TWO DAUGHTERS, LLC VS. HARBOUR BAY, LLC (L-0990-18, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2020 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-0388-19T3
    TWO DAUGHTERS, LLC,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    HARBOUR BAY, LLC,
    THE CITY OF MARGATE
    PLANNING BOARD and
    THE CITY OF MARGATE,
    Defendants-Respondents.
    ___________________________
    Argued telephonically September 15, 2020 –
    Decided October 7, 2020
    Before Judges Fisher and Gummer.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Atlantic County, Docket No. L-0990-18.
    Anthony Monzo argued the cause for appellant (Monzo
    Catanese Hillegass, PC, attorneys; Louis A. DeLollis,
    on the briefs).
    Benjamin Zeltner argued the cause for respondent
    Harbour Bay, LLC (Levine, Staller, Sklar, Chan &
    Brown, PA, attorneys; Benjamin Zeltner, on the brief).
    Elias T. Manos argued the cause for respondent The
    City of Margate Planning Board.
    John Scott Abbott argued the cause for respondent The
    City of Margate.
    PER CURIAM
    Plaintiff Two Daughters, LLC, appeals from a final judgment rejecting its
    prerogative-writs challenge to defendant City of Margate Planning Board's
    approval of defendant developer Harbour Bay, LLC's application for variance
    relief and site-plan approval and to two municipal ordinances adopted by
    defendant City of Margate. We substantially agree with the comprehensive
    analysis of Judge Julio L. Mendez and affirm.
    Plaintiff is the owner of Sophia's, a restaurant that is across the street from
    the Harbour Bay property at issue. With structures that have been on the
    property since the 1960s, the Harbour Bay property is in need of redevelopment.
    Harbour Bay submitted to the Board an application in which it sought
    preliminary and final major site plan approval of its redevelopment plan for the
    property. Harbour Bay proposed to demolish the existing structures on the
    property and build a mixed-use building occupying the same footprint as the
    existing building with an approximately 2600-square-foot new addition. That
    new building would consist of an office, a 149-seat restaurant, and a bait shop
    A-0388-19T3
    2
    and would be elevated to meet FEMA requirements. Harbour Bay proposed
    completely rebuilding the existing marina, with a new bulkhead that would help
    to reduce flooding, a boat fueling station, and a public pedestrian boardwalk. In
    its application Harbour Bay also sought variance relief pursuant to N.J.S.A.
    40:55D-70(c) and a waiver from the submission of a written traffic impact study.
    The Board conducted a hearing on Harbour Bay's application on February
    22, 2018. During that hearing, the Board heard testimony from Harbour Bay's
    planning expert, engineer, architect, and traffic-engineer expert, and members
    of the public.1 It heard the testimony of the Board's planner and reviewed his
    report and the report of the City's engineer. No one presented expert testimony
    opposing the applications or contesting the conclusions of Harbour Bay's expert
    witnesses. Plaintiff's representatives attended the hearing, but did not testify,
    present any witnesses, or oppose Harbour Bay's application.
    In an eleven-page Decision and Resolution, the Board granted the
    application, finding that Harbour Bay's proposed project was proper in all
    1
    Plaintiff cites to the "numerous objectors" who spoke at the hearing as
    evidence of the adverse impact plaintiff claims this project will have on
    neighboring properties. In fact, only three members of the public spoke in
    opposition to the proposal. Two people spoke in favor of it. One business owner
    expressed concern about how the construction of the project would impact
    businesses during summer months.
    A-0388-19T3
    3
    respects, would revitalize the bay-front area and advance the City's Master Plan
    and the purposes of the Waterfront Special District zone in which the property
    was located, and, as a whole, would advance several zoning purposes, citing
    N.J.S.A. 50:55D-2. As to the requested variances, the Board concluded, among
    other things, that they would advance the goals of the Municipal Land Use Law
    ("MLUL"), N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 to -163, their benefits would outweigh any
    detriment, they were justified by physical features and constraints affecting the
    property, and they would not cause a substantial detriment to the public or impair
    the intent of the zoning plan and ordinance. The Board set forth specifically its
    factual conclusions, including conclusions regarding setbacks, signage, parking,
    and fencing, and its reasons for granting the request to waive the submission of
    a written traffic-impact study.
