PHILLIP A. DIXON VS. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONSÂ (NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS) ( 2017 )


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  •                           RECORD IMPOUNDED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
    Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
    parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-1491-15T3
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY IN THE
    INTEREST OF I.T., a minor.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Submitted February 14, 2017 – Decided            March 7, 2017
    Before Judges Koblitz and Rothstadt.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Chancery Division, Family Part, Bergen County,
    Docket No. FJ-02-88-15.
    Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
    for appellant (Alison Perrone, Designated
    Counsel, on the brief).
    Gurbir S. Grewal, Bergen County Prosecutor,
    attorney for respondent (Catherine A. Foddai,
    Senior Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and
    on the brief; Matthew Fitzpatrick, Assistant
    Prosecutor, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    In   this   appeal    from    an   order    adjudicating     a   juvenile
    delinquent and requiring restitution, the juvenile argues that the
    court deprived him of his right to counsel.                 We disagree and
    affirm.
    In June 2014, then thirteen-year-old I.T. was charged with
    conduct that, if he were adjudicated as an adult, would constitute
    fourth-degree theft, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3.1           I.T. appeared without
    counsel before a hearing officer who determined that the State's
    evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that I.T. committed the
    charged act.   The hearing officer recommended that I.T.'s sentence
    be postponed so he could complete a six-month period of adjustment
    (POA) and make restitution.        I.T.'s mother, who attended the
    hearing, disagreed with the recommendation and asked for review
    by the judge assigned to the matter.
    In accordance with I.T.'s mother's request, the matter was
    referred to a Family Part judge and scheduled for an informal
    hearing to be held on November 18, 2014.     I.T. was not represented
    by counsel nor did a prosecutor appear on behalf of the State.            A
    sergeant for the local police department involved with the matter
    began his presentation by stating that it was "made clear to the
    juvenile and his family that no punitive measures were being
    sought."   After the judge considered the testimony presented at
    the hearing, he found that the State proved beyond a reasonable
    doubt   that   I.T.   committed   the   charged    act,   but   postponed
    disposition to allow for a one-year POA.     The order of disposition
    1
    The facts surrounding the theft are not germane to our
    consideration of I.T.'s appeal.
    2                              A-1491-15T3
    entered by the judge required I.T. to make restitution in the
    amount of $675, find and maintain employment, and have no contact
    with his victim.      The order further stated that "compliance with
    the conditions of the [o]rder will result in the matter being
    dismissed on November 18, 2015 . . . ."
    By October 2015, I.T. had yet to make restitution.             The trial
    court re-listed the matter for November 10, 2015, before the same
    judge for a hearing.         The order scheduling the hearing advised
    that the matter was now listed on the court's "formal" calendar
    and that I.T. "must be represented by an attorney."
    I.T. appeared at the hearing with counsel.         His attorney made
    an application for a new trial at which I.T. could be represented
    by counsel.    After considering the parties' arguments, the judge
    denied I.T.'s motion, converted the POA to an adjudication without
    committing I.T. or imposing any period of supervisory probation.
    The   judge    entered   an    order       of   disposition   that    stated,
    "adjudication of delinquency based on [I.T.'s] failure to pay
    court ordered restitution" and required restitution be paid within
    thirty days or the restitution amount would be reduced to a civil
    judgment.
    This appeal followed.
    On    appeal,   I.T.    contends      that   his   "adjudication        of
    delinquency must be reversed and the matter remanded for a new
    3                               A-1491-15T3
    hearing at which [he] is represented by counsel."                    The State
    disagrees and contends that I.T. did not have a "right to the
    assistance of counsel at an informal hearing where [he did] not
    face commitment or a consequence of magnitude as a potential
    disposition."
    We conclude that the juvenile's argument in this case is
    without    sufficient    merit   to    warrant    discussion    in   a    written
    opinion.      R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).       We add only the following brief
    comments.
    A child charged with conduct, which if committed by an adult
    would be a crime, is entitled to counsel "at every critical stage
    in the proceeding which, in the opinion of the court may result
    in the institutional commitment of the juvenile."              N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-
    39(a).    See also State ex rel. P.M.P., 
    200 N.J. 166
    , 175-76 (2009)
    (citing In re Gault, 
    387 U.S. 1
    , 41, 
    87 S. Ct. 1428
    , 1451, 18 L.
    Ed. 2d 527, 554 (1967)); Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court
    Rules, comment 2.2 to R. 5:3-4 (2017) (a juvenile is entitled to
    counsel    when   he   is    facing   "the   potential   for    institutional
    commitment or other consequence of magnitude").
    Here, I.T. appeared before the hearing officer and the judge
    initially in informal proceedings where he was not facing the
    possibility of commitment or any other consequence of magnitude.
    A   hearing    officer      cannot    recommend   incarceration      or     other
    4                                 A-1491-15T3
    consequence of magnitude, see N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-74(d)(4); State ex
    rel. L.R., 
    382 N.J. Super. 605
    , 620 (App. Div. 2006), certif.
    denied, 
    189 N.J. 642
    (2007), and "[u]nder our rules the juvenile
    may not be committed if his case is on the informal calendar"
    before a judge.   State v. W., 
    115 N.J. Super. 286
    , 300 (App. Div.
    1971) (citing State v. Interest of G.J., 
    108 N.J. Super. 186
    (App.
    Div. 1969), certif. denied, 
    55 N.J. 447
    (1970)), aff'd o.b., State
    v. R.W., 
    61 N.J. 118
    (1972). "[A]bsence of counsel at the previous
    [informal] hearings [was] harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,"
    
    G.J., supra
    , 108 N.J. Super. at 188, because I.T. was required to
    pay restitution only. He did not suffer a consequence of magnitude
    based on a finding following an uncounseled informal hearing.
    Affirmed.
    5                         A-1491-15T3