JAMES C. LAWRENCE VS. SKY ZONE FRANCHISE GROUP, LLC (L-2149-19, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3092-19
JAMES C. LAWRENCE,
Plaintiff-Respondent/
Cross-Appellant,
v.
SKY ZONE, LLC, SKY ZONE
FRANCHISE GROUP, LLC,
CIRCUSTRIX HOLDINGS, LLC,
BUCKINGHAM INVESTMENT
GROUP, INC. d/b/a SKY ZONE
LAKEWOOD, and RPSZ
CONSTRUCTION, LLC,
Defendants-Appellants/
Cross-Respondents,
and
FUN SPOT MANUFACTURING,
LLC, INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF TRAMPOLINE
PARKS, INC. (Discovery Only),
and AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR
TESTING AND MATERIALS d/b/a
ASTM INTERNATIONAL,
(Discovery Only),
Defendants.
Submitted March 15, 2021 – Decided March 30, 2021
Before Judges Fasciale and Mayer.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Ocean County, Docket No. L-2149-19.
Chazen & Chazen, LLC, attorneys for
respondent/cross-appellant (David K. Chazen, of
counsel and on the briefs).
Wood Smith Henning & Berman, LLP, attorneys for
appellants/cross-respondents (Kelly A. Waters, of
counsel and on the briefs; Samuel G. John and Carolynn
A. Mulder, on the briefs).
Cohen, Placitella & Roth, P.C. attorneys for amicus
curie New Jersey Association for Justice (Jared M.
Placitella and Christopher M. Placitella, of counsel and
on the briefs).
PER CURIAM
Sky Zone, LLC, Sky Zone Franchise Group, LLC, Circustrix Holdings,
LLC, Buckingham Investment Group, Inc. (d/b/a Sky Zone Lakewood), and
RPSZ Construction, LLC (collectively defendants), appeal from a March 30,
2020 order denying reconsideration of a December 20, 2019 order denying their
motion to dismiss plaintiff's first amended complaint and compel arbitration.
The judge altered his earlier finding that the unavailability of JAMS rendered
the agreement unenforceable but concluded that the agreement still lacked
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mutual assent because it did not adequately explain what replaced a jury.
Defendants generally maintain that the law only requires that plaintiff
understand he waived a jury.
Plaintiff cross-appeals from the March 30, 2020 order contending that the
judge erroneously changed his mind about JAMS. Plaintiff primarily maintains
that the agreement is unenforceable because, despite the designation that the
arbitration would be administered by JAMS utilizing its rules, JAMS itself is an
unavailable arbitration forum in New Jersey. Thus, plaintiff argues, there was
no meeting of the minds. The New Jersey Association for Justice (NJAJ),
participating as amici, also argues that there was no meeting of the minds.
On these motions, the parties and the judge focused on whether the
agreement adequately explained the ramifications of a jury waiver, particularly
addressing whether it sufficiently referenced the rights that replaced the jury.
That made sense because, at the time, they attempted to apply our decision in
Flanzman.1 But since the issuance of the orders, the Supreme Court reversed
1
Flanzman v. Jenny Craig, Inc., 456 N.J. Super. 613 (App. Div. 2018).
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our opinion,2 which directly impacts our adjudication of the issues on appeal. 3
The parties did not make arbitrating the dispute utilizing JAMS and its rules an
integral term to the agreement, which contained a severability clause indicating
that if one term is unenforceable, the rest of the agreement will not be affected.
The automatic application of the New Jersey Arbitration Act (NJAA)4 supplies
the missing terms about the arbitration process, as does the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA),5 which the agreement generally references.6 We therefore reverse.
I.
Before entering the indoor trampoline facility, plaintiff was required to
execute a six-page release agreement entitled "Participation Agreement, Release
and Assumption of Risk" (Release Agreement). The Release Agreement
generally required him to release the facility from liability, assume the risk of
using the trampolines and other equipment, and waive certain rights, such as his
2
Flanzman v. Jenny Craig, Inc., 244 N.J. 119 (2020).
