IN THE MATTER OF ERIC J. BRUNO (NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF LAW AND PUBLIC SAFETY) ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0967-19
IN THE MATTER OF ERIC J.
BRUNO and MIRAKILL
BRANDS, LLC.
__________________________
Submitted March 3, 2021 – Decided March 25, 2021
Before Judges Sumners and Geiger.
On appeal from the Department of Law and Public
Safety, Division of Consumer Affairs.
Levenson Law, LLC, attorneys for appellants Eric J.
Bruno and Mirakill Brands, LLC (Scott Levenson, on
the brief).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent New Jersey Bureau of Securities (Jane C.
Schuster, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Evan
A. Showell, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Appellants Eric J. Bruno and Mirakill Brands, LLC (Mirakill), appeal a
September 24, 2019 final order issued by Christopher W. Gerold, Chief of the
New Jersey Bureau of Securities (the Bureau), that adopted the August 9, 2019
summary decision of Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Thomas Betancourt in its
entirety. We affirm.
We discern the following facts from the record. Mirakill was a Nevada
limited liability company (LLC) with offices in Old Tappan, New Jersey. BBA
Enterprises, LLC (BBA), was the managing member of Mirakill. Bruno owned
fifty-one percent of BBA and served as its president.
Mirakill described its mission as developing a proprietary antimicrobial
product designed to prevent the growth of harmful bacteria on high-contact
surfaces. Mirakill and Bruno offered and sold membership interests and
warrants called "units" to prospective investors. Prospective investors were
provided with a confidential private placement memorandum (PPM) that "set
forth the nature of the business, risks, executives, consultants, projected
revenues, use of funds, together with other information." The PPM stated
Mirakill intended to raise up to $2,500,000, to be used for administrative,
production, and other uses in specified amounts.
Mirakill also provided prospective investors with an Interest Purchase
Agreement (IPA) which confirmed they received the PPM and that their decision
to invest was based on the information contained in the PPM. At least eight
investors purchased interests and warrants, raising approximately $137,500.
A-0967-19
2
The Bureau investigated Bruno and Mirakill to determine if they violated
the Uniform Securities Law (1997) (the Securities Law), N.J.S.A. 49:3-47 to -
76. The investigation included the deposition of Bruno and Gerard Adams,
Mirakill's marketing and branding expert. Based on the documents and
information compiled during the investigation, Bureau Chief Gerold made the
following findings:
1. Eric J. Bruno, residing in River Vale, New Jersey,
was the President of Mirakill from at least July 2013 to
June 2014 (the "Relevant Period"). Bruno has never
been registered with the Bureau in any capacity.
2. Mirakill was a Nevada [LLC] formed on July 1, 2013
and dissolved on June 12, 2014 with offices located [in]
. . . Old Tappan, New Jersey. BBA Enterprises LLC
("BBA") was the managing member of Mirakill. BBA
was a Delaware limited liability company formed on
June 12, 2012. Bruno was the President of BBA and
owned a 51% stake in the company. Bruno cancelled
BBA's limited liability registration with the Delaware
Secretary State on June 14, 2014.
Offer and Sale of Unregistered Mirakill Securities
3. Mirakill purported to be a start-up business that
would be developing an improved, proprietary
antimicrobial additive designed to prevent the growth
of harmful microorganisms with industrial uses
including plastics, paints, and filters (the "Mirakill
Product").
4. During the Relevant Period, [appellants] offered and
sold unregistered securities in the form of membership
A-0967-19
3
interests and warrants to buy membership interests in
Mirakill. Each membership interest and warrant to buy
a membership interest in Mirakill was sold as one "unit"
(the "Mirakill Securities").
5. [Appellants] raised approximately $137,000 from
the sale of the unregistered Mirakill Securities to at
least seven New Jersey residents.
6. The Mirakill Securities are securities as defined in
N.J.S.A. 49:3-49(m) of the Securities Law and were
required by N.J.S.A. 49:3-60 to be registered with the
Bureau, federally covered, or exempt from registration.
