STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. C.J.R. (15-09-0780, CUMBERLAND COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2020 )

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1338-18T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
C.J.R.,1
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________
Argued telephonically September 22, 2020 —
Decided September 30, 2020
Before Judges Yannotti, Haas, and Mawla.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Cumberland County, Indictment No. 15-09-
0780.
Whitney F. Flanagan, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E.
Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Whitney F.
Flanagan, of counsel and on the brief).
Andre A. Araujo, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the
cause for respondent (Jennifer Webb-McRae,
1
We use initials to protect the identities of the minor victims. R. 1:38-3(c)(9).
Cumberland County Prosecutor, attorney; Andre A.
Araujo, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant C.J.R. appeals from a December 18, 2017 order denying
various pre-trial motions and also challenges his sentence following his guilty
plea to two counts of first-degree aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-
2(a)(1). We affirm.
Defendant's father and stepmother adopted two young children, K.R. and
C.R. In October 2013, they contacted police and reported both girls disclosed
defendant sexually abused them in the family home, at the family's vacation
residence, and in defendant's Maryland home. Investigators interviewed the
girls the same day, who both reported multiple instances of sexual abuse starting
as early as seven years of age. Defendant was arrested on November 1, 2013,
and charged with multiple counts of aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault,
and endangering the welfare of a child.
The investigation revealed defendant digitally penetrated both girls on
numerous occasions and exposed his penis to them. Investigators determined
the timing of some of the offenses against C.R. occurred between May 25 and
September 30, 2007; the abuse in the vacation residence occurred between May
25 and August 31, 2009; and the sexual penetration occurred at the family home
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between May 25 and September 30, 2011. The abuse against K.R. occurred
between September 28, 2008 and September 27, 2009 in the family home, and
at the vacation residence between May 25, 2011 and August 31, 2012.
Following the initial charges, investigators interviewed the girls again.
Both disclosed that defendant also committed acts of vaginal penetration with
his penis. C.R. recalled that while she, K.R., defendant, and defendant's wife
were in a swimming pool together, defendant slipped off her bathing suit bottom
on the far side of the pool, and vaginally penetrated her with his penis. K.R.
stated while she was sleeping on the living room couch, defendant removed her
clothes and engaged in vaginal penetration with his penis and only stopped when
K.R. insisted she had to use the bathroom.
Defendant's stepmother discovered footage of both girls in various stages
of undress on defendant's digital camera, which she turned over to police who
obtained search warrants for the device. Pursuant to the search, police found
footage of the girls in their bathing suits and multiple shots of their vaginal areas
from an underwater camera. Investigators also recovered separate footage of
the girls in an outdoor shower stall at the vacation home, recorded on a hidden
camera.
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Investigators recovered a computer belonging to defendant from his aunt's
home. The laptop was in the possession of defendant's wife, who was living
with the aunt after defendant's arrest. The aunt consented to the search of her
home. Defendant's wife also did not object to the search and led investigators
into the bedroom where she was staying to retrieve the laptop. Pursuant to a
search warrant, the laptop was sent to the New Jersey State Police Regional
Computer Forensic Laboratory to secure the data on the device.2
On January 15, 2014, defendant's stepmother contacted investigators and
informed them C.R. disclosed defendant may have filmed or photographed her
on his iPhone. Investigators contacted the Cumberland County Jail and
confirmed an iPhone was inventoried and stored in the jail at the time of
defendant's detention, obtained a search warrant for the locker containing
defendant's property, and seized the phone.
On February 10, 2014, defendant's parents obtained defendant's Apple
time capsule (an external hard drive) from his wife, which contained disturbing
videos of him and C.R. that was subsequently seized by police. Investigators
were unable to search the time capsule and sent it to the State Police laboratory
2
Another laptop belonging to defendant was also seized from the family
residence and forwarded for forensic analysis.
