MICHAEL VANCE VS. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS) ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4553-18
MICHAEL VANCE, a/k/a
MICHAEL VANTASSAL, and
MICHAEL VANTASSEL,
Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent.
__________________________
Submitted May 5, 2021 – Decided July 21, 2021
Before Judges Ostrer and Vernoia.
On appeal from the New Jersey Department of
Corrections.
Michael Vance, appellant pro se.
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Jane C. Schuster, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel; Stephanie M. Mersch, Deputy
Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
In this Department of Corrections disciplinary appeal, Michael Vance
challenges the finding that while incarcerated at South Woods State Prison, he
possessed contraband drugs — specifically, a synthetic cannabinoid.
See N.J.A.C. 10A:4–4.1(a)(6)(i) (prohibited act *.203) (prohibiting "possession
or introduction of any prohibited substances, such as drugs, intoxicants, or
related paraphernalia not prescribed for the inmate by the medical or dental
staff"); N.J.A.C. 10A:4–4.1(a) (stating that "[p]rohibited acts preceded by an
asterisk (*) are considered the most serious and result in the most severe
sanctions"). Because the Department relied on a field test of unproved reliability
and denied Vance's request for a confirmatory test, we reverse.1
1
According to Department of Corrections records, Vance was released from
custody on February 14, 2021. State of New Jersey Department of Corrections,
OFFICIAL SITE OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
https://www20.state.nj.us/DOC_Inmate/inmatesearch.jsp (type "Vance" in last-
name field and "Michael" in first-name field; then click "Submit"; then follow
"000201259C" hyperlink) (last visited June 29, 2021) (Department removes
offender information one year after custodial term's completion). However, we
decline to dismiss the appeal as moot. Although it is unclear if the finding will
trigger collateral consequences, see Cinque v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 261 N.J.
Super. 242, 244 (App. Div. 1993) (stating that a case will be dismissed for
mootness "if the potential of adverse collateral consequences is speculative and
remote"), the Department's reliance on field tests raises an issue of significant
public importance that will surely recur, see State v. Cassidy, 235 N.J. 482, 491
(2018) (declining to dismiss appeal as moot for similar reasons).
A-4553-18
2
A corrections officer reported that during a "non-routine strip search," he
"discovered a bag of green leafy substance in a clear plastic bag wrapped in
tissue . . . in an altered sewn pocket" in Vance's pants. A few days later, a special
investigator, relying on a field test, reported that the substance tested positive
for "Synthetic Cannabinoids Reagent." Vance was charged with a *.203
prohibited act for possessing the alleged synthetic cannabinoid, and a hearing
officer found him guilty. 2 To support her finding, the hearing officer cited the
field test and the corrections officer's report. For that infraction, Vance received
180 days of administrative segregation, ninety days' loss of commutation time,
permanent loss of contact visits, and other sanctions.
On appeal, Vance contends that the Department acted arbitrarily and
capriciously and denied him due process by relying on the field test as proof of
guilt after denying his request to submit the substance for further testing. Vance
asserted that the hearing officer stated that the field test was sufficient evidence
of guilt. He also contends that the hearing officer arbitrarily refused to obtain
2
Because Vance tested positive for suboxone, another hearing officer found
him guilty of a *.204 prohibited act, see N.J.A.C. 10:4–4.1(a)(6)(ii) (prohibiting
"use of any prohibited substances, such as drugs, intoxicants, or related
paraphernalia not prescribed for the inmate by the medical or dental staff ");
however, Vance appeals only the finding of a *.203 infraction.
A-4553-18
3
and examine color photos of the leafy substance. Vance argues that it was
brown, not green.
Vance's arguments rely heavily on our decision in Blanchard v. N.J. Dep't
of Corr., 461 N.J. Super. 231 (App. Div. 2019). The Department counters that
Blanchard is distinguishable on its facts, and that substantial credible evidence
supports the finding against Vance.
In Blanchard, we reversed a finding of a *.203 infraction that relied on a
field test. The test indicated that the inmate's powder, which he kept inside
rolled or folded magazine paper tucked in a paperback book, was cocaine and
not a coffee sweetener as he contended. Four primary considerations led us to
hold that the Department acted arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably in
denying the inmate's request for a confirmatory laboratory test.
First, we relied on the field test's unproved reliability and the lack of
evidence that a properly-trained special investigator performed the test. Id. at
243-46. We recognized that, because the Department need not apply the Rules
of Evidence, the test's admissibility was not at issue. Id. at 243. But at the same
time, we stated, "[T]he test's reliability is pertinent to whether the agency has
provided a fundamentally fair hearing, and met its burden of proof." Ibid.
A-4553-18
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Second, we pointed to the dearth of evidence corroborating the claim that
the inmate possessed drugs. Id. at 246-47. Third, we concluded that the
Department's policy of routinely sending specimens for confirmatory tests
indicated that the Department recognized a field test's limitations, and also
indicated that confirmatory testing was "not unduly burdensome." Id. at 247.3
And fourth, we cited the Department's failure to provide any reasoned
explanation for refusing Blanchard's request for a confirmatory test. Id. at 247-
48.