7. The Mirakill Securities were not registered with the
Bureau, "federally covered" or otherwise exempt from
registration.
8. In or about September or October 2013, [appellants],
along with two other officers of Mirakill, held an event
for prospective Mirakill investors. Approximately
[thirty] to [forty] individuals attended. During the
event, Bruno provided an overview of the Mirakill
Product to the prospective investors, as well as its
potential applications, and discussed the amount of
funds that would be required to bring the Mirakill
Product to market. After the event, several of the
attendees purchased the Mirakill Securities.
9. Mirakill's investors were provided the Mirakill PPM
describing the Mirakill Securities, the nature of
Mirakill's business risks, executives, consultants,
project revenues, use of funds, and other material
information that would be useful to investors.
10. Mirakill investors were also provided a
subscription agreement ("Interest Purchase
Agreement") [(IPA)] to sign that was an exhibit to the
A-0967-19
4
Mirakill PPM. The [IPA] confirmed that they had been
provided a copy of the PPM and that their investment
decision was based on the information contained in the
Mirakill PPM. Bruno countersigned the [IPAs] as
President of Mirakill.
11. In addition to countersigning the [IPA], Bruno
personally met with certain investors, received and
deposited investment checks, and received wire
transfers into accounts that he controlled.
Misuse of Investor Funds
12. Investor funds were deposited or wired into an
account ending in 1735 held in the name of Mirakill
Brands, LLC at Oppenheimer & Co., Inc. (the "Mirakill
Account"). The Mirakill Account was opened on
August 27, 2013. Bruno and another office of Mirakill
were the only authorized signatories.
13. Bruno and Mirakill, through Bruno, made material
misstatements of fact to investors through the Mirakill
PPM, which stated investor funds would be use for:
a. administrative uses, including office space,
salaries, and professional fees.
b. production of the Mirakill Product, including
purchase of raw materials, deposits, packaging,
and other direction productions costs; and
c. other business uses including intellectual
property registration, working capital, research
and development, and marketing of the Mirakill
Product.
14. Contrary to the statements in the Mirakill PPM, and
without disclosure to Mirakill investors, Bruno used
A-0967-19
5
investors' funds for his own personal expenses and
entertainment.
15. Bruno misused at least $82,000 of investor funds.
The misuse of investor funds from the Mirakill Account
included:
a. Cash withdrawals at ATMs totaling $28,148;
b. Automobile lease and insurance payments
totaling $1,500;
c. Debit card charges at restaurants, liquor stores,
and grocery stores totaling $19,388;
d. Debit card charges at a New York "gentleman's
club" totaling $7,134;
e. Limousine services totaling $2,222.18;
f. Pharmacy, gas station, and convenience store
purchases totaling $1,033; and
g. Clothing and dry[-]cleaning expenses totaling
$2,333.
16. Bruno also transferred $21,000 from the Mirakill
Account to BBA's bank account at Wells Fargo ending
in 5247, which he misused as follows:
a. Debit card purchases at the same New York
"gentleman's club" totaling $1,649;
b. Cash withdrawals from ATMs and counter
withdrawals totaling $18,108; and
A-0967-19
6
c. Debit card charges for other personal expenses
including restaurant meals, limousine services,
gasoline, and dry cleaning.
The Bureau Chief determined that appellants committed the following
violations of the Securities Law:
18. Bruno and Mirakill, through Bruno, made untrue
statements of material facts and/or omitted . . .
material facts necessary in order to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading to investors
in connection with the offer and sale of securities.
19. Each omission or materially false statement
constitutes a violation of N.J.S.A. 49:3-52(b).
....
22. Bruno and Mirakill, through Bruno, offered and
sold securities that were not registered with the
Bureau.
23. The Mirakill Securities were required to be
registered with the Bureau, federally covered, or
exempt pursuant to N.J.S.A. 49:3-60.
24. Each offer or sale of unregistered securities
constitutes a violation of N.J.S.A. 49:3-60 and is
cause for the imposition of civil monetary penalties
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 49:3-60.
....
