Watts, 223 N.J. 503, 516
(2015) (citing State v. Vargas, 213 N.J. 301, 327 (2013)).
"[T]o safeguard a suspect's Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination, confessions obtained during custodial interrogations are
inadmissible as evidence unless the defendant has been advised of his or her
constitutional rights." State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 265 (2015) (citing
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 492). The term "custodial interrogation" is defined as
"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way." Id. at 265-66 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444). "[I]f the questioning
is simply part of an investigation and is not targeted at the individual because
she or he is a suspect, the rights provided by Miranda are not implicated." Id.
at 266 (quoting State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 614-15 (1999)).
We may not disturb the trial court's findings merely because we "might
have reached a different conclusion were it the trial tribunal" or because "the
trial court decided all evidence or inference conflicts in favor of one side" in a
close case. State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964). "The governing principle,
then, is that '[a] trial court's findings should be disturbed only if they are so
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clearly mistaken that the interests of justice demand intervention and
correction.'" Robinson, 200 N.J. at 15 (quoting Elders, 192 N.J. at 244).
Here, the trial court considered the two issues raised by defendant
regarding suppression of his statement: (1) he requested an attorney prior to
making his statement; and (2) his will was overborne by the amount of time he
was at police headquarters. The court considered the testimony of defendant
and Koch and watched the videotape of defendant's interview.
Defendant testified:
I was asked to make a statement multiple times. I
refused to -- I didn't want to make the statements . . . .
I was asked again, I said no. I was asked again, and
said no, was asked again and said no.
And then I believe it was actually Officer Koch himself
that came up to me the last time and . . . just made it
sound a lot different. He seems like a real nice guy, he
was just explaining to me that you know, . . . it has
nothing to do with the arrest, it has to do with a different
matter. . . . [E]ven if I didn't want to make a statement,
we should just go back there and talk a little bit about a
burglary just to see if . . . I at least knew anything about
a certain burglary is what he mentioned to me.
On cross-examination, defendant, for the first time, added that:
In the holding area, when I was repeatedly asked to
make a statement, I said no, I said . . . I think it would
be better if I waited until I had a lawyer. And I said can
I have a lawyer now and they said, it's not, you know,
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it's not our responsibility to call your lawyer. I
remember that.
Notwithstanding his testimony, defendant was unable to identify which officer
denied him the opportunity to contact an attorney.
Here, the record supports the court's finding that defendant was not
credible because he never expressed any hesitation or unwillingness to speak to
Koch. To the contrary, the video and statement show that defendant was eager
to tell his story, and there was never an indication he wanted or requested an
attorney before the interview. Therefore, the court correctly determined
defendant's statement was voluntary.
A voluntary statement by a defendant is admissible at trial. State v. Miller,
76 N.J. 392, 402 (1978). In determining the issue of voluntariness, "a court
should assess the totality of all the surrounding circumstances." Ibid.
"[R]elevant factors [to consider] include the suspect's age, education and
intelligence, advice as to constitutional rights, length of detention, whether the
questioning was repeated and prolonged in nature and whether physical
punishment or mental exhaustion was involved." Ibid. Based upon our careful
review of the record, we are satisfied the relevant factors were considered by the
trial court, aptly noting that defendant appeared "relaxed, willing and
cooperative" in the video.
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Here, even after Koch read defendant his Miranda rights, Koch
emphasized that defendant was free to request counsel after waiving that right,
or remain silent. Moreover, the court properly concluded that the questioning
and length of time between interviews was not problematic, rejecting
defendant's claim he was in a "dream state" because he specifically recalled
asking for an attorney. The court duly noted defendant's "speech was certainly
not slurred or stunted and quite frankly, very similar to the testimony that he
. . . gave . . . in court."
We are convinced there is sufficient credible evidence in the record
supporting the trial court's findings of fact. We also conclude that the judge's
decision to deny defendant's motion to suppress was legally correct.
Affirmed.
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