IN THE MATTER OF JOHN P. WARNOCK (NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF FAMILY DEVELOPMENT) ( 2020 )


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  •                              NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-2724-18T1
    IN THE MATTER OF
    JOHN P. WARNOCK
    _____________________________
    Submitted November 16, 2020 – Decided December 3, 2020
    Before Judges Fasciale and Rothstadt.
    On appeal from the Department of Human Services,
    Division of Family Development, Office of Child
    Support Services.
    Fusco & Macaluso Partners, LLC, attorney for
    appellant (Amie E. Dicola, on the brief).
    Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
    respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney
    General, of counsel; Mark D. McNally, Deputy
    Attorney General, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    John P. Warnock appeals from a January 14, 2019 final agency decision
    by the Department of Human Services, Office of Child Support Services
    (OCSS), which denied his challenge to its bank-account levy. Warnock's sole
    contention is that this decision was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. We
    disagree and affirm.
    Warnock owes $31,549.08 in child support. On December 7, 2018, OCSS
    obtained a levy on a bank account at Lakeland Bank. OCSS subsequently
    notified Warnock of its levy, informed him that he could contest it, and provided
    the contest form. Warnock filed a timely contest with OCSS, checking off the
    "other" box and claiming the bank account's funds were proceeds from the sale
    of his mother's home. As her durable power of attorney, Warnock claimed the
    funds were used for his mother's financial obligations.
    OCSS acknowledged Warnock's contest, but requested additional
    information, specifically: (1) proof of power of attorney over his mother's
    financial obligations; (2) proof of the sale of her property; (3) the last three
    months of bank statements including deposit slips; and (4) his last three pay
    stubs. Warnock supplied this information on January 14, 2019, and on the same
    day, OCSS issued its Notice of Contest Resolution and Right to Appeal. In the
    Notice, OCSS denied Warnock's contest, giving two reasons: "1) [o]utstanding
    arrears balance and 2) [f]ailure to pay child support as court ordered."
    Warnock appealed to us. OCSS filed a motion to remand seeking to
    clarify its reasons for denying Warnock's contest, and on January 7, 2020, we
    A-2724-18T1
    2
    granted that motion. On remand, OCSS issued a revised Notice of Contest
    Resolution and Right to Appeal dated February 24, 2020, which denied the
    contest and emphasized:
    The levy will continue. [Warnock] stated in [his]
    contest that [he is] Power of Attorney (POA) for [his]
    mother and [he] handle[s] her financial obligations,
    including those with funds obtained from the sale of her
    property. Section ii of the POA provided states that
    [he] can "conduct any business with any banking or
    financial institution . . . with respect to any of my
    accounts . . ." The "my" referring to [his] mother.
    Statements provided from the levied bank account were
    reviewed and found to be solely in [Warnock's] name.
    It is not an account in [his] mother's name that [he]
    accessed on her behalf nor is it a joint bank account.
    The proof of deposits provided were also reviewed but
    do not reflect the use of those funds for [his] mother's
    financial obligations. Therefore, the levy will continue.
    On appeal, Warnock raises the following point:
    POINT I
    THE COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE DENIAL OF
    . . . WARNOCK'S CONTEST OF THE NOTICE OF
    BANK LEVY AND OVERTURN THE LEVY UPON
    . . . WARNOCK'S ACCOUNT WITH [THE] BANK
    BECAUSE THE DECISION TO DENY THE CONTEST
    WAS      ARBITRARY,    CAPRICIOUS    AND
    UNREASONABLE,      GIVEN    THE    AMPLE
    DOCUMENTATION SUPPLIED BY . . . WARNOCK
    AND THE COMPLETE LACK OF ANY BASIS TO
    SUPPORT THE DENIAL OF THE CONTEST.
    A-2724-18T1
    3
    Our review of an administrative agency's final determination is limited.
    Burlington Cty. Bd. of Soc. Servs. v. G.W., 
    425 N.J. Super. 42
    , 45 (App. Div.
    2012). We will intervene "only in those rare circumstances in which an agency
    action is clearly inconsistent with its statutory mission or with other State
    policy." Brady v. Bd. Of Review, 
    152 N.J. 197
    , 210 (1997) (quoting George
    Harms Constr. Co. v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 
    137 N.J. 8
    , 27 (1994)). We should only
    reverse when an agency's decision is "arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or
    [] not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole." In
    re Stallworth, 
    208 N.J. 182
    , 194 (2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Henry
    v. Rahway State Prison, 
    81 N.J. 571
    , 579-80 (1980)).
    New Jersey enacted the New Jersey Child Support Improvement Act
    (Support Improvement Act), pertinently N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.53 and N.J.S.A.
    2A:17-56.57, which authorizes the Department of Human Services (DHS) to
    take action without a court order to recognize and enforce the authority of state
    agencies, including the authority to "[s]ecure assets to satisfy [child support]
    arrearages[.]"   N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.53(g).      "The [Support Improvement Act]
    authorizes DHS to conduct quarterly data matches with banks and other financial
    institutions based on the obligor's social security number in order to identify
    financial assets, and to freeze and seize the funds in order to satisfy child support
    A-2724-18T1
    4
    arrears." Spuler v. Dep't of Human Servs., 
    340 N.J. Super. 549
    , 550 (App. Div.
    2001) (citing N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.53(g)(2), -56.57(d)).
    As an administrative agency, OCSS uses its authority to locate financial
    assets when "non-custodial parents . . . who owe past due child support that
    equals or exceeds the amount of support payable for three months and for which
    no regular payments are being made."
    Id. at 551
    (alteration in original) (quoting
    N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.57(a)). Once OCSS effectuates a bank levy freezing access
    to funds, the child support obligor is given notice and instructed that he or she
    may contest OCSS's action. See N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.57(d).
    Here, OCSS had the statutory authority to levy the bank account, and it
    provided Warnock with a notice of levy, as well as the contest form. After
    Warnock contested by claiming the funds were proceeds from the sale of his
    mother's home and for her care, OCSS requested further information, which it
    reviewed prior to issuing its Notice of Contest Resolution and Right to Appeal.
    On remand, OCSS issued a revised Notice and clarified its reasoning for denying
    Warnock's contest. Warnock failed to address the revised notice in his merits
    brief. Moreover, there is no evidence in this record establishing that his mother
    jointly owns the bank account, nor evidence showing that the charges in the bank
    statements were for his mother's care. Applying our settled standard of review,
    A-2724-18T1
    5
    we therefore conclude OCSS did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or
    unreasonably.
    Affirmed.
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    6