MICHAEL SUKENIK VS. MARINA DIZIK(DC-14769-15, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)DCPP VS. K.M. AND R.A.IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF J.M.(FG-09-101-16, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)(RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2017 )


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  •                         NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
    Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
    parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-4053-15T3
    MICHAEL SUKENIK,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    MARINA DIZIK,
    Defendant-Respondent.
    ________________________________
    Argued May 15, 2017 – Decided          June 7, 2017
    Before Judges Currier and Geiger.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Law Division, Special Civil Part, Bergen
    County, Docket No. DC-14769-15.
    Michael Confusione argued the cause for
    appellant (Hegge & Confusione, LLC, attorneys;
    Mr. Confusione, of counsel and on the brief).
    Marina   Ginzburg   argued  the   cause              for
    respondent (Ruiz Doolan Law Firm,                   LLC,
    attorneys; Ms. Ginzburg, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Plaintiff Michael Sukenik appeals from a May 5, 2016 order
    granting defendant Marina Dizik's motion for involuntary dismissal
    at the close of the presentation of plaintiff's case.                  We affirm.
    Plaintiff was the sole witness to testify at the Special
    Civil    Part   trial.     He   testified        he   and   defendant    dated     for
    approximately one and one half years.                 Beginning in January 2014,
    they spent every weekend and holiday together, with plaintiff
    frequently staying overnight in defendant's home.                 Plaintiff moved
    into defendant's home on February 8, 2015.
    Plaintiff claimed he spent substantial sums not only on mutual
    expenses    such   as    vacations    and       dinners,    but   also   on    needed
    improvements to defendant's home and property because the home was
    in poor condition.        The improvements included replacing windows
    and     undertaking     interior     and       exterior     repairs.     Plaintiff
    testified he spent $8,850.36 for materials and a sprinkler system
    repair.    The bills he incurred and his credit card statements were
    admitted into evidence.            Plaintiff also contributed his labor,
    which he valued at $3,000, and $1,500 per month toward the mortgage
    payment.
    According to plaintiff, the relationship ended shortly after
    he underwent major kidney surgery on June 18, 2015, when defendant
    demanded he move out of her home.                Two months after moving out,
    plaintiff filed this action seeking recovery for his expenses and
    the value of his time spent undertaking the home improvements.                       He
    claimed damages totaling $11,850.36.               Defendant denied liability,
    contending that the improvements made to her home were gifts.
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    Plaintiff's trial testimony was sparse.          Noticeably absent
    was any testimony that defendant asked plaintiff to undertake the
    home improvements, promised to pay him for his services, or
    promised to reimburse him for his expenditures.           Nor was there any
    evidence that plaintiff expected to be paid for his labor or
    reimbursed for his costs.       When asked whether he had a contract
    or written agreement with defendant, plaintiff testified he was
    not in that kind of business relationship with her.                Similarly,
    his answers to interrogatories omitted reference to any contract
    or agreement with defendant.       In fact, plaintiff admitted that
    defendant never promised to pay him, or to give him anything of
    value, in exchange for the windows he installed or the other
    repairs that he performed.       Plaintiff candidly admitted it was
    because of the nature of their break-up that he needed to recover,
    at least partially, what he invested to improve defendant's home.
    Defendant moved for an involuntary dismissal under Rule 4:37-
    2(b) at the close of plaintiff's case.        In an oral decision, the
    trial judge granted the motion, dismissing the complaint with
    prejudice.
    On   appeal,   plaintiff   contends    the   trial    judge    erred    by
    dismissing his case because he was entitled to recover damages
    under the doctrines of unjust enrichment, detrimental reliance,
    quantum meruit, and quasi-contract.        Defendant contends the judge
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    properly     dismissed     plaintiff's     claims,     arguing      that     the
    improvements     were    unconditional     gifts.          Defendant   further
    contends: (1) there was no contract between the parties that would
    allow plaintiff to recover; (2) the doctrine of unjust enrichment
    does not apply to irrevocable gifts; (3) the theories of quantum
    meruit and quasi-contact do not apply when there is no expectation
    between    the   parties   of   repayment;    and    (4)    the   doctrine    of
    detrimental reliance does not apply as defendant made no promises
    to plaintiff.
    "A motion for involuntary dismissal is premised 'on the ground
    that upon the facts and upon the law the plaintiff has shown no
    right to relief.'"      ADS Assoc. v. Oritani Sav. Bank, 
    219 N.J. 496
    ,
    510 (2014) (quoting R. 4:37-2(b)).           The "motion shall be denied
    if the evidence, together with legitimate inferences therefrom,
    could sustain a judgment in plaintiff's favor."                
    Ibid.
     (quoting
    R. 4:37-2(b)).      "If the court, accepting as true all the evidence
    which supports the position of the party defending against the
    motion and according him the benefit of all inferences which can
    reasonably    and   legitimately   be    deduced    therefrom,     finds   that
    reasonable minds could differ, then the motion must be denied."
    
    Id. at 510-11
     (citation omitted).         "Stated differently, dismissal
    is appropriate when no rational [factfinder] could conclude from
    the evidence that an essential element of the plaintiff's case is
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    present."   Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment
    2.1 on R. 4:37-2(b) (citing Pitts v. Newark Bd. of Educ., 
    337 N.J. Super. 331
    , 340 (App. Div. 2001)).     "An appellate court applies
    the same standard when it reviews a trial court's grant or denial
    of a Rule 4:37-2(b) motion for involuntary dismissal." ADS Assoc.,
    supra, 219 N.J. at 511.
    "A trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal
    consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to
    any special deference."    Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of
    Manalapan, 
    140 N.J. 366
    , 378 (1995).     We review a trial court's
    interpretation and application of the law de novo.     ADS Assoc.,
    supra, 219 N.J. at 511.
    We are satisfied that the trial judge's grant of defendant's
    motion for an involuntary dismissal was appropriate as plaintiff
    presented insufficient evidence to sustain his burden of proof on
    his causes of action.     Plaintiff did not enter into a contract
    with defendant.    Defendant did not promise to reimburse plaintiff
    for the cost of materials or the value of his labor.     Plaintiff
    had no expectation of renumeration or compensation for undertaking
    the improvements.    Plaintiff has not shown detrimental reliance.
    The home improvements were not undertaken in contemplation of any
    future event.     Instead, they were unconditional gifts that were
    complete upon delivery.    See Jennings v. Cutler, 
    288 N.J. Super. 5
                             A-4053-15T3
    553, 562 (App. Div. 1996) (boyfriend's actions manifested his
    intent to give girlfriend mortgage as gift); see also In re Dodge,
    
    50 N.J. 192
    , 216 (1967); Pascale v. Pascale, 
    113 N.J. 20
    , 29
    (1988).     Accordingly, there is no basis for equitable recovery
    under the theories of unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, or quasi-
    contract.    The trial court correctly determined that there was no
    basis for plaintiff to recover damages for the cost or value of
    those unconditional gifts.
    Affirmed.
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