MAURICE ANDERSON VS. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS) ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5593-17T4
MAURICE ANDERSON,
Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent.
____________________________
Submitted May 6, 2020 – Decided May 20, 2020
Before Judges Fuentes and Mayer.
On appeal from the New Jersey Department of
Corrections.
Maurice Anderson, appellant pro se.
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Jane Schuster, Assistant Attorney General,
of counsel; Tasha Marie Bradt, Deputy Attorney
General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Appellant Maurice Anderson, currently an inmate at South Woods State
Prison, appeals from a New Jersey Department of Corrections (DOC) final
agency decision affirming a finding of guilty for the following prohibited acts:
*.002, assaulting any person; *.708, refusal to submit to a search; and *.306,
conduct which disrupts or interferes with the security or orderly running of the
correctional facility. He also appeals from the resulting sanctions imposed. We
affirm.
The disciplinary charges against Anderson arose when an officer was
frisking inmates entering the prison's recreation yard. The officer noticed
Anderson attempted to enter the yard without being searched. When the officer
asked Anderson to tuck in his shirt to be frisked, Anderson refused. Anderson
told the officer, "I don't tuck my shirt in for anyone" and stated "you're not
putting your hands on me playa." Anderson then spun around and struck the
officer in the face with a closed fist.
Several officers attempted to subdue Anderson, which caused him to
resist. The officers used pepper spray, but Anderson continued to struggle. An
emergency response team within the correctional facility was called to take
control of the situation and restore order. Anderson continued to fight the
officers by kicking and pushing himself off the floor. The response team
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eventually handcuffed Anderson and took him to the infirmary for a medical
evaluation.
Anderson was issued disciplinary charges for prohibited acts *.002, *.708,
and *.306. After the charges were served, the DOC staff investigated and
referred the matter to a hearing officer.
The disciplinary hearing was postponed several times to accommodate
Anderson's request to confront the officers involved in the incident and have
them submit to a polygraph. Anderson pleaded not guilty to all three charges
and received the assistance of counsel substitute prior to the hearing.
At the hearing on May 14, 2018, Anderson and his counsel substitute were
afforded an opportunity to make a statement. Anderson's counsel claimed the
officer provoked Anderson by uttering a racial slur and therefore Anderson's
reaction was justified. Anderson provided a written summation to the hearing
officer in lieu of making a personal statement. In addition, Anderson was
permitted to offer witness statements on his behalf, but he declined to do so.
Anderson confronted and cross-examined adverse witnesses through written
questions provided to the hearing officer. Anderson's request for a polygraph
examination of the officers involved in the incident was denied by the hearing
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officer as Anderson's "disciplinary report and supplemental evidence
support[ed] the charge."
Based on the evidence, the hearing officer found Anderson guilty of
prohibited acts *.002, *.708, and *.306. In addition to the testimony of the
witnesses, the hearing officer reviewed the videotape of the recreation yard on
the date of the incident. The hearing officer explained the videotape showed
Anderson attempting to enter the recreation yard without being frisked. In
accordance with the correctional facility's procedure, the videotape depicted the
officer "call[ing] [Anderson] back to be frisked," and then Anderson "turn[ing]
and str[iking]" the officer in the face.
The hearing officer imposed the maximum sanctions of 365 days
administrative segregation, 365 days loss of commutation time, and 180 days
loss of recreational privileges for the three charges combined. In support of the
sanctions, the hearing officer explained Anderson's behavior "resulted in a code
and [institution-wide] cancellations" of recreation movement. He found
Anderson assaulted one officer and, by remaining combative, endangered other
officers who responded to the incident. In addition, the hearing officer stated
Anderson was non-compliant with well-known procedures within the
correctional facility.
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Anderson filed an administrative appeal from the hearing officer's
determination. In upholding the hearing officer's decision, the Assistant
Superintendent found "[t]here was no misinterpretation of the facts" as "[v]ideo
of the incident clearly shows [Anderson] striking the officer in the face while he
was attempting to conduct a pat search." The Assistant Superintendent
explained Anderson's "actions were impulsive and this type of behavior will not
be tolerated." This appeal followed.
On appeal, Anderson argues his rights were violated, the guilty finding
was not supported by the evidence, and the sanctions imposed were excessive.
Our review of an agency determination is limited. In re Stallworth, 208
N.J. 182, 194 (2011). We will not reverse an administrative agency's decision
unless it is "arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or [] not supported by
substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole." Ibid. (omission in
original) (quoting Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980)).
In determining whether an agency action is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable,
we consider whether: (1) the agency followed the law; (2) substantial evidence
supports the findings; and (3) the agency "clearly erred" in "applying the legislative
policies to the facts." In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482-83 (2007) (quoting Mazza v.
Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995)). "'Substantial evidence' means 'such evidence
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as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'"
Figueroa v. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186, 192 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting
In re Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 35 N.J. 358, 376 (1961)).
Prison disciplinary hearings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the
full spectrum of rights due to a criminal defendant does not apply. Avant v.
Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 522 (1975). However, when reviewing a DOC
determination in a matter involving prisoner discipline, we consider not only
whether there is substantial evidence that the inmate committed the prohibited
act, but also whether, in making its decision, the DOC followed regulations
adopted to afford inmates procedural due process. See McDonald v. Pinchak,
139 N.J. 188, 194-96 (1995).
Having reviewed the record, we are satisfied there is sufficient credible
evidence in the record supporting the DOC's final decision. The videotape of
the incident shows Anderson refusing to be searched prior to entering the
recreation yard and then striking the officer in the face with a closed fist. In
responding to the incident, the orderly operation of the correction al facility was
disrupted until Anderson was subdued. Based on the videotape evidence and
testimony, there is a substantial basis in the record for the guilty finding against
Anderson for each of the prohibited acts.
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Anderson also contends he was not afforded all the process due to inmates.
We disagree. Anderson was not prohibited from calling witnesses or presenting
witness statements. Anderson had an opportunity to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses and did so. In addition, Anderson reviewed the adjudication
reports and all evidence presented to the hearing officer. The signature of
Anderson's counsel substitute on the adjudication reports indicated the
information contained in the reports accurately reflected the hearing proceeding.
Thus, we are satisfied Anderson received all the process an inmate is due.
Anderson also argues the sanctions imposed were excessive and amounted
to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.
We disagree. The sanctions imposed for each of the prohibited acts on which
Anderson was found guilty fell within the range of potential disciplinary action
established under the New Jersey Administrative Code and therefore were
proper.
Affirmed.
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