26. Bruno acted as an agent, as defined under
N.J.S.A. 49:3-49(b), in effecting or attempting to
A-0967-19
7
effect transactions in Mirakill Securities from and in
New Jersey.
27. Bruno was not registered with the Bureau as an
agent of Mirakill.
28. Bruno violated N.J.S.A. 49:3-56(a), which
provides, among other things, that only persons
registered with the Bureau may lawfully act as
agents.
....
31. Mirakill employed Bruno to act as an agent, as
defined under N.J.S.A. 49:3-49(b), to attempt to
effect transactions in securities in or from New
Jersey.
32. Mirakill's conduct constituted employing an
agent who was not registered with the Bureau in
violation of N.J.S.A. 49:3-56(h).
On May 23, 2018, the Bureau Chief: (1) ordered Mirakill and Bruno to
cease and desist from further violations of the Securities Law; (2) assessed a
$100,000 civil monetary penalty against Mirakill and Bruno, jointly and
severally, for their violations of the Securities Law; and (3) denied Mirakill and
Bruno any exemptions under N.J.S.A. 49:3-50(a), (b).
Appellants filed a contesting answer and requested a hearing. In their
answer, they admitted that Bruno "has never been registered with the Bureau in
any capacity," but claimed that he met an exemption to register under N.J.S.A.
A-0967-19
8
49:3-50(b) "because sales were made to less than ten (10) [New Jersey]
residents." This matter was then transferred to the Office of Administrative Law
as a contested case and assigned to ALJ Betancourt.
The parties cross-moved for summary decision pursuant to N.J.A.C. 1:1-
12.5. The cross-motions were supported by voluminous certifications, exhibits,
and the deposition transcripts. On August 9, 2019, ALJ Betancourt issued an
Initial Decision granting summary decision to the Bureau, denying appellants'
cross-motion, and affirming the Bureau Chief's May 23, 2018 summary order.
The ALJ concluded that the evidence was "so one sided that [the Bureau] must
prevail as a matter of law."
The ALJ excluded the unsworn certifications of Adam Bruno, Dr. Gregori
Moriello, and Christine Schneidman from consideration because they did not
comply with Rule 1:4-4(b). He considered Bruno's suspect expenditures "the
most troubling" and "unexplained" of the allegations. Appellants did not
support their "blanket statement" that investor funds spent on "dinners, outings,
gentlemen's clubs, and the like" were for manufacturing supplies, equipment, or
recruitment of Advisory Board members and additional capital. The ALJ
observed "[t]here is no real dispute that Bruno used investor funds for other than
Mirakill business." He also noted "[t]here are no descriptions of events where
A-0967-19
9
Advisory Board members are recruited . . . [or] description of events where
additional capital [was] sought. Nothing at all is said about the large amount of
ATM withdrawals."
Furthermore, the ALJ found "Bruno and Mirakill failed to disclose this
use of company funds to potential investors. The use of investor funds is a
material fact and must be disclosed." Prior to investing in Mirakill, Marc
Demyen, George Venizelos, Michael DiGiorgio, and Michael Baldino "were not
apprised by Bruno that investor funds would be used for Bruno's personal
benefit, expenses and entertainment. None of them would have invested in
Mirakill had they been so apprised."
The ALJ further found the Mirakill interests were securities as
expansively defined by N.J.S.A. 49:3-49(m) and unregistered securities in
violation of N.J.S.A. 49:3-60 and that "Mirakill refer[red] to the Units as
securities several times in both the PPM and the Agreement." Thus, appellants
failed to demonstrate that the Mirakill interests were exempt under N.J.S.A.
49:3-50(b)(9):
[Appellants] offer no evidence that they reasonably
believed that all buyers are purchasing for investment.
They have not established that there was no
renumeration. In fact, Bruno received renumeration by
his misuse of investor funds to pay personal expenses.
Likewise, [appellants] have not offered any evidence
A-0967-19
10
that the Mirakill securities were not offered or sold by
general solicitation of any general advertisement.
[Appellants] have admitted that the Mirakill securities
were not registered.
