K.U. VS. E.M. (FV-20-1359-19, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2020 )


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  •                                       RECORD IMPOUNDED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-5127-18T1
    K.U.,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    E.M.,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ______________________________
    Submitted May 12, 2020 – Decided May 26, 2020
    Before Judges Fisher and Rose.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Chancery Division, Family Part, Union County, Docket
    No. FV-20-1359-19.
    Lubiner, Schmidt & Palumbo, attorneys for appellant
    (Todd David Palumbo and John Evan Jenkins, on the
    brief).
    Respondent has not filed a brief.
    PER CURIAM
    Plaintiff K.U. (Kevin, a fictitious name) filed this action against his
    former girlfriend, defendant E.M. (Evelyn, also a fictitious name), under the
    Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (the Act), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35,
    alleging he was harassed by her communications. At the end of a short hearing
    at which only the unrepresented parties testified, the judge found Kevin credible,
    concluded Evelyn's communications were of a harassing nature, and issued a
    final restraining order (FRO) in Kevin's favor. Evelyn's later reconsideration
    motion was denied.
    Evelyn appeals, arguing that the trial judge erred by failing to determine
    whether her communications were made with a purpose to harass and by failing
    to allow her to cross-examine Kevin.        We find insufficient merit in these
    arguments to warrant further discussion in a written opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E),
    and affirm, adding only a few brief comments.
    Evelyn, of course, is correct that to find harassment a judge must
    determine that the harasser acted, in the words of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4, "with
    purpose to harass another." See J.D. v. M.D.F., 
    207 N.J. 458
    , 477-78 (2011);
    State v. Burkert, 
    444 N.J. Super. 591
    , 600 (App. Div. 2016). It is also true that
    in his oral decision the judge did not actually say whether Evelyn's
    communications were made with a purpose to harass Kevin or his current
    A-5127-18T1
    2
    girlfriend.   But, the judge found the communications were harassing and,
    because the very nature of the communications, which included the sending of
    what were referred to as "racy confections," were on their face annoying,
    alarming, and otherwise pointless, we are satisfied the judge implicitly found
    Evelyn's communications were made with a purpose to harass.
    Evelyn also correctly argues due process principles require that judges
    afford domestic violence litigants with "the opportunity to cross-examine
    witnesses." 
    J.D., 207 N.J. at 481
    ; see also Peterson v. Peterson, 
    374 N.J. Super. 116
    , 124-26 (App. Div. 2005).        But, because such matters are speedily
    adjudicated, domestic violence judges are not required to give any great "leeway
    to a party whose testimony seems disjointed or irrelevant." 
    J.D., 207 N.J. at 481
    . Having closely examined the trial transcript, we conclude that the judge
    provided Evelyn with the opportunity to cross-examine Kevin and that she did,
    in fact, cross-examine Kevin, albeit briefly.
    After Kevin finished testifying, the judge advised Evelyn that she was
    "under no requirement to say anything" and asked "if [she] would like to respond
    to [Kevin's] testimony."    After Evelyn expressed a desire to respond, the
    following occurred:
    [EVELYN]: But before I do, I do have a couple of
    clarifying questions.
    A-5127-18T1
    3
    THE COURT: Questions for [Kevin]?
    [EVELYN]: Yes.
    THE COURT: Well, you know, it's a little difficult to
    conduct a cross-examination when it's plaintiff against
    defendant. Suppose you just tell me what your
    concerns are.
    Evelyn then asked Kevin a few questions.
    Evelyn's first question, as the judge correctly held, sought irrelevant
    information and, so, he did not require a response from Kevin. The judge
    restated Evelyn's second question for clarity's sake and followed it with a few
    more questions of his own. After that, Evelyn posed what she described as her
    "final question" for Kevin. That question prompted discussion between the
    judge and Evelyn, and Kevin never was asked to give a response; Evelyn did not
    complain about not getting an answer, and she did not pursue that line of
    questioning further. The judge then asked "what else[?]" Evelyn said "[t]hat's
    it in . . . regard to the clarifying questions," and she then gave her own direct
    testimony. We are satisfied the judge provided Evelyn with the opportunity to
    cross-examine, which she exercised as fully as she desired.
    Affirmed.
    A-5127-18T1
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-5127-18T1

Filed Date: 5/26/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 5/26/2020