STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. LAMONT LOPER (17-10-2153, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1593-18T3
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
LAMONT LOPER, a/k/a
LAMONT ROPER,
MUHAMMAD LATIF and
LOTTI LAMONT,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________
Submitted February 12, 2020 – Decided May 18, 2020
Before Judges Koblitz and Whipple.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Atlantic County, Indictment No. 17-10-2153.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Marcia H. Blum, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Amanda Gerilyn Schwartz, Deputy
Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Lamont Loper appeals from an October 5, 2018 judgment of
conviction after pleading guilty to second-degree possession of cocaine with the
intent to distribute in a quantity of one-half ounce or more, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-
5(b)(2). We affirm.
Defendant raises the following issues on appeal:
POINT I: THE EVIDENCE MUST BE SUPPRESSED
BECAUSE THE SEARCH WAS THE PRODUCT OF
AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL DETENTION.
POINT II: THE SENTENCE VIOLATES THE
INJUNCTION AGAINST IMPOSITION OF THE
MAXIMUM PAROLE DISQUALIFIER ON TOP OF
A MID-RANGE BASE TERM AND WAS IMPOSED
WITHOUT CONSIDERATION OF A RELEVANT
MITIGATING FACTOR.
On October 10, 2017, defendant was indicted for third-degree possession
of a controlled dangerous substance, cocaine, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1); second-
degree possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute in a quantity of one-
half ounce or more, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(2); and second-degree possession of
cocaine within 500 feet of certain public property, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1(a).
The relevant facts are discerned from the transcripts of defendant's
January 18, 2018 suppression hearing and October 5, 2018 sentencing hearing.
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This case began on May 14, 2017, when Detective Brian Hambrecht of
the Atlantic City Police Department received information from an allegedly
reliable confidential informant (C.I.) that defendant regularly drove from
Bridgeton to Atlantic City carrying drugs he planned to sell. Hambrecht found
a photo of defendant online but took no further action at that time.
About two months later, around July 11, the C.I. told Hambrecht
defendant drove a black Ford Taurus for his trips from Bridgeton to Atlantic
City via the Atlantic City Expressway. The C.I. stated defendant's wife, whom
he drove to work, rode in the car with him, and that defendant generally arrived
at the toll booth near exit 4 between 2:30 and 3:30 p.m., where he would use the
right cash-only lane. The C.I. also provided Hambrecht with the vehicle's
license plate number and told him where defendant would park the car in
Atlantic City. Hambrecht went to the site in Atlantic City and confirmed that
the make, model, and license number matched the vehicle described by the C.I.
Two days later, on July 13, Hambrecht was parked on the Atlantic City
Expressway conducting surveillance with other detectives, one of whom was
parked at exit 4. At approximately 2:55 p.m., the other detective "observed the
vehicle with a female in the car come through the toll booth, the right lane, pay
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cash, and drive east . . . towards Atlantic City. . . ." The vehicle then passed
Hambrecht, who followed it and conducted a motor vehicle stop.
Hambrecht ordered defendant out of the car and told him he received
information that he was transporting drugs. Defendant stated, "I have stuff in
the car," and offered to get the drugs for the detectives. Hambrecht advised
defendant that he did not have to consent to a search, could terminate the search
at any time, and had the right to be present during the search. Defendant signed
a form consenting to a search of the car, and the detectives found nineteen grams
of crack cocaine.
On January 30, 2018, the court denied defendant's motion to suppress and
issued a written opinion. The court found, based on Hambrecht's testimony, that
the C.I. provided reliable, corroborated information which was very detailed and
not readily available to the average person in the community. The court further
found that Hambrecht reasonably relied upon the information provided by the
C.I., which created a reasonable particularized suspicion that drug activity had
occurred or would occur in the future, which ultimately led to the questioning
of defendant. Although the corroborated tip did not provide the detectives with
enough information to conduct a search, defendant gave informed and voluntary
consent to search the vehicle.
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On June 6, 2018, defendant entered a negotiated plea to the charge of
second-degree possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute in a quantity
of one-half ounce or more, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(2). In exchange for the plea,
the State agreed to recommend a seven-year sentence with three and one-half
years of parole ineligibility. The court sentenced defendant in accordance with
the plea agreement.
This appeal followed.
I.
Our review of a motion judge's factual findings in a suppression hearing
is limited. State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 15 (2009). "We are obliged to uphold
the motion judge's factual findings so long as sufficient credible evidence in the
record supports those findings." State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 101 (2016)
(citation omitted). "Those findings warrant particular deference when they are
substantially influenced by [the trial judge's] opportunity to hear and see the
witnesses and to have the 'feel' of the case, which a reviewing court cannot
enjoy." State v. Rockford, 213 N.J. 424, 440 (2013) (alteration in original)
(citations omitted). The suppression court's "findings should be disturbed only
if they are so clearly mistaken that the interests of justice demand intervention
and correction." Robinson, 200 N.J. at 15 (citation and internal quotation marks
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omitted). However, we owe no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions
or interpretations of the legal consequences flowing from established facts, and
we review questions of law de novo. State v. Watts, 223 N.J. 503, 516 (2015).
Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress
the drug evidence because the search was the product of an unconstitutional
detention after an unjustified vehicle stop. We disagree.
"[T]he State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that a warrantless search or seizure falls within one of the few well -
delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement." State v. Mann, 203 N.J. 328,
337-38 (2010) (citation and internal quotations omitted). "One such exception
is denominated an investigatory stop or a Terry1 stop." Id. at 338. A police
officer may conduct an investigatory stop if it is based on "'specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,'
give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." State v. Birkenmeier,
185 N.J. 552, 561-62 (2006) (quoting State v. Rodriguez, 172 N.J. 117, 126-27
(2002) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21(1968))).
"It is well established that information provided by an informant can
provide the basis for an investigatory stop." State v. Thomas, 110 N.J. 673, 683
1
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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(1988). The court must consider the informant's "veracity and basis of
knowledge." State v. Keyes, 184 N.J. 541, 555 (2005) (citation omitted). "The
veracity factor may be satisfied by demonstrating that the informant has proven
reliable in the past, such as providing dependable information in previous police
investigations." Ibid. The "basis of knowledge" underlying an informant's tip
can be established by "direct evidence of the manner in which the informant
learned of the criminal activity, by details that establish that the informant's
knowledge has been derived from a trustworthy source, or by a prediction of
hard-to-know future events." State v. Williams, 364 N.J. Super. 23, 34-35 (App.
Div. 2003); see also State v. Smith, 155 N.J. 83, 94-95 (1998). When assessing
reliability, courts must give "sufficient weight to the officer's knowledge and
experience and to the rational inferences that could be drawn from the facts
objectively and reasonably viewed in light of the officer's expertise." State v.
Arthur, 149 N.J. 1, 10 (1997).
Here, the C.I. provided the reasonable and articulable suspicion necessary
to justify an investigative stop of the defendant. The C.I. provided police with
the date and approximate time of defendant's travel, his starting location, the
vehicle defendant would be traveling in, that defendant's wife would be with
him, defendant's direction of travel, including what lane he would use to pay the
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toll, and the approximate time. Based on these details and predictions of future
events, it can be inferred that "the information had a sufficient basis of
knowledge of the underlying criminal conduct." Smith, 155 N.J. at 95.
Therefore, the officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop
of defendant. See Birkenmeier, 185 N.J. at 561 (finding reasonable suspicion
based on an informant's tip identifying the defendant, his car, his time of
departure and direction of travel, and that he would be carrying a laundry bag).
II.
Defendant next argues that the matter must be remanded for a resentencing
because the court did not credit defendant with mitigating factor twelve, and
therefore, it had no mitigating factor to weigh against the aggravating factors in
assessing the propriety of a parole disqualifier. We review a trial judge's
sentencing under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Pierce, 188 N.J. 155,
166 n.4 (2006). "[T]rial judges are given wide discretion so long as the sentence
imposed is within the statutory framework." State v. Dalziel, 182 N.J. 494, 500
(2005).
Defendant argues the court should have credited his cooperation with the
police as a mitigating factor under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(12), because during the
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stop he admitted that he had drugs in the car, signed a consent to search form,
and attempted to secure the drugs for the officers. We disagree.
We have rejected the argument that a confession qualifies as cooperation
under this subsection where the defendant did not identify another perpetrator
or assist in solving other crimes. State v. Read, 397 N.J. Super. 598, 613 (App.
Div. 2008) (finding a "defendant's confession was not entitled to any substantial
weight in determining his sentence in view of its limited benefit to the State");
but see State v. Reed, 211 N.J. Super. 177, 180, 189 (App. Div. 1986) (finding
a defendant who gave a recorded statement may also be entitled to N.J.S.A.
2C:44-1(b)(12) as a mitigating factor). We do not suggest N.J.S.A. 2C:44-
1(b)(12) can never be considered where a defendant confesses but does not assist
in solving other crimes, but here, defendant's confession was of limited use and
the factor was not clearly supported by the record.
We also reject defendant's argument that the trial court's imposition of the
parole term, without consideration of mitigating factor twelve, was
disproportionate to the base term and therefore excessive. A second-degree
crime under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(2) does not carry with it a mandatory period
of parole ineligibility, but N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(b) states "where the court is clearly
convinced the aggravating factors substantially outweigh the mitigating factors,
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. . ." the court can impose a term of parole ineligibility, provided the term does
not exceed one-half of the base term.
Our Supreme Court acknowledged "the longest permitted minimum term,
one-half the base term, would ordinarily be imposed only on base terms at or
near the top of the range for that degree of crime," State v. Towey, 114 N.J. 69,
81 (1989), but held that such inconsistencies are not improper if justifiable, id.
at 81-82. Here, the sentencing judge found "aggravating factors three, six and
nine preponderate over the absence of mitigating factors," defendant was
sentenced in accordance with his plea agreement, and defendant also
acknowledged, in his plea agreement, that "the court could, in its discretion,
impose a minimum time in confinement to be served before [becoming] eligible
for parole, which period could be as long as one half of the period of the
custodial sentence imposed." We discern no abuse of the court's discretion.
Affirmed.
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