STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. ALTERICK KELLY (98-08-3556, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2021 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-2086-19
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    ALTERICK KELLY, a/k/a
    CLARENCE KELLY,
    AL-TERICK KELLY,
    GLEN KELLY, ARNALD
    STITH, TRYEE STITH,
    KHALIF STITH, ARNOLD
    STITH, and CLARENCE
    YOUND,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    _______________________
    Submitted February 10, 2021 – Decided March 4, 2021
    Before Judges Geiger and Mitterhoff.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 98-08-3556.
    Alterick Kelly, appellant pro se.
    Theodore N. Stephens, II, Acting Essex County
    Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Stephen A.
    Pogany, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting
    Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Defendant Alterick Kelly appeals from a November 6, 2019 order denying
    his second motion to correct an illegal sentence. We affirm.
    We recounted the underlying facts in our opinion on direct appeal:
    At approximately 1:00 a.m. on April 29, 1998,
    Newark police officers responded to a report of shots
    fired in the backyard lot of 25 Aster Street. The bodies
    of Derrick Powell and Jhidoniane Anderson were
    discovered slumped over each other and riddled with
    multiple gun shot wounds. The bodies were surrounded
    by spent shell casings from three separate weapons: a
    .38 caliber, a .380 caliber and a 9mm. Officer Johnny
    Faulkner was one of the first at the scene, and he saw
    drops of blood on the ground leading away from the
    bodies. He followed a trail of blood west on to Murray
    Street and south on Brunswick Street, to a building at
    86 Brunswick Street. Faulkner then notified the officer
    in charge, Lieutenant James D. O'Connor, of his
    observations.
    O'Connor testified that he and a team of officers
    followed the fresh blood trail found by Officer Faulkner
    which led to an apartment building, into the foyer and
    to the door at apartment 1A. Believing that an injured
    person was in the apartment, whether it be a murderer
    or an innocent victim, O'Connor knocked on the door.
    A woman, later identified as Delfonda Swint, opened
    the door, and O'Connor saw a man, later identified as
    defendant, standing two feet behind her with a black
    pistol in his hand. One of the other officers pulled
    Swint out of the way, and O'Connor and another officer
    A-2086-19
    2
    ran into the apartment. The man holding the gun fled
    further back into the apartment. O'Connor saw two
    other men in the apartment as he entered. Later
    identified as co-defendants Deshawn Stith and Stephen
    Whitley, these men were secured by other officers as
    O'Connor pursued the man with a gun into the kitchen.
    O'Connor next saw the defendant's arm coming down
    as if he had placed something on top of a kitchen
    cabinet, and he observed blood trickling from the
    cabinet. When the defendant was told to show his
    hands, he did not do so, holding the left side of his body.
    O'Connor then wrapped his hands around and
    discovered that defendant was wounded. After the
    apartment was secured, a .38 caliber handgun, a .380
    caliber handgun, and a 9mm handgun were located on
    top of the kitchen cabinets. The suspects were arrested
    and read their rights.
    ....
    At trial co-defendants Stith and Whitley testified
    for the State after pleading guilty to aggravated
    manslaughter. Whitley testified that the killing was
    Kelly's idea because there was a turf war with the
    victims and that "either we kill them or they're going to
    kill us." He said that all three assailants had a gun and
    that defendant had the 9mm. He said that Kelly lured
    the victims to the back lot and they pulled out the guns
    at the same time and started shooting. He said that
    Kelly was shot accidently during the execution of the
    two victims. Whitley's testimony was corroborated by
    Stith, who said that they all agreed to kill the two
    victims, and they all participated in the shooting.
    Defendant testified in his own defense that he
    was "just hanging out" drinking with the co-defendants
    when a patrolman told them to move off of the street.
    They went into the back lot where they confronted the
    A-2086-19
    3
    victims. Defendant said that Stith had two guns, and
    Whitley had another. When the two co-defendants
    started shooting the victims, defendant said he tried to
    intervene and was accidently shot. After the shooting,
    they all went to Swint's apartment where defendant
    tried to treat his wound. When the police entered a few
    minutes later, he said he did not have a gun in his hand
    but rather a black cordless phone.