    When Harbour Bay submitted its application, the Harbour Bay property
    was located in part in a designated Waterfront Special District and in part in a
    riparian district, which did not permit restaurant or office uses. According to
    the Board's zoning officer and planner, the existing boundary line between those
    districts was created by mistake in 2008 and had the unintentional effect of
    rendering existing businesses non-conforming. Harbour Bay proposed that the
    boundary line between the districts be relocated to its prior location, with
    A-0388-19T3
    4
    existing uses reverting to being conforming uses in the Waterfront Special
    District.     After an investigation by the City, the Board's issuance of a
    Consistency Report recommending the adoption of an ordinance resetting the
    boundary line, and the required publication of the proposed ordinance, and
    having received no opposition, the City adopted Ordinance No. 02-2018 during
    a public meeting held on February 1, 2018. The ordinance had the effect of
    moving the district boundary line, impacting approximately forty-two
    properties.
    On October 4, 2018, the City adopted Ordinance No. 24-2018, a
    comprehensive ordinance that revised in many respects the land use chapter of
    the City's Code, including a revision regarding parking requirements. The
    amendment to that section of the Code had the effect of including property
    located in the Waterfront Special District and riparian zones in the Code’s
    existing on-site parking allowance.2
    On May 4, 2018, plaintiff filed its complaint in lieu of prerogative writs,
    challenging each of the Board's decisions regarding the Harbour Bay application
    and, more than ninety days after the City had adopted it, Ordinance No. 02-2018.
    2
    It also reduced the required number of parking spaces for restaurants. Plaintiff
    does not challenge that aspect of the ordinance.
    A-0388-19T3
    5
    Plaintiff later amended its complaint to include a challenge to Ordinance No.
    24-2018. After hearing oral argument, Judge Mendez issued a final order and a
    twenty-page opinion in which he held that the Board's decisions were not
    arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; upheld the validity of Ordinance Nos. 02-
    2018 and 24-2018; and found that plaintiff's challenge to Ordinance No. 02-
    2018 was time barred.
    Plaintiff appeals each aspect of the court's decision. Plaintiff argues that
    the trial court should have found that the Board's decisions were arbitrary,
    capricious, and unreasonable because Harbour Bay failed to present evidence
    that a hardship would result if the requested variances were not granted, granting
    the variances would not cause substantial detriment to the public, or positive
    criteria for the variances existed. Plaintiff also faults the court for upholding
    the Board's decision not to require a traffic study. Plaintiff asserts that the trial
    court erred in deciding that plaintiff's spot-zoning challenge to Ordinance No.
    02-2018 was time-barred, Ordinance No. 02-2018 was valid and did not
    constitute improper spot zoning, and the City's adoption of Ordinance No. 24-
    2018 was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
    Courts do not determine the wisdom of a planning board action.
    Kaufmann v. Planning Bd. for Warren, 
    110 N.J. 551
    , 558 (1988). Land-use
    A-0388-19T3
    6
    decisions "are entrusted to the sound discretion of the municipal boards . . . ."
    Ibid. Courts defer to
    decisions of local boards if they are adequately supported
    by the record, Lang v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 
    160 N.J. 41
    , 61 (1999), and if
    they are not arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious, Pullen v. Twp. of S.
    Plainfield Planning Bd., 291 N.J. Super 1, 6 (App. Div. 1996).           A party
    challenging a board's decision must establish that the board's action was
    arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious. Price v. Himeji, LLC, 
    214 N.J. 263
    , 284
    (2013). A board's factual determinations are entitled to "great weight" and
    should not be disturbed "unless there is insufficient evidence to support them."
    Rowatti v. Gonchar, 
    101 N.J. 46
    , 52 (1985). When reviewing a board decision,
    a court must consider the issues before the board in their entirety and not focus
    on the legal sufficiency of one factor standing alone.        Kramer v. Bd. of
    Adjustment, 
    45 N.J. 268
    , 287 (1965). For example, a court cannot consider a
    variance in isolation, but must consider it "in the context of its effect on the
    development proposal, the neighborhood, and the zoning plan." Pullen, 291 N.J.