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for examination on November 13, 2014. Due to difficulties accessing the data
on defendant's laptop, its hard drive was sent to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) Computer Imaging Center in Quantico, Virginia on June 12,
2014. The FBI did not return the hard drive until November 25, 2014.
On September 3, 2014, the State presented its evidence to a grand jury,
which indicted defendant on twelve counts, including: four counts of first-
degree aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1); two counts of second-
degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b); one count of second-degree
endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(4); and five counts of
third-degree endangering the welfare of a minor, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a).
Defendant was arraigned on October 27, 2014. Two weeks prior to the
arraignment, defendant's wife left the country for the Philippines and, according
to defendant, thereafter, traveled to Saudi Arabia for employment purposes. She
was not interviewed by defense counsel.
A status conference was held on December 1, 2014. Defense counsel was
apprised discovery was available for review at the Cumberland County
Prosecutor's Office, and if the case was not resolved prior to the receipt of the
forensic analysis of defendant's devices, additional charges could be filed.
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Defense counsel postponed the conference request due to incomplete discovery.
A January 20, 2015 status conference was also postponed for the same reason.
The State Police laboratory completed its analysis of a laptop and the time
capsule on January 21 and February 9, 2015, respectively. Another status
conference, scheduled for February 26, 2015, was postponed at defense
counsel's request due to incomplete discovery. On March 4, 2015, investigators
reviewed defendant's time capsule and laptop which revealed additional images
of child pornography. Defendant's father and stepmother identified the children
in the images as C.R. and K.R. As a result, on March 17, 2015, defendant was
charged with additional offenses.
Over the following six months, the defense postponed seven status
conferences and a bail motion due to incomplete discovery and attorney
availability. Defendant's first attorney was unavailable because of medical leave
and defendant was assigned a second attorney on a temporary basis.
On September 2, 2015, a grand jury returned a superseding indictment
charging defendant with five additional counts of second-degree endangering
the welfare of a child. Defendant was arraigned on October 19, 2015. However,
the proceeding was postponed by defense counsel for incomplete discovery, and
the arraignment was ultimately completed by December 7, 2015. Two months
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later, defendant's counsel was re-assigned, and a third attorney was assigned to
represent defendant. Over the course of the following four months, status
hearings were postponed at the defense's request on six occasions either due to
attorney unavailability or incomplete discovery. Defendant was then assigned
a fourth defense attorney who postponed status hearings between April 29, 2016
and August 29, 2016, due to incomplete discovery. The status hearing was
finally completed on October 24, 2016.
A pretrial conference scheduled for December 12, 2016, was postponed
by defense counsel for incomplete discovery before the case was transferred to
a fifth defense attorney. Defense counsel also postponed pretrial conferences
scheduled for May 15, July 24, September 19, and October 27, 2017.
The defense then filed the motions to sever, suppress, and dismiss, which
the trial judge heard on December 8 and 18, 2017. The defense argued the court
should : 1) grant the motion for severance because a trial involving both victims
would prejudice defendant and outweighed the State's desire to resolve the
matter efficiently; 2) dismiss the indictment because the delay in the case
violated defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial; and 3) suppress
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the evidence seized from the laptop found at the aunt's house because it was
obtained illegally.3
In a comprehensive oral opinion, the trial judge denied the motions.
Applying the Barker v. Wingo4 factors, he found that despite the four years
between arrest and the motion to dismiss, the majority of the delays were at the
request of the defense and thus there was no speedy trial violation. Weighing
the Cofield5 factors, the judge denied the severance motion finding there was
"undoubtedly a sufficient nexus between the counts of the [i]ndictment relating
to [C.R.] and the counts of the [i]ndictment relating to K.R. . . . ." He also found
the laptop was legally seized from defendant's aunt's house because, as the
homeowner, she consented to the search and defendant's wife did not object.
On February 12, 2018, defendant pled guilty to two counts of first-degree
aggravated sexual assault pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement. The State
recommended concurrent sentences, each between fifteen and twenty years,
3
In addition to the laptop from the aunt's house, the suppression motion sought
to bar the evidence seized from defendant's underwater camera, the SD memory
card associated with the underwater camera, the Apple time capsule, the iPhone,
and the laptop seized from the family residence, which are not part of this appeal.
