STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. STEPHEN v. MAURRASSE (12-03-0208, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1452-18T2
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
STEPHEN V. MAURRASSE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Submitted April 28, 2020 – Decided May 12, 2020
Before Judges Accurso and Rose.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Somerset County, Indictment No. 12-03-
0208.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Kevin G. Byrnes, Designated Counsel, on
the briefs).
Michael H. Robertson, Somerset County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Amanda Paige Frankel,
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Stephen Maurrasse appeals an order denying his petition for
post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. Because
defendant's petition is procedurally barred under Rule 3:22-5, we affirm.
Following the denials of his motions to suppress his statement and
evidence seized from his apartment, a jury convicted defendant of armed
robbery and weapons offenses, charged in the same Somerset County indictment
as his co-defendant, Jeremy Grant. The judge sentenced defendant to an
aggregate thirteen-year prison term subject to the No Early Release Act,
N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.
On direct appeal, we affirmed defendant's convictions and sentence. State
v. Grant, No. A-5470-13 (App. Div. Mar. 13, 2017) (slip op. at 32). The
Supreme Court denied certification on October 16, 2017.1 We incorporate by
reference the facts and procedural history set forth in our prior opinion . Id. at
1-9.
Pertinent to this appeal, Grant provided a statement to police inculpating
himself and defendant in the knife-point robbery of a victim, who had responded
to a Craigslist advertisement for discounted cellphones and tablets. Id. at 1-4.
1
Defendant was tried separately from Grant, but we consolidated their appeals
and issued one opinion.
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2
The cellphone number listed in the advertisement was subscribed to defendant's
girlfriend. Id. at 4. Pursuant to a communication data warrant, police
intercepted incriminating text messages that had been exchanged between that
cellphone number and Grant's cellphone on the day of the robbery. Id. at 5.
After Grant gave his statement, the police responded to defendant's
apartment. Ibid. Defendant's girlfriend answered the door and told police
defendant was not home. Ibid. But, "police saw a man in the back of the
apartment." Ibid. "An officer called out [defendant]'s name, stated that he
wanted to talk with him, and [defendant] began walking towards the officer."
Id. at 5. The police entered the apartment and arrested defendant without a
warrant. Id. at 5, 29.
When police asked defendant's girlfriend to accompany them to
headquarters, she responded that "she needed to bring her child and gather her
belongings." Id. at 6. Accompanying the girlfriend to the bedroom, the police
observed a cellphone on the bed, and seized it after confirming it was identified
with the same number listed in the Craigslist advertisement. Ibid. After waiving
his Miranda2 rights, defendant gave a statement implicating Grant and himself
in the robbery. Id. at 6.
2
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
A-1452-18T2
3
On direct appeal, defendant argued the trial court erroneously denied his
suppression motions. Id. at 10-11. Defendant claimed police coerced him to
make the statement, asserting they would otherwise arrest his pregnant
girlfriend; and "the cellphone should have been suppressed because the police
entered his apartment without a warrant, and saw and seized the phone when
they illegally followed his girlfriend into a bedroom." Id. at 27. We rejected
both arguments. Id. at 27, 29-30.
In reaching our decision, we expressly recognized:
[Defendant] argues that the police did not have a
warrant and they entered the apartment without
consent. He goes on to argue that there were no other
exceptions justifying the entry into the apartment. In
response, the State argues that [defendant] never
challenged the entry into the apartment before the trial
court.
We need not over analyze those contentions. The
record developed during the suppression hearing
demonstrates that [defendant] raised an issue as to the
entry into the apartment. The trial court, however,
properly rejected that argument finding that there was
probable cause to arrest [defendant]. Thus, when the
detectives saw [defendant] in the apartment, they had
the right to step into the apartment and arrest him.
[Id. at 29-30 (emphasis added).]
We distinguished "[t]he facts as found by the trial court" from those in
State v. Legette, 227 N.J. 460 (2017):
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In Legette, the [C]ourt held that it is not permissible for
the police to follow the suspect into his home during an
investigatory stop. Here, in contrast, the trial court
found that the police had probable cause to arrest
[defendant]. Moreover, the police did not enter the
apartment until they saw and verified that [defendant]
was present. Under these circumstances, the entry into
the apartment was lawful.
[Grant, slip op. at 30 (emphasis added).]
