STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. ANDRE L. HENDERSON (12-06-0488, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2022 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-4370-19
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    ANDRE L. HENDERSON,
    a/k/a ANDRE LYDELL
    HENDERSON,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    _______________________
    Submitted February 8, 2022 – Decided March 17, 2022
    Before Judges Currier and Smith.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Union County, Indictment No. 12-06-0488.
    Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
    appellant (Steven M. Gilson, Designated Counsel, on
    the brief).
    William A. Daniel, Union County Prosecutor, attorney
    for respondent (Albert Cernadas, Jr., Assistant
    Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Defendant appeals from the order denying his petition for post-conviction
    relief (PCR). We affirm.
    Defendant was charged in an indictment with first-degree attempted
    murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and 2C:11-3; second-degree aggravated assault, 2C:12-
    1(b)(1); and third-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(5) arising out
    of his assault on a police officer. A jury convicted him on the aggravated assault
    charges. We affirmed the convictions and sentence. State v. Henderson, No. A-
    4019-14 (App. Div. May 17, 2018) (slip op. at 2).
    After defendant filed his petition for PCR in which he asserted his counsel
    did not properly inform him about his right to testify at trial, 1 the court granted
    an evidentiary hearing. Defendant was also given more time to file an additional
    certification in support of his claim.
    During the hearing, defendant testified that he met with his trial attorney
    several times and that "at the beginning, [counsel] said that he wanted me to
    testify, that it was . . . important to the case." Defendant stated he "wanted to
    testify because [he] felt that the jury wanted to hear [his] side of the story."
    1
    Defendant raised numerous other arguments in his PCR petition and during
    the evidentiary hearing regarding his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
    On appeal, he only raises one argument: that trial counsel never told him it was
    his decision whether to testify or not.
    A-4370-19
    2
    Defendant explained that at the end of the trial he had a conversation with
    trial counsel who told him "that the case looked good, that [counsel did not] feel
    that [defendant] needed to testify, that it's okay, that we'll be okay." Defendant
    said counsel did not tell him it was his right to testify or that it was his decision
    to make. He reiterated that when they discussed the issue at the end of the trial,
    counsel said "you're good, you don't need to testify. It looked good."
    Defendant conceded during the PCR hearing that he had a good
    relationship with his trial counsel. He thought his attorney was a good lawyer
    and did well during the trial. He said trial counsel discussed strategy with him.
    He also recalled the trial judge asking defendant whether he wanted to testify or
    not and responding to the judge that he had decided on his own volition not to
    testify. Defendant told the trial judge he did not have any questions of the court
    or his trial counsel. He also signed a document attesting that he understood the
    right to testify, and he had chosen to remain silent.
    Defendant told the PCR judge that trial counsel never told him he could
    not testify, he just advised defendant he did not need to do so. And defendant
    conceded that he agreed with trial counsel's advice. Defendant further explained
    to the PCR court that while his testimony would have been the same as the
    A-4370-19
    3
    witnesses who testified at trial, he "would have been the one presenting it
    because it happened to [him]."
    In a comprehensive written opinion, the PCR judge rejected defendant's
    argument. The court found defendant clearly waived his right to testify, finding
    defendant told the trial judge he had discussed testifying with his attorney and
    chose not to do so. Defendant did not specify to the PCR court as to what his
    testimony might have been and what impact it might have had on the outcome
    of the trial. He only said he felt the jury wanted to hear from him. However, he
    conceded he had nothing new to say apart from what other witnesses had
    testified to.
    The standard for determining whether counsel's performance was
    ineffective for purposes of the Sixth Amendment to the United States
    Constitution was formulated in Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
     (1984),
    and adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 
    105 N.J. 42
     (l987). To
    prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must meet the
    two-prong test of establishing that: (l) counsel's performance was deficient and
    he or she made errors that were so egregious that counsel was not functioning
    effectively as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment; and (2) the defect in
    performance prejudiced defendant's right to a fair trial such that there exists a
    A-4370-19
    4
    "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result
    of the proceeding would have been different."         
    Id. at 52, 60-61
     (quoting
    Strickland, 
    466 U.S. at 687, 694
    ).
    To establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
    defendant must present legally competent evidence rather than "bald assertions."
    See State v. Cummings, 
    321 N.J. Super. 154
    , 170 (App. Div. 1999). Defendant
    has not met that standard.
    It is clear the trial judge engaged in a lengthy conversation with defendant
    during trial to ensure he understood his right to testify as well as the risks
    associated with testifying and to confirm defendant wished to waive his right to
    testify. Moreover, defendant stated he discussed testifying with his trial counsel
    and understood it was his decision to make. He also stated that he and counsel
    discussed strategy. A trial strategy that proves unsuccessful "does not mean that
    counsel was ineffective." State v. DiFrisco, 
    174 N.J. 195
    , 220 (2002) (quoting
    State v. Bey, 
    161 N.J. 233
    , 251 (1999)).
    Defendant also did not establish that his testimony could have affected the
    outcome of the trial. He said he believed the jury wanted to hear from him, but
    he also stated his testimony would not have differed from what the previous lay
    and expert witnesses had said. Therefore, defendant failed to demonstrate that
    A-4370-19
    5
    trial counsel's alleged error was "so serious as to undermine . . . confidence in
    the . . . result reached." State v. Chew, 
    179 N.J. 186
    , 204 (2004).
    In summary, defendant did not present a prima facie case of ineffective
    assistance. The PCR judge's determination was supported by sufficient credible
    evidence and was reached after a hearing during which defendant testified. We
    see no reason to disturb the trial court's order denying defendant's PCR petition.
    Affirmed.
    A-4370-19
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-4370-19

Filed Date: 3/17/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 3/17/2022