PAUL MEMO, ETC. VS. JOHN R. STRANGFELD, JR. (C-191-13, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2017 )


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    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
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    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-1241-15T2
    PAUL MEMO, derivatively
    on behalf of PRUDENTIAL
    FINANCIAL, INC.,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.
    JOHN R. STRANGFELD, JR.,
    RICHARD J. CARBONE, PETER
    B. SAYRE, THOMAS J. BALTIMORE,
    JR., GORDON M. BETHUNE, GASTON
    CAPERTON, GILBERT F. CASELLAS,
    JAMES G. CULLEN, MARK B. GRIER,
    CONSTANCE J. HORNER, MARTINA
    HUND-MEJEAN, KARL J. KRAPEK,
    CHRISTINE A. POON, JAMES A.
    UNRUH and JON F. HANSON,
    Defendants-Respondents,
    and
    PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL, INC.,
    Defendant.
    ________________________________________________
    Submitted March 7, 2017 – Decided August 21, 2017
    Before Judges Messano, Espinosa and Suter.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New
    Jersey, Chancery Division, Essex County,
    Docket No. C-191-13.
    Kantrowitz, Goldhamer & Graifman, PC and The
    Weisier Law Firm, PC, attorneys for appellants
    (Gary S. Graifman, on the brief).
    Wong   Fleming,   and  Edwin   G.   Schallert
    (Debevoise & Plimpton, LLP) of the New York
    Bar, admitted pro hac vice, attorneys for
    respondents (Daniel C. Fleming, on the brief;
    Mr. Schallet, of counsel and on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    This   appeal      requires   us    to   consider    application    of   the
    business judgment rule, which "is embedded in American corporate
    law[,] . . . [and] 'protects a board of directors from being
    questioned     or   second-guessed        on    conduct   of   corporate   affairs
    except in instances of fraud, self-dealing, or unconscionable
    conduct.'"      In re PSE & G S'holder Litig., 
    173 N.J. 258
    , 276-77
    (2002) (quoting Maul v. Kirkman, 
    270 N.J. Super. 596
    , 614 (App.
    Div. 1994)).        "One recognized infringement on director autonomy
    is [a] shareholder-derivative action." Id. at 277; N.J.S.A. 14A:3-
    6.2.    Before commencing such an action, the plaintiff must serve
    "a written demand . . . upon the corporation to take suitable
    action."      N.J.S.A. 14A:3-6.3(a); see also R. 4:32-3 (setting forth
    prerequisites       for    filing    a    shareholder     derivative   complaint,
    including pre-suit demand by a plaintiff for the "desired" "action"
    by "managing directors or trustees").
    2                               A-1241-15T2
    In response to such a demand, the defendant managing directors
    and board members "may appoint a special litigation committee
    [(SLC)] to investigate whether the suit is in the best interest
    of the corporation."      PSE & G, supra, 
    173 N.J. at
    283 (citing
    Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 
    430 A.2d 779
    , 786 (Del. 1981). "Based
    on the committee's findings, the corporation may move for dismissal
    of the suit, although the corporation has the burden of proving
    the 'independence,' 'good faith,' and 'reasonableness' of the
    committee's investigation."       
    Ibid.
         (quoting Zapata, 
    supra,
     
    430 A.2d at 788
    ).     Regardless whether an SLC is formed or not, our
    Court has adopted
    a modified business judgment rule that imposes
    an initial burden on a corporation to
    demonstrate that in deciding to reject or
    terminate a shareholder's suit the members of
    the   board    (1)   were   independent    and
    disinterested, (2) acted in good faith and
    with due care in their investigation of the
    shareholder's allegations, and that (3) the
    board's decision was reasonable.     All three
    elements must be satisfied.
    [Id. (emphasis added) (citing In re PSE & G
    S'holder Litig., 
    315 N.J. Super. 323
    , 335 (Ch.
    Div. 1998)).]
    In 2012, plaintiff Paul Memo, a shareholder of Prudential
    Financial, Inc. (Prudential), sent a pre-suit demand letter to
    John   R.   Strangfeld,   Jr.,   Chairman    of   Prudential's   Board    of
    Directors (the Board) and its Chief Executive Officer (CEO),
    3                              A-1241-15T2
    asserting Prudential's management had breached their fiduciary
    duties.      Plaintiff demanded the Board commence an independent
    internal investigation and bring a civil action against members
    of its management team.          On March 12, 2013, the Board appointed
    three of its members to a "special evaluation committee" (SLC) to
    investigate plaintiff's allegations.            The SLC interviewed two law
    firms, and chose Day Pitney, LLP (Day Pitney), to serve as its
    counsel.
