MANNIX DANIELS VS. NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE (NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF STATE POLICE) ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5288-18T3
MANNIX DANIELS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY STATE
POLICE,
Respondent-Respondent.
__________________________
Argued November 16, 2020 – Decided January 26, 2021
Before Judges Currier and DeAlmeida.
On appeal from the New Jersey Division of State
Police.
Kevin T. Conway argued the cause for appellant.
Tasha Marie Bradt, Deputy Attorney General, argued
the cause for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney
General, attorney; Jane C. Schuster, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel; Erica R. Heyer, Deputy Attorney
General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Petitioner Mannix Daniels appeals from the May 16, 2019 final agency
decision of the Acting Superintendent of the State Police denying his application
for a certificate of registration as a security officer because of a prior criminal
conviction. We affirm.
I.
The following facts are derived from the record. Daniels is a New Jersey
resident who applied to the New Jersey Division of State Police for a certificate
of registration as a security officer. Such a certificate is necessary to be
employed in this State as a security officer in most circumstances. N.J.S.A.
45:19A-4(a). On the application, Daniels replied "No" to the following
questions:
(1) "Have you ever been convicted of a crime of the first, second, third
or fourth degree in New Jersey, or convicted of a crime in New Jersey or any
other State . . . which subjected you to imprisonment for more than six months?";
and
(2) "Have you ever been convicted of any other crime or offense?"1
1
Daniels also answered "No" to the question "[a]re you licensed or certified as
a security officer in any other State . . .?" According to representations made in
Daniels's brief, his response to this question was false. The Acting
Superintendent did not deny Daniels's application based on his answer to this
question.
A-5288-18T3
2
A background check revealed that Daniels was convicted of third-degree
robbery in New York State in December 1995.2
On October 9, 2018, the Division denied Daniels's application based on
his conviction of third-degree robbery pursuant to N.J.S.A. 45:19A-4(c), which
provides in relevant part that
[n]o person shall be issued a certificate of registration
as a security officer . . . if the person has been
convicted, as indicated by a criminal history
background check performed pursuant to the provisions
of this section, of: a crime of the first, second, third or
fourth degree . . . or any offense where the registration
of the individual would be contrary to the public
interest, as determined by the superintendent . . . .
[N.J.S.A. 45:19A-4(c).]
Daniels contested the denial and requested a hearing. The Division
transferred the matter to the Office of Administrative Law, where it was
assigned to Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Ernest M. Bongiovanni. The
Division moved for summary disposition. Daniels did not file opposition.
ALJ Bongiovanni issued an initial decision granting the Division's motion
and affirming the denial of Daniels's application. The ALJ found there was no
2
It appears that Daniels was also convicted in New York of second-degree
criminal impersonation on April 18, 2000, and third-degree aggravated
unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle on January 1, 2000. The Acting
Superintendent did not rely on these convictions in reaching his decision.
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3
genuine dispute as to the material fact that Daniels was convicted of third-degree
robbery. In addition, ALJ Bongiovanni concluded that N.J.S.A. 45:19A-4(c)
unambiguously precludes Daniels from receiving a certificate of registration as
a security officer because of his criminal conviction.
Daniels did not file exceptions to the ALJ's initial decision. On May 16,
2019, the Acting Superintendent issued a final agency decision adopting the
ALJ's initial decision for the reasons stated therein.
This appeal followed. Daniels raises the following argument for our
consideration.
THIS COURT SHOULD CONDUCT A DE NOVO
REVIEW AND GRANT A HEARING TO
CHALLENGE THE NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE'S
DENIAL OF THE APPELLANT'S APPLICATION
FOR A CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION AS A
SECURITY OFFICER.
II.
Our review of decisions by administrative agencies is limited, with
petitioners carrying a substantial burden of persuasion. In re Stallworth, 208
N.J. 182, 194 (2011). An agency's determination must be sustained "'unless
there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that
it lacks fair support in the record.'" Russo v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's
Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011) (quoting In re Hermann, 192 N.J. 19, 27-28
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4
(2007)). "[I]f substantial evidence supports the agency's decision, 'a court may
not substitute its own judgment for the agency's even though the court might
have reached a different result . . . .'" In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 483 (2007)
(quoting Greenwood v. State Police Training Ctr., 124 N.J. 500, 513 (1992)).
We are not, however, bound by an agency's interpretation of legal issues, which
we review de novo. Russo, 206 N.J. at 27.
Having carefully reviewed the record in light of the relevant legal
precedents, we affirm the Acting Superintendent's final agency decision. The
relevant legislative provision is unequivocal. "No person shall be issued a
certificate of registration as a security officer" if they have been convicted of a
criminal offense of the third degree. N.J.S.A. 45:19A-4(c). Daniels does not
deny that he was convicted of third-degree robbery. He is, therefore,
disqualified by statute from receiving a certificate of registration as a security
officer. The Acting Superintendent correctly applied the law when he denied
Daniels's application.
Daniels argues that he was denied due process because he was not given
an opportunity "to cross-examine the Agency's decision and put on his own case
supporting the grant of the requested relief." It is clear from the record,
however, that Daniels did not file opposition to the Division's motion for
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5
summary disposition before ALJ Bongiovanni. Nor did Daniels file exceptions
to the ALJ's initial decision. He failed to take advantage of two opportunities
to contest the fact of his conviction and to argue that the unambiguous statutory
prohibition does not apply to him.
In addition, Daniels argues that the Acting Superintendent's decision is
invalid because New York State issued a "certificate of relief from disabilities"
with respect to his third-degree robbery conviction. This argument was not
raised before the ALJ or the Acting Superintendent. The certificate on which
Daniels relies is not part of the administrative record, given that it was not filed
with the agency. R. 2:5-4(a). It is not listed in the statement of items comprising
the record on appeal. R. 2:5-4(b).
Daniels did not move to supplement the record. Instead, his counsel
included in his appendix what appears to be a copy of the certificate of relief
from disabilities. The certificate is not accompanied by an affidavit attesting to
its authenticity. In addition, although the certificate states "SEE REVERSE
SIDE FOR EXPLANATION OF THE LAW GOVERNING THIS
CERTIFICATE," a copy of the reverse side of the certificate is not included.
We note too that Daniels's brief cites no statute, regulation, or legal precedent
explaining the meaning of the certificate or whether it has any legal significance
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6
in New Jersey. We, therefore, decline to consider Daniels's arguments relating
to the New York certificate of relief from disabilities. Townsend v. Pierre, 221
N.J. 36, 45 n.2 (2015) ("We do not consider [evidence] that was not presented
to the trial court and that was submitted by the parties for the first time on
appeal.") (citing Rule 2:5-4(a)).3
Affirmed.
3
Similarly, we do not consider the Acting Superintendent's argument, raised
for the first time on appeal, that denial of Daniels's application was warranted
because he knowingly made false statements in his application. See N.J.A.C.
13:55A-3.7(a)(6).
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