STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. SAYVON LAWSÂ (13-01-0182 AND 13-04-0640, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2017 )

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
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parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5294-13T2
IN THE MATTER OF THE CIVIL
COMMITMENT OF J.A., SVP-528-09.
_______________________________
Submitted February 16, 2017 – Decided March 24, 2017
Before Judges Hoffman, O'Connor and Whipple.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Essex County, Docket No. SVP-
528-09.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Vincent J. Bochis, Designated
Counsel, on the brief).
Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General,
attorney for respondent (Melissa H. Raksa,
Assistant Attorney General, of counsel;
Stephen Slocum, Deputy Attorney General, on
the brief).
PER CURIAM
Appellant, who is now fifty-three years of age, appeals
from a June 5, 2014 judgment continuing his involuntary
commitment to the Special Treatment Unit (STU) pursuant to the
New Jersey Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), N.J.S.A. 30:4-
27.24 to -27.38. We affirm.
I.
We discern the following facts from the record.1
Appellant's history of sexual misconduct began in the 1980s.
First, on December 10, 1983, when appellant was twenty years
old, his seventeen-year-old former girlfriend reported he
sexually penetrated her against her will in his apartment.
Shortly thereafter, on April 21, 1984, appellant reportedly
pulled his car alongside a woman, D.B., and her four-year-old
son and five-year-old daughter. Appellant exited his car and
proceeded to grab the boy and pull him towards the vehicle; he
also rubbed D.B.'s hair, breasts, and buttocks. On that same
date, appellant stopped M.N., a fourteen-year-old girl, and
asked her for directions. She entered appellant's car and he
drove her to a cemetery where he pushed her down and attempted
to unzip her jeans.
According to the State's 2009 petition for civil
commitment, police charged appellant in April 1984 with three
counts of sexual contact, unlawful possession of a weapon,
kidnapping, and attempted sexual assault; appellant pled guilty
to one count of sexual assault and one count of unlawful
possession of a weapon.
1
For the most part, the pertinent facts are set forth in the
State's petition and appellant's various psychiatric
evaluations. These reports contain some slight factual
inconsistencies, but none of significance.
2 A-5294-13T2
Next, while he was in California and on probation, on March
30, 1994, police charged appellant with sexual battery, fraud,
and annoying phone calls. According to Dr. Dean DeCrisce's 2010
report, appellant pled guilty to charges relating to fraud and
the phone calls.
On August 23, 1995, K.O. reported to police in Bellevue,
Washington that she met appellant at his apartment for a dinner
date. Appellant attempted to kiss her, but she refused and
struggled with him, during which time appellant fondled her
breasts. When K.O. later attempted to leave, appellant followed
her to the door and again fondled her. Shortly thereafter, on
September 26, 1995, B.L., an adult woman, told police appellant
asked her for a ride home from an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting.
Appellant refused to leave her car when she arrived at his
apartment and instead attempted to kiss her. He further tried
to climb on her lap and fondled her breasts as they struggled.
Appellant received two charges for "Indecent Liberties" for
these incidents and was sentenced to a term of incarceration.
On January 6, 1997, appellant exposed himself to a hotel
worker and attempted to restrain her from leaving his bathroom.
Appellant pled guilty to lewdness for this incident.
Next, on or about January 3, 1998, appellant approached
sixteen-year-old Z.Y. at an Atlantic City casino and
3 A-5294-13T2
impersonated a security guard. Appellant brought Z.Y. to an
elevator, where he attempted to grope her against her will.
According to the State's petition, appellant was convicted of
child abuse for this offense.
On September 16, 2001, twenty-one-year-old C.R. reported to
police that appellant brought her to the dressing room of a
store and inserted his finger in her vagina. Appellant was
acquitted of all charges stemming from this incident.
On April 14, 2003, Q.K., a nineteen-year-old patient at
Hampton Hospital, told a staff member that appellant went to her
room after they watched television together. Appellant coaxed
her into the bathroom where he locked the door and fondled her
breasts. Police arrested appellant and charged him with
criminal sexual contact; however, he was convicted of a
downgraded charge of harassment.