Defendant filed a pro se PCR petition claiming his trial and appellate
counsel were ineffective. Defendant asserted trial counsel should have moved
to suppress his statement "because it was the product of an illegal arrest and
unattenuated detention." Acknowledging the trial court found probable cause
existed "to arrest him, in the context of the seizure of plain-view evidence,"
defendant nonetheless asserted his trial attorney should have called him to
testify to explain the circumstances of his arrest were not as police described.
Defendant also acknowledged his "appellate attorney argued that the entry into
his home was illegal," but asserted that "argument was made in the context of
suppressing the cellphone that was seized" and not to support his claim that his
post-arrest statement was the fruit of an illegal arrest.
Following oral argument, the PCR judge, who did not decide defendant's
suppression motions, issued the order under review accompanied by a thorough
written decision. Citing our opinion on defendant's direct appeal, the judge
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determined, "regardless of the context in which appellate counsel argued the
[suppression] issue, the Appellate Division found the arrest lawful." Because
we had previously adjudicated the claims defendant raised on PCR, the judge
determined they were procedurally barred under Rule 3:22-5.
The PCR judge also addressed the merits of defendant's assertion that trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to permit him to testify on his own behalf at
the suppression hearing. The judge recognized the existence of several
"strategic reasons for a defense attorney to refrain from calling a defendant " as
a witness in a suppression hearing. Those reasons may include "prematurely
reveal[ing] trial strategy [thereby] hinder[ing] one's defense," and using that
testimony against the defendant should he testify at trial. Accordingly, the judge
concluded "under Strickland,3 trial counsel's assistance did not fall below an
objective standard of reasonableness, and furthermore, [defendant] was not
prejudiced by counsel's decision."
On appeal, defendant raises the following points for our consideration:
3
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (enunciating a two-
pronged test a defendant must satisfy to establish a prima facie case of
ineffective assistance of counsel: that counsel was deficient or made egregious
errors, so serious that counsel was not functioning effectively as guaranteed by
the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution; and counsel's deficient
performance actually prejudiced the accused's defense); see also State v. Fritz,
105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987) (adopting the Strickland analysis in New Jersey).
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POINT I
TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE BY
FAILING TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF WHETHER
THE POLICE WERE REQUIRED TO HAVE AN
ARREST WARRANT PRIOR TO ENTERING THE
DEFENDANT'S PREMISES AND ARRESTING HIM
POINT II
THE DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO AN
EVIDENTIARY HEARING
POINT III
THE DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO DE NOVO
REVIEW, AND NO DEFERENCE SHOULD BE
GIVEN TO THE ERRONEOUS CONCLUSION
BELOW.
More particularly, defendant contends his PCR petition was not
procedurally barred because trial counsel "never challenged the illegal and
warrantless police entry" and, as such, we did not decide that issue on appeal.
Defendant claims our decision concerning defendant's arrest was dictum
because the record was not fully developed before us to decide the issue.
Defendant abandons his arguments against appellate counsel and that trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to call him as a witness at trial. Instead,
defendant seeks a new trial, or an evidentiary hearing so that trial counsel can
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"explain why he thought that the police may enter a residence based solely on
probable cause" without a warrant.
Because defendant's contentions on appeal challenge the PCR judge's
legal conclusions, our review is de novo. State v. Parker, 212 N.J. 269, 278
(2012). Having conducted that review here, we conclude defendant's
contentions lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.
2:11-3(e)(2). We affirm substantially for the reasons set forth by the PCR judge
in his well-reasoned decision, adding only the following comments.
When an issue has been determined on the merits in a prior appeal it
cannot be re-litigated in a later appeal of the same case, even if of constitutional
dimension. R. 3:22-5; State v. McQuaid, 147 N.J. 464, 484 (1997). The Rule
3:22-5 bar will preclude a PCR argument if the issue "is identical or
substantially equivalent" to the issue previously adjudicated on its merits.
McQuaid, 147 N.J. at 484. The procedural bar is consistent with New Jersey's
public policy, which aims "to promote finality in judicial proceedings." Id. at
483.
As the PCR judge correctly determined, we expressly addressed
defendant's warrantless arrest on direct appeal. Grant, slip op. at 29-30. And,
as we observed, trial counsel "raised an issue as to the entry into the apartment"
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before the trial court. Id. at 29. Accordingly, because that "substantially
equivalent" issue was raised in defendant's PCR petition and decided on direct
appeal, Rule 3:22-5 precluded the PCR judge's consideration of defendant's
argument.
Affirmed.
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