4
407 U.S. 514, 530-31 (1972).
5
127 N.J. 328, 338 (1992).
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subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. On September
14, 2018, the trial judge sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of eighteen
years in prison, subject to NERA, Megan's Law, and parole supervision for life.
Defendant raises the following points on appeal:
POINT I - THE INDICTMENT MUST BE
DISMISSED BECAUSE THE FOUR-YEAR DELAY
BETWEEN [DEFENDANT]'S ARREST AND
CONVICTION VIOLATED HIS RIGHT TO A
SPEEDY TRIAL.
A. FACTOR ONE: LENGTH OF DELAY.
B. FACTOR TWO: REASON FOR DELAY.
C. FACTOR THREE: ASSERTION OF THE
RIGHT.
D. FACTOR FOUR: PREJUDICE TO THE
DEFENDANT.
POINT II - THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
MOTION TO SUPPRESS BECAUSE POLICE
SEIZED [DEFENDANT]'S LAPTOP WI[TH]OUT A
WARRANT OR VALID CONSENT.
POINT III - THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING
[DEFENDANT]'S MOTION TO SEVER SEXUAL
OFFENSES AGAINST TWO DIFFERENT
COMPLAINANTS WHEN IT COULD NOT
ARTICULATE ANY RELEVANCE OF ONE
OFFENSE TO THE OTHER.
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POINT IV – [DEFENDANT]'S SENTENCE OF
EIGHTEEN YEARS' STATE PRISON IS
MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE.
I.
Defendant argues the trial judge erred in failing to dismiss the indictment
because the four-year delay between his arrest and conviction violated his right
to a speedy trial. We analyze speedy trial issues under an abuse of discretion
standard. State v. Fulford, 349 N.J. Super. 183, 195-96 (App. Div. 2002).
The Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses
guarantee the accused the right to a speedy trial. U.S. Const. amends VI, XIV;
N.J. Const. art. I ¶ 10; Barker, 407 U.S. at 515; State v. Szima, 70 N.J. 196, 200-
01 (1976). The speedy trial right attaches at the time of arrest or indictment.
Szima, 70 N.J. at 199-200. Defendant bears the burden of establishing a
violation of his speedy trial right. State v. Tsetsekas, 411 N.J. Super. 1, 9 (App.
Div. 2009).
The trial court must balance the following factors: 1) the length of the
delay; 2) the reasons for the delay; 3) whether and how defendant asserted his
speedy-trial right; and 4) the prejudice to defendant caused by the delay. State
v. Townsend, 186 N.J. 473, 487 (2006); see also Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. If the
factors are met, dismissal of the indictment is the remedy. Strunk v. United
A-1338-18T4
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States, 412 U.S. 434, 438 (1973). However, "if delay is attributable to the
defendant," then he may be deemed to have waived his right. Barker, 407 U.S.
at 529.
The trial judge found the delay was caused in part by the fact defendant
was assigned five different attorneys, "through no fault of his own." The judge
also found other causes for the delay, namely, the evidence required complex
forensic evaluation by the State Police laboratory and the FBI, which he noted
were completed in a "timely fashion"; the discovery of additional evidence
through the forensic evaluation resulting in a superseding indictment; and
defendant was charged with "very significant crimes, which allows for a
lengthier delay."
However, the judge found the primary reason for the delay was defense
counsel's postponement of twenty-five of the thirty-three status conferences due
to incomplete discovery or attorney unavailability. The judge noted the defense
was advised additional delays would result in a superseding indictment, which
in fact created more delays. The judge acknowledged the delay had a prejudicial
effect because the memories of C.R. and K.R., who were young when the
assaults took place, could fade with time. Ultimately, the judge concluded the
A-1338-18T4
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complexity of the case and the defense requests for postponements were not
unreasonable and did not violate defendant's right to a speedy trial.