3
The parties and amici submitted supplemental briefs since the Court rendered
its decision in Flanzman.
4
New Jersey Arbitration Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 to -36.
5
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§1-16.
6
See e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 5 (providing for the appointment of an arbitrator), id. § 7
(addressing witnesses, documents, fees, and the power to issue a summons).
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right to a jury trial by agreeing to arbitrate covered disputes. The Release
Agreement reads as follows:
ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES; TIME LIMIT TO
BRING CLAIM
I understand that by agreeing to arbitrate any dispute as
set forth in this section, I am waiving my right, and the
right(s) of the minor child(ren) above, to maintain a
lawsuit against SZ and the other Releasees for any and
all claims covered by this Agreement. By agreeing to
arbitrate, I understand that I will NOT have the right to
have my claim determined by a jury, and the minor
child(ren) above will NOT have the right to have
claim(s) determined by a jury. Reciprocally, SZ and the
other Releasees waive their right to maintain a lawsuit
against me and the minor child(ren) above for any and
all claims covered by this Agreement, and they will not
have the right to have their claim(s) determined by a
jury. ANY DISPUTE, CLAIM OR
CONTROVERSY ARISING OUT OF OR
RELATING TO MY OR THE CHILD'S ACCESS
TO AND/OR USE OF THE SKY ZONE PREMISES
AND/OR ITS EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING THE
DETERMINATION OF THE SCOPE OR
APPLICABILITY OF THIS AGREEMENT TO
ARBITRATE, SHALL BE BROUGHT WITHIN
ONE YEAR OF ITS ACCRUAL (i.e., the date of the
alleged injury) FOR AN ADULT AND WITHIN
THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
FOR A MINOR AND BE DETERMINED BY
ARBITRATION IN THE COUNTY OF THE SKY
ZONE FACILITY, NEW JERSEY, BEFORE ONE
ARBITRATOR. THE ARBITRATION SHALL BE
ADMINISTERED BY JAMS PURSUANT TO ITS
RULE 16.1 EXPEDITED ARBITRATION RULES
AND PROCEDURES. JUDGMENT ON THE
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AWARD MAY BE ENTERED IN ANY COURT
HAVING JURISDICTION. THIS CLAUSE
SHALL NOT PRECLUDE PARTIES FROM
SEEKING PROVISIONAL REMEDIES IN AID OF
ARBITRATION FROM A COURT OF
APPROPRIATE JURISDICTION. This Agreement
shall be governed by, construed and interpreted in
accordance with the laws of the State of New Jersey,
without regard to choice of law principles.
Notwithstanding the provision with respect to the
applicable substantive law, any arbitration conducted
pursuant to the terms of this Agreement shall be
governed by the [FAA] (9 U.S.C., Sec. 1-16). I
understand and acknowledge that the JAMS Arbitration
Rules to which I agree are available online for my
review at jamsadr.com, and include JAMS
Comprehensive Arbitration Rules & Procedures; Rule
16.1 Expedited Procedures; and, Policy On Consumer
Minimum Standards of Procedural Fairness.
[Emphasis in original.]
It is undisputed that JAMS could not administer the arbitration proceeding.
Consequently, that part of the agreement was unenforceable. The severance
provision provides that
[i]f any term or provision of this Release shall be
illegal, unenforceable, or in conflict with any law
governing this Release[,] the validity of the remaining
portions shall not be affected thereby.
In entering the orders under review, and guided by our Flanzman decision, the
judge concluded the agreement was unenforceable for lack of mutual assent
because the parties did not fully understand what rights replaced the jury .
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II.
On appeal, defendants raise the following arguments, which we have re -
numbered, for our consideration:
[POINT I]
THE [MOTION JUDGE] ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE IS
UNENFORCEABLE BECAUSE IT DOES NOT
EXPLAIN OR SUMMARIZE THE ARBITRATION
RULES.[7]
[POINT II]
THE [MOTION JUDGE] CORRECTLY HELD THAT
THE UNAVILABILITY OF JAMS IS IMMATERIAL
TO THE ENFORECEABILITY OF THE
ARBITRATION PROVISION.