Additionally, Bruno acted as an unregistered "agent for Mirakill when he
solicited investments from various individuals,' in violation of N.J.S.A. 49:3-
56(a) and, in turn, that Mirakill employed Bruno as an unregistered agent in
violation of N.J.S.A. 49:3-56(h).
Lastly, the ALJ found that Bruno "misrepresented the use of investor
funds to at least five individuals[.]" He "sold, or solicited the sale of, securities
to at least five individuals," in violation of the Security Law, which carries up
to a $10,000 penalty for the first violation and up to a $20,000 penalty for each
subsequent violation under N.J.S.A. 49:3-70.1.
Thus, the ALJ affirmed the Bureau Chief's May 23, 2018 summary order.
Appellants filed written exceptions to the Initial Decision, contending the
decision was flawed procedurally and substantively. The Bureau contended the
exceptions were both substantively without merit and procedurally deficient
under N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4(b)(2), (3).
The Bureau Chief issued a September 24, 2019 final order adopting the
ALJ's Initial Decision in its entirety. The Final Order: (1) ordered Mirakill and
A-0967-19
11
Bruno to cease and desist from further violations of the Securities Law; (2)
assessed a $100,000 civil monetary penalty against Mirakill and Bruno, jointly
and severally; (3) denied Mirakill and Bruno any exemptions under N.J.S.A.
49:3-50(a)(9), (10), and (11) and N.J.S.A. 49:3-50(b); and (4) ordered that the
exemption from registration requirements provided by N.J.S.A. 49:3-56(b), (c),
and (g) be revoked as to Bruno and Mirakill. This appeal followed.
Appellants raise the following points for our consideration:
I. THE ALJ ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
DECISION AND THE COMMISSIONER ACTED
ARBITRARILY AND CAPRIC[I]OUSLY IN
ADOPTING HIS FINDINGS THAT MIRAKILL’S
OFFERING IS NOT EXEMPT FROM
REGISTRATION PURSUANT TO N.J.S.A. 49:3-
50(b)(9).
II. THE ALJ ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
DECISION AND THE COMMISSIONER ACTED
ARBITRARILY AND CAPRIC[I]OUSLY IN
ADOPTING HIS FINDINGS THAT [APPELLANTS]
ARE NOT EXEMPT FROM REGISTRATION
PURSUANT TO N.J.S.A. 49:3-56(b).
III. THE ALJ ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
DECISION AND THE COMMISSIONER ACTED
ARBITRARILY AND CAPRIC[I]OUSLY IN
ADOPTING HIS FINDINGS THAT THERE EXISTS
NO GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO
WHETHER THE MIRAKILL LLC "MEMBERSHIP
UNITS" CONSTITUTE SECURITIES.
A-0967-19
12
IV. THE ALJ ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
DECISION AND THE COMMISSIONER ACTED
ARBITRARILY AND CAPRIC[I]OUSLY IN
ADOPTING HIS FINDINGS THAT THERE EXISTS
NO GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO
WHETHER [APPELLANTS] MADE MATERIALLY
FALSE AND/OR MISLEADING STATEMENTS
AND/OR OMITTED MATERIAL FACTS IN THEIR
OFFERING.
V. THE ALJ ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
DECISION AND THE COMMISSIONER ACTED
ARBITRARILY AND CAPRIC[I]OUSLY IN
ADOPTING HIS FINDINGS THAT THERE EXISTS
NO GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO
WHETHER [APPELLANTS] MISUSED ANY
INVESTOR FUNDS.
Appellate review of a final agency decision is limited. In re Carter, 191
N.J. 474, 482 (2007). We do not ordinarily overturn a final agency decision "in
the absence of a showing that it was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or
that it lacked fair support in the evidence." Ibid. (quoting Campbell v. Dep't of
Civ. Serv., 39 N.J. 556, 562 (1963)). In general, our role is limited to
determining:
(1) whether the agency’s action violates express or
implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency
follow the law; (2) whether the record contains
substantial evidence to support the findings on which
the agency based its action; and (3) whether in applying
the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly
erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably
have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.
