STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. TRACY TISDOL (95-11-1254, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3214-18
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
TRACY TISDOL, a/k/a
POETIC,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
Submitted February 8, 2021 – Decided March 24, 2021
Before Judges Gooden Brown and DeAlmeida.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Passaic County, Indictment No. 95-11-1254.
Tracy Tisdol, appellant pro se.
Camelia M. Valdes, Passaic County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Mark Niedziela, Assistant
Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Tracy Tisdol appeals from the February 21, 2019 order of the
Law Division denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence. We affirm.
I.
In 1995, defendant, then nineteen, conspired with Meshach Greene and
Corie Miller to rob two young women who were sitting in a car with the windows
down on a summer night in Paterson. Miller was armed with a loaded handgun,
which defendant had seen in his possession earlier that day.
The three men surrounded the women and demanded they turn over their
money. When the victims said that they did not have any money, Miller cocked
the gun and struck one of the women in the head. The assault caused the weapon
to discharge. The bullet struck the other woman, lacerating several of her
internal organs and lodging in her liver. Defendant and his co-conspirators fled
the scene, leaving the gravely injured victim to bleed to death while her friend
frantically tried to drive her to the hospital.
A jury convicted defendant of first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-
3(a)(1); first-degree felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-(3)(a)(3); second-degree
conspiracy to commit armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1;
two counts of first-degree armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; second-degree
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possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(1); and
third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b).
The court merged the felony murder conviction into the murder
conviction, for which it sentenced defendant to life imprisonment with a thirty -
year period of parole ineligibility. The conspiracy conviction was merged into
the armed robbery convictions. The court sentenced defendant to a twenty-year
period of incarceration with a ten-year period of parole ineligibility on each
armed robbery conviction, with one sentence to run concurrent to the sentence
for murder and one to run consecutive to the sentence for murder. For the
possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, the court sentenced defendant
to a ten-year term of imprisonment with a five-year period of parole ineligibility.
Finally, the court sentenced defendant to a five-year term of imprisonment for
the unlawful possession of a weapon conviction. The court directed that the
sentences on the weapons convictions run concurrently with the murder
sentence. In the aggregate, the court sentenced defendant to a term of life
imprisonment, plus twenty years, with a forty-year period of parole ineligibility.
On direct appeal, defendant argued, along with other points, that the trial
court erred when it imposed the maximum sentence for his armed robbery
convictions and directed that the sentence for one armed robbery conviction run
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consecutively to his sentence for murder. He also argued that his aggregate
sentence was manifestly excessive. We affirmed defendant's convictions and
sentence. State v. Tisdol, No. A-6056-96 (App. Div. Nov. 12, 1999). The
Supreme Court denied certification. State v. Tisdol, 163 N.J. 396 (2000).
We subsequently affirmed the trial court's denial of defendant's first
petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). State v. Tisdol, A-3698-03 (App. Div.
Feb. 10, 2005). The Supreme Court denied certification. State v. Tisdol, 183
N.J. 586 (2005).
Defendant filed for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District
Court, which the court denied on September 25, 2006. Tisdol v. Cathel, No.
Civ. A. 05-3823 (JAP) (D.N.J. Sep. 25, 2006). The Third Circuit affirmed, and
the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Tisdol v. Milgram, 552 U.S. 1284 (2008).
Defendant subsequently filed his second PCR petition. Among the issues
defendant raised was that his sentence was excessive. The trial court rejected
the petition as time barred and substantively meritless. We affirmed. State v.
Tisdol, No. A-1018-09 (App. Div. Oct. 29, 2010). The Supreme Court denied
certification. State v. Tisdol, 205 N.J. 518 (2011).
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On September 9, 2018, defendant filed a motion in the Law Division to
correct an illegal sentence. In an oral opinion, the trial court denied defendant's
motion, explaining as follows:
I don't think that there's any basis whatsoever for the
claim that there was an illegal sentence, which is truly
the only legal basis under which this matter could be
before the [c]ourt at this stage after appeals have been
exhausted, after other issues raised in the two previous
PCRs.
....
As I noted, it was a standard murder sentence given,
and there was a consecutive term imposed on one of the
first[-]degree robberies, that with regard to the
surviving victim.
[W]hether . . . that sentence was lawful or excessive
was addressed specifically by the Appellate Division in
its decision. It was also addressed on the second PCR
. . . . Those are fully adjudicated issues . . . .
So there is nothing whatsoever illegal about the
sentence, and . . . that truly ends our inquiry . . . .
....
The only thing . . . which in theory could have been an
argument [is] that males don't have their brain
chemistry fully developed until the age of [twenty-five]
or so . . . and there was an indication [defendant] had
used drugs and alcohol. It might have been a
[nineteen]-year-old brain going on [fifteen]. . . . But
the law doesn't make that distinction.