Appellant also has a history of arrests, charges, and
convictions for non-sexual offenses, including criminal
mischief, disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, battery,
disturbing the peace, and vandalism. He has a significant
history of alcohol abuse. According to the psychological
evaluations, appellant attributes most of his sexual offending
to his alcohol use.
4 A-5294-13T2
On March 9, 2008, appellant committed the "predicate
offense" that led to his initial confinement in the STU. On
this date, appellant approached a female patron at a casino in
Atlantic City and told her he could help her obtain a new
player's club card. The patron followed appellant to a
stairwell where he forced her against a wall and digitally
penetrated her vagina. Appellant pled guilty to fourth-degree
criminal sexual contact, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(b), and the court
sentenced him to eighteen months of incarceration.2
On May 8, 2009, prior to the expiration of appellant's
criminal sentence, the State moved for appellant's civil
commitment under the SVPA. The court entered a temporary order
of commitment on May 13, 2009. In reviewing appellant's
commitment, the court considered Dr. DeCrisce's 2010 evaluation,
which noted that "a number of conditions might be placed upon
[appellant] to reduce his risk below the highly likely [to re-
offend sexually] threshold."
On July 6, 2010, Judge James F. Mulvihill entered a consent
order creating a plan for appellant's conditional discharge.
The parties agreed appellant was subject to commitment under the
SVPA, but stipulated, "[W]ith the imposition of certain
2
Appellant applied for post-conviction relief in 2010, which
the court granted, vacating his conviction. Appellant then
entered a new plea for criminal trespass.
5 A-5294-13T2
conditions, he is not highly likely to reoffend and therefore
does not require indefinite commitment to the [STU]." As such,
the court required appellant to seek inpatient treatment for his
alcoholism. Upon discharge from the STU or inpatient treatment,
he was subject to "the functional equivalent of those conditions
imposed under Parole Supervision for Life and which may include
. . . electronic monitoring."
On October 26, 2010, the court entered a consent order3
discharging appellant from the STU and sending him to reside at
the America's Keswick facility (Keswick). The court reiterated
the requirement that appellant "cooperate with and abide by
Parole supervision, as if he were on Parole Supervision for
Life."
On January 3, 2011, appellant returned to the STU after he
engaged in a verbal confrontation with another Keswick resident.
The court returned appellant to Keswick by order dated July 28,
2011. On February 14, 2012, Judge Mulvihill denied appellant's
request to move to Philadelphia. Keswick discharged appellant
to an outpatient program around March 2012. On April 10, 2012,
the court entered a consent order, permitting appellant to live
at any residence approved by parole. Appellant remained subject
to parole conditions upon his release.
3
The court entered an amended order on October 29, 2010.
6 A-5294-13T2
On June 10, 2012, appellant cut the GPS monitoring device
from his ankle and travelled to Atlantic City, where he became
intoxicated. Police arrested him the next morning, and the
court returned him to the STU on June 14, 2012. Appellant
claims he removed the bracelet, in part, because of the "intense
pain" it caused him.
Judge Philip M. Freedman conducted a review hearing of
appellant's commitment on December 5 and 6, 2012. During the
December 5 hearing, the judge noted the court had vacated
appellant's March 2008 predicate offense for sexual contact,
prompting him to ask counsel for a new predicate offense to
justify appellant's commitment. The court then identified
appellant's 1984 conviction for "two counts of sexual contact
. . . [f]or which he pled guilty on June 18, 1984," as "the only
one . . . that meets the definition of . . . a sexually violent
offense" under N.J.S.A. 2C:30:4-27.26(a). The judge allowed the
State to amend its petition to establish this conviction as the
predicate offense.
The State presented testimony from Dr. DeCrisce and another
expert. Dr. DeCrisce acknowledged his previous recommendation
but said the Atlantic City incident changed his mind, stating,
"[T]here's nothing . . . that can mitigate [appellant's] risk,
other than institutionalization at this facility for intensive
7 A-5294-13T2
treatment that addresses both the personality disorder and the
substance abuse and the sexual offending." Appellant also
presented expert testimony.