    On    September      10,   2013,   plaintiff       filed    a    shareholder
    derivative     action      against    Strangfeld,     Richard         J.    Carbone,
    Prudential's Chief Financial Officer (CFO), Peter B. Sayre, its
    Principal Accounting Officer, and directors Thomas J. Baltimore,
    Jr., Gordon M. Bethune, Gaston Caperton, Gilbert F. Casellas,
    James G. Cullen, Mark B. Grier, Constance J. Horner, Martina Hund-
    Mejean, Karl J. Krapek, Christine A. Poon, James A. Unruh and Jon
    F.   Hanson    (collectively,        defendants).        Among    other      things,
    plaintiff asserted ten months had passed since he served the demand
    letter     without   any    substantive      response.      Plaintiff        further
    claimed the Board's inaction was a functional refusal of his demand
    and defendants breached their fiduciary duties to Prudential's
    shareholders.
    Day   Pitney   notified      plaintiff's      counsel      of   the   ongoing
    investigation.       On March 24, 2014, the SLC issued its report.
    4                                   A-1241-15T2
    Shortly thereafter, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint
    pursuant    to   Rule     4:6-2(e),   but     the   court    permitted    limited
    discovery before ruling on the motion.                 See PSE & G, supra, 
    173 N.J. at 286
     (permitting access to corporate records and discovery
    "limited to the narrow issue of what steps the directors took to
    inform themselves of the . . . demand and the reasonableness of
    its decision" (quoting PSE & G, supra, 
    315 N.J. Super. at 337
    )).
    In April 2015, plaintiff filed opposition to defendants' motion.
    After considering oral argument, Judge Thomas Moore granted
    defendants'      motion    for   reasons      placed    on   the   record     in    a
    comprehensive oral opinion. Judge Moore's October 6, 2015 order
    dismissed plaintiff's complaint with prejudice, and this appeal
    followed.
    Plaintiff     contends      there   were    material     factual    disputes
    regarding the independence of the SLC members, particularly in
    light of a Day Pitney memo dated the same day the SLC issued its
    report.    Plaintiff also argues Judge Moore erred in concluding as
    a matter of law that Day Pitney acted independently and the SLC's
    investigation was reasonable.            Having considered these arguments
    in light of the record and applicable legal standards, we affirm.
    I.
    We briefly summarize some background to place plaintiff's
    claims in proper context.
    5                                  A-1241-15T2
    Prudential provided financial management services and sold
    various     investment   products      to   the   public,      including       life
    insurance    policies    and   annuity      contracts.      In     2009,     Verus
    Financial, LLC (Verus) notified the company that it would be
    examining Prudential's unclaimed property practices and compliance
    procedures on behalf of thirteen states.1                 In public filings,
    Prudential    acknowledged     the    "audit   may    result     in   additional
    payments of abandoned funds to [United States] jurisdictions and
    to changes in the Company's practices and procedures for the
    identification of escheatable funds, which could impact claim
    payments and reserves, among other consequences."
    In June 2011, the Board held a meeting that was attended by
    three members of the subsequently-formed SLC, during which the
    directors were given updates on the progress of the Verus audit.
    In November 2011, Prudential issued a press release announcing it
    increased its reserves by an additional $139 million, the lion's
    share of which was an acknowledgment of the company's decision to
    change its procedures for identifying deceased policy and contract
    holders, and the potential liability that might result.                           In
    December    2011,   Prudential       entered   into   a   Global      Resolution
    Agreement (GRA) with Verus, adopting modifications to its business
    1
    The number of states continued to grow over ensuing years to a
    total of thirty-three.
    6                                  A-1241-15T2
    practices and requiring Prudential to "identify and locate the
    beneficiaries" of all "policies and contracts active at any time
    since January 1, 1992 through December 31, 2010."            Under the GRA,
    if a beneficiary could not be located, Prudential would remit all
    proceeds to the particular jurisdiction as unclaimed property
    subject to escheat.
    Plaintiff claimed Prudential inappropriately held unclaimed
    property, resulting in the company posting stronger earnings than
    it should have.     The disclosure of these irregularities resulted
    in significant decreases in the stock price.