    [State v. Kelly (Kelly I), A-1744-00 (App. Div. July 5,
    2002) (slip op. at 1-4), certif. denied, 
    174 N.J. 548
    (2002).]
    An Essex County grand jury returned an indictment charging defendant,
    Stith, and Whitley with first-degree murder of Powell and Anderson (counts one
    and two), N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3; three counts of third-degree unlawful possession of
    a weapon (counts three, five, and seven), N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); three counts of
    second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose (counts four, six,
    and eight), N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a); and fourth-degree possession of a defaced
    firearm (count nine), N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3d.       We recounted the subsequent
    procedural history in our opinion on appeal from the denial of defendant's
    petition for post-conviction relief (PCR):
    On June 13, 2000, a jury convicted defendant of
    the first-degree aggravated manslaughter of Derrick
    Powell, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a), as a lesser-included
    offense of murder (count one); the aggravated
    manslaughter of Jhidoniane Anderson, also as a lesser-
    included offense of the original charge of murder
    (count two); third-degree unlawful possession of a
    A-2086-19
    4
    firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (count seven); and
    second-degree possession of a firearm for unlawful
    purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) (count eight). Defendant
    was sentenced on July 28, 2000, to thirty years
    imprisonment on count one, subject to eighty-five
    percent parole ineligibility in accord with the No Early
    Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2; twenty years
    subject to NERA on count two, consecutive to count
    one; five years imprisonment on count seven,
    concurrent to count two and consecutive to count one;
    and ten years with five years of parole ineligibility on
    count eight, concurrent to count two and consecutive to
    count one.
    ....
    [Co-defendants] Stith and Whitley entered guilty
    pleas to two aggravated manslaughter charges. In
    exchange for their guilty pleas and their agreement to
    testify truthfully in defendant's trial, Whitley received
    an aggregate sentence of twenty-four years subject to
    NERA, and Stith received an aggregate twenty-five
    years subject to NERA.
    [State v. Kelly (Kelly II), No. A-4331-07 (App. Div.
    Dec. 10, 2009) (slip op. at 1-4) (footnote omitted).]
    We affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence on direct appeal except
    for count eight, which we remanded to the trial court for entry of amended
    judgment of conviction reflecting a merger of that charge. Kelly I.
    A-2086-19
    5
    On August 24, 2004, defendant filed a pro se PCR petition. Counsel was
    assigned to represent him.      Defendant raised a Blakely1/Natale2 sentencing
    argument that he again raises in this appeal. On January 11, 2008, the PCR court
    denied his claim, finding the case was not in the pipeline at the time of the
    Supreme Court's decision in Natale, the sentence appears "to be totally
    appropriate in the circumstances," the Appellate Division had already reviewed
    the sentence and found it was not excessive, and, therefore, sentencing should
    not be revisited. In his appeal from the denial of PCR, defendant did not argue
    that his sentence violated Blakely or Natale. See Kelly II, slip op. at 1.
    In December 2010, defendant filed a petition for habeas corpus in the
    United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. Kelly v. Bartkowski
    (Kelly III), No. 11-363 (DMC), 
    2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100627
    , at *6 (D.N.J.
    July 19, 2012). Ground eleven of his petition stated: "The sentence imposed on
    [defendant] by the trial judge was contrary to the clearly established federal
    precedent set forth in Blakely v. Washington." Id. at *10. The District Court
    found that defendant raised this claim before the PCR court, which denied his
    request. Id. at *45. The District Court noted the "Supreme Court of New Jersey
    1
    Blakely v. Washington, 
    542 U.S. 296
     (2004).
    2
    State v. Natale, 
    184 N.J. 458
     (2005).
    A-2086-19
    6
    held that the rule it announced in Natale was applicable retroactively only to
    cases in the direct appeal pipeline as of the date of that decision, August 2,
    2005." Id. at *49. Defendant "had already concluded his direct appeals by the
    date of the Natale decision; thus, the Natale decision did not entitle him to relief,
    as a matter of state law." Ibid. Accordingly, it held that "whether or not the
    sentence was imposed in violation of the rules announced in the Apprendi/Natale
    line of cases, [defendant] is not entitled to relief in this federal collateral
    proceeding." Id. at *49-50.
