GARDEN STATE INVESTMENT VS. TOWNSHIP OF BRICK, NEW JERSEY AND THE APPROVED REALTY GROUP VS. TOWNSHIP OF BRICK (C-0234-17 and C-0080-18, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (CONSOLIDATED) ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0082-19T2
A-0093-19T2
GARDEN STATE INVESTMENT
and ISADORE H. MAY t/a
GARDEN STATE
INVESTMENTS, II,
APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
Plaintiffs-Appellants, December 10, 2020
APPELLATE DIVISION
v.
TOWNSHIP OF BRICK, NEW
JERSEY,
Defendant-Respondent.
_______________________________
THE APPROVED REALTY GROUP,
LLC,
Defendant-Appellant,
v.
TOWNSHIP OF BRICK, NEW
JERSEY,
Defendant-Respondent.
_______________________________
Submitted October 27, 2020 – Decided December 10, 2020
Before Judges Fisher, Gilson and Moynihan.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Ocean County, Docket Nos. C-
0234-17 and C-0080-18.
Ford, Flower, Hasbrouck & Loefflad, attorneys for
appellants (Willis F. Flower, on the briefs).
Grace, Marmero & Associates, LLP, attorneys for
respondent (Michael R. Burns, on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FISHER, P.J.A.D.
Plaintiffs are the purchasers of tax sale certificates on vacant lots in Brick
Township (the township). Plaintiffs, who admit they have "extensive
experience" in making these types of investments, acknowledge they each did
the same depth of research prior to purchasing the tax sale certificates: they
physically inspected the properties and examined the assessment records and tax
map maintained by the tax assessor. What they did not do was obtain title
searches prior to their purchases. Instead, they paid taxes on the properties and
bided their time until entitled to commence foreclosure actions. With the
foreclosure actions underway, plaintiffs finally obtained title searches, learning
for the first time that the properties were encumbered by a conservation
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easement.1 Soon after this revelation, plaintiffs filed their separate complaints
in these two matters, seeking rescission of their tax sale certificate purchases
and reimbursement of taxes they paid on the properties. In ruling on cross -
motions for summary judgment, the chancery judge found plaintiffs were not
entitled to equitable relief and denied rescission. We agree and affirm the
judgments entered in both matters.
There are no disputed facts, only arguments about the significance of those
facts. Simply put, the former owner of a large tract of land engaged in litigation
with the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) that ended in 2001,
when the DEP consented to the construction of thirty-four dwellings on the tract
in exchange for the owner's agreement "not to disturb in perpetuity" those lots
now involved in these suits. To ensure compliance, the settlement agreement
required the owner's execution and recordation of a deed declaring each affected
lot would thereafter be burdened by a "conservation/restriction easement." See
Village of Ridgewood v. Bolger Foundation, 104 N.J. 337, 340-41 (1986). The
1
Although stating in a certification that The Approved Realty Group's attorney
obtained a title search when commencing the foreclosure action, its principal
stated that he was unaware of the conservation easement until making attempts
to sell the foreclosed property.
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property owner and the DEP also agreed this restriction "shall run with the land
and be binding upon all successive owners."
In February 2002, the DEP advised the municipal clerk of the conservation
easement. The township's tax collector, who has held that position since 1989,
filed an unrebutted certification asserting that information about the existence
of the conservation easement was not forwarded to her office, nor did the
property owner ever seek a reduction in the encumbered lots' assessed values.
The assessment card did not indicate the presence of the conservation easement,
and the tax collector certified she was personally unaware of the conservation
easement until plaintiffs learned of it.
In appealing, plaintiffs rely almost entirely on Township of Middletown
v. Simon, 193 N.J. 228 (2008), affirming in part, 387 N.J. Super. 65 (App. Div.
2006), which they claim entitles them to a rescission of their tax sale certificate
purchases and reimbursement of the taxes they have since paid on these
properties.2 We find Middletown dissimilar.
Because plaintiffs bank so much on Middletown, we find it necessary to
discuss it in depth. The record there revealed that, in 1929, owners subdivided
2
We find insufficient merit in plaintiffs' other arguments to warrant discussion
in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
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a large tract of land adjacent to Shadow Lake into fifty-six residential lots, and
one lot labeled "Park" (the Park lot). When one of the improved lots was sold
some sixty years later, it was learned that the Park lot had been mistakenly joined
for tax purposes with that other lot; consequently, the tax assessor gave the Park
lot a separate tax designation and listed the owner as "unknown." 193 N.J. at
233. Thereafter, taxes on the Park lot went unpaid, and tax sale certificates were
sold to different individuals in 1990, 1991, and 1995. Id. at 233-34.
Following his purchase of a tax sale certificate in 1995, Richard Simon
paid the taxes on the Park lot for the following five years and commenced a tax
sale foreclosure action in 2000. Id. at 234. Simon joined as a defendant, among
others, the owner of the formerly adjoining lot; that defendant filed an answer,
asserting Middletown was an indispensable party because of the dedication for
public use. By motion, the trial court rejected that defense and determined that
the original owners did not intend to dedicate the Park lot for public use. Ibid.
Despite that ruling, Middletown's attorney approached Simon's attorney,
taking the position that the tax sale certificates on the Park lot had been sold in
error and seeking a compromise. Ibid. Nothing was resolved, and Middletown
was neither joined as an indispensable party nor sought to intervene, id. at 234-
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35, allowing Simon to proceed forward, obtain a foreclosure judgment, and sell
the property to a developer, who planned to build a residence on the Park lot.