The trial judge's findings are supported by the substantial credible
evidence in the record. Our review of the record confirms the delay was indeed
occasioned by multiple defense requests for more time to address discovery and
the complexity of the case. Regarding the latter, the record supports the judge's
finding the State worked diligently to gather and examine the evidence. Given
the circumstances, the length of and reasons for the delay were not unreasonable
and outweigh the prejudice to defendant.
II.
Defendant argues the judge erred in denying the motion to suppress the
evidence obtained from the warrantless seizure of his laptop. We will uphold
the denial of a suppression motion where "the factual findings underlying the
trial court's decision . . . are 'supported by sufficient credible evidence in the
record.'" State v. Sencion, 454 N.J. Super. 25, 31 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting
State v. Boone, 232 N.J. 417, 425-26 (2017)).
The New Jersey and United States constitutions protect against
unreasonable searches and guarantee the right of individuals to be secure in their
house and effects, free from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const.,
A-1338-18T4
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amends. IV, XIV; N.J. Const., art. I ¶ 7. Warrantless searches are presumed
invalid, except under a few, well-delineated exceptions. State v. Pineiro, 181
N.J. 13, 19 (2004); see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219
(1973); State v. Wilson, 178 N.J. 7, 12 (2003). One exception is where there is
consent. Pineiro, 181 N.J. at 19 (citing State v. Maryland, 167 N.J. 471, 482
(2001)). "[A]ny consent given by an individual to a police officer to conduct a
warrantless search must be given knowingly and voluntarily." State v. Carty,
170 N.J. 632, 639 (2002) (citing State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 354 (1975)).
In the context of a residential search, consent may be given by a third-
party with lawful authority over the premises or objects to be searched. United
States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974). The third-party may be a co-
occupant of the premises. Id. at 171. In determining the validity of a third-
party's consent, the court considers if the individual "possessed common
authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought
to be inspected." State v. Miller, 159 N.J. Super. 552, 557 (App. Div. 1978)
(quoting Matlock, 415 U.S. at 169-72). The authority of the third-party
relies not upon the law of property, 'but rests rather on
mutual use of the property by persons generally having
joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is
reasonable to recognize that any of the co-habitants has
the right to permit the inspection in his [or her] own
right and that others have assumed the risk that one of
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their number might permit the common area to be
searched.
[Id. at 557-58 (quoting Matlock, 415 U.S. at 169-72).]
See also State v. Coles, 218 N.J. 322, 340-41 (2014) (holding that evidence
seized wherein a third-party only had apparent authority need not be suppressed
under the New Jersey Constitution because the query is not whether the officer
was factually correct about the third-party's ability to consent to the search, but
rather "whether the officer's belief that the third[-]party had the authority to
consent was objectively reasonable in view of the facts and circumstances
known at the time of the search.").
Defendant's laptop was seized from a residence owned and occupied by
his aunt and her spouse. As the judge noted, defendant's wife began residing
with the aunt after his arrest as a "temporary guest . . . because she . . . [later]
left the State and the country[,]" and did not own the residence or pay rent.
Defendant never resided in his aunt's home. The judge concluded defendant's
aunt
as the owner and occupant of the residence, clearly had
the authority to consent to [the] search of her residence.
. . . Defendant's wife, who transported . . . [d]efendant's
laptop . . . to the residence . . . where she was staying,
was there.
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. . . I have no information before me that indicated that
she objected to the seizure of that item and, in fact, both
she and the owner of the premises took . . . law
enforcement to the location where it was being stored.
. . . [Defendant's wife] could have objected had she
wanted to. She did not.
We discern no error in the decision to deny the suppression motion. The
aunt had actual authority regarding the residence which she owned and occupied
and there is no question she voluntarily consented to the search. Defendant's
wife also had authority regarding the laptop because she transported it from her
family residence to the aunt's home during her stay. She did not object to the
search, and the record shows she voluntarily consented by guiding investigators
to the laptop and surrendering it. Therefore, under either an actual or apparent
authority analysis, investigators could reasonably rely on the consent both
women provided to seize the laptop without a warrant.