    Three directors, Baltimore, Hund-Mejean and Poon, comprised
    the SLC, with Poon elected as chair.           All had extensive business
    experience, were more recent additions to the Board and had no
    direct   involvement    with     managing   the   company.      Each    member
    completed a questionnaire consisting of twenty-five questions.
    The SLC report described a number of factors intended to ensure
    the   committee's      members     were     independent   and    personally
    disinterested in plaintiff's complaint.
    The SLC concluded Prudential should take all appropriate
    actions to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, stating:
    Contrary to the claims in the Shareholder
    Letter and Shareholder Complaint, the SLC
    found that the Board and executive officers
    acted on an informed basis, with the input and
    advice of competent advisors, and in the good
    7                                A-1241-15T2
    faith belief they were acting in the best
    interests   of   the   corporation   and   its
    shareholders, generally and with respect to
    the periodic financial reports at issue. It
    found there existed reasonable systems for the
    flow of information to the Board and senior
    management, including with respect to the
    claims asserted in this matter. It found no
    evidence that the Board acted in other than
    good faith and in the best interests of the
    corporation and its shareholders, or that it
    consciously failed to oversee the operations
    of the Company or disregarded any red flags.
    II.
    Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for failure
    to state a claim for relief, Rule 4:6-2(e).              The Rule plainly
    provides:
    If, on a motion to dismiss based on the defense
    numbered (e), matters outside the pleading are
    presented to and not excluded by the court,
    the motion shall be treated as one for summary
    judgment and disposed of as provided by R.
    4:46, and all parties shall be given
    reasonable opportunity to present all material
    pertinent to such a motion.
    [R. 4:6-2.]
    In this case, after limited discovery regarding the appointment
    of   the   SLC,   its   counsel   and    its   investigation,   Judge     Moore
    considered the issues presented by applying the standards set
    forth in Rule 4:46.
    We consider the grant of summary judgment de novo, using the
    "same standard as the motion judge."           Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev,
    8                              A-1241-15T2
    
    225 N.J. 469
    , 479 (2016)   (quoting Bhagat v. Bhagat, 
    217 N.J. 22
    ,
    38 (2014)).
    That standard mandates that summary judgment
    be granted "if the pleadings, depositions,
    answers to interrogatories and admissions on
    file, together with the affidavits, if any,
    show that there is no genuine issue as to any
    material fact challenged and that the moving
    party is entitled to a judgment or order as a
    matter of law."
    [Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union
    Fire Ins. Co., 
    224 N.J. 189
    , 199 (2016)
    (quoting R. 4:46-2(c)).]
    Our "task is to determine whether a rational factfinder could
    resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving
    party."   Perez v. Professionally Green, LLC, 
    215 N.J. 388
    , 405-06
    (2013).
    An opposing party must "do more than 'point[] to any fact in
    dispute' in order to defeat summary judgment."    Globe Motor Co.,
    
    supra,
        225 N.J. at 479 (quoting Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.
    of Am., 
    142 N.J. 520
    , 529 (1995)).   If the opposing party
    offers . . . only facts which are immaterial
    or of an insubstantial nature, a mere
    scintilla, "fanciful, frivolous, gauzy or
    merely suspicious," he will not be heard to
    complain if the court grants summary judgment,
    taking as true the statement of uncontradicted
    facts in the papers relied upon by the moving
    party, such papers themselves not otherwise
    showing the existence of an issue of material
    fact.
    9                           A-1241-15T2
    [Id. at 480 (quoting Brill, 
    supra,
     
    142 N.J. at 529
    ) (quoting Judson v. Peoples Bank &
    Trust Co., 
    17 N.J. 67
    , 75 (1954)).]
    Our review is limited to the record before Judge Moore.                Lombardi
    v. Masso, 
    207 N.J. 517
    , 542 (2011).
    We    also    review    the   trial    court's   decision    to   dismiss
    plaintiff's complaint under the modified business judgment rule
    de novo.       PSE & G, supra, 
    173 N.J. at 287
    .         Because defendants
    bear the burden of proof, we "must view the record with all
    legitimate inferences drawn in the [plaintiff]'s favor and decide
    whether    a    reasonable    factfinder      could   determine    that      the
    [defendants] ha[ve] not met [their] burden of proof." Globe Motor,
    supra, 225 N.J. at 481.        In other words, we must decide whether
    "the evidence is so one-sided that . . . [defendants] . . . must
    prevail as a matter of law."               Brill, 
    supra,
     
    142 N.J. at 540
    (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
    477 U.S. 242
    , 252, 
    106 S. Ct. 2505
    , 2512, 
    91 L. Ed. 2d 202
    , 214 (1986)).
