AUDREY WILSON VS. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD (NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD) ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0834-19T2
AUDREY WILSON,
Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY STATE
PAROLE BOARD,
Respondent.
_____________________
Submitted November 16, 2020 – Decided December 4, 2020
Before Judges Fasciale and Mayer.
On appeal from the New Jersey State Parole Board.
Audrey Wilson, appellant pro se.
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel; Christopher Josephson, Deputy
Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Audrey Wilson appeals from a September 25, 2019 final agency decision
of the New Jersey State Parole Board (Board) denying her parole and imposing
an eighty-four-month future eligibility term (FET). We affirm.
On December 3, 1990, Wilson pleaded guilty to conspiracy to murder,
N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3. In accordance with the plea agreement,
on January 11, 1991, she was sentenced to an aggregate term of life in prison,
with a mandatory minimum term of thirty years.
Wilson became eligible for parole for the first time on April 21, 2019. On
December 7, 2018, a hearing officer referred the matter to a two-member Board
panel for review.
Wilson was denied parole by the two-member panel on March 21, 2019.
In determining there was a reasonable likelihood Wilson would violate
conditions of her parole if released, the panel cited: the facts and circumstances
of the offense, noting Wilson aided in the stabbing death of her mother while
her mother was sleeping; commission of persistent disciplinary infractions,
resulting in the loss of commutation time and confinement in detention;
insufficient problem resolution, including a failure to sufficiently address a
substance abuse problem and a lack of understanding and remorse for her crime;
and the results of an objective risk assessment evaluation indicating a "low-
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medium" risk of recidivism. The panel also acknowledged the following
mitigating factors: participation in programs specific to behavior; participation
in institutional programs; favorable institutional adjustment; attempts to enroll
in programs; and achieving a bachelor's degree while incarcerated.
The matter was referred to a three-member panel for establishment of an
FET outside of the administrative guidelines. On June 17, 2019, the three-
member panel issued an eight-page written decision and established an eighty-
four-month FET. The three-member panel based its decision on the same factors
identified by the two-member panel and considered letters of mitigation
submitted on behalf of Wilson.
Wilson appealed the decisions rendered by the panels to the full Board.
On September 25, 2019, the Board affirmed the decisions to deny parole and
impose an eighty-four-month FET.
On appeal, Wilson argues:
POINT I
THE DECISION BY THE PAROLE BOARD WAS
ARBITRARY, AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, DID
NOT COMPORT WITH THE LAW, AND WAS NOT
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL CREDIBLE
EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD.
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POINT II
THE PAROLE BOARD ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT IMPOSED AN EXCEPTIONAL FUTURE
ELIGIBILITY TERM (FET) IN THIS CASE.
Our review of a parole board's decision is limited. Hare v. N.J. State Parole
Bd., 368 N.J. Super. 175, 179 (App. Div. 2004). We "must determine whether the
factual finding could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence
in the whole record." Ibid. (citing Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 166 N.J. 113,
172, modified, 167 N.J. 619 (2001)). We will overturn a Parole Board's decision
only if it is arbitrary and capricious. Perry v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 459 N.J. Super.
186, 193 (App. Div. 2019). An appellate court must not substitute its judgment for
that of the agency, and an agency's decision is accorded a strong presumption of
reasonableness. McGowan v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 347 N.J. Super. 544, 563 (App.
Div. 2002). The appellant bears "[t]he burden of showing that an action was
arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious." Ibid.
The Board must consider the factors enumerated in N.J.A.C. 10A:71-
3.11(b)(1)-(23) in making its decision. The Board, however, is not required to
consider each and every factor; rather, it should consider those applicable to
each case. McGowan, 347 N.J. Super. at 561.
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We have considered Wilson's contentions and conclude they are without
sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
We affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by the Board in its cogent
decision. We add the following remarks.
The Board considered each of Wilson's arguments and explained, in detail,
why her contentions lacked merit. The Board specifically rejected Wilson's claim
that the panel members acted unprofessionally during the hearing by "belittl[ing]
[her] explanation as to [her] motive, stating 'so your mom was mean to you – get
over it'" and mocking her religious faith by "stating 'everybody gets religion when
they come to prison.'" The Board listened to the electronic recording of the hearing
and found "no evidence to support [the] allegation of improper conduct by any Board
members." The Board concluded Wilson was "asked appropriate questions in a
professional manner and the Board panel afforded [her] ample time and opportunity
to ask and answer questions and to speak on several points." Based on the recording,
the Board rejected Wilson's claim that the panel was "unprofessional and
demeaning" toward her during the hearing.
The Board's action was consistent with the applicable law. The decision
was not arbitrary or capricious, and there is substantial credible evidence in the
record to support the denial of parole. The Board's determination addressed
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each of the arguments raised by Wilson and explained why it rejected her
arguments.
Likewise, we are satisfied the eighty-four-month FET imposed by the
Board is supported by the record and is not arbitrary and capricious. An FET
outside the standard guidelines may be established if the standard FET is
inappropriate based on the inmate's lack of satisfactory progress in reducing the
likelihood of criminal behavior. N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21(d).
Here, the three-member panel found that, even after thirty years of
incarceration, Wilson lacks adequate understanding of "the personality defects
and emotional dynamics that impelled [her] to participate in the murder of [her]
mother." The Board determined Wilson lacked genuine remorse and an
understanding of the motivation for her criminal actions, requiring additional
time for her to participate in counseling to address "the emotional dynamics that
affect [her] anti-social thinking."
In sum, on this record, we have no reason to second-guess the Board's
findings or conclusions and defer to its expertise in these matters.
Affirmed.
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