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The legal age of majority was lowered to [eighteen]
from [twenty-one] many years ago. It means that
anyone [eighteen] years of age or older is subject to
[the] full range of criminal penalties.
A February 21, 2019 order memorializes the court's decision.
This appeal follows. Defendant raises the following arguments for our
consideration.
POINT I
DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE WAS ILLEGAL SINCE
IT WAS NOT IMPOSED IN ACCORDANCE WITH
LAW.
POINT II
THE SENTENCING COURT FAILED TO FOLLOW
[STATE V. YARBOUGH] GUIDELINES FOR
CONCURRENT SENTENCES.
POINT III
DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE EVIDENCES
SENTENCE DISPARITY.
POINT IV
THE COURTS CONFUSED THE ACTIONS OF
DEFENDANT TISDOL WITH DEFENDANT
MILLER WHICH RESULTED IN AN EXCESSIVE
SENTENCE FOR DEFENDANT TISDOL.
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POINT V
STATUTE WHICH MANDATES A SENTENCE OF
[THIRTY] YEARS TO LIFE FOR ALL OFFENDERS
WHO MURDER WITHOUT CONSIDERING ANY
FACTORS OF MITIGATION, INCLUDING THE
OFFENDER'S AGE AND THE LEVEL OF
CULPABILITY, VIOLATES THE PROPORTION-
ATE PENALTIES C[L]AUSE OF THE EIGHT[H]
AMENDMENT OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION[.]
II.
A motion to correct an illegal sentence may be filed at any time. R. 3:21-
10(b)(5); State v. Schubert, 212 N.J. 295, 309 (2012). An illegal sentence
"exceed[s] the penalties authorized by statute for a specific offense." State v.
Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 246 (2000). "A sentence may also be illegal because it
was not imposed in accordance with law. This category includes sentences that,
although not in excess of the statutory maximum penalty," are not authorized by
statute. Id. at 247. "In addition, a sentence may not be in accordance with law
because it fails to satisfy required presentencing conditions" or "include a
legislatively mandated term of parole ineligibility." Ibid. We review de novo
the trial court's finding that a sentence is legal. Schubert, 212 N.J. at 303-04.
Having carefully reviewed the record, we agree with the trial court's
conclusion that defendant has offered no cogent argument that the sentence
imposed on him was illegal. Defendant received a life sentence with a thirty-
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year period of parole ineligibility for first-degree murder. This sentence is
authorized by N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(1), which provides, in relevant part, that
a person convicted of murder shall be sentenced . . . by
the court to a term of [thirty] years, during which the
person shall not be eligible for parole, or be sentenced
to a specific term of years which shall be between
[thirty] years and life imprisonment of which the person
shall serve [thirty] years before being eligible for
parole.
"[B]ecause the crime of murder has no presumptive term, defendant, like every
murderer, knows he is risking life in prison." State v. Abdullah, 184 N.J. 497,
508 (2005).
Defendant argues that he was sentenced for a longer term than permitted
by the statute because his aggregate sentence is a life term, plus twenty years,
with a forty-year period of parole ineligibility. Defendant errs, however, by
conflating the aggregate sentence for his multiple convictions with the sentence
he received for his first-degree murder conviction.
As explained above, in addition to the sentence defendant received for
first-degree murder for the victim who was shot to death, he was also sentenced
to a consecutive twenty-year period of incarceration with a ten-year period of
parole ineligibility for the first-degree armed robbery of the victim who
survived. As we held on defendant's direct appeal, the separate consecutive
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sentence for one of the first-degree armed robbery convictions was authorized
by law because the armed robbery of the victim who lived was a distinct criminal
act against a person other than the murder victim. Defendant's aggregate
sentence reflects more than just the sentence he received for first-degree murder.
Our decision in defendant's direct appeal also precludes his claim that his
sentence is illegal because the sentencing court misapplied the holding in State
v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627, 630 (1985). That issue has been adjudicated and is
not an appropriate basis for a motion to correct an illegal sentence. See State v.
Trantino, 60 N.J. 176, 180 (1972) (A prior adjudication on the merits of an issue
on direct appeal is conclusive and cannot be relitigated, even if of constitutional
dimension).
Nor are we persuaded by defendant's argument that he is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether his sentence is illegal because of a
disparity in sentencing statewide for murder convictions. We recognize that our
Supreme Court has "consistently stressed uniformity as one of the major
sentencing goals in the administration of criminal justice." State v. Roach, 146
N.J. 208, 231 (1996). In support of his argument, however, defendant cites only
to what he describes as a "list of criminal cases involv[ing] some defendant[s]
who were convicted of murder with far more serious criminal histories, but were
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sentenced to thirty years without parole as opposed to having to serve the 'life'
component and other[s] who were sentenced to life with thirty years."
