DCPP VS. T.T., AND E.P. AND R.H., IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF D.P., M.P., AND D.T. (FG-17-0018-19, SALEM COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2021 )


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  •                                       RECORD IMPOUNDED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-3408-19
    NEW JERSEY DIVISION
    OF CHILD PROTECTION
    AND PERMANENCY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    T.T.,
    Defendant-Appellant,
    and
    E.P. and R.H.,
    Defendants.
    ________________________
    IN THE MATTER OF THE
    GUARDIANSHIP OF D.P.,
    M.P., and D.T., minors.
    ________________________
    Submitted February 3, 2021 – Decided March 1, 2021
    Before Judges Whipple, Rose, and Firko.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Chancery Division, Family Part, Salem County, Docket
    No. FG-17-0018-19.
    Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
    appellant (Robyn Veasey, Deputy Public Defender, of
    counsel; Caitlin A. McLaughlin, Designated Counsel,
    on the briefs).
    Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
    respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney
    General, of counsel; Amy Melissa Young, Deputy
    Attorney General, on the brief).
    Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian,
    attorney for minors (Meredith A. Pollock, Deputy
    Public Defender, of counsel; Noel C. Devlin, Assistant
    Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Defendant, T.T. (Terry), 1 mother of D.P. (Dylan), M.P. (Melissa), and
    D.T. (Drew), appeals from an April 17, 2020 judgment of guardianship
    terminating her parental rights for her three children. 2
    Dylan was born in 2011. Melissa was born in 2013 to the same father.
    Shortly after Melissa was born, the Division of Child Protection and
    1
    We refer to adult parties and to children by fictitious names to protect their
    privacy; in doing so, we mean no disrespect. R. 1:38-3(d)(12).
    2
    Terry had previously surrendered her parental rights to a daughter who is now
    an adult.
    A-3408-19
    2
    Permanency (Division) received a referral regarding Terry after a neighbor had
    spotted her acting erratically outside of her apartment, writing on a mattress near
    a dumpster. The neighbor believed there was an infant alone in the apartment.
    The Division investigated and was able to confirm that Terry left Dylan and
    Melissa alone in the apartment while she was outside. Terry claimed to have
    recently broken up with Dylan and Melissa's father, and reported she was in a
    relationship with a country music star.       The inside of the apartment was
    unsuitable for raising two young children, so the Division effected an emergency
    removal3 and placed Dylan and Melissa into resource homes.
    The Division arranged for Terry to receive psychiatric care in order to
    reunify her with her children.      She was diagnosed with major depressive
    disorder, schizophrenia, and schizoaffective disorder, as well as persistent
    delusions and hallucinations. For a period after the removal, defendant failed to
    maintain her prescribed medication regiment, with her condition deteriorating
    to the point of near homelessness. Eventually, however, defendant started to
    respond positively to a course of treatment she could maintain and was reunited
    with Dylan and Melissa in September 2016, a few months after having another
    3
    An emergency, or "Dodd," removal refers to the emergency removal of a child
    without a court order, pursuant to the Dodd Act, N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 to -8.82.
    A-3408-19
    3
    child, Drew.     The Division closed its file on Terry, with her living in an
    apartment with her three children and continuing community health treatment in
    place.
    However, by March 2018, after Terry failed to pick up Melissa from her
    bus stop, the Division dispatched investigators to her apartment, and again, the
    Division found the premises unsuited to raising three young children. The
    Division performed an emergency removal and placed the children in separate
    resource homes. At the time of the trial, all three siblings were still placed in
    separate resource homes.
    Dylan was placed with a resource mother, her husband, and children.
    Melissa, too, was placed with a resource mother and father and their children.
    Drew was placed with a couple, their biological son, and three-year-old twins
    previously placed by the Division. All three families communicate and have
    maintained arrangements for Drew, Melissa, and Dylan to visit with each other.
    All three children and the resource parents underwent bonding evaluations, as
    did Terry. Those evaluations were considered by the court at trial.
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    4