A. FEDERAL LAW PROVIDES FOR
COURT APPOINTMENT OF AN
ARBITRATOR AND PREEMPTS ANY
CONTRARY STATE LAW.
B. NEW JERSEY LAW PROVIDES FOR
COURT APPOINTMENT OF AN
ARBITRATOR.
C. THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
AT ISSUE HERE REQUIRES
7
We need not reach this contention because JAMS itself was unavailable to
administer the arbitration. Whether plaintiff had the opportunity to read the
JAMS rules, therefore, is academic: JAMS could not arbitrate the dispute
regardless.
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ARBITRATION EVEN IF JAMS IS
UNAVAILABLE.
[POINT III]
THE [MOTION JUDGE] ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS MUST
SUMMARIZE OR PROVIDE A COPY OF THE
ARBITRATION RULES.
[POINT IV]
PLAINTIFF'S SUBSTANTIVE OBJECTIONS TO
THE JAMS RULES LACK MERIT AND ARE
IMMATERIAL TO THE ENFORCEABILITY OF
THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE. (Not Ruled on
Below).
A. PARTIES MAY AGREE TO LIMIT
DISCOVERY AND OTHER
PROCEDURES IN THEIR
ARBITRATION AGREEMENT.
B. LIKE THE NEW JERSEY COURT
RULES, THE JAMS RULES CONTAIN
APPROPRIATE SAFEGUARDS AND
FLEXIBILITY.
C. EVEN IF PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS
TO THE JAMS RULES HAD MERIT,
THEY ARE IMMATERIAL BECAUSE
ARBITRATION CLAUSES ARE
SEVERABLE AS A MATTER OF LAW.
[POINT V]
THE [MOTION JUDGE] CORRECTLY HELD THAT
THE UNAVAILABILITY OF JAMS DOES NOT
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AFFECT THE VALIDITY OF THE ARBITRATION
CLAUSE BECAUSE JAMS IS NOT INTEGRAL TO
THE AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE.
A. NEW JERSEY LAW REQUIRES
COURT-APPOINTMENT OF AN
ARBITRATOR EVEN THOUGH JAMS
IS UNAVAILABLE.
B. EVEN IF PLAINTIFF'S POSITION
REGARDING NEW JERSEY LAW
WERE CORRECT, FEDERAL LAW
WOULD PREEMPT NEW JERSEY LAW
AND REQUIRES COURT-
APPOINTMENT OF AN ARBITRATOR.
[POINT VI]
PLAINTIFF'S RELIANCE ON UNREPORTED
DECISIONS IS UNAVAILING AND
PROCEDURALLY IMPROPER.
[POINT VII]
PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT REGARDING THE
TRUTH-IN-CONSUMER CONTRACTS,
WARRANTY, AND NOTICE ACT IS WITHOUT
MERIT.
[POINT VIII]
PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT REGARDING NON-
SIGNATORIES IS WITHOUT MERIT.
[POINT IX]
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THE ALLEGED FAILURE TO EXPLAIN THE JAMS
RULES HAS NO EFFECT ON THE ARBITRATION
AGREEMENT'S VALIDITY.
[POINT X]
THE UNAVAILABILITY OF JAMS HAS NO
EFFECT ON THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT'S
VALIDITY.
[POINT XI]
NJAJ IMPROPERLY RELIES ON IMMATERIAL
AND UNSUPPORTED ARGUMENTS THAT WERE
NOT RAISED BELOW.
[PONT XII]
IN SKUSE,[8] THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT
REAFFIRMED THE FAA'S EQUAL-FOOTING
PRINCIPLE AND APPLIED GENERAL CONTRACT
LAW.
[POINT VIII]
IN SKUSE, THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT
HELD THAT PLAINTIFFS BEAR THE BURDEN OF
OBTAINING AND REVIEWING AVAILABLE
INFORMATION.
On his cross-appeal, plaintiff raises the following contentions, which we
have re-numbered:
[POINT I]
8
Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc., 244 N.J. 30 (2020).
