STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. LUIS F. LECAROS-DELGADO (22-2019, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2401-19
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
LUIS F. LECAROS-DELGADO,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________
Submitted June 7, 2021 – Decided August 9, 2021
Before Judges Mayer and Susswein.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Middlesex County, Municipal Appeal No. 22-
2019.
Eric B. Morrell, attorney for appellant.
Yolanda Ciccone, Middlesex County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (David M. Liston, Assistant
Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant appeals from a February 18, 2020 Law Division order denying
his motion to withdraw two driving-while-intoxicated (DWI) guilty pleas that
he entered in municipal court in 2007. Defendant did not seek to withdraw those
guilty pleas until 2019. He now contends the municipal court judge who
accepted the pleas and imposed the sentence was hostile and biased against him.
After carefully reviewing the record in light of the applicable legal principles,
we reject defendant's contentions and affirm.
We briefly summarize the pertinent facts and procedural history. In the
early morning hours of February 24, 2007, defendant drove from the bar he
owned after consuming a substantial amount of alcohol. He was stopped by
police and subsequent testing indicated a blood alcohol content (BAC) well
above the legal limit. Less than two weeks later, on March 9, 2007, defendant
was again arrested and charged with DWI when he again consumed alcohol and
proceeded to operate his vehicle.
On April 12, 2007, defendant pled guilty to both DWI offenses. On the
conviction for the first incident, the municipal court judge imposed an eight -
month license suspension, twelve hours in the Intoxicated Driver Resource
Center (IDRC), and monetary fines and penalties. On the conviction for the
second DWI offense, the judge imposed a two-year license suspension, forty-
A-2401-19
2
eight hours in the IDRC, monetary fines and penalties, and participation in a
twenty-eight-day rehabilitation program to be immediately followed by a thirty-
day county jail term.
Defendant appealed to the Law Division seeking to modify the sentence.
The Law Division conducted a de novo review and imposed the same sentence
on December 17, 2007. Defendant did not file a direct appeal to the Appellate
Division.
Ten years later, in 2017, defendant was charged with yet a third DWI
offense. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) in the municipal
court claiming ineffective assistance of counsel in the first two matters, which
the court denied on June 8, 2017. Defendant appealed the denial of his PCR
petition to the Law Division. On November 6, 2017, Judge Robert J. Jones
denied defendant's PCR petition, stating his reasons in a six-page written
decision. On appeal, we affirmed the denial of PCR. State v. LeCaros-Delgado,
A-1829-17 (App. Div. Apr. 10, 2019) (slip op.).
Defendant then moved before the municipal court to withdraw his 2007
guilty pleas. That motion was denied on July 31, 2019. Defendant appealed
that decision to the Law Division. On February 18, 2020, Judge Jones affirmed
the denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas in an oral opinion.
A-2401-19
3
Defendant raises the following contentions for our consideration:
POINT I
THE COURT PRACTICED AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN ITS DECISION TO DENY THE
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO VACATE THE PLEA.
A. THE COURT CITED THE TIMING [OF THE
MOTION TO WITHDRAW] AS A REASON FOR
DENIAL IN OPPOSITION TO 7:6-2(b).
B. NEITHER THE COURT NOR THE STATE
DEFINITIVELY PROVE OR STATE THAT
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF BIAS AT THE
DEFENDANT'S ORIGINAL HEARING.
Because we affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in Judge Jones's
thorough and thoughtful oral opinion, we need not re-address defendant's
arguments at length. We add the following comments.
Rule 7:6-2(b) provides "[a] motion to withdraw a plea of guilty shall be
made before sentencing, but the court may permit it to be made thereafter to
correct a manifest injustice." The scope of our review of the denial of a motion
to withdraw a guilty plea is narrow. "Absent 'an abuse of discretion which
renders the [Law Division's] decision clearly erroneous,' we must affirm a trial
court's decision on a motion to vacate." State v. Mustaro, 411 N.J. Super. 91,
99 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting State v. Simon, 161 N.J. 416, 444 (1999)).
A-2401-19
4
In State v. Slater, our Supreme Court "distill[ed] . . . common principles
to help trial courts assess plea withdrawal motions." 198 N.J. 145, 157 (2009).
The Court set forth a four-factor test: "(1) whether the defendant has asserted a
colorable claim of innocence; (2) the nature and strength of defendant's reasons
for withdrawal; (3) the existence of a plea bargain; and (4) whether withdrawal
would result in unfair prejudice to the State or unfair advantage to the accused."
Id. at 157–58. The Court emphasized, moreover, that "efforts to withdraw a
guilty plea after sentencing must be substantiated by strong, compelling
reasons." Id. at 160.
Judge Jones addressed and weighed all four Slater factors. We agree with
Judge Jones that defendant has not presented a colorable claim of innocence.
We also agree with Judge Jones that withdrawing DWI guilty pleas more tha n a
decade after the pleas were entered would result in unfair prejudice to the State
and an unfair advantage to defendant. See State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 575
(acknowledging "[a]s time passes after conviction, the difficulties associated
with a fair and accurate reassessment of the critical events multiply").