    We review issues of law de novo and accord no deference to
    the trial judge's legal conclusions.             Nicholas v. Mynster, 
    213 N.J. 463
    , 478 (2013).        In this regard, we note that shortly after
    the SLC was formed in this case, on April 1, 2013, the Legislature
    enacted N.J.S.A. 14A:3-6.5, which "details various alternative
    procedures for the corporation to make an independent decision as
    to whether the derivative proceeding is in the best interests of
    10                                A-1241-15T2
    the corporation."       Assembly Commerce and Economic Development
    Committee, Statement to A. 3123 (September 24, 2012); Senate
    Commerce Committee, Statement to A. 3123 (January 14, 2013).
    N.J.S.A. 14A:3-6.5 permits a corporation, prior to seeking
    dismissal of a shareholder derivative action, to form a "committee
    . . . of one or more independent directors appointed by a majority
    vote of independent directors[,]" N.J.S.A. 14A:3-6.5(2)(b), and
    defines who is an independent director.            N.J.S.A. 14A:3-6.5(7).
    The statute further provides that
    a derivative proceeding shall be dismissed by
    the court on motion by the corporation if the
    court finds that . . . [such a committee] has
    determined in good faith, after conducting a
    reasonable inquiry upon which its conclusions
    are based, that the maintenance of the
    derivative proceeding is not in the best
    interests of the corporation[.]
    [N.J.S.A. 14A:3-6.5(1)(a).]
    Importantly,   if    the   corporation   follows    such   procedures,    in
    certain circumstances, the statute shifts the burden of proof to
    the plaintiff.      N.J.S.A. 14A:3-6.5(4) and (6).
    In this case, neither party argued the statute applied, nor
    did Judge Moore discuss the statute.        Neither party has cited the
    statute in its appellate brief.          We assume, therefore, that it
    does not apply.
    11                              A-1241-15T2
    Moreover, for the present, we are bound by the Court's
    guidance as to how we should consider the impact, if any, that the
    formation of an SLC and its subsequent report to the Board has
    upon the modified business judgment standard.                   Although the issue
    was not squarely before it in PSE & G, supra, the Court said, "as
    a general framework for analysis, we will 'not differentiate
    between        cases       where   a    shareholder         litigation        committee
    investigated the demand and cases in which demand was refused by
    the board.'"       
    173 N.J. at 283
     (quoting, PSE & G, supra, 
    315 N.J. Super. at
       329    n.1).       As   a    court   of     intermediate      appellate
    jurisdiction,         we   defer   to   the      Court's    authority    to    adopt    a
    different standard, particularly in light of the enactment of
    N.J.S.A. 14A:3-6.5.            Riley v. Keenan, 
    406 N.J. Super. 281
    , 297
    (App. Div.), certif. denied, 
    200 N.J. 207
     (2009).
    III.
    We provide some additional context as we consider plaintiff's
    specific arguments.
    In its report, the SLC detailed the selection process for its
    three members, which took into account, among other things:                          the
    SLC members' positions on the Board and Audit Committees, the
    "lack     of    any    personal     financial        gain    distinct    from     other
    shareholders from the activities alleged in the Shareholder Letter
    and Shareholder Complaint," the lack of personal interest in the
    12                                  A-1241-15T2
    litigation and the lack of personal liability for the alleged
    activities.    Counsel for the SLC reviewed additional information
    regarding relationships between SLC members, their families and
    affiliated    organization,     and    Prudential,   other      directors    and
    senior management.
    The questionnaires completed by the SLC members contained two
    questions that focused on whether the member was involved in any
    discussions, prior to November 2011, as members of the "Audit
    Committee or Corporate Governance and Business Ethics Committee,"
    regarding the company's treatment of unclaimed death benefits,
    escheatment    and    establishment     of   reserves    (question    24),    or
    whether the member was involved in the approval or review of
    Prudential's response to Verus' audits (question 25).                All three
    SLC members answered in the negative.           Day Pitney conducted face-
    to-face interviews with Hund-Mejean and Baltimore, but not Poon.
    On March 24, 2014, the day the SLC filed its report, a Day
    Pitney   intra-office       memorandum       indicated   that     during     the
    investigation,       SLC   members    "became    aware   of   materials      and
    information" showing "the Board . . . and the Audit Committee
    received updates from management regarding . . . the . . .
