STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. FRANK P. RENDFREY (09-09-1481, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2020 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-5982-17T1
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    FRANK P. RENDFREY,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Submitted February 25, 2020 – Decided March 18, 2020
    Before Judges Hoffman and Currier.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 09-09-
    1481.
    Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
    appellant (Craig S. Leeds, Designated Counsel, on the
    brief).
    Christopher L.C. Kuberiet, Acting Middlesex County
    Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (David Michael
    Liston, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting
    Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
    Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief.
    PER CURIAM
    Defendant Frank Rendfrey appeals from an April 13, 2018 order denying
    his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR).
    Defendant raises the following points of argument in his counseled brief:
    POINT I
    DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE
    ASSISTANCE    OF   TRIAL   COUNSEL    IN
    VIOLATION OF THE UNITED STATES AND [THE]
    NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTIONS AND THE LOWER
    COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING OTHERWISE
    POINT II
    THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE ERRORS
    COMPLAINED OF RENDERED THE TRIAL
    UNFAIR
    POINT III
    DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE
    ASSISTANCE OF APPELLATE COUNSEL
    POINT IV
    THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING
    DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR [PCR] WITHOUT
    AFFORDING HIM AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING
    In a pro se supplemental brief, without point headings, defendant argues
    that trial counsel was ineffective because counsel: 1) failed to raise the issue of
    A-5982-17T1
    2
    the victim's dogs to discredit an eyewitness's testimony; 2) failed to explore the
    victim's mental health as a defense; 3) disallowed defendant from testifying in
    his own defense; and 4) he lacked the competence to handle the technology
    required to put forth an effective defense. He also raised two arguments that are
    identical to those in the counseled brief.
    After thoroughly reviewing the record, we conclude that all of defendant's
    arguments are without merit and, except as briefly addressed below, they do not
    warrant discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We affirm substantially for the reasons
    stated by the PCR judge in his oral decision of April 13, 2018. We add these
    comments.
    Defendant was convicted of third-degree theft, contrary to N.J.S.A.
    2C:20-3; first-degree murder, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) to (2); third-
    degree hindering own apprehension, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b); and first-
    degree witness tampering, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(a)(2). He was also
    found guilty of criminal trespass, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3, a lesser-included
    offense of burglary. He was found eligible for an extended term sentence and
    sentenced to a prison term of life plus fifteen years, with thirty-five years of
    parole ineligibility.
    A-5982-17T1
    3
    We affirmed defendant's convictions on direct appeal. State v. Rendfrey,
    No. A-3897-11 (App. Div. Nov. 20, 2013). The matter was remanded for
    resentencing under the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. On remand,
    defendant was resentenced on the murder count to life imprisonment with 63.75
    years of parole ineligibility.
    The evidence was discussed in detail and need not be repeated here. In
    summary, defendant strangled his girlfriend and staged her death as a heroin
    overdose, putting a rubber band around her arm, a syringe in her arm and placing
    empty heroin packets on the floor. He later told the mother of his child he had
    strangled the victim in self-defense; he told police he was in New York at the
    time of these events.
    In his PCR brief, defendant raised eighteen grounds on which he asserted
    trial counsel was ineffective.      He also contended appellate counsel was
    ineffective for failing to raise additional issues on appeal.
    The PCR court addressed and rejected each of the arguments in its oral
    decision. He noted that some of the arguments of ineffective assistance were
    dispelled by the evidence of counsel's actions in the record, some were bald
    assertions with no supporting certifications, some were already raised and
    decided on direct appeal, Rule 3:22-5, and others were barred because they could
    A-5982-17T1
    4
    have been raised on direct appeal, Rule 3:22-4. The court also found defendant's
    contentions regarding appellate counsel meritless as counsel raised four
    arguments on appeal, evidencing he made a "learned," "strategic decision" to
    omit the other claims.
    The PCR court's analysis of the raised claims is supported by credible
    evidence. Many of the issues were procedurally barred as they could have been
    raised on direct appeal. "Issues that could and should have been raised on direct
    appeal from the defendant's conviction are barred by Rule 3:22-4(a) unless the
    exceptions to the Rule have been established." State v. Reevey, 
    417 N.J. Super. 134
    , 148 (App. Div. 2010) (citation omitted). "Where the exceptions do not
    apply, consideration of such issues is properly barred." 
    Ibid. (citations omitted). Defendant
    has not asserted any applicable exceptions.
    The remainder of the assertions were not supported by certifications or
    affidavits. To establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel,
    a defendant must present legally competent evidence, rather than "bald
    assertions . . . ." See State v. Cummings, 
    321 N.J. Super. 154
    , 170 (App. Div.
    1999). Defendant did not meet that standard here.
    As stated, defendant presented a pro se supplemental brief raising an
    additional four arguments. The PCR court did not explicitly address those
    A-5982-17T1
    5
    contentions. We are mindful that under Rule 3:22-11, a PCR court must "state
    separately its findings of fact and conclusions of law" regarding the arguments
    set forth in a PCR petition. Here, the PCR court stated he had "read all the
    papers" but he did not refer to the supplemental arguments. Nevertheless, we
    are satisfied after reviewing the pro se arguments in light of the record and
    applicable principles of law, that a remand is unnecessary.
    The contention regarding the victim's dogs is intertwined with the
    argument the PCR court considered and rejected in its analysis regarding the
    cross-examination of a particular eyewitness. The remaining contentions are all
    bald assertions, without merit, and unsupported by any certification or affidavit.
    Defendant has not presented a prima facie case as to either prong of the
    Strickland1 test. Therefore, he was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his
    PCR petition.
    Affirmed.
    1
    Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687 (1984).
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    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-5982-17T1

Filed Date: 3/18/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 3/18/2020