Judge Freedman rendered his oral findings on January 10 and
11, 2013. The judge found by clear and convincing evidence that
appellant required commitment under the SVPA. The judge
essentially agreed with Dr. DeCrisce's analysis, noting that
appellant "cut off his GPS, went right back to the scene of the
crime, so to speak, and started drinking. And there's no better
evidence [that appellant cannot] be controlled in the
community." As such, the court entered judgment on January 11,
2013, committing appellant to the STU. Appellant appealed, but
he withdrew the appeal on July 9, 2013.
Prior to the entry of the judgment under review, Judge
Freedman reviewed appellant's status at a hearing on May 28,
2014. At this hearing, the State presented expert testimony
from Alberto M. Goldwaser, M.D., and psychologist Debra Roquet,
Psy.D. Appellant presented expert testimony from Christopher P.
Lorah, Ph.D., and presented lay testimony from Brian Nolan, an
investigator from the Office of the Public Defender.
Dr. Goldwaser evaluated appellant on May 19, 2014, for
approximately ninety minutes and prepared a report detailing his
findings. He first testified regarding appellant's history of
8 A-5294-13T2
sexual offenses, noting they were all "characterized as . . .
very similar ways of behaving." Dr. Goldwaser noted appellant's
"urge to proceed . . . in this particular sexual manner, is
overwhelming to him. He cannot control it."
Dr. Goldwaser diagnosed appellant with "substance use
disorder, alcohol, severe, currently in controlled environment."
He said this substance use disorder does not cause appellant to
commit sexual offenses by itself, but "decreases inhibitions"
and "emboldens somebody to do whatever one wants to do." He
noted substance abuse treatment is available at the STU. The
doctor described the events leading to appellant's 2012 arrest
in Atlantic City and noted appellant "has been doing really very
poorly" since returning to the STU. He said appellant had not
shown interest in addressing his sexual offenses or substance
abuse issues.
Dr. Goldwaser further diagnosed appellant with "unspecified
paraphilic disorder coercion non[-]consent in controlled
environment" and antisocial personality disorder. He determined
appellant experiences sexual urges "involving sexual arousal to
person[s] who by virtue of his employed force or their age are
unable to consent." Dr. Goldwaser said appellant's disorder was
"chronic" and would not remit on its own.
9 A-5294-13T2
Regarding the antisocial personality disorder, Dr.
Goldwaser found appellant's behavior demonstrated a pattern of
disregard for the rights of others. He found appellant failed
to conform to social norms based on his "repetitively performing
acts that are grounds for arrest" and that appellant
demonstrated a lack of empathy or remorse. The doctor noted
this condition "does not remit by itself."
Dr. Goldwaser found appellant was "highly likely" to re-
offend unless confined to a secure facility for treatment. He
based this conclusion on appellant's sex-offense history, his
relapse after months of alcohol rehabilitation treatment, and
his non-sexual offenses. He scored appellant as a seven4 on the
Static-99R test, an actuarial measure of relative risk for
sexual offense recidivism, placing him on the high range for
sexually re-offending.
Dr. Roquet interviewed appellant on October 8, 2013, as a
member of the STU Treatment Progress Review Committee, reviewed
prior records, and prepared a report of her findings. Dr.
Roquet diagnosed appellant with sexual disorder NOS, alcohol
dependence in a controlled environment, and antisocial
personality disorder. Dr. Roquet found "similarities" in
4
Dr. Goldwaser testified to a score of seven, but his report
indicates he scored Appellant as an eight on the Static-99R
test.
10 A-5294-13T2
appellant's sexual offenses, noting, "Once he has the woman
within his circle of control, he acts in a sexually aggressive
manner." She noted appellant's substance abuse did not explain
his sexual offenses, describing "a pattern of sexual behavior
that is . . . a sexual pathology."
Dr. Roquet concluded appellant was a "[h]igh risk" to
reoffend unless confined in a secure facility. She based this
conclusion on appellant's violations of probation and
supervision, including his incident involving the GPS bracelet,
his antisocial personality, and his score of seven on Static-99R
test.
Dr. Lorah interviewed appellant on January 8, 2014, for
approximately ninety minutes and prepared a report of his
findings. Doctor Lorah diagnosed appellant with alcohol
dependence in sustained full remission in a controlled
environment and bipolar II disorder. He declined to diagnose
paraphilia or other sexual disorders, stating, "I believe that
the majority of [appellant's] illegal sexual behavior is
strongly attributable to his alcohol abuse."
