R.M. VS. SOMERSET COUNTY BOARD OF SOCIAL SERVICES (NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES) ( 2020 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-5324-18T2
    R.M.,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    SOMERSET COUNTY BOARD
    OF SOCIAL SERVICES,
    Respondent.
    ____________________________
    Submitted November 5, 2020 – Decided December 4, 2020
    Before Judges Fuentes and Firko.
    On appeal from the Somerset County Board of Social
    Services, Docket No. 05296-19.
    R.M., appellant pro se.
    Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
    respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney
    General, of counsel; James A. McGhee, Deputy
    Attorney General, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Petitioner R.M. appeals from the June 27, 2019 final agency decision of
    respondent Department of Human Services (DHS), Division of Family
    Development (DFD), which affirmed the decision of respondent Somerset
    County Board of Social Services (SCBSS) to terminate R.M.'s emergency
    assistance benefits (EA) in the form of temporary rental assistance (TRA). We
    affirm.
    In November 2018, R.M. began receiving benefits from SCBSS housing
    assistance, and he signed an EA service plan, which was effective until May
    2019. As a condition to receiving benefits, R.M. was required to apply for
    Section 8 housing and conduct five affordable housing searches every week. By
    executing the EA service plan, R.M. acknowledged that "failure to participate
    in any of the activities [he] ha[s]agreed to in this [service plan], including
    housing/employment searches as required, may affect [his] eligibility for [EA]."
    On March 28, 2019, R.M. filed an application for an EA hardship
    extension because he alleged he lost or was in immediate danger of losing a bona
    fide offer of employment. The next day, March 29, 2019, R.M. was notified that
    his EA housing benefits would be terminated as of May 1, 2019, because he
    failed to comply with his service plan. The SCBSS determined that R.M. was
    A-5324-18T2
    2
    not in "danger of losing employment" because he was offered another position
    with his then current employer, Path Stone.
    At R.M.'s request, the matter was transferred to the Office of
    Administrative Law for a hearing as a contested case. R.M. and a social worker
    from SCBSS testified at the hearing. In his testimony, R.M. admitted that he
    did not supply the housing search logs. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
    issued an Initial Decision finding R.M. had not complied with the terms of his
    service plan to seek permanent housing, and he failed to demonstrate hardship
    because he was offered a new position at work.           The ALJ recommended
    termination of R.M.'s EA benefits under N.J.A.C. 10:90-6.6 and denial of the
    extreme hardship extension. On June 27, 2019, DFD issued a Final Agency
    Decision adopting the ALJ's decision. Thus, R.M. was no longer eligible for EA
    and was ineligible for an EA extreme hardship extension. This appeal followed.
    Our role in reviewing the decision of an administrative agency is limited.
    In re Stallworth, 
    208 N.J. 182
    , 194 (2011). We will reverse an agency's decision
    if we find it is "'arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or . . . not supported by
    substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole.'"
    Ibid. (quoting Henry v.
    Rahway State Prison, 
    81 N.J. 571
    , 579-80 (1980)).
    A-5324-18T2
    3
    In determining whether agency action is arbitrary, capricious, or
    unreasonable, we must examine:
    (1) whether the agency's action violates express or
    implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency
    follow the law;
    (2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to
    support the findings on which the agency based its
    action; and
    (3) whether in applying the legislative policies to the
    facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion
    that could not reasonably have been made on a showing
    of the relevant factors.
    
    [Stallworth, 208 N.J. at 194
    (quoting In re Carter, 
    191 N.J. 474
    , 482-83 (2007)).]
    We "'may not substitute [our] own judgment for the agency's, even though
    [we] might have reached a different result.'"
    Ibid. (quoting Carter, 191
    N.J. at
    483). "This is particularly true when the issue under review is directed to the
    agency's special 'expertise and superior knowledge of a particular field.'"
    Id. at 195
    (quoting In re Herrmann, 
    192 N.J. 19
    , 28 (2007)). Furthermore, "[i]t is
    settled that '[a]n administrative agency's interpretation of statutes and
    regulations within its implementing and enforcing responsibility is ordin arily
    entitled to our deference.'" E.S. v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs.,
    
    412 N.J. Super. 340
    , 355 (App. Div. 2010) (second alteration in original)
    A-5324-18T2
    4
    (quoting Wnuck v. N.J. Div. Motor Vehicles, 
    337 N.J. Super. 52
    , 56 (App. Div.
    2001)).
    "Nevertheless, 'we are not bound by the agency's legal opinions.'" A.B.
    v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 
    407 N.J. Super. 330
    , 340 (App. Div.
    2009) (quoting Levine v. State Dep't of Transp., 
    338 N.J. Super. 28
    , 32 (App.
    Div. 2001)). "Statutory and regulatory construction is a purely legal issue
    subject to de novo review.
    Ibid. (citation omitted). Applying
    these standards,
    we discern no reason to disturb the Director's decision.
    Receipt of EA is limited to a maximum of twelve lifetime months.
    N.J.S.A. 44:10-51(a); N.J.A.C. 10:90-6.4(a). A six-month extension may be
    granted in cases of extreme hardship where the recipient has taken "all
    reasonable steps to resolve the emergent situation but the emergency nonetheless
    continues or a new emergency occurs, which causes extreme hardship to the
    family." N.J.A.C. 10:90-6.4(b); see also N.J.S.A. 44:10-51(a)(2). Examples of
    extreme hardship are: (1) the danger of loss of employment or a bona fide offer
    of employment by a recipient adult; (2) the recipient adult is in imminent
    physical danger; (3) the danger of serious harm to persons who are
    clinically/medically diagnosed as mentally and/or physically incapable of caring
    for themselves, thereby possibly leading to inpatient hospital care or
    A-5324-18T2
    5
    institutionalization; or (4) the request for additional EA arises directly out of a
    substantial loss of shelter, food, clothing, household furnishings and/or essential
    utilities incurred as a result of a natural disaster. N.J.A.C. 10:90-6.4(b)(1)(i)-
    (v).
    DFD found that R.M. failed to complete the affordable housing searches
    by March 2019 as required by his service plan, and he was "gainfully employed
    as of April 10, 2019." Accordingly, R.M. was not entitled to an extreme
    hardship extension of EA. Therefore, R.M.'s benefits were properly terminated
    under N.J.A.C. 10:90-6.6.
    Because R.M. failed to engage in housing searches as required by his
    service plan, and since he was not in danger of losing employment, he was no
    longer entitled to receive EA. He also failed to satisfy the criteria for extreme
    hardship.   We are satisfied that the Director's decision was supported by
    substantial credible evidence in the record, and it is not arbitrary, capricious, or
    unreasonable.
    Affirmed.
    A-5324-18T2
    6