A-0967-19
13
[Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995) (citing
Campbell, 39 N.J. at 562).]
Moreover, in reviewing final agency decisions, we "must defer to an
agency's expertise and superior knowledge of a particular field." Carter, 191
N.J. at 483 (quoting Greenwood v. State Police Training Ctr., 127 N.J. 500, 513
(1992)). "[I]f substantial evidence supports the agency's decision, 'a court may
not substitute its own judgment for the agency's even though the court might
have reached a different result.'" Ibid. (quoting Greenwood, 127 N.J. at 513).
However, we are not "bound by the agency's interpretation of a statute or its
determination of a strictly legal issue." Ibid. (quoting Mayflower Sec. Co. v.
Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973)).
A party is entitled to summary decision where the motion record "show[s]
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the
moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law." N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5(b).
Summary decision is appropriate "where the undisputed material facts . . .
indicate that a particular disposition is required as a matter of law." In re Robros
Recycling Corp., 226 N.J. Super. 343, 350 (App. Div. 1988). We review the
grant of summary decision de novo. N.J. Div. of Tax'n v. Selective Ins. Co.,
399 N.J. Super. 315, 322 (App. Div. 2008).
A-0967-19
14
Applying these well-settled principles, we affirm substantially for the
reasons expressed by the Bureau Chief in his May 23, 2018 summary order and
the ALJ in his August 9, 2018 initial summary decision. We add the following
comments.
The Securities Law makes it unlawful for any "security" to be offered or
sold unless: (1) the security is registered under the Securities Law; (2) the
security is a federally covered security; or (3) the security is exempt under the
Securities Law. N.J.S.A. 49:3-60. The Securities Law defines the term
"security" broadly; it includes any "certificate of interest," "transferable share,
investment contract," or "warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the
foregoing." N.J.S.A. 49:3-49(m).
The Securities Law's definition of security "unequivocally follow[s] the
definition proffered by the Federal Securities Act of 1933." Manheim NJ Invs.,
Inc. v. Div. of Tax'n, 30 N.J. Tax 18, 34 (N.J. Tax Ct. 2017) (citing Conroy v.
Schultz, 80 N.J. Super. 443, 450 (Ch. Div. 1963)). Indeed, the Securities Law's
definition is "virtually identical" as that of 15 U.S.C. 77b(a)(1). AMR Realty
Co. v. State, Bureau of Sec., 149 N.J. Super. 329, 334 (App. Div. 1977). We
look to the United State Supreme Court for guidance. Manheim, 30 N.J. Tax at
34 (citing Conroy, 80 N.J. Super. at 451).
A-0967-19
15
An investment contract is a security where there is "[(1)] an investment of
money [(2)] in a common enterprise with [(3)] profits to come solely from the
efforts of others." SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946). Our
Supreme Court adopted this test in AMR Realty, 149 N.J. at 339.
A financial instrument meeting the definition of a security may be offered
or sold without registration if exempt under the Securities Law. N.J.S.A. 49:3-
60. "[T]he burden of proving an exemption or an exception from a definition is
upon the person claiming it." N.J.S.A. 49:3-50(d).
Offers or sales of securities are exempt if sales are not made to more than
ten people within twelve months, as long as "(i) the seller reasonably believes
that all buyers are purchasing for investment, and (ii) no commission or other
remuneration is paid or given directly or indirectly for soliciting any prospective
buyer in this State, and (iii) the securities are not offered or sold by general
solicitation or any general advertisement." N.J.S.A. 49:3-50(b)(9).
Appellants first argue a genuine issue of material fact existed as to
whether the "units" they offered and sold are securities as defined by the
Securities Law. Conceding the Mirakill units were neither registered in New
Jersey nor federally covered, appellants contend the units met the exemption in
N.J.S.A. 49:3-50(b)(9) because they only had nine investors, Bruno did not
A-0967-19
16
receive renumeration from investor funds, and the units were not offered or sold
by general solicitation.