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THE [MOTION JUDGE] CORRECTLY HELD THE
ARBITRATION PROVISION TO BE
UNENFORCEABLE BECAUSE THE JAMS RULES
WERE "UNACCESSIBLE[,]" THE ARBITRATION
PROVISION "DOES NOT EXPLAIN THE RULES[,]"
AND "BECAUSE IT LACKS A MEETING OF THE
MINDS.["]
[POINT II]
THE [MOTION JUDGE] HELD CORRECTLY THAT
THE DESIGNATION OF JAMS AS THE
EXCLUSIVE ARBITRAL FORUM AND ITS
UNAVAILABILITY MEANT THAT THERE WAS
NO MEETING OF THE MINDS BETWEEN THE
PARTIES AND THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE IS
UNENFORCEABLE[;] THE [MOTION JUDGE]
ERRED UPON RECONSIDERATION IN HOLDING
THAT THE UNAVAILABILITY OF JAMS WAS
NOT SO INTEGRAL TO THE ARBITRATION
CLAUSE TO RENDER IT UNENFORCEABLE.
[POINT III]
DIVERGENT COURT OPINIONS HAVE LEFT THE
VALIDITY OF THE SKY ZONE ARBITRATION
CLAUSE UNSETTLED.
[POINT VI]
DISMISSAL OF THE FIRST AMENDED
COMPLAINT WOULD BE IMPROPER BECAUSE
NON-SIGNATORIES TO THE AGREEMENT
CANNOT BE COMPELLED TO ARBITRATE.
[POINT V]
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THE SKY ZONE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
CONTAINS MATERIAL DISCREPANCIES
ESSENTIAL TO A CONSUMER WAIVER-OF-
RIGHTS NEGATING A MEETING OF THE MINDS.
[POINT VI]
SKY ZONE CLAIMS SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION
UNDER THE JAMS RULE 16.1 EXPEDITED
PROCEDURES AND RULES ARE AN EXAMPLE
OF INDUSTRY-WIDE CONTRACTS OF
[9]
ADHESION.
[POINT VII]
FLANZMAN HOLDS THAT THE NJAA PROVIDES
A DEFAULT PROCEDURE WHEN PARTIES OMIT
THE TERMS FOR SELECTION OF THE
ARBITRATOR AND THE ARBITRATION
PROCESS—BUT DISTINGUISHES THE HOLDING
IN KLEINE WHERE THE PARTIES AGREE TO A
SPECIFIC ARBITRATION ORGANIZATION AS AN
ESSENTIAL TERM AND RENDER IT
UNENFORCEABLE WHEN THE ARBITRATION
ORGANIZATION WAS UNAVAILABLE AT THE
TIME THE CONTRACT WAS EXECUTED—AS
ESSENTIAL TO A CONSUMER WAIVER-OF-
RIGHTS AND NEGATING A MEETING OF THE
MINDS.
A. SKY ZONE SELECTED JAMS AS
THE EXCLUSIVE ARBITRATION
ORGANIZATION AND KNEW OR
9
There is insufficient information on this record for us to adjudicate this
contention, which was not explicitly addressed by the judge, either by way of
findings of fact or conclusions of law.
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SHOULD HAVE KNOWN JAMS WAS
UNAVAILABLE.
B. THE SKY ZONE ARBITRATION
CLAUSE VIOLATES THE PLAIN
LANGUAGE ACT AND THE TRUTH-
IN-CONSUMER CONTRACT,
WARRANTY AND NOTICE ACT.
C. SKY ZONE'S SELECTION OF JAMS
WAS AN ESSENTIAL/INTEGRAL
CONTRACT TERM.
NJAJ, as amici, raise the following points, which we have re-numbered:
[POINT I]
THERE WAS NO ASSENT BY [PLAINTIFF] TO
WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL SO THE
[MOTION JUDGE] CORRECTLY HELD THAT HE
CANNOT BE COMPELLED TO ARBITRATION.
A. THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
HERE FAILS TO EXPLAIN TO THE
CONSUMER THE RAMIFICATIONS OF
SURRENDERING HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A JURY
TRIAL.
B. THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
FAILED TO PROVIDE AND EXPLAIN
THE JAMS EXPEDITED ARBITRATION
RULES, AND ITS MERE REFERENCE
TO THOSE PROCEDURES
PREVENTED ANY MEETING OF THE
MINDS.
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C. THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
IS CONTRADICTORY, CONFUSING
AND VIOLATES NEW JERSEY'S PLAIN
LANGUAGE ACT.
[POINT II]
THE [MOTION JUDGE] ERRED IN [HIS] DICTUM
STATEMENT THAT [HE] COULD APPOINT AN
ARBITRAL FORUM NOT CONTEMPLATED BY
THE PARTIES BECAUSE THAT WOULD
INAPPROPRIATELY RE-WRITE THE PARTIES'
AGREEMENT.
[POINT III]
THE [MOTION JUDGE] CORRECTLY HELD THAT
[PLAINTIFF] CANNOT BE COMPELLED TO
ARBITRATION BECAUSE [SKY ZONE'S]
AGREEMENT FAILS TO CLEARLY AND
UNMISTAKABLY EXPLAIN THAT HE WAS
SURRENDERING HIS RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL
AND THE RAMIFICATIONS FOR DOING SO.
[POINT IV]
THE [MOTION JUDGE] CORRECTLY HELD THAT
[PLAINTIFF] CANNOT BE COMPELLED TO
ARBITRATE BECAUSE THE CONFUSING AND
CONTRADICTORY LANGUAGE OF [SKY ZONE'S]
AGREEMENT FAILED TO ASSURE HIS MUTUAL
ASSENT.
[POINT V]
FLANZMAN REQUIRES THAT ARBITRATION
CANNOT BE COMPELLED HERE BECAUSE SKY
ZONE LLC'S SELECTED ARBITRAL FORUM AND
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PROCESS WAS NEVER AVAILABLE TO THE
PARTIES AND THUS THERE WAS NO MUTUAL
ASSENT TO ARBITRATE.
III.
We begin by addressing the judge's conclusion that the agreement was
unenforceable for lack of mutual assent. The judge undertook a careful analysis
of whether there existed a meeting of the minds; specifically, whether the parties
understood what rights replaced the jury.
The judge reached his conclusion by relying on our appellate opinion in
Flanzman, where we quoted both Atalese v. U.S. Legal Serv. Group, L.P., 219
N.J. 430, 443-45 (2014) and NAACP of Camden Cty. E. v. Foulke Mgmt., 421
N.J. Super. 404, 425 (App. Div. 2011), explaining that " [judges] take particular
care in assuring the knowing assent of both parties to arbitrate, and a clear
mutual understanding of the ramifications of that assent." Flanzman, 456 N.J.
Super at 621. And like us, the judge cited Kleine v. Emeritus at Emerson, 445
N.J. Super. 545, 552-53 (App. Div. 2016), where this court determined that to
clearly understand the ramifications of waiving a jury, a party "must be able to
understand—from clear and unambiguous language—both the rights that have
been waived and the rights that have taken their place." Flanzman, 456 N.J.
Super. at 622 (citing Kleine, 445 N.J. Super. at 552-53). That is because the
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Supreme Court explained that the word "arbitration" is not self-defining. See
Kernahan v. Home Warranty Admin., 236 N.J. 308, 332-33 (2019); Morgan v.
Sanford Brown Inst., 225 N.J. 289, 308 (2016); Atalese, 219 N.J. at 442. We
understood "ramifications of the assent" to mean not just the rights parties gave
up but also the rights the parties received in their place. The Supreme Court
disagreed with our understanding and clarified that "ramifications" referred only
to waiving a jury, rather than also understanding what replaced the jury.
Unlike Flanzman, where the parties omitted any reference to what
replaced the jury, the parties' agreement here incorporated that information.