    Super. at 9.
    Our role in reviewing zoning ordinances is narrow. Zilinksy v. Zoning
    Bd. of Adjustment of Verona, 
    105 N.J. 363
    , 367 (1987). Courts recognize that
    because of their familiarity with their communities, local officials "are best
    A-0388-19T3
    7
    suited to make judgments concerning local zoning ordinances." 
    Pullen, 291 N.J. Super. at 6
    . Thus, we presume that a governing municipal body's actions
    are valid. Jayber Inc. v. Mun. Council of W. Orange, 
    238 N.J. Super. 165
    , 173
    (App. Div. 1990). We defer to its judgment "so long as its decision is
    supported by the record and is not so arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious as
    to amount to an abuse of discretion."
    Ibid. The party challenging
    the
    ordinance must overcome its presumption of validity. Riggs v. Long Beach,
    
    109 N.J. 601
    , 611 (1988). If an ordinance is "debatable, it should be upheld."
    Ibid. With the MLUL,
    our Legislature authorized municipalities to enact and
    amend zoning ordinances. See N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62(a); see also Riya Finnegan
    LLC v. Twp. Council of S. Brunswick, 
    197 N.J. 184
    , 191 (2007). A
    municipality may amend a zoning ordinance while a site-plan application is
    pending; it may amend an ordinance in direct response to a pending
    application. Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 
    140 N.J. 366
    , 378-79 (1995); see also House of Fire Christian Church v. Zoning Bd. of
    Adjustment of Clifton, 
    379 N.J. Super. 526
    , 541-42 (App. Div. 2005). The
    amendment simply must be consistent with the MLUL. 
    Manalapan, 140 N.J. at 379
    .
    A-0388-19T3
    8
    Applying these standards, we find no cause to disturb Judge Mendez's
    carefully perpended findings, all of which are well supported by the record.
    We reject plaintiff's contention that the Board made inadequate findings to
    support its conclusions. To the contrary, after considering the unopposed
    expert testimony and other evidence presented during its hearing on Harbour
    Bay's application, the Board issued a detailed resolution spelling out the
    reasons for its approval of the application, including the request for variances
    on setbacks, fencing, signage, and parking. We agree with Judge Mendez's
    conclusion that the Board appropriately contemplated the impact the project
    would have on the neighboring properties and the zone.
    As for the waiver of the traffic study, the court correctly noted that it was
    within the Board's discretion to determine if it needed a traffic study and
    reasonably found that the Board acted within its discretion when it determined
    that a written study was not necessary when the expert who would author that
    study would be available at the hearing and could be questioned by members of
    the Board and the public.
    We find no reason to disturb Judge Mendez's findings as to the ordinances.
    Judge Mendez acted within his discretion in finding plaintiff's challenge to
    Ordinance No. 02-2018 to be time barred by Rule 4:69-6 and in rejecting
    A-0388-19T3
    9
    plaintiff's attempt to enlarge the time to make that challenge. See Tri-State Ship
    Repair & Dry Dock Co. v. City of Perth Amboy, 
    349 N.J. Super. 418
    , 423-24
    (App. Div. 2002). Judge Mendez's determination that Ordinance No. 02-2018
    did not constitute impermissible spot zoning was supported by credible evidence
    in the record regarding its impact on approximately forty-two other properties
    and the prior erroneous setting of the boundary line. See Riva Ltd. Liab. Co. v.
    Twp. Council of S. Brunswick, 
    197 N.J. 184
    , 187 (2008). His finding that
    Ordinance No. 24-2018 serves the general welfare of the zone and a legitimate
    purpose by facilitating redevelopment of dilapidated properties and reducing the
    number of variances requested also is supported by the record and the law. See
    
    Price, 214 N.J. at 284
    (recognizing that MLUL "exhibits a preference for
    municipal land use planning by ordinance rather than by variance").
    All of Judge Mendez's findings were supported by sufficient evidence in
    the record. His findings, and the findings of the Board and the City, are entitled
    to our deference. We, therefore, affirm substantially for the reasons set forth
    by Judge Mendez in his well-reasoned and thorough written opinion.
    Affirmed.
    A-0388-19T3
    10