    Company's response to the Verus audit."              The memo specifically
    cited questions 24 and 25 of the questionnaire, and stated "the
    13                               A-1241-15T2
    SLC members affirmatively wish to update their responses . . . to
    acknowledge and reflect these developments."
    All three members of the SLC were deposed.             Under oath, Poon
    specifically stated she did not want to update her answers on the
    questionnaire.        In her deposition, Hund-Mejean reiterated her
    answers to questions 24 and 25.            Baltimore testified in a manner
    that was consistent with the answers on his questionnaire.
    Plaintiff argues the Day Pitney memo raises a genuine material
    factual dispute about the members' knowledge of and involvement
    in Prudential's practices and response to the Verus audit as it
    was ongoing, which should have foreclosed summary judgment on the
    critical issue of whether the SLC was "independent."            We disagree.
    "Directorial independence 'means that a director's decision
    is based on the corporate merits of the subject before the board
    rather than extraneous consideration or influences.'" PSE & G,
    supra,   
    173 N.J. at 290
       (quoting    In   re   Prudential   Ins.   Co.
    Derivative Litig., 
    282 N.J. Super. 256
    , 276 (Ch. Div. 1995)).
    Judge Moore accepted the commonsense notion that as members of the
    Board, each SLC member would have received some information about
    the audit as it was ongoing.        The judge focused on the deposition
    testimony of the three SLC members, which was unequivocal.                    We
    agree that the Day Pitney memorandum, standing alone, does not
    raise a material factual dispute about the knowledge each SLC
    14                               A-1241-15T2
    member possessed, or the actions or inactions they took as Board
    members, and therefore does not raise a material factual dispute
    about the SLC's independence and disinterestedness.
    Plaintiff next contends material facts regarding Day Pitney's
    independence foreclosed the conclusion that it acted independently
    in providing counsel to the SLC.               Specifically, plaintiff argues
    the law firm had previously represented a Board member, Krapek,
    in unrelated litigation, and it represented another corporation
    of which Poon served as a director.
    Plaintiff's claims rest upon a table prepared by Day Pitney
    indicating its representation between January 1, 2010 and March
    24,    2014,   the   date     the   SLC   report   was    issued,   of   "Entities
    Associated With Individual Defendants" named in this litigation.
    In five instances, Day Pitney represented a client with which
    Krapek had some affiliation.              It was apparently undisputed that
    the    firm    had   earned    more   than     $300,000    in   fees     for     these
    representations, some of which ended before the SLC was formed,
    but that was a minute percentage of the firm's gross revenues.
    Poon appeared as an associated defendant with respect to one
    Day Pitney client.2            However, when specifically questioned at
    2
    The chart listed three entities in one line item.
    15                                   A-1241-15T2
    deposition about her directorship with the listed entities, Poon's
    answers were unclear.3
    3
    The Day Pitney conflicts list included "Philips Electronics" as
    the entity with which Poon was affiliated. At deposition, she was
    asked about her membership on corporate boards, and responded:
    Q: And which boards might those be?
    A: I am a director of the public board called
    Regeneron.
    Q: Okay.
    A: I'm a director of the public board that's
    called Philips.
    . . . .
    Q: Okay. And with regard to Philips, would
    that be Philips Electric?
    A: Yes. Electronics.
    Q: I'm sorry. Electronics.
    A: Royal Philips is —
    Q: Okay. Royal Philips. And is there another
    name that begins with a K that's probably too
    long for me to say?           Something like
    Koinklijke?
    A: Yes.
    Q: And there are also I believe some
    subsidiaries that you're affiliated with of
    Philips; is that correct?
    A: That's not correct.
    16                        A-1241-15T2
    Judge Moore concluded Day Pitney's prior representation of
    entities with which Krapek and Poon had some affiliation did not
    raise a genuine factual dispute about the law firm's independence.
    He cited In re Par Pharmaceutical, Inc. Derivative Litigation, 
    750 F. Supp. 641
    , 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), where the court held that an
    SLC must be represented by independent counsel.               However, as Judge
    Moore noted, in that case, the same firm represented both the SLC
    and the corporation.     
    Id. at 644
    .
    Before us, plaintiff relies upon a portion of Justice Stein's
    concurring opinion in PSE & G, supra, 
    173 N.J. at 298-300
    , which
    discussed the importance of an SLC having independent counsel.
    However, there too, the law firm conducting the investigation of
    the plaintiffs' claim had previously represented the corporation
    in seeking an extension to respond to the complaint.                
    Id.
     at 299-
    300.