The Mirakill units, however, are investment contracts as defined by the
Securities Law and W.J. Howey. First, the Mirakill units were undoubtedly
purchased with an expectation of profits; the PPM distributed to investors
described the company's business model and expected earnings. Second,
Mirakill is a common enterprise. Lastly, Mirakill's investors expected their
profits to come solely from the efforts of Mirakill's leadership.
The Mirakill units were not exempt from registration. Mirakill has not
produced any evidence that Bruno did not receive renumeration from his misuse
of investor funds. In fact, appellants misconstrue their burden of disproving
renumeration by stating "there is no evidence in the record to contradict that
[Bruno] received no renumeration for the Mirakill offering." On the contrary,
there is ample evidence that Bruno received renumeration.
Appellants further argue that Bruno was not required to be registered
because he was a broker-dealer and met a fifteen-sales-or-less exemption. But
N.J.S.A. 49:3-56(a) makes it unlawful for any person to act as an agent "unless
that person is registered or exempt from registration" under the Securities Law.
A-0967-19
17
Likewise, it is unlawful for "any broker-dealer or issuer to employ an agent . . .
unless the agent is registered." N.J.S.A. 49:3-56(h).
The record demonstrates that Bruno served as Mirakill's exclusive agent.
He met with potential investors as the "face" of Mirakill and solicited their
investments. Although agent registration is not required under certain
circumstances, none of those exemptions apply to this case. 1 Bruno served as
an unregistered agent of Mirakill, in violation of N.J.S.A. 49:3-56(a), (h).
"Both Congress and our Legislature have chosen to protect investors by
assuring that they [will] be given all materials necessary to make an informed
decision." Rudbart v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 127 N.J. 344, 348
(1992). The Securities Law makes it unlawful
for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or
purchase of any security, directly or indirectly . . . (b)
[t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
1
Agent registration is not required for: (1) sale of a security that is "issued or
guaranteed by the United States, any state, [or] any political subdivision of a
state," N.J.S.A. 49:3-50(a)(1); (2) any security issued or guaranteed by Canada,
N.J.S.A. 49:3-50(a)(2); (3) "[a]ny security issued by and representing an interest
in or a debt of, or guaranteed by, any bank, savings institution, or trust
company," N.J.S.A. 49:3-50(a)(3); (4) "[a]ny investment contract issued in
connection with" employee retirement or benefit plans under N.J.S.A. 49:3-
50(11); (5) certain federally covered securities under N.J.S.A. 49:3-50(b); (6)
sales made to employees, partners, or directors of the issuer; or (7) for
transactions related to penny stocks. N.J.A.C. 13:47A-3.3(b).
A-0967-19
18
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they are made, not misleading[.]
[N.J.S.A. 49:3-52(b).]
"[M]ateriality depends on the significance the reasonable investor would place
on the withheld or misrepresented information." Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485
U.S. 224, 240 (1988).
The Bureau argues the PPMs appellants distributed failed to inform
potential investors that appellants planned to use investor funds to finance "trips
to gentlemen's clubs or other personal expenses" and that such
misrepresentations or omissions were material to the investors' decision to invest
in Mirakill. Appellants argue all the sums spent at gentlemen clubs, outings,
dinners, and the like were "for the recruitment of advisory board members and/or
to attract additional investment capital." They contend these expenses
constituted marketing expenses under the PPM.
These purported marketing expenses totaled $83,605.64, nearly sixty
percent of the entire sum contributed by investors. In contrast, the $500,000
marketing estimate set forth in the PPM is only twenty percent of the projected
estimated investments, $2,500,000. Surely, Mirakill investors would find a
misstatement equating to a forty percent difference of allocated investor funds
as "material." Appellants clearly violated N.J.S.A. 49:3-52(b).
A-0967-19
19
Appellant's remaining arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
In sum, the record amply supports the Bureau Chief's and ALJ's factual
findings. Their legal conclusions are likewise fully supported by the record and
consonant with applicable law. We discern no basis to overturn any aspect of
the Bureau Chief's final order.
Affirmed.
A-0967-19
20