The Department does not address factors one, three, or four; we therefore
conclude that they are present in this case, just as they were in Blanchard.
Notably, with regard to factor one, the manufacturer of the Nark II field test for
synthetic cannabinoids used in Vance's case states on its own website, "ALL
TEST RESULTS MUST BE CONFIRMED BY AN APPROVED
ANALYTICAL LABORATORY! The results of this test are merely
presumptive. NARK® only tests for the possible presence of certain chemical
compounds. Reactions may occur with, and such compounds can be found in,
both legal and illegal products." NARK II Synthetic Cannabinoid Reagent,
3
The Department amended its regulation, which it once limited to urine, to
cover confirmatory testing of other bodily specimens. Id. at 241, n.5.
A-4553-18
5
SIRCHIE (emphasis added), https://www.sirchie.com/nark-ii-synthetic-
cannabinoid-reagent-5-tests.html#.YNU9l_KSmUk (last visited June 29, 2021).
Of course, scientific test-results need not be infallible to be admissible. Cassidy,
235 N.J. at 491-92 (stating that "[s]cientific test results are admissible in a
criminal trial only when the technique is shown to be generally accepted as
reliable within the relevant scientific community"). But here, the Department
presented no evidence at all regarding the field test's accuracy. Furthermore,
regarding factor four, the department did not explain why it refused a
confirmatory test — even though it evidently used a laboratory test of Vance's
urine to conclude that he used suboxone. 4 In her written decision, the hearing
officer did not address Vance's request for a confirmatory test. Vance contends
on appeal that she "claimed that the field test was sufficient for a guilty finding."
So, we focus on factor two. The Department contends that, in contrast to
Blanchard, there was corroborating evidence that Vance possessed a synthetic
cannabinoid: Vance secreted the leafy substance in a plastic bag in a hidden
pocket in his pants, and he was present in a restricted area without authorization.
4
We rely on Vance's submission for this assertion about the urine test.
Unfortunately, the Department document which he cites for support contains
unexplained abbreviations.
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But those facts are insufficient to offset the hearing-officer's reliance on the
field-test results.
We stated that "[t]he sole issue" in Blanchard was "whether, in a case with
a single positive field test of unproved reliability, and no other corroborating
evidence, procedural fairness compels a second, confirmatory test, to assure that
the field test did not produce a false positive." Blanchard, 461 N.J. Super. at
241. We did not decide — because we did not have to — whether corroborating
evidence could salvage a finding that relied on a field test of unproved
reliability. We do so now.
We conclude that the additional facts the Department cites do not
constitute substantial credible evidence supporting the finding of guilt. Neither
do they mean that Vance received a fair hearing. Evidence of Vance's allegedly-
unauthorized presence in a restricted area and of his hidden pocket does not
excuse the Department's failure to obtain a confirmatory test and its reliance on
a field test of unproved reliability. We reach that conclusion for three reasons.
First, the hearing officer did not state that she relied on the allegation that
Vance was in an unauthorized area to meet another inmate. Instead, she referred
only to the field test (and the report of the officer who described how he found
the bag in Vance's hidden pocket). Thus, we cannot conclude that her reliance
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on the field test was "harmless." See Jacobs v. Stephens, 139 N.J. 212, 219
(1995) (applying "harmless-error analysis" to denial of inmate's procedural
rights).
Second, the hearing officer made no finding on why Vance was in the
medical area. According to a sergeant's report — which the hearing officer did
not cite to support her findings — Vance admitted that he was in the medical
area to meet another inmate. But on appeal, he contends that he was there to
receive medication. It is not for us to resolve this dispute on appeal.
Third, the allegedly corroborating evidence — even if credited — is far
from overwhelming. Vance's secret pocket may bespeak contraband, but it does
not so clearly bespeak drugs. Vance contended that the vegetation in his pocket
was tobacco, which was itself contraband. And even if Vance was in the medical
area for an unauthorized meeting, that fact does little to prove he possessed
synthetic cannabinoids. Instead, it tends to show that he used suboxone. The
other inmate allegedly possessed suboxone, and both he and Vance tested
positive for that substance.
Substantial evidence must underlie an agency's finding. In re Carter, 191
N.J. 474, 483 (2007); Blanchard, 461 N.J. Super. at 237-38; N.J.A.C. 10A:4-
9.15(a). In other words, the finding must rest on "such evidence as a reasonable
A-4553-18
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mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Blanchard, 461 N.J.
Super. at 238.
The record before us does not meet that threshold. Absent evidence of the
field test's reliability, we are unpersuaded (especially in light of the
manufacturer's caveat) that a reasonable mind would find the test adequate to
support a finding of guilt. Nor does the additional evidence tip the balance.
Reversed.
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