Dr. Lorah found appellant did not demonstrate antisocial
personality disorder because "he engages in this type of
behavior when he drinks." He acknowledged appellant engaged in
high-risk behavior by drinking in Atlantic City, but noted
11 A-5294-13T2
appellant did not commit a sex offense during this incident.
However, Dr. Lorah acknowledged that alcoholism does not cause
sex offending and further identified appellant's alcohol abuse
as a "contributing factor" for his sex offending "[a]s opposed
to a causal factor."
Nolan testified regarding his investigation of appellant's
discharge options. He said appellant's mother was willing to
let appellant stay with her.
Based on the expert proofs, Judge Freedman found by clear
and convincing evidence that appellant required continued
commitment in the STU. The judge incorporated by reference his
previous opinion from January 2013 and then reviewed the
testimony presented during the current hearing. He determined
both State witnesses were credible and rejected Dr. Lorah's
testimony that appellant's sexual offenses were related to his
alcohol use. The judge concluded appellant suffered from mental
abnormalities predisposing him to engage in acts of sexual
violence; if released, he would be highly likely to engage in
sexually violent acts "within the reasonably foreseeable
future."
Accordingly, Judge Freedman entered an order, continuing
appellant's commitment in the STU. This appeal followed.
12 A-5294-13T2
II.
The Legislature's purpose in enacting the SVPA was "to
protect other members of society from the danger posed by
sexually violent predators." In re Civil Commitment of J.M.B.,
197 N.J. 563, 570-71 (citing N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.25), cert. denied,
558 U.S. 999, 130 S. Ct. 509, 175 L. Ed. 2d 361 (2009). Thus,
the SVPA provides for the involuntary commitment of any person
deemed by the court to be a sexually violent predator within the
meaning of the statute. N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.32(a). The statute
defines a sexually violent predator as:
a person who has been convicted, adjudicated
delinquent or found not guilty by reason of
insanity for commission of a sexually
violent offense . . . and suffers from a
mental abnormality or personality disorder
that makes the person likely to engage in
acts of sexual violence if not confined in a
secure facility for control, care and
treatment.
[N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26.]
To warrant commitment of an individual under the SVPA, the
State must prove "the individual has serious difficulty in
controlling sexually harmful behavior such that it is highly
likely that he or she will not control his or her sexually
violent behavior and will reoffend." In re Commitment of W.Z.,
173 N.J. 109, 132 (2002). The court must consider the
individual's "present serious difficulty with control over
13 A-5294-13T2
dangerous sexual behavior[,]" and the State must establish "by
clear and convincing evidence . . . that it is highly likely
that the person . . . will reoffend." Id. at 132-34 (emphasis
in original).
Our review of a trial court's decision in a commitment
proceeding under the SVPA is "exceedingly narrow." In re Civil
Commitment of W.X.C., 407 N.J. Super. 619, 630 (App. Div. 2009)
(citing In re Civil Commitment of J.M.B., 395 N.J. Super. 69, 89
(App. Div. 2007), aff'd, 197 N.J. 563 (2009); In re Civil
Commitment of V.A., 357 N.J. Super. 55, 63 (App. Div.), certif.
denied, 177 N.J. 490 (2003)), aff'd, 204 N.J. 179 (2010), cert.
denied, 562 U.S. 1297, 131 S. Ct. 1702, 179 L. Ed. 2d 635
(2011). Further, we "must give the 'utmost deference' to the
reviewing judge's determination of the appropriate balancing of
societal interest and individual liberty." Ibid. (citing In re
Commitment of J.P., 339 N.J. Super. 443, 459 (App. Div. 2001)).
Modification is only proper on appeal when the record reveals a
clear abuse of discretion. Ibid. (citing J.M.B., supra, 395
N.J. Super. at 90). Accordingly, the reviewing court has a
responsibility to "canvass the record, inclusive of the expert
testimony, to determine whether the findings made by the trial
judge were clearly erroneous." Ibid. (citing In re D.C., 146
N.J. 31, 58-59 (1996)).
