N.S. VS. J.M.W. (FV-09-2272-20, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2021 )


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  •                                       RECORD IMPOUNDED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-4128-19
    N.S.,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    J.M.W.,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    _______________________
    Submitted March 16, 2021 – Decided April 1, 2021
    Before Judges Fisher and Gilson.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County,
    Docket No. FV-09-2272-20.
    Dwyer, Bachman, Newman & Solop, attorneys for
    appellant (Howard A. Bachman, of counsel and on the
    brief; Lauren Conway, on the brief).
    Respondent has not filed a brief.
    PER CURIAM
    Plaintiff N.S. (Nancy) 1 commenced this action under the Prevention of
    Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, alleging defendant J.M.W.
    (Jack) sent a group text message that forwarded a video clip of he and Nancy
    engaging in sexual intercourse. Jack sent the video not only to Nancy but to her
    parents as well. At the start of the final hearing, the parties stipulated their
    dating relationship was encompassed by the Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(d), and that
    Jack committed the predicate act of harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4, by sending
    the sexually explicit video to Nancy's parents. That left to be decided only the
    so-called second Silver2 factor: whether a final restraining order was needed to
    prevent future domestic violence. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b).
    After a brief hearing at which both parties testified, the judge found the
    second Silver factor was established, and he entered a final restraining order in
    Nancy's favor. Jack appeals, arguing:
    I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
    MAKE      CREDIBILITY   DETERMINATIONS
    REGARDING THE PARTIES' TESTIMONY.
    II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
    IN FINDING THAT A FINAL RESTRAINING
    ORDER WAS NECESSARY TO PROTECT THE
    PLAINTIFF FROM FURTHER ABUSE.
    1
    The names we use are fictitious to protect the parties' privacy.
    2
    Silver v. Silver, 
    387 N.J. Super. 112
    , 126 (App. Div. 2006).
    A-4128-19
    2
    We find insufficient merit in these arguments to warrant further discussion , R.
    2:11-3(e)(1)(E), and add only a few brief comments.
    In rejecting Jack's first point, we agree that the judge did not express a
    definitive view about the witnesses' credibility. But it is also clear such findings
    would not have been critical as there were no material disputes about the second
    Silver prong.
    In rejecting the second point, we note that the experienced judge
    recognized the second prong turned on the likelihood that the parties might come
    into unexpected contact and the potential for future harassment of a similar
    nature. The judge found the former because of the undisputed fact that the
    parties will soon be working in the same field. While it is true Nancy returned
    to school in Massachusetts, her plan on completing her course of studies was to
    come back to New Jersey and enter the same field in which Jack also works. So,
    the judge was rightfully concerned about the potential for future encounters. He
    also referenced the ease with which similar harassing communications may be
    made.
    Despite Jack's self-serving protestations that nothing like this would ever
    occur again, the judge's determination that the evidence supported a finding on
    the Silver second prong is entitled to our deference. We would add that it is a
    A-4128-19
    3
    mistake to assume Silver compels an express finding on the second prong in all
    cases. In fact, in many cases the need for a final restraining order "to prevent
    further abuse," N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b), is "self-evident." 
    Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 127
    ; see also S.K. v. J.H., 
    426 N.J. Super. 230
    , 233 (App. Div. 2012). The
    emphasis on the second prong usually arises when the predicate act is some form
    of verbal harassment. The act that occurred here was made possible through the
    use of technology that may be effortlessly repeated. Implicit in the judge's
    findings was his desire to relieve Nancy of any further concern about a repeat
    occurrence. We agree that these circumstances were sufficient to support the
    second Silver prong and that Nancy's need for restraints was self-evident in light
    of what had already admittedly occurred.
    Affirmed.
    A-4128-19
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-4128-19

Filed Date: 4/1/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/1/2021