When property owners near Shadow Lake "voiced objections" to
Middletown's governing body about the proposed construction on the Park lot,
387 N.J. Super. at 72, Middletown filed an action against Simon, the preceding
tax sale certificate purchasers, and the developer (collectively, the defendants),
seeking a declaration that the Park lot was dedicated for public use. After
commencing the action, Middletown's governing body adopted an ordinance
accepting the dedication of the Park lot for public use.
On cross-motions, the trial judge determined that Middletown did not have
a dedicated interest. 193 N.J. at 231-32. On appeal, we reversed, holding that
Middletown was not barred by estoppel principles because the dedication of the
lot for public use was "irrevocable." 387 N.J. Super. at 77.
The Supreme Court agreed with our determination that the Park lot was
subject to an irrevocable dedication to public use even though Middletown failed
to accept that dedication for so many years. 193 N.J. at 240-42. The Court held
that the disposition of Simon's foreclosure action, which was based in part on a
determination that the original owners did not dedicate the Park lot for public
use, as well as Middletown's course of conduct in selling a tax sale certificate
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despite the dedication, did not prevent Middletown from accepting – seventy-
eight years later – the dedication of the lot as a park. Id. at 242-43. The Court,
however, went further than we did and concluded that the defendants were
entitled to an equitable remedy because of these unusual circumstances. The
Court remanded the matter to allow the defendants reimbursement of the taxes
paid. Id. at 245-46. Plaintiffs claim entitlement to a similar remedy.
We agree with the trial judge that plaintiffs are not entitled to equitable
relief because of the significant differences between these cases and
Middletown. Particularly relevant is the fact that Middletown played an active
role in seeking to deprive Simon of his investment. Middletown sold tax sale
certificates for unpaid taxes on the Park lot: a step that certainly suggested its
own lack of interest in accepting the dedication. That alone would not have been
enough to support the equitable claim, but when Simon rebuffed Middletown's
desire to negotiate a resolution, Middletown allowed Simon to continue to seek
a foreclosure judgment without intervening, later commenced its own action for
a declaratory judgment about the dedication, and then took the step of actually
adopting an ordinance that formally accepted the dedication, which deprived
Simon of his investment.
A-0082-19T2
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Unlike Middletown, the township here took no affirmative action with
respect to these lots. The tax assessor has asserted, without contradiction, that
she had no knowledge of the conservation easement. When taxes went unpaid,
the routine step of selling tax sale certificates was taken. As we recognized in
Middletown, there was no inconsistency with Middletown's issuance of a tax
sale certificate and its belief that the property was dedicated to public use, 387
N.J. Super. at 80, and no basis to allow such a circumstance to give the purchaser
an equitable remedy upon later learning of facts that would reveal their poor
investment. It was Middletown's later change in approach toward the Park lot
that gave rise to the investor's right to the remedy of rescission and the
reimbursement of paid taxes. In those unusual circumstances, the Court viewed
Middletown as having been unjustly enriched by selling a tax sale certificate
and accepting the taxes paid by the purchaser prior to the foreclosure action and
then, years later, resurrecting its long-dormant right to accept the park
designation for its own benefit. 193 N.J. at 245-46.
Moreover, the Court emphasized that Middletown was amenable to
granting the defendants that relief. Id. at 245. In its declaratory-judgment
action, it was Middletown that initially sought imposition of a remedy for the
investor, by demanding a determination of "the amount it should reimburse to
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defendants." Ibid. Concluding this was "a fair request," the Court held that "a
fair and equitable remedy is to bind [Middletown] to its prayer for the court to
fix the amount it should reimburse defendants." Ibid. These circumstances were
not present here.
We conclude the chancery judge appropriately viewed the circumstances
to be materially different from those in Middletown. The township tax assessor
was unaware of the conservation easement. While its existence was
ascertainable to all – since deeds containing the easement had been recorded in
the County Clerk's Office – plaintiffs, by engaging in this form of investment,
had a greater interest in learning of any limitations on the property than the
township did. Unlike Middletown, the township was passive throughout; it took
none of the affirmative steps Middletown took to pull the rug out from under the
investor. Middletown allowed Simon to continue to pursue his foreclosure
action and expend funds only to eviscerate his investment opportunity by
accepting the public use dedication at a later date.
The township made no misrepresentation and engaged in no unfair
conduct that would give plaintiffs a right to an equitable remedy, as the trial
judge correctly concluded. See Manor Real Estate & Trust Co. v. City of
Linden, 8 N.J. Super. 114, 116 (App. Div. 1950); see also Simon v. Twp. of
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Voorhees, 289 N.J. Super. 116, 122 (App. Div. 1996) (recognizing the "general
rule . . . that the holder of a tax certificate may not be reimbursed by a taxing
authority in the absence of a statute giving that right"). Plaintiffs and the
township were laboring under the same misunderstanding about the property.
And both sides had the same ability to learn more. The township, however, had
no reason to be curious about the lots or inquire further,3 while plaintiffs had
every reason to uncover all material circumstances about their investments.
Plaintiffs' failure to act more diligently in ascertaining any defects in or
limitations on their investments bars their claim for equitable relief, particularly
against the township, which acted passively and innocently throughout. See
Harrington v. Heder, 109 N.J. Eq. 528, 534 (E. & A. 1932) (invoking the maxim
that "[e]quity does not aid one whose indifference contributes materially to the
injury he complains of"); Lever v. Thomas, 340 N.J. Super. 198, 203 (App. Div.
2001) (invoking the maxim that "equity favors the vigilant").
Affirmed.
3
Nor did the township tax assessor have any hint that things had changed with
these lots because the prior owner never sought a reassessment when or after the
conservation easement was imposed.
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