14 A-5294-13T2
Appellant argues Judge Mulvihill established the "law of
the case" with his 2010 consent order, finding appellant was a
sexually violent predator who, "with the imposition of certain
conditions[,] . . . is not likely to reoffend and therefore does
not require indefinite commitment to the [STU]." Appellant
raises several arguments based on this determination,
challenging the court's findings prior to the June 5, 2014
judgment at issue on appeal.
Specifically, appellant argues the State, STU, and Dr.
DeCrisce "abandoned" him by failing to arrange appropriate
treatment services upon his conditional discharge. Appellant
further contends his discharge violations for non-sexual
behavior did not provide sufficient basis for the review courts
to reject the "law of the case" and recommit him to the STU.
See In re Civil Commitment of E.D., 183 N.J. 536, 551 (2005)
(holding that "in order for the State to cause the recommitment
of a committee who has been conditionally discharged, the State
must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the
committee is highly likely not to control his or her sexually
violent behavior and will reoffend"). Appellant asserts the
2012 court erred by "blindly" accepting the opinions of the
State's experts that he "morphed from an individual who could be
15 A-5294-13T2
rehabilitated in the community to someone in need of involuntary
civil commitment."
We reject these arguments. The "law of the case" doctrine
"sometimes requires a decision of law made in a particular case
to be respected by all other lower or equal courts during the
pendency of that case." State v. Reldan, 100 N.J. 187, 203
(1985). However, this principal is not applicable to the
instant matter. The purpose of a review hearing, including
review hearings under the SVPA, is to evaluate a committee's
"current condition." See State v. Fields, 77 N.J. 282, 310
(1978). All prior evidence remains relevant, but "[t]he
reviewing judge must evaluate the current evidence submitted to
him in light of all evidence adduced in earlier proceedings."
Ibid.
Therefore, given our deferential standard of review in
civil commitment matters, we find no basis to reverse the 2014
judgment continuing appellant's commitment. Substantial
evidence in the record supports the judge's finding that
appellant suffers from a mental abnormality making him highly
likely to sexually reoffend. W.Z., supra, 173 N.J. at 132. Dr.
Goldwaser diagnosed appellant with a paraphilic disorder due to
the clear pattern of violent behavior in appellant's sexual
offense history. He further diagnosed appellant with antisocial
16 A-5294-13T2
personality disorder based on his failure to follow social norms
and his lack of empathy or remorse. Both conditions do not
spontaneously remit. Dr. Roquet similarly determined appellant
had a sexual pathology that she could not solely attribute to
his alcohol abuse. The experts determined appellant posed a
high likelihood to reoffend due to his conditions, offending
history, and relapse in Atlantic City. Based on the evidence in
the record, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by
continuing appellant's commitment.
Next, appellant argues the 2012 review court erred by using
his 1984 "sexual contact" convictions as the predicate offense
to justify confinement under the SVPA. See In re Commitment of
P.C., 349 N.J. Super. 569, 576 (App. Div. 2002) (noting
predicate offense is necessary for confinement). Our statutes
do not define "predicate offense"; instead, courts use this term
to refer to the crimes that qualify as sexually violent offenses
under N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26(a) or (b). See, e.g., In re Civil
Commitment of P.Z.H., 377 N.J. Super. 458, 460, 463 (App. Div.
2005). As noted, the record of appellant's 1984 convictions is
unclear; although the State's petition says appellant pled
guilty to sexual assault, Judge Freedman determined appellant
was convicted of two counts of "sexual contact." However,
17 A-5294-13T2
sexual assault and "criminal sexual contact" both constitute
"sexually violent offenses" under N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26(a).
Appellant's brief is inconsistent on this issue. In his
statement of facts, appellant suggests the record is unclear
whether he was actually convicted of "sexual contact" in 1984.
He also asserts the SVPA does not list sexual contact as a
predicate offense. Conversely, in his legal argument section,
appellant acknowledges his sexual contact conviction but
contends its "remoteness" should have precluded the court from
using it as the predicate offense.
We conclude the record shows appellant was at least
convicted of sexual contact in 1984, thereby placing him under
the purview of the SVPA. See N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26(a); State v.