    On December 11, 2012, defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal
    sentence. The trial court denied the motion on April 14, 2014. We affirmed.
    The Supreme Court denied certification. State v. Kelly, 
    223 N.J. 280
     (2015).
    Defendant filed a second motion to correct an illegal sentence on October
    21, 2019. He claimed that his thirty-year NERA term on count one was above
    the presumptive statutory term and is not based solely on any prior conviction,
    in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to jury trial. The trial court denied
    the motion on November 6, 2019. In its accompanying written decision, the
    court found:
    The holding in [Natale] is inapplicable to your
    case. The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that
    [Natale] only applied to defendants with cases on direct
    appeal as of the decision date of [Natale] and to those
    A-2086-19
    7
    defendants who raised claims arising out of Blakely v.
    Washington, 
    542 U.S. 296
     (2004) at trial or on direct
    appeal. Natale 
    184 N.J. at 495
    . Your appeal was
    decided in 2002, three years prior to Natale.
    Additionally, the [c]ourt has no evidence or reason to
    believe that either you or your attorney raised a Blakely
    claim at trial or on direct appeal. Furthermore, the
    [c]ourt is completely unpersuaded by the logic of your
    argument advanced in footnote [one] of your brief[.]
    Natale is simply inapplicable to your case.
    This appeal followed. Defendant argues:
    THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
    DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO CORRECT AN
    ILLEGAL SENTENCE UNDER BLAKELY V.
    WASHINGTON
    "[A]n illegal sentence is one that 'exceeds the maximum penalty . . . for a
    particular offense' or a sentence 'not imposed in accordance with law.'" State v.
    Acevedo, 
    205 N.J. 40
    , 45 (2011) (quoting State v. Murray, 
    162 N.J. 240
    , 247
    (2000)).   "That includes a sentence 'imposed without regard to some
    constitutional safeguard.'" State v. Zuber, 
    227 N.J. 422
    , 437 (2017) (quoting
    State v. Tavares, 
    286 N.J. Super. 610
    , 618 (App. Div. 1996)). "A defendant may
    challenge an illegal sentence at any time."      
    Ibid.
     (citing R. 3:21-10(b)(5);
    Acevedo, 
    205 N.J. at
    47 n.4).
    The trial court correctly held that the new constitutional rule adopted in
    Natale applied only to defendants with cases on direct appeal as of the decision
    A-2086-19
    8
    date in Natale and to those defendants who raised Blakely claims at trial or on
    direct appeal. Defendant does not fall within either of those categories. Natale
    was decided on August 2, 2005. His direct appeal was decided by this court on
    July 5, 2002. Defendant did not raise a Blakely claim at trial or on direct appeal.
    Accordingly, Natale does not apply to defendant's sentence. The motion was
    properly denied on that basis.
    Defendant's sentence on counts one and two, which was affirmed on direct
    appeal, is not otherwise illegal. Notwithstanding the provisions of N.J.S.A.
    2C:43-6(a)(1), the ordinary base term for first-degree aggravated manslaughter
    is between ten and thirty years. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(c). Here, defendant was
    sentenced to a thirty-year NERA term on count one and a consecutive twenty-
    five-year NERA term on count two. The prison terms fall within the statutory
    range and do not exceed the maximum penalty. Claims that a sentence "within
    the range permitted by a verdict" is excessive must be raised on direct appeal,
    State v. Hess, 
    207 N.J. 123
    , 145 (2011), and "are not cognizable . . . under the
    present Rule 3:21-10(b)(5)," Acevedo, 
    205 N.J. at 47
    .
    In addition, "[a] prior adjudication upon the merits of any ground for relief
    is conclusive whether made in proceedings resulting in the conviction or in any
    post-conviction proceeding brought pursuant to [Rule 3:22] . . . or in any appeal
    A-2086-19
    9
    taken from such proceedings." R. 3:22-5. Defendant raised a Natale/Blakely
    claim in his prior PCR proceeding, which was denied on the merits by the PCR
    court. He is barred from relitigating that claim.
    Affirmed.
    A-2086-19
    10