    Plaintiff cites to no other authority for the proposition
    that Day Pitney's representation of entities with which Krapek and
    Poon   had   some   affiliation   raised      a    material     factual   dispute
    regarding the independence of the firm's investigation of the
    complaint and the advice and counsel it rendered to the SLC.
    Plaintiff also argues genuine material factual disputes exist
    regarding     the   reasonableness       of       the   SLC's    investigation.
    Specifically, he contends the SLC failed to conduct interviews of
    17                                    A-1241-15T2
    key witnesses and never considered in its investigation the impact
    of another class action securities fraud complaint made against
    Prudential (the securities action).            Defendants contend these
    issues were never raised before Judge Moore, and we agree that his
    oral    decision   does   not   specifically     address   these    claims.
    Nonetheless, we conclude plaintiff's arguments lack any merit.
    The Court described how we should consider whether the company
    conducted a reasonable investigation.          "[T]he court's inquiry is
    not into the substantive decision of the board, but rather is into
    the procedures employed by the board in making its determination."
    PSE & G, supra, 
    173 N.J. at 291
     (citation omitted).                "In that
    regard, there is 'no prescribed procedure that a board must
    follow.'"    
    Id. at 291-92
     (quoting Levine v. Smith, 
    591 A.2d 194
    ,
    214 (Del. 1991), overruled on other grounds, Brehm v. Eisner, 
    746 A.2d 244
     (Del. 2000)).      "Nonetheless, the process should be such
    that a reviewing court can look to it and conclude confidently
    that it reflects a corporation's earnest attempt to investigate a
    shareholder's complaint."       
    Id. at 292
    .     "Stated differently, the
    inquiry is whether the 'investigation has been so restricted in
    scope, so shallow in execution, or otherwise so pro forma or half
    hearted as to constitute a pretext or sham[.]'"            
    Ibid.
     (quoting
    Stoner v. Walsh, 
    772 F. Supp. 790
    , 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (internal
    quotation marks and citation omitted)).
    18                               A-1241-15T2
    Plaintiff contends the SLC failed to interview Mark Grier,
    Prudential's Vice-Chairman who admittedly was responsible for a
    wide variety of corporate functions.         The federal district court
    denied   Prudential's    motion   to    dismiss   the   complaint   in   the
    securities action that named Grier as a defendant.         Plaintiff also
    contends the SLC failed to interview Verus or any government entity
    affected by Prudential's practices during the relevant period.
    The Court has recognized that "[o]ne of a board's prerogatives
    . . . is 'to entrust its investigation to a law firm[.]'"             PSE &
    G, supra, 
    173 N.J. at 292
     (quoting Stepak v. Addison, 
    20 F.3d 398
    ,
    405 (11th Cir. 1994)).     In City of Orlando Police Pension Fund v.
    Page, 
    970 F. Supp. 2d 1022
     (N.D. Cal. 2013), the court said:
    [T]he [SLC] committee was not obligated to
    interview every potential witness identified
    by plaintiff (or any witnesses at all), nor
    does it suggest that plaintiff is somehow
    relieved of its burden to show that the un-
    interviewed individuals "had knowledge that
    was unique and unobtainable without those
    interviews, and how those interviews if taken
    would have altered the board's decision to
    refuse demand."
    [Id. at 1032 (quoting Copeland v. Lane, No.
    5:11-cv-01058 EJD, 
    2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146815
     (N.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2012)).]
    The SLC's report details the process employed to investigate
    plaintiff's claims.     In part, Day Pitney reviewed more than eleven
    million pages of documents and interviewed twenty-nine witnesses.
    19                               A-1241-15T2
    Those     interviewed      included    "current           and   former    employees,
    officers, and members of the Board[;] [m]ultiple members of senior
    management . . . , as well as employees involved in the Company's
    disclosure process[,] and . . . representatives of multiple Board
    Committees."         We    can     conclude        with    confidence     that    the
    investigation    conducted       by   the    SLC    "reflects     a   corporation's
    earnest    attempt    to     investigate      a     shareholder's        complaint."
    PSE & G, supra, 
    173 N.J. at 292
    .
    Plaintiff's final contention, that the SLC did not consider
    the securities action in reaching its conclusion, lacks sufficient
    merit to warrant discussion.          R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).             The SLC report
    actually cites other contemporaneously filed litigation against
    Prudential     and   other       insurance    companies         regarding    alleged
    failures to properly investigate deaths of policy holders.
    Affirmed.
    20                                    A-1241-15T2