AMERICAN PROPERTIES AT MADISON, LLC VS. INTERSTATE FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY (L-0996-16, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2021 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-3791-19
    AMERICAN PROPERTIES
    AT MADISON, LLC, a New
    Jersey Corporation, Individually
    and as assignee of First Specialty
    Insurance Company in Connection
    with all claims made by First
    Specialty Insurance Company in
    this matter,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    INTERSTATE FIRE AND
    CASUALTY COMPANY AND
    CRUM & FORSTER SPECIALTY
    INSURANCE COMPANY,
    Defendants-Respondents.
    _____________________________
    Submitted June 9, 2021 – Decided July 13, 2021
    Before Judges Fuentes, Whipple and Firko.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Mercer County, Docket No. L-0996-16.
    Hutt & Shimanowitz, PC, attorneys for appellant
    (Bryan D. Plocker and Thomas J. Perry, on the briefs).
    Rivkin Radler, LLP, attorneys for respondent Interstate
    Fire and Casualty Company (Michael A. Kotula, of
    counsel and on the brief).
    Kennedys CMK, LLP, attorneys for respondent Crum
    & Forster Specialty Insurance Company (Gary S. Kull
    and Tara E. McCormack, of counsel and on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    In this insurance coverage dispute, plaintiff American Properties at
    Madison (APM) individually and as assignee of First Specialty Insurance
    Company (FSIC), appeals from three separate orders entered September 4, 2018;
    the April 23, 2019 denial of its motion for reconsideration; and the April 30,
    2020 order granting summary judgment to defendants Crum & Forster Specialty
    Insurance Company (C&F) and Interstate Fire and Casualty Company
    (Interstate). We affirm for the reasons expressed by Judge Janetta D. Marbrey
    in her thorough written opinion issued with the September 4, 2018 orders.
    APM was the developer that sponsored, designed, and built Madison at
    Ewing Condominium (Condominium), a six-building housing complex that
    includes 192 dwelling units and common elements. The Madison at Ewing
    Condominium Association (Association) filed a complaint on October 29, 2013,
    asserting damages related to the construction of the dwellings and common
    A-3791-19
    2
    elements at the Condominium (the underlying litigation). The Association's
    complaint alleged that APM's subcontractors were negligent, resulting in
    damage. Various causes of action were listed, but in large part, the underlying
    litigation was about the exterior walls causing damage by allowing water
    intrusion.   The issue in this litigation, regarding coverage under insurance
    policies, revolves around the materials used to construct the exteriors and when
    the water intrusion began.
    Three insurance providers issued general liability policies to APM for the
    Condominium. Each policy was applicable to a different time period in the
    underlying litigation. C&F insured APM through three contiguous yearlong
    policies extending from May 1, 2005, to May 1, 2008.           Interstate's two
    contiguous policies with APM were in effect from May 1, 2008, to May 1, 2010;
    FSIC's four contiguous policies were effective May 1, 2010, to May 1, 2014.
    FSIC provided coverage, but C&F and Interstate disclaimed coverage. 1
    1
    The underlying litigation was settled for $925,000, with FSIC contributing
    $600,000 and APM contributing $325,000.
    A-3791-19
    3
    On May 12, 2016, FSIC sued C&F and Interstate, seeking a declaration
    that both had a duty to defend and indemnify APM and to recover fees. APM
    later intervened, and FSIC eventually assigned its claims to APM.2
    C&F asserted that the three policies barred coverage for APM's work and
    the work of its subcontractors for Exterior Insulation and Finish Systems
    (EIFS).3 C&F's two policies between May 2005, and May 1, 2007, contained
    express exclusion clauses, and the proofs established that EIFS was installed
    throughout the multi-year project. Consequently, C&F also asserted that a
    continuous or progressive injury and damage exclusion barred coverage under
    its 2007-2008 policy.
    Interstate also denied coverage for plaintiff's claimed damages in the
    underlying litigation and said it would not defend or indemnify APM. Interstate
    relied on the pre-existing damage exclusion in its two policies with APM.
    Pointing to consultant reports that informed the Association's complaint,
    Interstate asserted that, according to the reports, the damage at the buildings
    began to occur immediately following the completion of construction between
    2
    A consent order was entered, granting amendment of the caption.
    3
    EIFS is essentially synthetic stucco.
    A-3791-19
    4
    July 2005 and July 2006, well before the inception date of the two Interstate
    policies, which were effective from May 1, 2008, to May 1, 2010.
