STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JAMES LEROY BAXTER (90-01-0093, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2020 )


Menu:
  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-3261-18T4
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    JAMES LEROY BAXTER,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    _______________________
    Submitted October 15, 2020 – Decided December 10, 2020
    Before Judges Whipple and Rose.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Mercer County, Indictment No. 90-01-0093.
    James Baxter, appellant pro se.
    Angelo J. Onofri, Mercer County Prosecutor, attorney
    for respondent (Narline Casimir, Assistant Prosecutor,
    of counsel and on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Defendant James Baxter appeals pro se from a March 12, 2019, trial court
    order denying his motions to compel discovery, for removal to federal court, to
    correct an illegal sentence and assign counsel, as well as the denial of his petition
    for post-conviction relief (PCR) and his amendments to his petition. We affirm
    for the reasons stated by Judge Timothy Lydon in his written decision.
    Defendant was convicted by a jury in 1991 with first-degree murder,
    N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1); felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3); first-degree
    robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 and 2C:2-6; third-degree theft by unlawful taking,
    N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3(a) and 2C:2-6; and second-degree possession of a weapon for
    an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) and 2C:2-6. He was sentenced to an
    aggregate term of life imprisonment with a thirty-year term of parole
    ineligibility, and an additional concurrent sentence of twenty years with ten
    years of parole ineligibility. We affirmed his conviction on direct appeal, and
    the Supreme Court denied certification. State v. Baxter, 
    134 N.J. 568
    (1993).
    Defendant filed a PCR petition, which was denied and affirmed on appeal, and
    the Supreme Court denied certification. State v. Baxter, 
    161 N.J. 335
    (1999).
    Defendant filed this second petition for PCR and moved for a new trial in
    September 2018, asserting newly-discovered evidence. The newly-discovered
    evidence was that a cooperating witness, Ronald Granville, had a pending
    indictment undisclosed at the time of trial that could have been used by
    defendant during cross-examination to undermine Granville's credibility. The
    A-3261-18T4
    2
    court denied defendant's second PCR petition as well as other requested relief
    in an omnibus order of March 12, 2019.        Defendant's appeal herein only
    addresses the denial of his motion for a new trial and his motion to correct an
    illegal sentence. He argues the following:
    POINT I
    THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
    DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BASED
    ON NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE.
    POINT II
    THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
    [DEFENDANT'S] MOTION TO CORRECT AN
    ILLEGAL SENTENCE.
    In his March 2019 written decision, Judge Lydon concluded defendant's
    arguments regarding Granville's undisclosed indictment are procedurally barred.
    The court concluded:
    In the amendment to your PCR, you raise a new
    ineffective assistance claim. You assert that your
    attorney "failed to make reasonable efforts to learn of
    the State's key witness' criminal history.". . . . You
    assert that "had the jury been informed of the
    suppressed pending indictments, full criminal history,
    and the sentence considerations Granville would be
    receiving for his testimony resulting in bias, it is
    'reasonably probable' that the result of the proceeding
    would have been different.". . . . Your new ineffective
    assistance claim is procedurally barred. Under Rule
    3:22-4, any PCR claim "that reasonably could have
    been raised in a prior proceeding" is barred from
    A-3261-18T4
    3
    assertion in a future proceeding. Your trial was held
    over [twenty-seven] years ago in February 1991. More
    than three years passed between your trial and the
    submission of your first PCR on August 31, 1994. You
    had an opportunity during this period of time to identify
    and substantiate any ineffective assistance claims
    against your attorney. In fact, your first PCR made
    several allegations of ineffective assistance, including
    the claim that your attorney failed to inform the court
    of a conflict of interest. You certainly could have
    raised your new ineffective assistance claims as a part
    of your first PCR. It is clear that your claim does not
    rest on a previously unknown "factual predicate." Rule
    3:22-4. Instead, you simply contend that your trial
    attorney failed to explore Granville's alleged bias.
    Because you were in a position to assert this argument
    at a prior PCR proceeding, you are not permitted [to]
    pursue it in this subsequent petition.
    The court also concluded defendant's claims regarding Granville were
    barred by Rule 3:22-4 because they could have been raised on direct appeal.
    The court stated defendant's arguments regarding Granville lacked substantive
    merit because "[i]n order to establish a Brady1 violation the defense must
    demonstrate that (1) the prosecution failed to disclose the evidence, (2) the
    evidence was of a favorable character for the defense; and (3) the evidence was
    material. State v. Carter, 
    85 N.J. 300
    , 311 (1981)." The court further stated
    1
    Brady v. Maryland, 
    373 U.S. 83
    (1963).
    A-3261-18T4
    4
    defendant had not met the test to demonstrate the evidence had "the propensity
    to influence the outcome of the trial."
    Finally, the court concluded defendant's assertions were not sufficient to
    meet the Strickland/Fritz 2 standard for ineffective assistance claims. Based on
    our review of the record, we discern no error requiring us to disturb the denial
    of the petition nor the denial of a motion for a new trial.
    We also reject defendant's second argument regarding sentencing. Based
    on our review, the application of aggravating factor N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1) did
    not render the sentence illegal.
    Affirmed.
    2
    State v. Fritz, 
    105 N.J. 42
    (1987) (adopting the standard set forth in Strickland
    v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    (1984)).
    A-3261-18T4
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-3261-18T4

Filed Date: 12/10/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/10/2020