    After a nine-day trial4 held between December 2019 and April 2020, Judge
    Mary K. White terminated Terry's parental rights as to Dylan, Melissa, and
    Drew. Judge White found that despite the Division's efforts, Terry's inability to
    control her mental health struggles satisfied each of the four prongs of the best
    interest test under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) by clear and convincing evidence.
    Judge White found that the health, safety, and development of the children
    were and would continue to be in danger if the parental relationship were
    maintained, highlighting Terry's refusal to consistently take her medication and
    seek treatment for her mental health issues. This compromised Terry's ability
    to parent effectively, since "[a] child's safety depends on [his or her] parent's
    ability to take medication and react appropriately while on medication." Judge
    White classified this as a volitional act, in that Terry at some point made a
    conscious decision to cease taking the prescriptions that allowed her to manage
    her mental illness.
    4
    Due to the restrictions as a result of Covid-19, the court was operating under
    the Supreme Court's March 27, 2020, Omnibus Order, which implemented
    emergency modification to court operations, including transition to video
    proceedings to minimize in-person contact. Thus, subsequent to the in-person
    trial where all testimony was in person, the judge delivered her decision via
    ZOOM videoconferencing with the parties.
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    5
    Judge White reasoned that even without the act of not taking her
    medication, Terry had demonstrated enough reckless behavior to pose a risk to
    her children's safety, health, and development. Finally, Judge White found that
    the act of living with a parent struggling with a severe case of mental illness
    constituted harm.
    Terry's mental illness did not constitute a per se prong one finding.
    Rather, the trial court carefully considered the effect Terry's mental illness had
    on her children and found that her incoherent and erratic behavior, inability to
    maintain a clean and safe home, inability or unwillingness to maintain her
    medication, and repeated instances constituted a risk that the children's safety,
    health, or development would be harmed by a continuance of the parental
    relationship. This appeal followed.
    Terry raises the following issues on appeal:
    I. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN THE
    RECORD TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S
    CONCLUSION THAT [TERRY] EITHER HARMED
    HER CHILDREN OR POSED A RISK OF HARM TO
    THEM SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY PRONG ONE OF
    N.J.S.A.  30:4C-15.1[(a)]  AND   JUSTIFY
    TERMINATION OF HER PARENTAL RIGHTS.
    II. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN THE
    RECORD TO SUPPORT A FINDING THAT
    [TERRY] WAS UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO
    ELIMINATE HARM TO HER CHILDREN.
    A-3408-19
    6
    III. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN
    THE RECORD TO SUPPORT THE LEGAL
    CONCLUSION THAT [THE DIVISION] PROVIDED
    SUFFICIENT    SERVICES    TO    SUPPORT
    REUNIFICATION AND MADE REASONABLE
    EFFORTS TO REUNIFY THIS FAMILY.
    IV. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN
    THE RECORD TO SUPPORT THE LEGAL
    CONCLUSION   THAT    TERMINATION       OF
    PARENTAL RIGHTS WOULD NOT DO MORE
    HARM THAN GOOD TO D.P., M.P., AND D.T.
    In this appeal, our review of the judge's decision is limited. We defer to
    her expertise as a Family Part judge, Cesare v. Cesare, 
    154 N.J. 394
    , 411-13
    (1998), and we are bound by her factual findings so long as they are supported
    by sufficient, credible evidence. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M.,
    
    189 N.J. 261
    , 279 (2007) (citing In re Guardianship of J.T., 
    269 N.J. Super. 172
    ,
    188 (App. Div. 1993)). We conclude the factual findings of Judge White are
    fully supported by the record and the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are
    unassailable.   Judge White gave thoughtful attention to the importance of
    permanency and stability from the perspective of all three children 's needs, and
    she found the Division had established by clear and convincing evidence all four
    prongs of the best-interests test, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), which, in the best
    A-3408-19
    7
    interest of the child, permits termination of parental rights. In re Guardianship
    of K.H.O., 
    161 N.J. 337
    , 347-48 (1999).
    Affirmed.
    A-3408-19
    8
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-3408-19

Filed Date: 3/1/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 3/1/2021