    On August 1, 2017, FSIC 4 moved for summary judgment seeking the
    following declarations: (i) that defendants' policies cover claims asserted against
    APM in the underlying litigation; (ii) that defendants must reimburse FSIC for
    amounts incurred defending and indemnifying APM; and (iii) that they must
    defend and indemnify APM in the underlying litigation. C&F cross-moved for
    summary judgment, arguing its three policies do not cover APM with regard to
    the underlying action. Interstate also moved for summary judgment.
    In May 2018, the court heard the oral arguments on all summary judgment
    motions, and on September 4, 2018, issued the first three of the five orders under
    appeal, accompanied by a lengthy, thorough written opinion. First, the court
    granted C&F's summary judgment motion in part, because it was evident that
    EIFS was present in six buildings and was used in the construction of the project
    during the two coverage periods spanning 2005-2007. Addressing the 2007-
    2008 coverage year, the court granted summary judgment for that time period
    under the continuous progressive injury and damage exclusion.           The court
    denied the exclusion of coverage for masonry cracks because, unlike the
    4
    APM joined FSIC's motion.
    A-3791-19
    5
    allegations of continuous trigger theory for water damage, the factual record did
    not support exclusion for the masonry failure.5 Thus, the court ordered APM to
    satisfy the self-insured retention clause for the 2007-2008 policy term.
    The second September 4, 2018 order granted Interstate's motion for
    exclusion of EIFS and enforced the pre-existing damage exclusion and
    dismissed the complaints against it. The third September 4, 2018 order denied
    APM's motion for summary judgment.
    Subsequent motions for reconsideration by APM and C&F were denied
    on April 23, 2019. One year and one week later, the trial court issued an order
    for final judgment. This appeal followed.
    On appeal, plaintiff argues the court erred as a matter of law when it
    determined the EIFS exclusions, the pre-existing damage exclusion, and the
    continuous progressive injury and damage exclusions barred recovery, and that
    C&F and Interstate had no duty to defend APM.
    We apply the same standard as does the trial court when deciding a
    summary judgment motion. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Boylan, 
    307 N.J. Super. 162
    , 167 (App. Div. 1998). Summary judgment should be entered
    5
    The parties agreed to forgo a trial on the masonry issue and consented to final
    judgment.
    A-3791-19
    6
    by the trial court "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and
    admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
    genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is
    entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law." R. 4:46-2(c).
    Our review of summary judgment is de novo. Dep't of Envt'l Prot. v.
    Kafil, 
    395 N.J. Super. 597
    , 601 (App. Div. 2007).        We accord no special
    deference to the trial court, because a decision to grant summary judgment does
    not involve an assessment of the credibility of testimony or determinations of
    fact, but instead, is a ruling on a question of law. See Manalapan Realty, L.P.
    v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 
    140 N.J. 366
    , 378 (1995).
    Our Supreme Court has held that policy exclusions are "presumptively
    valid and will be given effect if 'specific, plain, clear, prominent, and not
    contrary to public policy.'" Princeton Ins. Co. v. Chunmuang, 
    151 N.J. 80
    , 95
    (1997) (quoting Doto v. Russo, 
    140 N.J. 544
    , 559 (1995)). As the Supreme
    Court noted, insurance policy limits and exclusions function "to restrict and
    shape the coverage otherwise afforded." Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 
    81 N.J. 233
    , 237 (1979).
    Unquestionably, the EIFS exclusions in the Interstate and C&F policies
    expressly bar coverage for property damage arising out of the use of EIFS in the
    A-3791-19
    7
    buildings' construction. APM does not dispute that property damage was taking
    place while the buildings were being constructed, the construction was
    completed in July 2006, and the C&F policy at issue with began in 2007 and
    included an express bar to coverage for EIFS.
    APM argues C&F did not present adequate proof of the presence of EIFS
    at the buildings and that any references to EIFS in the underlying litigation were
    inconsistent and insufficient to lead the motion judge to conclude that the burden
    had been met. APM also contends C&F should have proven the presence of
    EIFS with expert testimony. We disagree.
    The motion judge found adequate support for application of the EIFS
    exclusions here, writing:
    These proofs include the twenty separate work orders
    issued by [APM] to subcontractor Stucco Systems; the
    2008 Kipcon Report, created by the Kipcon consulting
    company[,] the Falcon's Group Proposal, created by the
    Falcon's Group consulting company[,] and the FWH
    Transition Study, created by the FWH consulting
    group.     Use of EIFS is also noted in the
    correspondences shared between counsel for [APM]
    and the Association.