Even if they had not, the Court has since explained a general reference to the
arbitration process governing the dispute is not a material term; failure to
reference it does not impact enforceability; and instead, the NJAA will fill in
the missing information. Flanzman, 244 N.J. at 136-39. The Court agreed—to
add clarity—it would be advantageous, sound, and practical for parties to
"designate in their agreement an arbitral organization" and "an alternative
method of choosing an organization" should the parties' primary choice be
unavailable. Id. at 140. By doing so, the parties would then understand what to
expect during the arbitration. But the Court concluded the information was not
essential to the arbitration agreement.
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The judge determined that the agreement was unenforceable for lack of
mutual assent because what the parties had contracted for—JAMS arbitrating
the dispute—could not occur. He found, therefore, that they did not reach a
meeting of the minds about what replaced the jury. Applying the Court's
decision in Flanzman, and Arafa v. Health Express Corp., 243 N.J. 147 (2020),10
we reach a different conclusion.
IV.
We conclude the agreement meets the requirements established in Atalese,
and therefore there exists mutual assent to arbitrate. The parties clearly
understood the ramifications of such assent because the agreement itself
explains that the parties have waived a jury. The unavailability of JAMS is not
fatal to the enforceability of the agreement, especially because the agreement
contains a severability clause. And even without the severability clause, under
Flanzman and Arafa, the NJAA will fill in the arbitration process details.
As evidence that the parties did not make JAMS integral to the arbitration
process, we turn to the language of the agreement that identified the NJAA and
FAA.
10
The orders under review were issued before the Court rendered its opinion in
Arafa.
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This Agreement shall be governed by, construed and
interpreted in accordance with the laws of the State of
New Jersey, without regard to choice of law principles.
Notwithstanding the provision with respect to the
applicable substantive law, any arbitration conducted
pursuant to the terms of this Agreement shall be
governed by the [FAA] (9 U.S.C., Sec. 1-16).
The parties' agreement did not make arbitration solely dependent on the
availability of JAMS. Instead, it included a severability clause and specifically
identified the NJAA and FAA.
In 2002, our Legislature enacted the NJAA to advance arbitration as an
alternative to litigation and to clarify arbitration procedures. Flanzman, 214 N.J.
at 133-34. The NJAA is a modified version of the Uniform Act, 11 which itself
is a default statute, meaning that statutory provisions can be varied or waived
by contract. Indeed, the NJAA is a modified default statute, as reflected by its
legislative history. See Assemb. Judiciary Comm. Statement to S. 514 1 (stating
that "[t]his bill is a modified version of the Uniform Arbitration Act of 2000
. . . as proposed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws").
11
The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, Rev. Unif. Arb. Act §§ 1-31 (2000),
updated and modified the Uniform Arbitration Act, Unif. Arb. Act §§ 1 -25
(1955).
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In Flanzman, the automatic application of the NJAA permitted the
appointment of an arbitrator, Flanzman, 224 N.J. at 141 (citing N.J.S.A.
2A:23B-11(a)),12 and provided the general framework of the arbitration process,
ibid. (citing N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-15). As to these two points, the same is true here.
Flanzman is not the first instance where the Supreme Court utilized the NJAA
to fill in missing terms in arbitration agreements. In July of last year, the Court
decided Arafa, a case in which the parties identified in their agreement the FAA
as the governing law, then later discovered that the FAA could not control. 243
N.J. at 166 (noting that "it is undisputed that Section 1 [of the FAA] applies" to
Arafa, which exempts employees and independent contractors involved in
interstate commerce from the FAA). The Court applied the NJAA and filled in
the missing terms addressing the arbitration process. Id. at 167. In Arafa, the
Court concluded that the NJAA applies automatically, as it does here.
To summarize: the arbitration agreement satisfies Atalese; the provision
that JAMS arbitrate the dispute is unenforceable because JAMS is not available;
the severability clause renders the rest of the agreement enforceable; and the
NJAA will fill in the missing term as to the arbitration process. We therefore
12
The FAA has a similar provision. See 9 U.S.C. § 5.
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reverse and remand, directing the parties to the arbitration agreement proceed to
arbitration.
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
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