Defendant appears to have compiled the information on which he relies
from the Department of Corrections (DOC) website which contains a short
profile of incarcerated offenders. The website includes an offender's
convictions, dates of conviction, and sentences. It does not, however, indicate
whether the offenders were convicted by a jury or entered a guilty plea, a
significant omission, given that negotiated pleas often result in less severe
sentences than convictions after trial for similar offenses. In addition, the
website provides no information regarding the circumstances of the offenders'
criminal acts or backgrounds, the details of which are crucial to a sentencing
court's weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors. The information cited
by defendant, therefore, is incomplete and missing critical information on which
to compare his sentence to those given to other offenders.
Nor did defendant explain how the inmates were selected for inclusion on
his list. He does not identify the offenders sentenced for murder whose
information he encountered and decided not to include on his list. Defendant
also did not produce evidence establishing the accuracy of the information on
the DOC's website. He did not explain whether the DOC website includes
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sentences for all offenders, including those who have completed their sentences,
are remanded to a county jail or other facility, or who are housed out -of-State.
Thus, even assuming the information on which defendant relies is accurate, it is
woefully insufficient to establish a prima facie claim of a statewide disparity in
sentencing for murder convictions warranting an evidentiary hearing.
Defendant also has not established a disparity in the sentences given to
him and his codefendants. Such a disparity may invalidate an otherwise sound
and lawful sentence. Id. at 232. Green, the codefendant with whom defendant
was tried, was sentenced to life imprisonment, plus twenty years, with a forty-
year period of parole ineligibility, the same aggregate sentence imposed on
defendant. Both were unarmed when they participated in the robbery that
resulted in their accomplice killing a young woman.
We also agree with the trial court that defendant has not established his
sentence is illegal because the sentencing court failed to consider his youthful
brain development. Defendant argues, in effect, that there is a growing medical
consensus that key areas of the brain relevant to decision-making and judgment
continue to develop in males into their early twenties. He argues a court must
take that data into account at sentencing.
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In support of his argument defendant relies on: (1) a February 2018 report
and resolution of the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association
(ABA) urging the organization to oppose imposition of a death sentence on any
person who was twenty-one or younger at the time of their offense; (2) a January
2004 article of the ABA entitled "Adolescence, Brain Development and Legal
Culpability;" (3) an undated and unsigned declaration by a neuropsychologist
apparently prepared in support of a 2002 Texas state habeas corpus petition; and
(4) a research paper of the MacArthur Foundation entitled "Less Guilty by
Reason of Adolescence." These documents identify scientific evidence relating
to brain development in young adults.
Defendant's argument must be examined in the context of recent legal
developments concerning juvenile offenders. The United States Supreme Court
has established, through a series of decisions issued between 2005 and 2016,
that juveniles are developmentally different from adults and individualized
consideration of these differences is necessary prior to imposing the harshest
punishments available under law. See e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
578 (2005) (holding that imposing the death penalty on defendants convicted as
juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82
(2010) (holding that imposing life term without parole on juveniles convicted of
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non-homicide offenses is unconstitutional); and Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S.
460, 465 (2012) (holding that mandatory life term without parole for juveniles
convicted of homicide is unconstitutional). The Court's holdings in each of these
cases were predicated on "scientific and sociological notions about the unique
characteristics of youth and the progressive emotional and behavioral
development of juveniles." State in Interest of C.K., 233 N.J. 44, 68 (2018).
In State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422, 446-47 (2017), our Supreme Court held
that "Miller's command that a sentencing judge 'take into account how children
are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing
them to a lifetime in prison,' applies with equal strength to a sentence that is the
practical equivalent of life without parole." (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 480)
(citation omitted).
Defendant argues that the scientific evidence that underpins the holding
in these precedents has advanced to include the development of post-adolescent
brains. The legal precedents, however, do not support his argument. The
evidence that defendant cites dates from before and around the time the Court
issued its opinion in Zuber. It is similar to the evidence on which the Court
relied to reach its holding in that case. Yet, there is no indication in Zuber, or
the precedents cited by the Court, that the constitutional protections established
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in recent decisions apply to offenders, like defendant, who commit crimes after
they have reached the age of majority. See United States v. Marshall, 736 F.3d
492, 500 (6th Cir. 2013) (noting that, for Eighth Amendment purposes, an
individual's eighteenth birthday marks the bright line separating juveniles from
adults; "In short, Marshall is at the very most an immature adult. An immature
adult is not a juvenile. Regardless of the source of the immaturity, an immature
adult is still an adult.").
We note also that defendant had an opportunity at sentencing to present
evidence of mitigating factors, including his age and immaturity, factors the
sentencing court appears to have recognized when it found that defendant was
influenced by Miller, the older codefendant who brought the gun to the robbery.
We have carefully considered defendant's remaining arguments and
conclude they are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written
opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
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