    Indeed, the record includes correspondence from counsel for APM to
    Association counsel in 2011, stating that APM would make repairs related to
    EIFS at the site, specifically "[i]nadequate finish on EIFS band fiberglass mesh
    A-3791-19
    8
    visible" and a "[c]rack across full stucco width through EIFA [sic] corners." The
    judge found APM "cannot contest the use of EIFS in the construction" of the
    project, which precludes coverage under C&F's 2007-2008 policy period. Thus,
    we conclude the motion judge's decision supporting the EIFS exclusion is
    supported in the record.
    APM also argues the continuous-trigger theory of coverage applies, as we
    held in Air Master & Cooling, Inc. v. Selective Insurance Co. of America, 
    452 N.J. Super. 35
    , 47 (App. Div. 2017). The "continuous trigger" is a theory that
    states the "last pull" of the trigger, which decides the end point of when a
    covered "occurrence" takes place, "happens when the essential nature and scope
    of the property damage first becomes known, or when one would have sufficient
    reason to know of it." 
    Id. at 38
    . However, that is not what occurred here. C&F
    and Interstate's relevant policies exclude continuous and progressive property
    damage and the damage was progressing as early as 2005, which was before the
    coverage period.
    Interstate further argued that the pre-existing damage exclusion was
    settled by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Cypress Point Condominium
    Association v. Adria Towers, LLC, 
    226 N.J. 403
     (2016). Although factually
    different than here, Cypress Point nonetheless supports Interstate's assertion. In
    A-3791-19
    9
    Cypress Point, the insurers of a condominium development argued that
    "subcontractors' faulty workmanship did not constitute an 'occurrence' that
    caused 'property damage' as defined by the policies." 
    Id. at 411
    . Interstate also
    asserted that the damage was barred from recovery because "faulty workmanship
    is not 'property damage' or an 'occurrence' under the terms of the policies . . . ."
    
    Id. at 413
    . The Court held that the condominium association's claims of water
    damage from subcontractors' defective workmanship should be considered an
    "occurrence" and "property damage" through the effective policies, thus
    precluding summary judgment in the insurers' favor. 
    Id. at 432
    .
    Here, unlike in Cypress Point, the "occurrence" of property damage at the
    Condominiums began prior to the inception of respondents' applicable insurance
    policies.   Interstate's policy language specifically bars coverage for such
    damage, as does the C&F 2007-2008 policy. APM introduced evidence in the
    underlying litigation that supports this timeline: damage was "continuous in
    nature from the time of the installation of the façade and will continue until such
    time as the entire envelope is removed and replaced with a working barrier." As
    Judge Marbrey found, "commensurate with [APM's] own admission as to the
    time damages were first alleged, all 'property damage' is admitted to have begun
    before the inception of the 2007-2008 [C&F] policy." "In the present case,
    A-3791-19
    10
    'property damage' first manifested in 2005 and continued to manifest well into
    the 2006-2007 policy year." This serves to bar coverage under C&F's 2007-
    2008 policy period. We conclude, therefore, the continuous and progressive
    damage exclusion in its policy language applies to bar coverage as to water
    intrusion.
    Notably, the motion judge rejected the application of the continuous-
    trigger theory to cracks in the buildings' masonry. Although water damage was
    noticed in December 2005, the trial court did not find evidence to support a
    similar "initial manifestation point of the masonry cracks." Accordingly, it
    denied C&F's motion for summary judgment as to the defective masonry.
    Finally, "[t]he duty to defend is triggered by a complaint alleging a
    covered claim." Polarome Int'l, Inc. v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 
    404 N.J. Super. 241
    ,
    273 (App. Div. 2008) (citing Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 
    128 N.J. 165
    ,
    173 (1992)). "An insurer's duty to defend an action against the insured is
    determined by whether the allegations set forth in the complainant's pleadings
    fall within the purview of the policy language." L.C.S., Inc. v. Lexington Ins.
    Co., 
    371 N.J. Super. 482
    , 490 (App. Div. 2004) (citing Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v.
    Flanagin, 
    44 N.J. 504
    , 512 (1965); Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 
    246 N.J. Super. 564
    , 569 (App. Div. 1991)).
    A-3791-19
    11
    Here, the record referenced a long history of water intrusion at the site,
    beginning at completion of the construction. Because there was no duty to
    indemnify APM, it cannot claim that C&F's and Interstate's duty to defend was
    triggered.
    Affirmed.
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    12