III.
Defendant argues the motion judge erroneously denied his motion to sever
the trial of the charges involving each victim from the other. "The trial court is
vested with the discretion to sever any count in an indictment, if joinder would
unfairly prejudice a defendant or the State." State v. Silva, 378 N.J. Super. 321,
324 (App. Div. 2005) (citing R. 3:15-2(b)). The denial of such motion "will not
A-1338-18T4
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result in reversal, absent an abuse of discretion." State v. Cole, 154 N.J. Super.
138, 143 (App. Div. 1977) (citing State v. Yormark, 117 N.J. Super. 315, 331
(App. Div. 1971)).
Pursuant of to Rule 3:7-6, two or more offenses may be charged in the
same indictment or accusation if they "are of the same or similar character or
are based on the same act or transaction or on [two] or more acts or transactions
connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan." If the
joinder of offenses prejudices a defendant, the court may order separate trials or
counts, or direct other appropriate relief. R. 3:15-2(b). However, when the
offenses charged are the same or similar, based on the same transactions, or of
a common plan or scheme, joint trials are preferable in the interest of judicial
economy, to avoid inconsistent verdicts, and allow for a "more accurate
assessment of relative culpability." State v. Weaver, 219 N.J. 131, 148 (2014)
(quoting State v. Brown, 118 N.J. 595, 605 (1990)).
The trial judge should consider whether if the charges were tried
separately the evidence of the offenses sought to be severed would be admissible
under N.J.R.E. 404(b) in the trial of the remaining charges. State v. Alfano, 305
N.J. Super. 178, 191 (App. Div. 1997). Joinder is permitted if there is a
A-1338-18T4
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connection between the charges, such that evidence on one charge would be
probative of another. State v. Sterling, 215 N.J. 65, 91-92 (2013).
In denying defendant's motion, the trial judge concluded "[t]here is
undoubtedly a sufficient nexus between the counts of the [i]ndictment relating
to C.R. and the counts of the [i]ndictment relating to K.R." The judge found the
evidence of the offenses against one child materially relevant to whether
defendant sexually assaulted the other child because: 1) the victims share the
same relation to defendant; 2) the assaults took place within the same time
period and locations, and were similar in nature; 3) evidence from the separate
assaults would be admissible in separate trials; and 4) "[m]any of the images,
which were seized . . . from the devices include both victims and it would be
impossible to redact those images to introduce evidence that only one victim
was sexually assaulted, with[out] at least acknowledging the fact there was a
second victim."
The judge concluded "[p]rejudice to the [d]efendant can't be avoided . . . .
But joinder of the counts against C.R. and counts against K.R. . . . will not divert
the minds of the jurors from a reasonable and fair evaluation of the basic issues
of the case." The judge concluded the court could mitigate any prejudice by
means of limiting instructions to the jury to consider each count separately.
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We agree. Defendant's assaults, the victims' identities, and the evidence
are substantially intertwined. The overlap of facts and evidence would be
admissible at both trials, and defendant would not suffer more prejudice in a
joint trial than he would in separate trials. State v. Chenique-Puey, 145 N.J.
334, 341 (1996). The judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the severance
motion.
IV.
Defendant argues his sentence is excessive. He contends the judge failed
to find a mitigating factor, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(11), and double-counted an
aggravating factor, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3). Defendant argues the judge failed
to consider that he is a veteran, had no prior criminal history, and would not re-
offend. He claims the sentence disregards the hardship to him and his famil y
whom he can no longer support evidenced by the fact his wife was forced to
travel abroad in search of work.