Bellamy, 178 N.J. 127, 140 (2003) (noting a conviction for
"fourth-degree sexual contact" constitutes a predicate offense
under the SVPA). Moreover, we find appellant's "remoteness"
argument lacks merit. As appellant acknowledges, the SVPA and
New Jersey case law do not set a time limit for consideration of
predicate offenses. See In re Civil Commitment of R.Z.B., 392
N.J. Super. 22, 44 (App. Div.) ("Although we recognize that [the
appellant's] New York offenses occurred in the 1980's, the
passage of time does not eliminate their legal significance as
eligible prior convictions under the SVPA."), certif. denied,
18 A-5294-13T2
192 N.J. 296 (2007). Instead, commitment under the SVPA focuses
on whether an individual poses a current threat; "[w]hile the
remoteness of the last predicate act may be relevant to that
inquiry, it also may be insignificant." P.Z.H., supra, 377 N.J.
Super. at 466.
Here, although appellant's only clear conviction for a
crime of sexual violence dates back to 1984,5 both State experts
reviewed his full history of sexual-offense arrests, noting that
downgraded or dismissed offenses are still relevant to their
clinical diagnoses. The experts concluded appellant was a
current risk for reoffending, and the judge found their
testimony credible. Therefore, we decline to reverse on this
basis.
Appellant further argues that if his 1984 conviction must
serve as the predicate offense, then the 2010 discharge
conditions requiring him to wear a GPS ankle device violated the
Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and New Jersey
Constitutions. The Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits the
5
During his oral opinion on January 10, 2013, Judge Freedman
noted the Washington statute for "indecent liberties" contained
similar elements to the New Jersey crime of sexual contact.
N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26(a) includes in its definition of sexually
violent offenses "a criminal offense with substantially the same
elements as any offense enumerated above." Judge Freedman
determined appellant's 1995 offenses in Washington met the New
Jersey definition of sexual contact, and therefore, we find
these convictions could also serve as the predicate offense.
19 A-5294-13T2
legislature from "increase[ing] the punishment for a crime after
it has been committed." Riley v. N.J. State Parole Board, 219
N.J. 270, 274 (2014).
In Riley, our Supreme Court held the Ex Post Facto Clause
barred the application of the Sex Offender Monitoring Act
(SOMA), N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.89 to -123.95, which the Legislature
passed in 2007, to an appellant's 1986 conviction for aggravated
sexual assault. Specifically, the Court held the appellant's
GPS ankle bracelet, which the Parole Board required he wear for
the rest of his life shortly after release from prison,
constituted an illegal additional punishment. Riley, supra, 219
N.J. at 274-75. Appellant urges the same result in the instant
matter.
We reject this argument. In Riley, the Court specifically
distinguished the SOMA from the SVPA, stating,
Unlike the [SVPA], which permits for yearly
review to determine whether the committee
continues to pose a danger to the public and
which allows for his release if he does not,
N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.35 to -27.36, SOMA ensures
that [the appellant's] future is static — he
is condemned to wear the electronic
monitoring device for the rest of his life.
[Id. at 294-95.]
Furthermore, under the SVPA, the trial court may impose
discharge conditions "for the purpose of ensuring that the
person . . . does not represent a risk to public safety."
20 A-5294-13T2
N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.32(c)(2). "If the court imposes conditions for
a period exceeding six months, the court shall provide for a
review hearing on a date the court deems appropriate but in no
event later than six months from the date of the order." Ibid.
Therefore, unlike the circumstances in Riley, appellant's
GPS bracelet was not a permanent punishment but a temporary
condition that the court imposed to ensure the public's safety.
Moreover, appellant agreed to conditions akin to parole
supervision as part of the 2010 consent orders. Because we find
Riley distinguishable, we decline to reverse on this basis.
Finally, appellant advances a public policy argument,
asserting imposing indeterminate sentences on sex offenders
through involuntary commitment does not serve the interests of
justice under his circumstances. Appellant also reiterates his
challenges to the State and Dr. DeCrisce's treatment, arguing we
should notice plain error not raised below if it causes an
unjust result. See R. 2:10-2.
These arguments lack merit. For the reasons discussed,
appellant's continuing commitment is entirely appropriate and
does not defy the interests of justice. We will not reverse on
this basis. Moreover, any arguments we did not specifically
address lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written
opinion. See R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
21 A-5294-13T2
Affirmed.
22 A-5294-13T2