IN THE MATTER OF BRIAN CLANCY, SHERIFF'S OFFICER (S9999R), BERGEN COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE (NEW JERSEY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION) ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2657-19
IN THE MATTER OF
BRIAN CLANCY, SHERIFF'S
OFFICER (S9999R), BERGEN
COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE.
___________________________
Submitted August 2, 2021 – Decided August 13, 2021
Before Judges Mawla and Rose.
On appeal from the New Jersey Civil Service
Commission, Docket No. 2019-3363.
The Law Offices of Fusco & Macaluso, PC, attorneys
for appellant Brian Clancy (Giovanna Giampa, on the
brief).
Eric M. Bernstein & Associates, LLC, attorneys for
respondent Bergen County Sheriff's Office (Eric M.
Bernstein, on the brief).
Andrew J. Bruck, Acting Attorney General, attorney for
respondent New Jersey Civil Service Commission
(Pamela N. Ullman, Deputy Attorney General, on the
statement in lieu of brief).
PER CURIAM
Brian Clancy appeals from a January 31, 2020 final decision by the Civil
Service Commission affirming his removal from the eligible list for sheriff's
officer by the Bergen County Sheriff's Office (BCSO). We affirm.
Clancy passed the civil service exam, but in October 2016, the BCSO
issued a notice removing him from the eligible list after conducting a
background investigation. Clancy appealed from the decision to the
Commission. The BCSO filed a fifteen-page memorandum detailing its reasons
for removing Clancy's name from the eligible list. The memorandum addressed
three categories of concern, namely: (1) Clancy's poor academic record, which
resulted in his being placed on academic probation and ultimately being
dismissed from college; (2) his termination from employment with the Bergen
County Police Department (BCPD) as a dispatcher, Stockton University Police
Department as a security officer, and Rutgers University Police Department as
a police officer; and (3) his poor driving record, which included multiple motor
vehicle summonses, accidents, and license suspensions.
Clancy argued as follows: (1) he withdrew from college and was not
dismissed; (2) he resigned from BCPD and was unaware of his supervisor's
request to terminate him (Clancy provided a letter from a different supervisor
asserting he was an "exemplary employee"); (3) he was terminated from
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Stockton for not passing the working test period, but had no disciplinary issues
and received no performance notices during his time there; (4) he disclosed his
termination from Rutgers, but argued he was denied due process because there
was never a disciplinary proceeding; and (5) the BCSO erred in relying on his
driving record because he had a valid license and was in good standing.
The Commission found Clancy failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence the BCSO erred. Citing N.J.A.C. 4A:4-4.7(a)(1) and N.J.A.C. 4A:4-
6.1(a)(9), the Commission noted Clancy's name could be removed from the
eligibility list "for other sufficient reasons includ[ing] . . . a consideration that
based on [his] background and recognizing the nature of the position at issue,
[he] should not be eligible for appointment." The Commission also noted the
aforementioned regulations permitted removal "from an eligible list for having
a prior employment history which relates adversely to the title." The
Commission further held it "has the authority to remove candidates from lists
for law enforcement titles based on their driving records since certain motor
vehicle infractions reflect a disregard for the law and are incompatible with the
duties of a law enforcement officer."
The Commission rejected Clancy's arguments and concluded the BCSO
did not err because Clancy's employment history and driving record showed he
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was unqualified for the sheriff's officer position. The Commission found as
follows:
[Clancy] has an adverse employment history based on
[his] resignation from the BCPD, his termination from
Stockton, and his termination from Rutgers. . . . While
[Clancy] claims that he was not aware that his former
supervisor with the BCPD requested [his] termination,
he did not have any disciplinary issues with Stockton[,]
and the allegations by Rutgers against him were either
false or exaggerated and his termination was without
due process, at minimum, [Clancy] has been unable to
maintain long-term employment with multiple law
enforcement organizations. Therefore, it was
appropriate for the appointing authority to conclude
that [Clancy's] employment background was not
suitable for a position as a [s]heriff's [o]fficer.
Additionally, [Clancy's] driving record
indicate[d] numerous motor vehicle summonses and
accidents between 1998 and May 2016, as well as his
driver's license being suspended from September 2002
to March 2003. [Clancy] argues that since his driver's
license is currently in good standing[,] his driving
record should not be used as a basis for his removal. In
this regard, [Clancy's] ability to drive a vehicle in a safe
manner is not the main issue in determining whether or
not he should remain eligible to be a [s]heriff's
[o]fficer. These motor vehicle incidents evidence
disregard for the motor vehicle laws and the exercise of
poor judgment. [Clancy] has offered no substantive
explanation for these incidents. While the Commission
is mindful of [Clancy's] recent attempts to remedy his
driving record, it is clear that [Clancy's] driving record
shows a pattern of disregard for the law and
questionable judgment on [Clancy's] part. Such
qualities are unacceptable for an individual seeking a
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position as a [s]heriff's [o]fficer, a law enforcement
employee. See Moorestown v. Armstrong, 89 N.J.
Super. 560 (App. Div. 1965), cert[if]. denied, 47 N.J.
80 (1966). See also In re Phillips, 117 N.J. 567 (1990).
The public expects [s]heriff's [o]fficers to present a
personal background that exhibits respect for the law
and rules.
The scope of appellate review of an administrative agency's final
determination is limited. In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011). "In order
to reverse an agency's judgment, an appellate court must find the agency's
decision to be 'arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or [] not supported by
substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole.'" Ibid. (alteration in
original) (quoting Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980)).
"Courts provide the widest possible interpretation of the [Civil Service]
Act as it was designed to procure efficient public service and to maintain
stability and continuity in ordinary public employment." In re Johnson, 215 N.J.
366, 377 (2013). Therefore, in undertaking our review, we ask
(1) whether the agency's action violates express or
implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency
follow the law; (2) whether the record contains
substantial evidence to support the findings on which
the agency based its action; and (3) whether in applying
the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly
erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably
have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.
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[In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482-83 (2007) (quoting
Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995)).]
Clancy reprises the arguments he raised before the Commission on this
appeal. He claims the Commission's decision was arbitrary, capricious,
unreasonable, and unsupported by the evidence. He asserts he resigned and was
not terminated from the BCPD since he was not subject to discipline. He argues
his termination from Rutgers lacked due process. He asserts his termination
from Stockton did not consider the fact he expressed remorse for his conduct
and was not criminally charged. He argues his driving record should not have
influenced the outcome because many of the infractions were not his fault and
his license is in good standing.
Clancy's arguments uniformly lack merit. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). The
Commission's final decision is supported by sufficient credible evidence on the
record as a whole and we affirm substantially for those reasons. R. 2:11-
3(e)(1)(D). We add the following comments.
The detailed memorandum issued by the BCSO refutes Clancy's
arguments relating to his employment history. As to Clancy's driving history,
the memorandum notes he pled guilty to seventeen violations between 1998 and
2012, was adjudicated guilty of three more violations, had his license suspended
on seven occasions, failed to appear in court ten times and was subject to three
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arrest warrants related to his failure to appear. On this record, we are hard
pressed to conclude the Commission's decision was anything other than
consistent with legislative policies, amply supported by the evidence, and
reasonable.
Affirmed.
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