With respect to the reasons urged by defendant for withdrawal, the
gravamen of defendant's argument is that the municipal court judge who took
the guilty pleas and imposed sentence exhibited hostility and bias. We agree
A-2401-19
5
with Judge Jones that the sentencing court was "stern" when he admonished
defendant for committing two DWI offenses in the span of two weeks. We also
agree with Judge Jones' conclusion the sentencing judge's comments did not
exhibit bias against defendant.
Specifically, the municipal court judge referred to defendant as a "deadly
menace." The judge also remarked, "what troubles me is every time he gets
drunk coming out of that bar, he aims himself like a missile straight at
Dunellen," referring to the back-to-back DWI offenses committed in that town.
As Judge Jones aptly observed, the sentencing judge's comments were offered
"to impress [upon defendant] the seriousness of what happened" and to take
"into account the fact that [defendant] had just pled guilty to . . . [t]wo drunk
driving incidents two weeks apart." Consternation is not necessarily
inappropriate at sentencing. A sentencing proceeding provides an opportunity—
if not obligation—for the court to make clear, using strong language, that a
defendant's repetitive unlawful conduct must cease and that future offenses will
not be treated lightly.
We add that the municipal court judge's characterization of defendant as
a deadly menace is consistent with the rhetoric we have used to condemn drunk
driving and to acknowledge the grave danger it poses to public safety. See State
A-2401-19
6
v. Magner, 151 N.J. Super. 451, 454 (App. Div. 1977) (referring to "the
dangerous menace posed by the intoxicated driver"); State v. Sisti, 62 N.J.
Super. 84, 87 (App. Div. 1960) (remarking that the DWI statute, N.J.S.A. 39:4 -
50, "regards an intoxicated driver as a menace").
We reject defendant's argument the judge's inclusion of the adjective
"deadly" somehow crossed the line of judicial propriety. The regrettable but
undeniable truth is that drunk driving does indeed pose a deadly menace. We
note that in enacting the requirement that repeat DWI offenders install an
ignition interlock device, the Legislature found in N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.16(a):
[t]his State's penalties for drunk driving, including the
mandatory suspension of driver's licenses and
counseling for offenders, are among the strongest in the
nation. However, despite the severity of existing
penalties, far too many persons who have been
convicted under the drunk driving law continue to
imperil the lives of their fellow citizens by driving
while intoxicated.
[(emphasis added).]
Sadly, DWI offenses too often result in fatal crashes. Strict enforcement
of our DWI laws is designed to deter and prevent such foreseeable tragedies.
We see nothing inappropriate in a sentencing judge remonstrating defendant by
referring to him as a "deadly menace" based on the back-to-back DWI offenses
he committed. So too the sentencing judge's reference to defendant as a
A-2401-19
7
"missile" expressed, if by means of hyperbole, the judge's legitimate concern for
the safety of the residents of the town in which both DWI offenses wer e
committed. The judge's use of that metaphor to describe defendant's repetitive
offense conduct suggests frustration and concern, but does not demonstrate
judicial bias warranting the withdrawal of defendant's knowing and voluntary
guilty pleas.
Nor does the fact that the municipal court judge imposed a county jail term
as authorized by law indicate judicial bias. As our Supreme Court stressed in
State v. Marshall, "bias is not established by the fact that a litigant is
disappointed in a court's ruling on an issue." 148 N.J. 89, 186 (1997).
Finally, we reject defendant's contention that it was inappropriate for
Judge Jones to consider that defendant's claim of judicial bias was made for the
first time a decade after sentencing. The timeliness of defendant's efforts to
withdraw his guilty plea is clearly relevant to whether vacating the pleas would
prejudice the prosecution. Slater, 198 N.J. at 158. Nor was it inappropriate to
consider that defendant could have raised the judicial bias contention in his PCR
petition. Judge Jones did not suggest there is a time limit for filing a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea under Rule 7:6-2(b) or that the judicial bias claim was
A-2401-19
8
otherwise procedurally barred. On the contrary, the judge carefully considered
and rejected defendant's bias argument on its merits.
We add that meritless arguments do not ripen with age. Nor does a
meritless argument become viable merely because a defendant, years later, now
has incentive to raise it for the first time. As we have noted, defendant sought
to withdraw his 2007 guilty pleas only after he was charged with a third DWI
offense. We appreciate that defendant is strongly motivated to find some basis
upon which to avoid enhanced punishment as a repeat DWI offender. 1 We
conclude that defendant's judicial bias argument affords no such basis.
In sum, defendant has not established that Judge Jones abused his
discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas. Mustaro, 411 N.J.
at 99. Defendant has not suffered a manifest injustice within the meaning of
1
N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 provides in relevant part:
For a third or subsequent [DWI] violation, a person
shall be subject to a fine of $1,000, and shall be
sentenced to imprisonment for a term of not less than
180 days in a county jail or workhouse, except that the
court may lower such term for each day, not exceeding
90 days, served participating in a drug or alcohol
inpatient rehabilitation program approved by the
Intoxicated Driver Resource Center and shall thereafter
forfeit the right to operate a motor vehicle over the
highways of this State for eight years.
A-2401-19
9
Rule 7:6-2(b). To the extent we have not addressed them, any additional
contentions raised by defendant lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a
written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
A-2401-19
10