We review an appeal from a sentence for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Jones, 232 N.J. 308, 318 (2018). We must consider whether: "(1) the sentencing
guidelines were violated; (2) the findings of aggravating and mitigating factors
were . . . 'based upon competent credible evidence in the record;' [and] (3) 'the
application of guidelines to the facts' of the case 'shock[s] the judicial
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conscience.'" State v. Bolvito, 217 N.J. 221, 228 (2014) (third alteration in
original) (quoting State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984)).
The trial judge found the following aggravating factors: N.J.S.A. 2C:44-
1(a)(1), the nature and circumstance of the offense; N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3), the
risk of reoffending; and N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9), the need to deter. The judge
gave moderate weight to all of the factors and declined to find N.J.S.A. 2C:44-
1(a)(2) as an aggravating factor in order to avoid double counting an element of
the offense he relied upon to find N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1).6
Regarding N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3), the judge noted this was defendant's
first conviction, however because
[d]efendant's behavior [occurred] over the course of
years, with two separate victims, leads this [c]ourt to
believe that there is a risk of reoffending.
The nature of the offense itself carries a substantial risk
of recidivism and his behavior was found to be
repetitive by the doctor at [the Adult Diagnostic
Treatment Center (ADTC)].
Not only did he perform physical acts of sexual assault
but the evidence establishes that he surreptitiously
videotaped the victims in the nude and saved them
either on a computer or on a camera, either for future
gratification or for further dissemination.
6
The judge also declined the State's request to find N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(6), the
extent of defendant's prior record and the seriousness of the offenses of which
he has been convicted as an aggravating factor.
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His denial of the events in the [p]re-[s]entence [r]eport
. . . also supports a finding, historically and statistically,
that there is a risk of reoffending.
The judge found the following mitigating factors: N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7),
lack of a prior criminal history; and N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(12), defendant's
cooperation in sparing the victims from a trial by entering into the plea. The
judge refused to find mitigating factor N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(11).
The judge noted the sentencing range for defendant's crimes was bet ween
ten and twenty years for each offense. Because the aggravating factors
outweighed the mitigating, the judge sentenced defendant to two eighteen-year
sentences to run concurrently with each other, subject to NERA.
We find no reversible error in the sentence. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3) states
that "[i]n determining the appropriate sentence to be imposed on a person who
has been convicted of an offense, the court shall consider . . . [t]he risk the
defendant will commit another offense." Determining the likelihood to reoffend
involves an evaluation and judgment of the individual in light of his or her
history. See State v. Thomas, 188 N.J. 137, 153 (2006).
Contrary to defendant's contention, the judge did not double count by
finding aggravating factors N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1) and (3) because the risk of
re-offense expressed in the latter aggravating factor is not an element of the
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aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1). The judge's findings
regarding N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1) noted "the depravity of the crimes" because
defendant "systematically and over the course of several years, sexually
assaulted the two victims, . . . when they were seven and eight years of age."
The judge found "the acts occurred at the family home and the family summer
residence, places certainly where the victims should feel safe." These findings
stand separate from the findings the judge made under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3).
Moreover, beyond defendant's crimes, the judge considered a multitude of facts,
including defendant's lack of remorse and the ADTC evaluation in assessing
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3), and we discern no error in the findings.
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(11) states the sentencing judge may consider whether
the "imprisonment of the defendant would entail excessive hardship to himself
or his dependents." "[H]ardship to children may be a significant mitigating
factor." State v. Mirakaj, 268 N.J. Super. 48, 51-52 (App. Div. 1993).
The judge declined to find N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(11) as a mitigating factor
noting for "[e]verybody who faces a stiff or a lengthy [s]tate [p]rison term, the
families are always inconvenienced and there's always going to be a financial
hardship." He concluded the evidence did not support a finding defendant's
family was significantly more affected than any other family. The judge noted
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defendant's father, not defendant, paid for defendant's family to return to the
Philippines, and paid for medical expenses, the mortgage, and personal property
so defendant's wife would have sufficient funds to meet the family needs. The
judge's findings are supported by the substantial credible evidence in the record .
Affirmed.
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